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S U M M A R Y
This thesis considers the relationship between the novels oi Wilkie 
Collins and nineteenth-century psychological methods and ideas. It explores 
the ways in which Collins extrapolates from these theories by appropriating 
them as means both of generating suspense and resolving tension, and shows 
how an investigation of these psychological ideas elucidates his fiction.
The Introduction briefly reviews Collins's development as a sensation 
novelist in relationship to contemporary sensation fictio n. Chapter One 
outlines the wide range of psychological ideas that have a direct bearing on 
Collins's work. It considers, firstly , how the meaning both of insanity and of 
social identity was shaped by the development of the asylum system and the 
precepts of moral management -  precepts that encapsulated many of the 
aspirations of early Victorian liberalism. Secondly it considers m id- 
nineteenth-century debates on the workings of the m in d : debates about how 
to understand identity, about how to analyse the workings of the 
consciousness, and about how to interpret the significance of aberrant states 
and unconscious mental processes. Th ird ly  it summarises how conceptions of 
evolution and heredity developed in the second h a lf of the nineteenth 
century.
The analysis of the novels emphasises C ollins's development of 
narrative strategies. It explores how he both assimilates and resists 
contemporary psychological perceptions in his m anipulation of narrative 
perspective and time, and how the development of this narrative method links 
the conjuring with perception and cognition with the exploration of the 
subjective shaping of social identity. Moral management provides the 
overarching framework for Collins's stories and is usually the source of 
narrative resolution, but it is qualified and undermined. In Basil and The  
Woman in White it is a primary source of tension and suspense; in No Name it 
is both undermined and underpinned by juggling with contrasting notions of 
evolution. Armadale draws on contemporary theories o f dreams to explore 
social and psychic inheritance and transmission; The Moonstone appropriates 
contrasting theories of the unconscious in a complex cognitive  investigation. 
The final chapter briefly discusses a selection of the la te r novels, considering 
their distinctive features, and arguing that the growing dominance of theories 
of degeneration had an important bearing on Collins's method in his later 
work.
1IN T R O D U C T IO N
C O LLIN S  AS  A  S E N S A TIO N  N O V E LIST
[Miss Braddon] has been preceded in the same path by 
Mr Wilkie Collins, whose Woman in White, with its 
diaries and letters and general ponderosity, was a kind 
of nineteenth-century version of Clarissa Harlowe. 
Mind, we say a nineteenth-century version. T o  Mr 
Collins belongs the credit of having introduced into 
fiction those most mysterious of mysteries, the 
mysteries that are at our own doors. This innovation 
gave a new impetus to the literature of horrors. It 
was fatal to Mrs Radcliffe and her everlasting castle 
in the Appenines. What are the Appenines to us, or we 
to the Appenines? Instead of the terrors of Udolpho, 
we were treated to the terrors of the cheerful country 
house or the busy London lodgings. And there is no 
doubt that these were infinitely the more terrible.
Henry James, Review of Aurora Floyd *
In January 1889 J .A . Noble, reviewing Collins's final completed novel, 
The Legacy of Cain  in The Spectator, noted that it 'is by no means one of Mr 
Wilkie Collins's best novels; but it reminds us of one of his best novels, for in 
one aspect its intellectual scheme is very similar to the intellectual scheme 
of Armadale'. 'Apart from their interest as mere stories', he continued, 'both 
books read like implicit protests against the fatalism which is more or less 
bound up with any full acceptance of the modern doctrine of heredity'. But 
suddenly his certainty about how to read the novel seems to w aver: Th e re  is, 
however, a possibility that our interpretation may be mistaken, and that the 
doctrine in question is not really discredited by the story . . .  Perhaps, 
however', he goes on, sinking back into the assurance of established cultural 
categories, 'we are considering too curiously, and breaking an intellectual 
butterfly on a critical wheel. Mr Wilkie Collins may occasionally have a 
theory to illustrate, but he always has a story to te ll, and the story is more 
important both to him and his readers than the theory'.2
2This study considers the connections between stories and theories in 
Collins's fiction. It investigates the ways in which his narratives negotiate 
and manipulate a complex set of contemporary psychological and social 
assumptions, perceptions and models, in forms that involve both assimilation 
of and resistance to them. Collins was a popular and highly professional 
w riter who aimed to produce exciting, compulsively readable stories for a 
mass, though predominantly middle-class, 'middle-brow', readership. His first 
full-length novel, Antonina, or Th e  Fall of Rome was published in 1850; his 
final one, Blind Love, completed by Walter Besant, in 1890. He was thus 
writing throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, at a time in 
which the boundaries between 'popular' and 'serious' fiction were hardening; 
and he was, in a real sense, a product of those boundaries. But his fiction and 
his own shifting cultural position as a popular w riter also illustrate how 
unhelpful those cultural divisions and the interpretative frameworks that they 
support can be.
Collins is no longer seen as a shady minor figure whose main claim to 
fame is proximity to Dickens.3 As both an early 'originator' of the English 
detective novel and as a m id-nineteenth-century sensation novelist his work 
has attracted increasing critical attention in the context of a growing 
interest in the development and significance of popular narrative forms. 
Kathleen Tillotson's essay 'The Lighter Reading of the 1860s' and Winifred 
Hughes's The Maniac in the C ella r each discussoCollins's fiction as part of 
rtS • consideration of the sensation novel, while Sue Lonoff's study of reader 
relations, Wilkie Collins and His Victorian Readers, provides an analysis of his 
position in the context of the development of the nineteenth-century novel 
and its readership.^ Lonoff investigates the elements at work in Collins's 
cultural and biographical circumstances, analyses the ways in which he 
developed fictional strategies that could both please and shock his readers,
3and discusses Collins's relationship to the c ritic a l establishment. Collins's 
reputation has benefitted, too, from developments in literary theory and 
narrative analysis, but while his plots have been interpreted in interesting and 
important ways, there has been no full-length study of their relationship to 
their intellectual culture.^
Here I shall bring together historical and narrative analysis to argue 
that Collins's novels offer explorations of identity and perception that are 
most complex at their most pleasurable, and to investigate how his stories 
generate mystery, ambiguity and suspense out of tensions that can be 
transposed into sources of narrative resolution. I shall analyse how they do 
this by interweaving and unpicking a wide range of nineteenth-century 
psychological theories and methods,Ahow they draw on these theories as 
narratives themselves and transform them into fictional strategies within an 
intellectual culture in which literature, psychology and social theory were not 
perceived as completely discrete disciplines. But Collins's novels were 
written first and foremost as sensation novels and the meaning of this term, 
its cultural position and Collins's early development as a novelist, need first 
to be briefly considered.
Collins was a radical professional w riter who moved between cultural 
worlds, often operating at their boundaries. T h i  s began with his immediate 
family and friendships. Both his family and his Christian names were derived 
from established but patronage-dependent domestic landscape painters -  Sir 
David Wilkie and William Collins -  and Collins's own first published book was 
his father's biography.^ But his contemporaries were the marginal and 
oppositional artistic group, the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, and it was partly 
through this association that he became connected with the bohemian
*metropolitan culture of the 1850s/ He met Dickens when Augustus Egg 
arranged for him to take part in an amateur dramatic production, and his 
brother Charles (who married Dickens's daughter Kate), was a close 
associate, though never actually a member of the Brotherhood. The Group 
sometimes met at the Collins's household, and Collins himself was friendly 
w ith Millais, Holman Hunt, Egg and Rossetti, as well as being sympathetic to 
the aims of the movement.8 He was also connected with The Leader in the 
early 1850s, the radical weekly founded by Thornton Hunt and George Henry 
Lewes, and contributed to its running when his friend Edward Pigott bought a 
9
controlling interest in the journal. Thus, from the early 1850s, he moved 
between overlapping intellectual circles.
Collins abandoned an early legal training, and by the mid-1850s had 
begun to establish himself as a promising young novelist who was able to 
appropriate and adapt a range of methods and genres. The biography of his 
father, together with Antonina, O r The Fall of Rome, a historical novel in the 
manner of Bulw er-Lytton that followed it, had been respectfully received, 
and it was from this position that he wrote the audacious study of 
transgression and breakdown, Basil, A  Story of Modern Life . Both with this 
novel and the short stories published in various journals during the 1850s, 
Collins was again drawing on fictional techniques that had already been 
established, notably the quasi-supernatural tale of terror, which he adapted in 
the context of mid-nineteenth-century social anxieties, while retaining many 
of its salient elements. This was a mode of fantastic writing which followed 
and borrowed from late-eighteenth-century Gothic romance, but which was 
distinguished from this tradition in certain key respects. Like Gothic writing, 
it involved intense situations and extreme emotions, subverting the sense of a 
stable objective world, but it did so not through establishing a clear break 
w ith the real through exotic or extraordinary physical settings, but by
5focussing more specifically on the immediate physical sensations and 
distorted sense perceptions o f the central narrative consciousness.1® This 
mode of w riting was written and read in a culture which had assimilated 
many of the materialist presuppositions of late eighteenth century 
sensationist psychology.
In Basil Collins elaborated many of these methods and extended their 
use of physiological referents to  explore how social relations were mediated 
through forms of consciousness and methods of perception by developing the 
confessional form and the fram ing conventions of William Godwin's Caleb 
Williams (179<>) and Mary Shelley's Frankenstein (1818), both radical stories of 
pursuit and retribution, social definitions and forms of power. The magazine 
short stories of the 1850s took up many of the narrative techniques that had 
been developed in the 'Tales' promoted by Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine 
from the 1820s, stories whose tensions were also based prim arily in the 
physiological sensation, and whose methods were most clearly elaborated in 
the context of contemporary psychological theory by Edgar Allen Poe.11 The 
close correspondence between Collins's and Poe's techniques was noted, for 
example by George Eliot, w ho emphasised in a review of A fte r Dark, a 
collection of stories framed and published in book form  in 1856: 'The main 
interest lies in the excitement either of curiosity or of terror; their great 
merit consists either in the effective presentation of a m ystery, or the 
effective working up of startling situations ... In these excessively knowing 
days a m ystery has become sim ply a problem ... instead of turning pale at a 
ghost we knit our brows and construct hypotheses to account for it .  Edgar 
Poe's tales were an effort of genius to reconcile the tw o  tendencies -  to appal 
the imagination yet satisfy the intellect, and M r Wilkie Collins in this respect 
often follows in Poe's tracks.'12
6But Collins wrote The Woman in White, a novel whose tension hinged on 
the distortion of the consciousness of interwoven narrators, on the doubling 
and substitution of identity, and crucially, on th e  problematic confinement of 
tw o women in a lunatic asylum, in the im m ediate journalistic context of 
Household Words and A ll The Year Round. 13 Household Words was Dickens's 
journal. It was the vehicle through which he a im ed to address his public as a 
fam ily audience -  'We aspire to live in the Household affections and be 
numbered among the Household thoughts of our readers' -  and which brought 
together distinct kinds of family readers. ^  Th e se  included the established 
middle-class readers of the growing number o f publishing-house journals 
(Bentley's Miscellany, Fraser's Magazine, The C o m h ill ,  Macmillan's Magazine) 
on the one hand and the lower-middle-class audience of weekly publications 
such as The Fam ily Friend, Chambers' Jo u rna l, Reynold*1 News on the 
o th er.4 * It was thus a weekly journal aiming to m ediate and expand a diverse 
and fluid readership -  'to bring the greater and the lesser in degree together 
.. .  and to mutually dispose them to a better acquaintance and a kinder 
understanding -  is one main object of our Household Words'.16 And as such it 
was caught up in the revolution in middle-range publishing in the late 1850s 
which came to a head when Dickens broke w ith  the journal's publishers 
Bradbury and Evans, and launched his own A l l  the  Year Round in direct 
competition with their Once a Week.
Collins played a crucial role in this venture, and The Woman in White 
was both its product and a chief cause of its  success. Dickens's crucial 
gam bit was to make the long serial a front-page feature of the new journal, 
and he took a certain gamble in asking the re la tive  newcomer Collins to 
immediately follow A  Tale  of Tw o  Cities, with w h ich  A ll the Year Round was 
promoted, with The Woman in White. The risk was met with astounding 
success -  the serial sales of the journal came to o v e r 100,000; no better than
7£eynai4sJ regular achievement, but a breakthrough in middle-range 
publishing. The success was compounded by the publication of the first 
edition of the novel, which thus became an immediate best seller: all 1,000 
copies of the first edition were sold on the day of publication, and seven 
subsequent editions were produced within six months.*7
Almost as soon as it was published The Woman in White was taken up as 
a typical yet superior specimen of the sensation novel; a 'phenomenon' 
debated, satirised, parodied, and felt to have widespread cultural significance 
and effect in the 1860s. As a literary tendency it was a fluid category, in and 
out of which writers as different as Dickens and Rhoda Broughton m ight 
slide; but Collins, Charles Reade, Mary Braddon and Mrs Henry Wood w ere 
often taken to be its chief representatives. Margaret Oliphant opened her 
discussion of three 'sensation novels' -  The Woman in White, G re a t 
Expectations and East Lynne -  in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine in 1862 by 
arguing that the form was both product and expression of a cu lture  
encountering not only the shocks of modern urban life and the lim its of 
expansionist optimism ten years after the Great Exhibition, but also the 
'ennui' that was its concom itant: 'We who once did, and made, and declared 
ourselves masters of a ll things, have relapsed into the natural size o f 
humanity before the events that have given a new character to the age', she 
wrote. I t  is a changed world in which we are standing .. .  It is only natural 
that art and literature should, in an age which has turned out to be one o f 
events, attempt a kindred depth of effect and shock of incident.'** English 
sensation fiction was sim ilar to Hawthorne's writing -  'that strange hybrid 
between French excitement and New England homeliness', she went on, in 
which 'we recognise the influence of a social system that has paralysed a ll 
the wholesome wonders and nobler mysteries of human existence'.*9 'N o t a 
New Sensation' in A ll the Y e a r Round pointed out that there was nothing new
8about intensely exciting stories in themselves, and fears of cultural crisis as a 
response to new methods of production had been voiced before the 1860s. 
But it was precisely the ways in which 'sensation' fictio n  collapsed different 
meanings of the term  into each other, and the process by which this 
conflation compounded the links between the form 's conventions, its 
readership and its method of production, that contributed to the physiological 
metaphors through which it was understood as a cu ltu ra l form. For it was 
described, overwhelmingly, as 'a diseased and m orbid  appetite, something 
novel, and significant of degeneration'.2®
The sensation novel was not so much a coherent genre in itself as a 
disturbing combination of genres held together by cu ltu ra l anxieties as well 
as shared devices and motifs.21 Their most frequently emphasised feature 
was the way that they 'domesticated' Gothic conventions by transposing them 
to a familiar, every-day setting; and although, as I have suggested, this 
device did not originate with Collins, it was now being developed in new 
contexts and newly-disturbing ways, often by w om en novelists, most 
notably Mary Braddon, who were seen as occupying a comparable cultural 
space to earlier female Gothic w riters, and appealing to  a female readership 
that was seen as newly vulnerable. Th e  sensation novel thus combined quasi- 
supernatural terror with high melodrama, domestic realism and *Newgate' 
novels -  stories of urban crim e and low life based on popular journalism and 
police reports. More im portantly, they were set not sim ply in the modern and 
familiar world, but specifically in the middle- or upper-m iddle-class family, 
exploiting its tensions by bringing into play the possibilities offered by its 
central narrative features -  secrecy and disguise.
The Spectator described sensation novels as 'a host of clearly 
complicated stories, the whole interest of which consists in the gradual 
unravelling of some carefully prepared enigma', and what was particularly
9exciting was that the pleasure of that unravelling often involved revealing a 
secret identity which in turn disclosed another set of questions concerning 
the transgressor's position within the fam ily.22 Lady Audley's ostensible 
secret -  that she is a bigamist -  both conceals and reveals a further one -  that 
she is mad. As in melodrama, the tension hinges on things not being what 
they seem; but in sensation fiction identity is not only dissembled through a 
masquerade -  people assume false selves in order to steal a place and a 
property, or to retrieve a place that they had lost: the fallen, outcast 
heroine of East Lynne, her face rendered unrecognisable by a railway 
accident, steals back to her lost home, disguising herself as the governess of 
her own children. In sensation fiction masks, too, are rarely stripped off to 
reveal a true self, for the mask both is the transformed expression of the 
hidden self and discloses its contradictions, and in the process identity itself 
emerges as something actively constructed within a dominant framework of 
social interests, perceptions and values. They thus focussed on the ambiguity 
of both social and psychological codes to insinuate that seeming, too, is not 
always what is seems to be.
The intensity of sensation fiction was both directly physiological and 
emotional, since the sensation author, unlike the painter, remarked Margaret 
Oliphant, 'must take the passions and emotions of life to make its effects 
w ithal'.23 The Woman In White was the exception which proved the rule, she 
suggested, since Collins 'ignored all these arbitrary sensations but in 
general the form was felt to represent a very different 'nervous' response 
from the sensibility associated with late eighteenth century Gothic fantasy, 
in which the nerves mediated physical, moral and emotional response; now 
feelings were rooted in physical response in a way that short-circuited 
m orality.24* T h e  Progress of F iction as an A rt ', which discussed the long­
term  evolution of narrative forms in The Westminster Review in 1833, and
10
which included Collins's Basil in an analysis which ranged from Greek epic to 
Charles Kingsley, had argued that fictional forms became more complex in as 
much as they corresponded w ith the increasingly complex conceptual models 
of their culture, but went on to maintain that this also involved increasing 
differentiation between forms. Sensation fiction was thus a degenerate, 
naturalistic form of Gothic romance, through the ways in which, as a mode of 
romance, it both broke and corresponded with its contemporary 'scientific' 
secular culture: I t  was the fashion then to construct a story out of strange 
and unnatural circumstances, it  is the fashion now to elaborate it out of 
morbid feelings and overwrought sensibilities', and this compounded the way 
it was perceived as a lower type of modern fiction.25 Focussing on feelings,
the 'nerves', became seen as increasingly morbid in itself: 'The faults of the 
French school are creeping into our literature, and threaten to flourish there',
maintained Fraser's Magazine. 'The  morbid analysation of feelings, which we 
have already reprobated, bids fair to be succeeded by an equally morbid 
analysation of mere sensation.'^6 This assessment was most polemically laid 
down in Henry Mansel's'polemical' article , *Sensation Novels', in The Quarterly
Review:
A  class of literature has grown up around us, usurping 
in many respects, intentionally or unintentionally, a 
portion of the preacher's office, playing no 
inconsiderable part in moulding the minds and forming 
the tastes and habits of its generation; and doing so 
principally, we had almost said exclusively, by 
'preaching to the nerves' ... Excitement, and 
excitement alone, seems to be the great end to which 
they aim ... And as excitement, even when harmless 
in kind, cannot be continually reproduced without 
becoming morbid in degree, works of this class 
manifest themselves as belonging, some more, some 
less, but all to some extent, to the morbid phenomena 
of literature -  indications of a widespread corruption, 
of which they are in part both the effect and the 
cause; called into existence to supply the cravings of a 
diseased appetite, and contributing themselves to 
foster the disease, and to stimulate the want that they 
supply.27
11
The sensation novel thus played an important role in consolidating 
cultural boundaries in the mid nineteenth century.2® With exceptions, 
responses to  it , from both conservative and progressive critica l quarters, 
often formed a chain of associations linking its specific conventions, its 
effect on the reader, its method of production, and back again to narrative 
technique, a ll of which implied that it represented a nervous disorder 
generated by the tensions of modern life, while also being a sign of modern 
moral atrophy, and an infection from 'outside'. Both the pace and the 
complexity of the narratives themselves were a key link in this chain of 
associations. 'The violent stimulant of serial publication -  of weekly 
publication, with its necessity for frequent and rapid recurrence of piquant 
situation and startling situation -  is the thing above all others most likely to 
develop the germ and bring it to fuller and darker being', commented 
Margaret Oliphant, on the development of a tendency which she feared would
29spring from imitators of The Woman in White.
Arm adale, on the other hand, was repeatedly attacked on account of 
the labyrinthine weavings of its obsessional plot, which caused it to be seen 
as a particularly virulent strain of the sensation virus. 'Now we have a 
sensational mania ... From  an epidemic, therefore, it has lately changed into 
an endemic. Its virus is spreading in all directions, from the penny journal to 
the shilling magazine, and from the shilling magazine to the th irty  shillings 
volume', commented The Westminster Review, discussing Arm adale, and went 
on to suggest that there was something unhealthy about Collins's very skill in 
constructing such plots which, displaying their own devices, both became a 
kind of morbid anatomy and turned characters into puppets o f the plot itself: 
T o  admire the plot and forget the character is like admiring the frame
instead of enjoying the picture ... The sight of having our dinners cooked 
30takes away our appetite.' This was a view  that was challenged by E.S.
12
Dallas in his wide-ranging treatise on aesthetic theory, The G ay Science 
(1866), which maintained that aesthetic pleasure recognised no division 
between high and popular forms, and which forcefully argued against hiving 
off either a mainstream or avant-garde high cultural tradition.31 Dallas 
insisted in the context of this contention that 'plot-dominated' novels were as 
conceptually complex as those creating the illusion of autonomous character, 
and it was the cultural position of popular narrative forms that determined 
the way that they were read: 'the difference between the two lies solely in 
the relation of the character portrayed to the actions described'.32
Dallas pointed out, moreover, that while 'plotting novels' 'represent 
circumstance and incident as all im portant, and characters amid the current 
of events as corks upon the waves, they generally introduce one character 
who, in violent contrast to all the others, is superior to the plot, plans the 
events, guides the storm ... He predominates over the plot, and the plot 
predominates over all else'.33 And it was this plotting of magnetic criminals 
within the novels that linked aesthetic and moral responses to sensation 
fiction. Sensation novels were often concerned with exploring the psychology 
of transgression and the social perception and definition of deviance, as well 
as invoking villainy; the portrayal of Lydia  G w ilt in Armadale, for example, 
pushes the portrayal of the subjective perspective of a wicked woman to its 
lim its. But the form's fascination w ith  deviance, and particularly bigamy, 
overruled the transgressor's penitence, as well as villainy's final retribution. 
'Nothing can be more wrong and fatal than to represent the flames o f vice as
a purifying fiery ordeal, through which the penitent is to come elevated and 
34
sublimed', maintained Oliphant. Its other common narrative feature 
though, madness, raised a more complex set of moral and aesthetic questions, 
since while also 'morbid' it was recognised as both a naturalistic and a 
fantastic device. 'Madness in Novels', which discussed Mary Braddon's Lady
13
Audley's S ecret, Mrs Henry Wood 's St Martins Eve and the anonymous The 
Clyffords o f C ly ffe  in The Spectator in 1866, illustrated the ways that 
madness could be used as a fictional strategy that collapsed different 
conventions and cognitive processes into each other -  that it simultaneously 
operated as a fantastic suspension of the real, and as a naturalised 
legitimation of the 'supernatural', giving an external form to intense 
emotions: T h e  nineteenth century believes in love and jealousy, and in a 
feeble way even in hate, but it is aware, nevertheless, that the mental 
concentrativeness out of which these passions spring is in this age rare', it 
opens and goes on:
O ne does not tumble down wells, but in the murder one 
m ig h t, if only it is artistically told, recognise the 
undeveloped wild beast in one's own heart. Miss 
Braddon perceived this, and it is to her credit that she 
discerned a mode of restoring the lost sensational 
e ffe c t to character. Madness may intensify any 
q ua lity , courage, or hate, or jealousy, or wickedness, 
and she made Lady Audley mad. Thenceforward she 
was released from the irksome regime of the probable 
.. .  Probability becomes unnecessary, vraisemblance a 
burden, naturalness a mistake in a rt, everything was 
possible, and the less possible the emotion, the greater 
the surprise and pleasure.
It was a great discovery, and novelists have not been 
slow to seize it. Here is Mrs H  Wood in want of a 
strongly sensational machinery. She wants to paint 
jealousy in its extreme form, and she has not of 
course the power to create Othello, or a rt to paint, as 
Thackeray and Trollope might have done, the morbid 
passion in its naturalistic nineteenth century dress ...
B u t Mrs Wood, being familiar with medical lore, can 
make a mad woman do anything.^*
Madness had not one function in sensation fiction, but several, the piece went 
on to argue. W ith Braddon it was a way of expressing suppressed tendencies, 
for Mrs Henry Wood, a means of blurring the boundaries of the natural: 'We 
say it is natural, but in all events the unnaturalness disappears, fo r no-one 
except Mr Forbes Winslow knows what is natural in a patient with 
intermittent lunacy.' In The Clyffords of C ly ffe  madness transposes the
novel into the realm of the marvellous since here, 'Every one is either mad, 
or fears he may be mad ... and of course everything is possible'. The piece 
concludes by arguing for the validity of sensation novels as modern forms of 
supernatural romance: 'We do not deny that there is a rt in depicting the 
unnatural, an art shown in conceptions lik e  Fuseli, an art which rivets the 
spectator, not in what it sees, but in the thought of what it would see were 
all the conditions of art reversed.'^
Collins's use of psychological conventions and notions of madness 
emerged in this complicated cultural setting. Th e  Woman in White appeared 
alongside Lady Audley*s Secret (1862), M artin's Eve  (1866) and Reade's Hard 
Cash (1863), novels which illustrate the diverse uses of madness as a 
sensation convention, as I shall briefly outline. Lady Audley's Secret in 
particular took up and inverted some of th e  patterns of Th e  Woman In White 
in the figure of its heroine, Lucy Graham , the bewitching young governess 
with golden curls and a secret past, w ho gains wealth and power by 
substituting a dead woman for herself; takes on a new identity by marrying 
the ageing Lord Audley; attempts to dispose of her former husband by pushing 
him down a well and of other adversaries by burning a village inn. In The 
Woman in White Laura's colourlessness allow s her identity to be obliterated 
once its social signs have been removed; Helen Talboys, the penniless 
deserted wife, turns herself into Lucy G ra h a m , a governess with an empty 
past, and gambles on the expectations created by her appearance to become 
Lady Audley. Both writers are questioning the blonde child-w ife  stereotype, 
and exploring the relationship between the  construction of femininity and 
insanity, but in very different ways. In T h e  Woman In White derangement is 
the product of the way that Laura is manipulated as a result of her situation; 
in Lady A  ud ley's Secret Lucy's 'latent insanity' is the only possible 
explanation of her behaviour -  she is bad because she is mad -  and is also the
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means by which her pathologisation grows out of her position as object of 
contemplation.
Both novels revolve round the problems of perception and 
interpretation. Each uses insanity as a key narrative device, as a way of 
setting up modes of perception and undercutting them. In each, this 
uncertainty affects not only how the victim  or villainess might be seen, but 
also how the detective consciousness interprets evidence -  both the central 
subjects fear at some stage that their own minds might be unbalanced. In 
each, too, the amateur detective's ability to interpret reality and to act on 
that interpretation is bound up with their increasing sexual and social control 
and their ability to overcome the stagnant quasi-feudal order which they 
replace. One difference, however, is that in Th e  Woman In W hite the process 
of writing and reconstructing evidence is made a central part o f the process 
of investigation, while in Lady Audley's Secret the story is to ld  through an 
omniscient narrative, whose focus progressively shifts from L u c y  to Robert 
Audley, her nephew by marriage and self-appointed private investigator. As 
she becomes the central object of disclosure he becomes the centra l subject, 
and the novel is so structured that discovering her secret becomes his passage 
out of aristocratic ennui and into a purposeful middle-class profession. 
Within this overall framework, however, a double process is at work that in 
some respects forms an impossible figure. In becoming a detective , Robert 
Audley not only reconstructs Lucy Graham's identity, but engages w ith her in 
a battle over who defines sanity. Lucy's claim to her place, an act of 
defiance and aggression, is to attempt to label Robert Audley mad, and to 
have him incarcerated. Thus the final resolution of the novel -  the 
establishment of hereditary insanity in Lucy and her comm ittal to  an asylum 
-  by which Robert Audley establishes his identity, Is a re -enactm ent, in 
another key, of the plot by which Lucy Graham attempted to secure her own.
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The lack of any stable reference points for defining insanity can work in
opposing ways in Lady Audley*s Secret. Lucy's insanity is both an extension
of and a departure from her ability to confound any distinction between
appearance and reality. Robert Audley's role as detective is to create an
alternative story of her past and her identity out of a tissue of unsubstantial
clues of circumstantial evidence. O f course Lady Audley's guilt is hinted
from the start, not least by the title of the novel; the suspense hinges on how
the alternative story of the past might be anchored in the present through the
detective-work. And just as Lucy's cunning is displayed by her skill in
manipulating her own appearance, so the shifting signs of her identity first
appear in her representation -  her portrait. The first clue to Lady Audley's
secret emerges through a particular artistic style, the obsessional, even
fetishistic perspective of the Pre-Raphaelite painting of her: 'No one but a
Pre-Raphaelite would have so exaggerated every attribute of that delicate
face as to give a lurid lightness to the blonde complexion, and a strange,
sinister light to the deep-blue e ye s.'^  Appearances are deceitful not only
because what seems to be true is false, but because what seems to be false, a
distortion, is true. The means of seeing the painting suggests a complicated
truth -  transformation, distortion and revelation -  where no line between
object and perceiver can be drawn:
It  was so like and yet so unlike; it was as if you had 
burned strange-coloured fires before my lady's face, 
and by their influence brought out new lines and new 
expressions never seen in it before. The perfection of 
feature, the brilliancy of colouring were there; but I 
suppose the painter had copied quaint medieval 
monstrosities until his brain had grown bewildered, for 
my lady, in his portrait of her, had something of the 
aspect of a beautiful fiend.38
And Robert Audley himself can only build up a chain of circumstantial 
evidence by actively projecting meaning into facts and events, in ways that
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throw his own sanity open to question. 'Why was it I saw some strange
mystery in my friend's disappearance?' he asks himself:
Was it a monition or a monomania? What if I am 
wrong after all? What if this chain of evidence that I 
have constructed link by link, is woven out of my own 
folly? What if this edifice of horror and suspicion is a 
mere collection of crotchets -  the nervous fancies of a 
hypochondriacal bajchelor? Mr Harcourt Talboys sees 
no meaning in the events out of which I have created a 
horrible mystery. I lay the separate links of the chain 
before him , and he cannot recognise their fitness. He 
is unable to fit them together. Oh my God, if it should 
be in myself all this time that the misery lies!39
And although this vacillation is finally overcome by his reaffirmation of the
objective reality of contingent facts, this can only happen through exploring
different modes of perception. The truth, when it is discovered, affirm s the
deceptiveness of the 'orderly outward world'. The novel finally, in
incarcerating Lucy, represses its own secret, but in working towards this
resolution, and in restoring the social order, the narrative covertly
acknowledges that process of repression by centring it on Robert.
Who has not felt, in the first madness of sorrow, an 
unreasoning rage against the mute propriety of chairs 
and tables, the stiff squareness of Turkey carpets, the 
unbending obstinacy of the outward apparatus of 
existence? We want to root up gigantic trees in a 
primeval forest, and to tear their huge branches 
asunder in our convulsive grasp; and the utmost we can 
do for the relief of our passion is to knock over an 
easy chair, or smash a few shillings worth of Mr 
Copeland's manufacture.
Madhouses are large, and only too numerous; yet 
surely it is strange they are not larger, when we think 
of how many hopeless wretches must beat their brains 
against this hopeless persistency of the orderly 
outward world, as compared to the storm and tempest, 
the riot and confusion within: -  when we think of how 
many minds must tremble on the narrow boundary 
between reason and unreason, mad today and sane 
tomorrow, mad yesterday and sane to d a y .^
In Mrs Henry Wood's St Martin’s Eve on the other hand, madness is used 
as a device to explain and make possible violent female behaviour, but this
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grows out of already existing tensions and jealousies within the family. 
Charlotte Norris, the ignorant inheritor of her father's 'taint', becomes the 
second wife to the wealthy George St John and step-mother to his heir; both 
she and their own second son lead a marginalised existence within the family 
home and a displaced relation to the patrilineal line which is compounded by 
the husband's premature death. Thus ironically, Charlotte's own 'inheritance' 
from her father becomes a threat to the pattern of inheritance from which 
she and her son are both excluded. Her madness, like Lady Audley's, takes 
the form of temporary seizure and is hidden beneath a bland exterior; as with 
Lady Audley's secret it is simultaneously a force transmitted from outside 
and an expression of her 'own' nature. Yet the emphasis has shifted in St 
Martin's Eve -  Charlotte's jealousy and acquisitiveness is on behalf of her son, 
and is portrayed as excess of maternal solicitude, whereas Lucy abandoned 
her son to seek her own advancement In a fit of puerperal insanity. 
Charlotte's incipient insanity is constantly half suggested, half kept 
concealed from the reader, and is presented contradictorily; one moment as 
an underlying evil nature, the next as a propensity which she gradually comes 
to recognise and struggle against: 'She deliberately intended to do right: but 
passion and prejudices are strong; unusually strong they were in her, and her 
mind was ill-regulated.'4 1 She is described as 'striving against her evil spirit', 
and at the same time as being driven mad by remorse for the murder of her 
step-son.
When a w riter of sensation romances makes a heroine 
push a superfluous husband down a well . . .  we smile 
over the highly seasoned dish, but we do not think of 
applying the warning to ourselves and for the future 
avoid sitting on the edge of a draw -w ell. But when we 
read as in the novel Very Hard Cash ... that any man 
may, at a moment, be consigned to a fate which to a 
sane man is worse than death, and that not by a single 
act of any of our Lady Audley's ... but as part of a 
regular organised system, with all the compliance of 
the laws of the land -  when we read this, a thrill of 
terror goes through the public mind. If what Mr 
Charles Reade says Is possible, who is safe?*2
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Thus J.S . Bushman, a physician at Laverstock House Asylum responded in a 
letter to The Daily News to the serialisation of Reade's novel -its  title later 
amended to Hard Cash -  in A ll the Year Round. As it suggests, the 'thrill of 
terror' of the novel was derived not from the image of madness but from the 
image of the madhouse, and the stresses it places on the sanity of the 
sensitive but sane individual; the 'dark place' where everything was possible, 
receptacles not simply of madness, but conspiracy and crim e. But the letter 
emphasises that the novel was also taken seriously as an exposure of real 
conditions in asylums, and was used by Reade to advance the campaign for 
their reforms 1 ... desire it to be known that this great question did not begin 
with me in the pages of this novel, neither shall it end there.'**3
Like The Woman In White, Hard Cash uses wrongful confinement in a 
private asylum for financial gain, and its sensation in part depends on 
connecting the fears that were associated with the image of the eighteenth- 
century madhouse with the particular debates on madness and confinement of 
the late 1850s and early 1860s. The hero, Alfred Hardie, a brilliant Oxford 
scholar, is duped and imprisoned in an asylum by his scheming father for his 
knowledge of his father's fraudulence; and here the definition of madness is 
explicitly seen as a form of social control. Hard Cash enacts a family drama 
of rivalry and retribution between father and son, by consigning the hero not 
simply to an unspeakable 'other' place, but to a place where social identity 
itself is obliterated with the collusion of the most progressive branches of the 
medical profession. Y e t finally the hero reasserts his sanity by his resolute 
bearing as a gentleman. Th e  tension of the novel depends on contrasting his 
fundamental sanity and coherent, male, upper-middle-class identity, with 
modern psychological medicine. This interprets a ll symptoms as potentially 
morbid, and is embodied in the figure of the asylum proprietor -  the
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sinister and slippery Dr Wycherley. Thus all three novels imply different 
conceptions of madness and put the device to distinct kinds of use. But they 
each depend on asserting, ambivalently, that madness represents absolute 
difference -  the 'wild beast in one's own heart' -  and that the boundaries of 
insanity are always problematic.
Collins's fiction was written within this literary context, but his writing 
raises a more complex set of questions. Like Lady AudleyS  Secret, his novels 
are clearly examples of what Tzvetan Todorov identified as the fantastic 
mode. They occupy that borderland state between the mimetic and the 
marvcQous, the literal and the metaphorical, in which the boundaries of the 
real are forever breaking down and, as was noted in the mid nineteenth
century, they articulate their contemporary culture's ambivalence towards
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the nature of knowledge and identity itself. Collins's novels continually 
produce a sense of the uncanny; perspectives suddenly become provisional and 
the familiar world strange through the development of recognisable and 
repeated motifs. There is the recurrent emergence of the 'other' figure, and 
of split and double selves, ambiguous figures who both threaten and 
transgress the boundaries of the 'orderly outward w orld' bringing with them 
echoes of the supernatural; figures who are perceived as anomalous, deviant 
or insane, and who continually come back in a way that threatens the 
boundaries that were founded on their exclusion. And as such they feed that 
sense of the uncanny -  the weird, the hidden, the inexplicable -  that Freud 
described in his essay on the phenomenon as expressing all that which is most 
familiar, coming back transformed into the sinister, by the process of 
repression.4,5 They do this moreover by extending the uncertainty to the 
consciousness of the perceiver whose sense of a stable reality is thus also 
undermined and who might be pushed into a state o f uncertainty, breakdown
21
or an alternative 'visionary' consciousness by the experience.. And this 
process is often recounted, too, through a shifting narrative perspective; 
there is usually a tacit struggle over narrative authority, and over who 
defines truth  and reality going on in Collins's novels.
In these respects Collins's novels are certainly fantastic texts and it is 
tempting to apply that analysis of fantasy that sees it as an inherently 
subversive mode to his work. But the methods by which these breaks with the 
'real' are achieved means that his novels also raise questions, not simply of 
how to analyse the development of those conventions historically, but also of 
how to think about the historical formation of those psychic processes that 
they explore. Rosemary Jackson, for example, lucidly puts forward a 
'subversive' reading of fantasy in Fantasy: A  Literature of Subversion; and 
following Foucault's analysis of the changing cultural meaning of madness in 
Madness and Civilization, argues that fantastic writing as it developed in the 
nineteenth century operates as the expression of those unassimilable 
elements of the individual and collective psyche repressed by a secular 
culture and a dominant realist tradition.*6 In this reading, fantastic motifs, 
particularly images of madness as representing 'otherness', always exist in 
some relation to the real, yet remain the 'w ild  card' which it cannot contain, 
in a way that im plicitly resorts to privileging madness, making it the bearer 
of an alternative truth, while also depending on a notion of a stable mimetic 
realism and a closed scientific system that has to be asserted in order to be 
subverted. But in Collins's novels fantastic devices work by drawing on the 
models o f  their culture in an explicitly m im etic way, and this breaks down 
the boundaries of the real still further, w hile  remaining in a 'real' relation to 
their external referents. And this contradictory relation transforms the 
significance of these figures of 'otherness', for it is their homeliness that is
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most weird, and their weirdness is invoked by appropriating contemporary 
images of madness.
Collins's novels, moreover, are  concerned with creating and resolving 
mysteries, with tracking down both criminals and hidden traces o f the past, 
reaching an interpretation of a range of shifting and contradictory evidence 
by following clues in both senses of the word: sign, and thread weaving 
through a labyrinth. They appropriate a wide range of fictional conventions 
to which no single generic category can be applied, but T .S . Eliot's dictum  -  
that The Moonstone is 'the first and greatest of English detective novels' -  is 
usually taken as a starting point, installing Collins as the 'father' of the 
English branch in genealogical histories of the fo rm .4*7 Detective novels are, 
in a sense, paradigms of the mechanisms of all narratives -  initial m ystery, 
retardation, reconstruction and recognition, engaging the willing 
participation of the reader. They provide the means of confronting social and 
psychic tensions; exploring the disruption of order in enclosed communities 
where anything is potentially significant and everyone is potentially guilty, 
and of restoring both social equilibrium  and a coherent fram ework of 
perception, through an analysis which reconstructs the past through 
interpreting the everyday clues of the present, re-establishing the order that 
was initially questioned.4*8 D etective fictions, too, lend themselves to 
psychoanalytic readings, and as explorations of latent meaning through 
manifest empirical signs they have been interpreted as analogues both of the 
psychoanalytic process and of the construction of scientific knowledge.4*9 
Psychoanalytic readings have been applied to Th e  Moonstone to analyse it as 
a novel which symbolically manifests the transformations at work in the 
process of repression, beginning  .--------- — 1 ~ -------- ------------------ ----------
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with Charles Rycroft's reading of the novel as symbolic re-enactm ent of the 
primal scene; and the sophistication with which the novel questions many of
the presuppositions of the genre while elaborating most o f its 'Whodunnit' 
50conventions has been noted. But again, The Moonstone is neither purely an 
unconscious fantasy that can be interpreted as if it was a dream, nor a 
prescient anticipation of later psychoanalytic techniques -  it  also derives 
both its m ystery and the resolution of it from incorporating and conjuring 
with contemporary theories of the unconscious, taking them  beyond their 
immediate frameworks by turning them into sources not so much of final 
truth as of cognitive ambiguity and elaborating a recurrent set of concerns 
and conventions that Collins had been developing throughout his writing.
In the preface to his extraordinary exploration of the scientific and 
occult possibilities of mesmerism, A  Strange Story (1S62), Edward Bulw er- 
Lytton argued that there was nothing so fantastic as scientific speculation 
though this m ight involve overturning many of the premises of the scientific 
establishment: I f  the Author of this work has presumed to borrow from 
science some elements of interest for Romance, he ventures to hope that no 
thoughtful reader -  and certainly no son of science -  w ill be disposed to 
reproach him .'51 He quotes an extract from William Hamilton's Lectures on 
Metaphysics as an epigraph to the novel: T o  doubt and to be astonished is to 
recognise our ignorance. Hence it is that the lover of wisdom is in a certain 
sort a lover of m ythi, for the subject of mythi is the astonishing and 
marvellous.'52 Collins's novels often share this sense of speculative enquiry, 
this fascination with forms of knowledge that hover on the margins of 
science. But although they are intellectually complex, they do not have the 
same kind of ambitions as those of Bulw er-Lytton, and this makes their 
relation to contemporary psychological theory the more convoluted. Collins 
does not draw on one psychological theory or model but on a range of
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methods as narratives, which, in becoming sources of tension, can either 
affirm  or overturn contemporary concepts. They thus become crucial to the 
way that the narratives proceed by setting up and undermining their own 
authority, the means by which particular framing and embedding devices set 
up relationships between narrators, and the way that the texts as a whole 
work as fabrics of overt and hidden associations.
The first chapter of this study w ill provide an overview of these 
theories, which form both a specific set of methods and perceptions that 
Collins draws on, and an overarching ideological framework within which it is 
shaped and makes sense. Psychology was emerging as a discipline and 
profession during the first half of the nineteenth century, drawing on and 
pulling together physiology, philosophy and social theory, in the context of 
the development of the asylum system, and of the asylum itself as the stage 
for the building up of social identity. It  thus linked theories of the workings 
of the mind with definitions of what it  meant to be a social being, drawing 
and contributing to wider perceptions of gender and class identity. I shall 
explore this, and look at how different theories of the workings of the 
consciousness and the unconscious emerged during the mid nineteenth 
century, linking these with changing conceptions of organic forces that 
shaped individual destinies -  inheritance, evolution and adaptation. In 
analysing Collins's novels I shall analyse how his fictional extrapolation of 
these perceptions and his narrative transformation of particular techniques is 
part o f a developing exploration of social identity. This begins first of all in 
the fam ily, which in Collins's fiction is a social, an organic and a psychic 
structure, based on the power of the father and its own continued line, often 
a waning line that needs to be revitalised from outside. 'The emotions are 
the nurses of the faculties', Collins wrote in the biography of his father, 'And 
the first home is the sanctuary in which they are created and reared'.53 In
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Collins's novels homes are sanctuaries, asylums, places of both safety and 
danger, where the self is built up and broken down. Families form the links 
with the past that give identity coherence, but they also take the form of a 
morbid inheritance, and this tension can only be overcome by the individual 
self undergoing a social and psychological transformation in order to return 
to a family that has a renewed cultural meaning.
So in each of the chapters on the novels I shall explore the ways that 
Collins reworks certain repeated motifs, replays plots w ith  different 
combinations, building up and breaking down different oppositions, focussing 
in detail on the interwoven threads of the narratives themselves, and their 
correspondence with the clues of psychological association. B ut each of the 
novels I shall analyse also elaborates particular areas of psychological theory. 
Basil and The Woman in White conjure with different aspects of moral 
management, and although this is a strand that runs throughout Collins's 
fiction, it is modified in other novels of the 1860s -  in No Nam e in relation to 
competing models of evolution; in Armadale in the context of theories of 
dreams, and in his most complex cognitive investigation, Th e  Moonstone, in 
relation to contrasting notions of the unconscious. In the final chapter I shall 
briefly analyse a range of the later novels in the context of the increasing 
predominance of degenerative assumptions in social and psychological theory.
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C H A P T E R  O N E
IN  T H E  C O M P L IC A T E D  L A B Y R IN T H S  O F  O U R  F R A M E : 
P S Y C H O L O G Y  AS SO C IA L  P E R C E P TIO N  IN  T H E  N IN E T E E N T H  C E N T U R Y
Nothing can be more slightly defined than the line of 
demarcation between sanity and insanity ... Make the 
definition too narrow, it becomes meaningless; make it 
too wide, and the whole human race becomes involved 
in the dragnet. In strictness we are all mad when we 
give way to passion, to prejudice, to vice, to vanity; 
but if all the passionate, prejudiced and vain people 
were to be locked up as lunatics, who is to keep the 
key to the asylum?
The Tim es, 22 July IS33>
Moral Management and Household Words
D uring October 1857, Dickens and Collins's collaborative short serial in 
The Lazy* Tour of Tw o  Idle Apprentices appeared in Household Words. The 
piece humorously traces the picaresque wanderings of the serious-minded and 
curious Francis Goodchild and the hedonistic Thomas Idle, and in the fourth 
instalment Goodchild gives an account of his visit to  a county lunatic asylum: 
'An immense place .. .  admirable offices, very good attendants; altogether a 
remarkable place.' He begins his description of the institution, though, by- 
using metaphors which immediately recall Dickens's own earlier 'A  Walk in a 
Workhouse': 'Long groves of blighted m en-and-women-trees; interminable 
avenues of hopeless faces; numbers, without the slightest power of really- 
combining for any earthly purpose; a society- of human creatures who have 
nothing in common but that they have all lost the power of being humanly 
social w ith  one another'.2 He goes on to focus on the scene, particularly- on 
one 'poor little  dark-chinned meagre man w ith a perplexed brow and a pensive 
face, stooping low over the matting on the floor, and picking out with his 
thumb and forefinger the course of its fibres'. The man is discouraged from
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this activity by the attendant and goes back to his room, but a minute later 
shuffles out again and returns to  poring over the matting. Goodchild 
continues:
I stopped to look at h im , and it  came into my mind, 
that probably the course of those fibres as they plaited 
in and out, over and under, was the only course of 
things in the whole wide world that it was left for him 
to understand -  that his darkening intellect had 
narrowed down to the small c left of light that showed 
him, T h is  piece was tw isted this way, went in here, 
passed under, came out there, was carried away here 
to the right where now I put my finger on it , and in 
this progress of events, the thing was made and came 
to be here.' Then, I wondered whether he looked into 
the m atting, next, to see if  it  could show him anything 
of the process through w hich he came to be there, so 
strangely poring over it . Th e n Tth o u g h t how all of us, 
God help us! in our different ways are poring over our 
bits of matting, blindly enough, and what confusions 
and mysteries we make in  the pattern. I had a sadder 
fellow-feeling with the dark-chinned, meagre man by 
that time, and I came away.3
The passage suggests a complex pattern of responses to the image of insanity. 
The visitor is at once impressed and depressed by what he sees. The asylum 
reminds him both of an inverted state ly  home and a workhouse wherein the 
pastoral imagery is ironically transferred to the occupants of the place. 
Mania, like 'the dragon Pauperism' in 'A  Walk in a Workhouse', 'in a very weak 
and impotent condition; toothless, fangless, drawing his breath heavily 
enough, and hardly worth chaining up', has been rendered tame in this model 
institution, but in the process has become the ultimate vision of social 
powerlessness.4 But looking at the 'meagre man' more closely, the 
perspective shifts: projecting meaning into his projections of the madman's 
projections, and seeing this as the development of a mystery story, the 
philanthropic observer is shocked out of his paternalistic complacency. 
Suddenly the madman's tracing of clues and weaving of meanings become an 
echo of his own uncertainty; it is this identification which lies behind his 
sympathy.
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The passage would have presented a familiar picture to  readers of 
Household Words -  five  years earlier Dickens had reported his ow n visit to St 
Luke's Hospital for the insane poor. But it might have had disturbing echoes 
too, since it emphasised a different side to asylum life from the one normally 
stressed in the journal. The question of the care and treatment o f the insane 
and the development of the lunacy reform movement was a particularly 
congenial subject for Household Words, but this was unlikely to  involve the 
attempt to disentangle insanity's internal meanings. Dispelling old myths and 
superstitions about madness and replacing them with enlightened 
humanitarianism was an especially suitable focus for the journal's mission as 
entertaining educator of a newly defined lower-m iddle-class family 
audience.^ And the plight of the human but helpless mad was a particularly 
worthy subject for such concern, since wherever madness might be found, it 
struck, above all, in the fam ily. 'There are few household calam ities so 
utterly deplorable as loss of reason in a husband, wife, or child; and there is, 
perhaps, no household calam ity for the lightening of which so m uch can be 
done or left undone by friends of the afflicted, according to their knowledge 
or their ignorance of certain leading truths', noted T h e  Cure of Sick Minds' in 
1859, summarising a mass of material that had appeared within the  previous 
few years. 'The development of this kind of knowledge has been the  work of 
science in our own day, and its diffusion is the duty of journals such as ours. 
For that reason we have, from tim e to tim e, dwelt upon points relating to 
insanity in England, and we now found, upon the latest reports of our county 
Lunatic Asylums, a few  more notes of profitable information.'6
The development of this kind of knowledge was not confined to 
Household Words. A rticles discussing a wide range of theories about the 
workings of the mind as well as contributing to debates about definitions and 
forms of insanity and the treatm ent of the insane were a significant feature
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of V ictorian  journals and periodicals. They formed part of an intellectual 
culture that included friendship networks and debates and discussions in 
journals and periodicals and where psychological, social, medical and cultural 
ideas interfused even as they became more specialised as scientific 
disciplines.7 Outside the texts themselves, evidence of Collins's direct 
involvem ent in these debates is vague and circum stantial, and depends on 
inference drawn from his friendships and wider acquaintance -  with Dickens 
(the close friend of Conolly and Elliotson, involved w ith  mesmerism, and 
crim inal and lunacy reform ), with Reade (involved, in a different way, with 
lunacy reform ); w ith B ulw er-Lytto n, with Edward P igo tt, George Eliot, G .H . 
Lewes and Herbert Spencer. The external evidence comes from Collins's 
explicit appropriation of precise sources which then become transformed in 
the texts rather than his e ^ag e m e n t with public debate outside the novels, 
and even here what is important is the combination of sources, and the 
significance of the ways in which they overlap.
T h e  source for the wrongful confinement of Laura Fa irlie  in The Woman 
in W hite that is most often cited is the 'sensational' late eighteenth century 
French case of the Marquise de Douhault, described in Mejan's Recueil des 
Causes Celebres, a copy of which Collins bought during a trip to Paris in 
1856. B ut he also much later described that he had received a letter asking 
him to intervene in a contemporary confinement case as he was planning the 
novel.8 T h e  novel was serialised in A ll the Year Round during 1859 and 1860; 
it coincided w ith the publication and widespread discussion of the 
Parliam entary Select Com m ittee Enquiry into the C are  and Treatment of 
Lunatics and Th e ir Property of 1858-9, members of which included Collins's 
two acquaintances, John Forster and Richard M onckton Milnes. And the 
Enquiry itself marked the culmination of a particular set of debates about 
how to establish the boundaries of madness. This concern formed part of a
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longer term shift in the c u ltu ra l meaning of the asylum and ideas about the 
social formation of identity: the kind of knowledge developed by Household 
Words, encapsulated in the concept and method of moral management. Moral 
management was a particular method of treating and perceiving insanity, and 
it gained its authority fro m  the way in which it at once encapsulated and 
contributed to the aspirations of progressive liberalism during the first half 
of the nineteenth century. Moral management provides the overarching 
ideological framework for Collins's fiction. As I shall show in my discussion 
of the novels, it both supplies the paradigm within which narrative authority 
and meaningful identity is form ed, and offers a means of overturning that 
authority, revealing its mechanisms of manipulation, its sources of power. 
This chapter begins by outlin ing  some of the ways that moral management 
was built up within the cu ltu re  around two poles, two extremes that were 
forever meeting -  the asylum  and the middle-class home. The paradigm was 
shaped unevenly, extending across a range of writings and practices, 
permeating contemporary cu ltu re  as an overlapping set of hypotheses, 
narratives, impressions and anecdotes, in which utopian visions of ideal 
asylums merged with accounts of visits to real ones and memories of good 
and bad ones, and where particular perceptions qualified, while being set 
within, an epic story of progress and heroic deeds, which was nonetheless 
tempered with ambivalence and anxiety.
This story opened w ith  tw o  mythologised gestures: the epic image of 
Pinel opening the gates and striking the chains from the bound and chained 
lunatics of the Dicetre ('C it iz e n , I am convinced that these madmen are 
intractable only because th e y  have been deprived of air and liberty',) in 1793, 
and its more prosaic English equivalent, William Tuke founding the Retreat, 
an asylum for insane Q uakers, near York in 1796.^ It  was undoubtedly a 
significant movement, m arking a point where Jacobin radicalism and English
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rational religious traditions merged and contributed to the formation of 
early-nineteenth century liberal ideology.^® B u t the gestures took on 
increasingly mythical connotations as the reform  movement developed 
through the first half of the nineteenth century, a development that depended 
in part on a continual process of self definition, w hich was based in turn on a 
repeated rewriting of its own history. So although there was in reality no 
absolute break in the perception and treatment of madness around 1800, the 
h o rrific  image of the eighteenth century madhouse needed to be continually 
invoked to highlight and make sense of nineteenth-century progressive 
reform . 'From a blind and hard-hearted policy, w hich embraced only the 
affliction of one evil by the affliction of another . . .  a sudden transition was 
made to a system, professing to be based on knowledge of the human mind, 
and on the common sympathies of our nature, and to  have as its object the 
eradication, or if  that appeared Utopian, the am elioration of the evil', wrote 
W .A .F . Browne in What Asylums Were, A re , and O ught to  Be in 1837.11
Indeed many of the outraged descriptions o f 'old corrupt' eighteenth 
century asylums, with their ubiquitous imagery, above a ll, of whips and 
chains, both reinforced the self-congratulatory portrayal of contemporary 
reform  and justified a prurient horrified fascination with the images of 
brutality that was not so very different from the despised voyeurism with 
which earlier observers had viewed the antics of the mad themselves. 
Dickens's description of Christmas at St Luke's in Household Words in 1852 
contrasted the scene with how it might have been a hundred years before: 
'Coercion for the outward man and rabid physicking fo r the inward man, were 
then the specifics for lunacy. Chains, straw, filth y  solitude, darkness and 
starvation; .. . spinning in whirligigs, corporal punishment, gagging, continual 
intoxication; nothing was too wildly extravagant, nothing too monstrously 
cruel to  be prescribed by these mad doctors. It was their monomania .. . ,12 A
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metaphor of Christian redemption was developed in 'The  Star of Bethlehem', 
a history of that most redolent symbol of the enforced bestiality of madness, 
Bethlehem Hospital, or Bedlam: T h e  remedy for lunacy which we now find  in 
cheerfulness and hope was sought in gloom and terror', and the article w ent 
on to describe the recurrent signs of eighteenth century brutality: Norris's 
cage, Cox's spinning chair, cold baths, and threats of drowning, and again, 
whips, chains and straw . ^  'Things Within D r Conolly's Remembrance' also 
charts a progress of gradual enlightenment, marking its beginning with the 
work of Tuke and Pinel and its culmination with the figure of 'the wise and 
good D r ConoHy\ Weightier journals and reports told the same sto ry . 
Andrew Wynter's lengthy summary of recent psychological findings and 
medical reports in Th e  Q uarterly Review in 1857, like many others, invoked 
Hogarth's allegorical painting of the consequences of unlicenced sexual 
excess, 'The Rake's Progress', to emphasise: 'It is not fifty  years since the  
state of things which now only exist in the imagination was both general and 
approved. The interior of Bethlehem at that date could furnish pictures m ore 
terrible than Hogarth ever conceived ... Through the instrumentality of the 
Tukes, Gardiner H ill, Charlesworth, Winslow and Conolly, the old method of 
treatment, with its whips, chains and manacles, has passed away for ever.* 
And he continues w ith a more striking image: 'And as a true emblem of the  
revolution which has taken place, we may mention that some years since a 
governor, in passing through the laundry of Bethlehem, perceived a w ris t 
manacle, which had been converted by one of the women into a stand fo r a 
f l i t  iron.'1’
The break was not nearly such a dramatic one of course, although the  
violent and often punitive practices of the eighteenth century madhouse w ere 
not a figment of the reformers' imaginations either. But while, pace 
Foucault, bestial images might have prevailed in the eighteenth century,
positioning the mad as the repositories of unreason, perverse reversions to an 
untamed state, other Whiggish models w ere also emerging, which saw 
madness more ambivalently, lurking at the heart of English culture itself. 
'Nervous' disorders, in particular hypochondria, melancholy and spleen, were 
felt to be peculiarly English diseases of affluence; the symptoms of the over- 
indulgence, idleness and excess of civilized refinem ent of the upper class of 
both sexes; but also the cause for a sneaking national pride, the sign of 
sensibility on the one hand, of ambition, energy and progressiveness itself on 
the o t h e r . ' W e  have more nervous diseases', noted George Cheyne in The 
English Malady in 1733, 'since the present Age has made Efforts to go beyond 
former Times, in all the A rts  of Ingenuity, Invention, Study, Learning, and all 
the Contemplative and Sedentary Professions.'*7 There was, too, increasing 
pressure for reform of the private madhouse system during the eighteenth 
century, leading to the setting up of pioneering curative  asylums. The moral 
treatment practised at the Retreat which in turn became the model for the 
development of the techniques of moral management with the massive 
expansion of the state asylum system during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, grew out of this Whiggish liberal traditio n, but the process of its 
development absorbed and expressed the contradictions of early Victorian 
liberalism. The domestication of the image of madness and the reforming of 
the insane into newly humanised subjects obviously drew on and contributed 
to the ideology of self-control, self-management and self-help which was one 
of its central features. But reform would be consolidated in a context where 
the newly-defined middle-class family was becoming the central model for 
the shaping of social identity.
This meant, too, that the Retreat could become a crucial reference- 
point for the development of both moral management as a method of 
treatment and the grow th of the county asylum system precisely because it
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preceded the transformation of the institutional landscape that it helped to 
shape. It was a private  asylum, set up in part to provide an alternative to  the 
notorious corrupt York madhouse; and like other private non-restraint 
asylums for the w ealthy set up at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
such as Brislington House and Ticehurst Asylum, it  was small enough to  look 
like a country house, in contrast to the vast, almost palatial edifices o f the 
mid-nineteenth century model county asylums such as Hanwell or Colney 
H a tch .18 And although Samuel Tuke's A  Description of the R etreat 
emphasised that the asylum was designed for Quakers 'of every class as 
regards to property', the operative word was Quaker; the inmates o f the 
Retreat shared the framework of rational and Christian self-management 
that was a central part of their treatment. Moreover moral treatm ent had 
the space to develop, Tuke argued, precisely because there was no clearly 
delineated set o f medical conventions or prescriptions: In  the present 
imperfect state of our knowledge, of the very interesting branch of the 
healing art, which relates to the cure of insanity; and unable as we generally 
are to ascertain its  true seat in the complicated labyrinths of our fra m e, the 
judicious physician is very frequently obliged to apply his means, ch ie fly  to
19the alleviation and suppression of symptoms.'
So the particular form of moral management developed at the R etreat 
was an eclectic one, gaining its coherence from  the reciprocal bonds of 
authority and affection of the fam ily. Patients were given good food, with 
wine and porter, taken on invigorating walks, occupied with pastimes and 
'suitable' accomplishments; sympathetic treatment Was a way of encouraging 
emotional as w ell as social reintegration. Propriety was thus more than the 
outward sign of self-possession and self-ascendancy, and this was achieved by 
the judicious blend of fear and the desire for self-esteem. T h e  principle  of 
fear, which is ra re ly  decreased by insanity, is considered as o f great
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importance in the management of the patients. But it is not allowed to be 
excited beyond that degree which naturally arises from the regulation of the 
fa m ily .'2® Patients, like children, 'quickly perceive .. .  that their treatment 
depends, in great measure, on their conduct', and this 'leads to many struggles 
to overcom e their morbid propensities'.21 Th is  hidden theatre where patients 
enacted their sane selves culminated in the Retreat's famous tea parties 
where the inmates, becoming visiting guests, audience and actors of their 
own concealed drama, 'dress in their best clothes and vie with each other in 
politeness and propriety. The best fare is provided and the visitors are 
treated with all the attention of strangers. T h e  evening generally passes in 
the greatest harmony and enjoyment ... the patients control, to a wonderful 
degree, their different propensities; and the scene is at once curious, and 
affectingly gratifying.'22
'A  Curious Dance Round a Curious T re e ', Dickens's description of 
Christm as at St Luke's Hospital in 1852, also focusses on the ritual gathering 
as a means of achieving self-possession by assuming a proper persona. But 
the resemblance between ritual, patient and institution highlights their 
differences: 'A t  one end were a number of m ad men, at the other, a number 
of mad women, seated on forms .. .  The ball was proceeding with great spirit 
but w ith  great decorum.'23 The narrator w rites in the character of a w e ll- 
informed observer and public personality, and like the other articles on 
insanity in Household Words (most of which were written by Morley), the 
piece stresses how the institution has im proved and presents insanity as 
prim arily a product of poverty, semi-starvation and 'grinding parochial 
parsimony1, as well as working class demoralisation. But as a 'curiosity* 
rather than a catalogue of advances, the piece is more tentative and 
ambivalent and represents a shift in the perception of moral management, as 
well as of the insane themselves. The decorum and orderliness of the mad,
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their learning of useful work and social skills, is a way of resisting insanity's 
powerlessness and isolation but also a means of compounding it. In contrast 
with the Lazy To u r image the mad are irreducibly 'other' here, but they are 
strange by virtue of the very decorum  with which they enact the motions of 
social life. St Luke's was a reform ed pauper hospital and did not have the 
same cachet as the large, purpose-built county asylums. Dickens's 
description here turns the sym bolic imagery of the Retreat inside out, and 
the place thus, too, acts as the underside of the public face of the co unty 
asylums, m id-century stages of m oral management, which in turn both echoed 
and transformed the earlier connotations of the Retreat.
The lunacy reform movement had been able to develop partly because 
of the absence of any coherent public or private structure, but this also 
shaped the pattern of the development of institutions during the first half of 
the nineteenth century. When the Retreat was founded there were various 
ways in which the insane could be confined: the wealthy at home o r  in 
private madhouses; paupers in prisons, in charitable institutions such as St 
Luke's or Bethlehem, or farmed out to private madhouses by the parish.2** 
The reformers' aim following the 1809 County Asylums A ct had been to 
encourage the development of the state sector, and also to lobby for greater 
state inspection of private madhouses and asylums; but the two sectors 
remained separate until 18<>5. Th is  meant that although the development of 
county asylums encountered initia l resistance from various landed interests, 
their development remained the focus of concern. Moral treatment had 
developed in the smaller, private environment of the Retreat yet although 
progressive private asylums were developing, in the mid-nineteenth century it  
was the massive county asylums that were set up as the primary models fo r 
the treatment of insanity.25 Th e  model county asylum was a Retreat w r it
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large, resembling a stately home rather than a county house, but now, too, a 
mass institution, a place of confinement as well as cure.
Thus Conolly, outlining the ideal asylum in Th e  Construction and 
Government of Lunatic Asylums and Hospitals for the Insane (1847), stressed 
the importance of the social organisation of space: 'Separate wards and 
bedrooms for the tranquil, for the sick, for the helpless, for the noisy, the 
unruly or violent, and the dirty while emphasising: T h e re  can be no doubt 
that the best site for an asylum is a gentle eminence, o f which the soil is 
naturally dry and in a fertile and agreeable country ... Patients of all classes 
derive advantage from the circumstances of situation just mentioned; and if 
it  is intended to receive patients of the educated classes into the house, it 
should unquestionably be situated amidst scenery calculated to give pleasure 
to such persons when of sane mind.'26 So confinement, too, becomes linked 
w ith the image of an idealised landscape, a private place that is on display 
and which bears a range of overlapping class connotations. Conolly's The 
Treatm ent of the Insane Without Mechanical Restraints (1836) reinforces 
this, stressing the importance of seclusion and repose to lu ll the patient out 
of a violent or manic state, to suppress anything that m ight give rise to 
irritation or distressing associations. Here mania is soothed out of existence 
rather than being wrestled with and overcome by the sane part of the self and 
a new image of leisure becomes associated with the remoulding of identity 
through work:
When they are taken out to walk in a quiet garden, or 
a pleasant field, among trees, and shrubs, and flowers, 
they are impressed w ith the sensations of a kind of 
new world. When, sitting down to comfortable 
dinners, they find that some of the officers s till come 
to see that all is conducted properly, a conviction that 
they are carefully looked after necessarily arises in 
their thoughts ... Day after day these influences 
operate, and day by day mental irritation subsides, and 
suspicions die, and gloomy thoughts gradually disperse, 
and confidence grows and strengthens, and natural 
affections re-awake and reason returns.*'
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In becoming domesticated in this way, insanity becomes feminised, as 
the model of middle-class w ifely propriety and domestic virtue becomes the 
role to which all women should aspire, and dom esticity acquires new kinds of 
homely connotations.2* Fem ininity and insanity did not become associated 
for the first time in the mid-nineteenth century, but they now are juxtaposed
in specific ways as the boundaries harden between male and female, public 
29and private spheres. The nervous disorders of upper-class women of the 
eighteenth century were inextricably associated w ith their class, but with the 
growth of the psychiatric profession, the female body becomes doubly 
pathologised, either by succumbing to passivity or resisting i t .3® As 
femaleness becomes vulnerable so the mad woman of every class is cured 
through learning to be a middle-class gentlewoman, yet moral management, 
which on the one hand encapsulates this learning of dependence, also provides 
the only means by which the constraints of fem ininity might be transcended. 
Dickens, describing St Luke's, noted the rigid division into male and female 
wards, male and female lines of dancers. The bleakness of the wards is the 
sign of the total social isolation of the madt 'Nothing in the rooms to remind 
the inmates of the world outside. No domestic articles to occupy, to 
interest, or to entice the mind away from its malady. U tter vacuity.' Yet 
while the patients become transformed back into human beings by enacting a 
domestic tableau, turning the institution into a home, they still remain silent 
-  they just look more comprehensible« I t  was a relief to come into the 
workroom; with coloured prints over the mantle-shelf, and china 
shepherdesses upon it; furnished also with tables, a carpet, stuffed chairs, and 
an open fire. I observed a great difference between the demeanour of the 
occupants of this apartment and the inmates of the other room. They were 
neither so listless nor so sad. Although they did not, while I was present, 
speak much, they worked w ith earnestness and diligence.'31
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Andrew W ynter, too, in his article on 'Lunatic Asylums' in The 
Quarterly Review, elaborated the point implied by his bizarre 'emblem' of 
progress -  a wrist manacle transformed into an iron stand -  in his description 
of the reformed Bedlam by describing the female side of the hospital: 'We 
find the apartments occupied by a score of busy workers, the m ajority of 
whom appear to be gentlewomen. Every conceivable kind of needlework is 
dividing their attention with the young lady who reads aloud David 
Copperfield while beside the fire, perhaps, an old lady with silver locks 
gives a touch of domesticity to the scene ...*32 Conolly emphasised that 
attention to dress, in another context empty-headed vanity, was an important 
means of re-establishing self-possession: 'A  neglect of this really proper 
feeling is a frequent cause of discontent in asylums and sometimes retards 
recovery ... many of the women should indeed be indulged in wearing neat 
articles of dress.'33 So while The English Woman's Journal, in a series of 
articles on insanity between 1859 and 1861, stressed a point also made by 
many alienists, that women's lack of education and opportunity to work led to 
a lassitude that could slip into nervous debility: T h e  nurture and education 
of women are as enervating as possible .. .  Now we .. .  make a demand for 
strong minded women. Yes, we own it, while repudiating much that this 
abused term has been made to include';3i> their very defensiveness sprang 
from the inescapability with which 'proper feeling' and self-possession now 
took the form of feminine propriety. Collins's manipulation of these 
contradictions forms one of the crucial sources of tension of The Woman in 
White. It also points to the wider dilemma in which mid-nineteenth century 
feminism was caught.
The figure of Dickens's friend John Conolly himself encapsulated many 
of the inherent tensions of moral management, the ambiguous effects of the 
growing status of psychological medicine, and the overlapping and contrasting
anxieties that surrounded public and private asylums by the 1850s. By the 
early 1840s, C onolly , architect of the non-restraint system at Hanwell, the 
Middlesex County Asylum, and whose work Shaftesbury (Chairman of the 
Lunacy Commission) effusively described as 'the greatest triumph of skill and 
humanity the world has ever known', was an ideal candidate for the situation 
of self-made hero of lunacy reform, and in a position to combine professional 
opportunism with philanthropic radicalism.35 But by the 1850s the precise 
character of those professional pressures transposed him into the shadow side 
of his earlier self. From  an impoverished though respectable farming family, 
and a difficult e arly  career as a physician attempting to secure a practice 
without private means, Conolly took up a teaching post in the newly- 
established medical school of University College, London, and was appointed 
superintendent at Hanw ell in 1839. He was involved with the Society for the 
Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, writing a popular pamphlet on cholera for 
them while in London, and made efforts at University College to establish the 
validity and respectability of psychological medicine.
His early book, An Enquiry Concerning the Indications of Insanity 
(1830), was part of this project, but it promoted it  by going against the grain 
36of contemporary orthodoxy. Drawing on phrenological and associationist 
models in Indications, Conolly pointed out that the definition of insanity 
itself was unstable, and that its recognition depended on a range of shifting 
signs and propensities. Confinement in an asylum, he argued, in many cases 
could actually create insanity: T h e  crowd of most of our asylums is made up 
of oddly harmless individuals, not much more absurd than numbers who are at 
large .. .  T o  all these patients, confinement is the very reverse of beneficial. 
It fixes and renders permanent what might have passed away, and ripens 
eccentricity, or temporary excitement or depression, into actual insanity'.37 
The most important thing for the practitioner, he went on, was 'that of
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considering ... whether or not the departure from sound mind be of a nature 
to justify the confinement of the individual, and the imposition of restraint 
upon him, as regards the use and disposal of his property'. 3** It was this 
analysis, combined with his enthusiasm for working-class education and self- 
improvement, that lay behind the zeal w ith which he advocated and practised 
the abolition of all mechanical restraint. Th e  ideal asylum for Conolly was a 
utopia of paternalistic self-management, a harmonious community where 
individuals would achieve their greatest potential under the benign eye of the 
superintendent. If this drew out the managerial side of the Owenite ideal and 
combined it with the Panopticon, Jerem y Bentham's ideal prison, it  was 
nonetheless inspired in part by Owen himself, whom Conolly invited to 
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But Conolly's full-tim e appointment at Hanwell was short lived, and by 
the late  1840s he was forced, partly by exigency, into a more dubious position 
as proprietor of his own private asylums for female patients, and, even more 
controversially, to be called as an expert witness in criminal cases where the 
40insanity defence was used. Here, and in even more delicate situations 
where he was called upon to establish whether an allegedly insane individual 
should be confined, he was placed in a role in  which he reinforced the position 
that he had repudiated in his earlier writings. The case of Eliza  Nottridge, 
for example, a wealthy and eccentric spinster, who insisted on living in the 
'Abode of Love', a millenial community where 'a mock religion and a 
boundless fanaticism sanction modes of worship which tend to destroy all 
sense of modesty*, illustrated for Conolly the dangers of 'leaving imbecile, 
visionary and fanatical women at large'. He argued that only confinement in 
an asylum  could protect both her reputation and her property, and whether or 
not she recovered, 'her habits would have at least have been regulated, all 
excess avoided, all painful exposure prevented*, and expressly overturned the
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defence's arguments that 'no lunatic should be confined unless dangerous to 
himself or others', that was based on his own earlier case in Indications.**^ In 
1859, too, he was sued by a patient whom he had committed to M oorcroft
U2House, an asylum in which he him self had a financial interest.
Conolly*s symbolic ro le , moreover, underwent a complete 
transformation as his mythologised figure became pressed into service for 
different causes within lunacy reform . For Dickens and Morley he was still 
the wise genius of public philanthropy in 1857, but by 1863, Dickens, as editor 
of A ll the Year Round, felt obliged to publish a disclaimer dissociating the 
journal from the implications of Reade's serial Very* Hard Cash (later 
published as Hard Cash).**^ Dickens was outraged by many aspects of the 
novel, including the portrayal o f the Lunacy Commissioners as well-meaning 
incompetents le^d by the nose by the medical profession, but he was 
particularly offended by D r W ycherley, a thinly disguised parody of Conolly 
himself. The 'sensation' of H a rd  Cash initially depends on the hero's 
incarceration in an 'old* corrupt madhouse, but the anxiety is then transposed 
as he becomes the victim o f Wycherley's more sinister and slippery 
manipulations. Wycherley is an expert who has become a monomaniac, a 
'collector of mad people', so puffed up by the medical language that he has 
developed that he interprets a ll behaviour as pathological, and the only sign 
of sanity is the acknowledgement of madness. Wycherley's book, The 
Incubation of Insanity, parodies and inverts Conolly*s Indications, including its 
discussion of particular cases, such as Pascal and Napoleon; W ycherley 
obsessively insists that Hardie should acknowledge that Hamlet re ally  was 
mad in order to prove his own rationality -  Conolly's own 'Study of Hamlet' 
published earlier the same year, had made a similar case.**4*
As a sensation novel Hard Cash formed part of a genre of scandalised 
exposures of the private madhouse system that had been appearing since the
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late eighteenth century. But what caused the furore round the novel when it 
appeared was the satire on the medical profession and the Lunacy 
Commission itself.**5 It was a campaigning novel, based on the plight of the 
male middle-class v ic tim  of a wrongful confinement conspiracy, yet while it 
does not have the fictional or ideological complexity of T h e  Woman in White, 
its sensations do not only depend on the exposure of corruption but on how 'in 
lunacy law the extrem es of intellect meet', pressing legal and medical 
definitions along infinitely expandable boundaries.**6 Reade, too, was 
actively involved in  the protection of alleged lunatics. H e  had started to 
collect material on conditions in asylums since the early 1850s, and in 1859 
had hid and protected John Fletcher, an escaped asylum inm ate; the case is 
W7documented in 'O ur Dark Places'. But Hard Cash marked the culmination 
of a panic about the plight of the inmates of private asylums that echoed 
older fears while being shaped by the liberal concerns of the reform 
movement itself, and which had contributed to the setting up of the 1858 
Parliamentary Select Com m ittee Enquiry into the Care and Treatment of 
Lunatics and their Property.
The propertied inmates of private asylums.were vulnerable potential 
victims of relatives' manipulations in a way that pauper lunatics could never 
be, but the debates on the 'liberty of the subject' that this prompted implied a 
very different subject from the one to be found in a co unty asylum. T h e  
tenacity of a private lunatic asylum is unique', commented the narrator in 
Hard Cash. 'A  little  push and you slide into one; but to g e t out again is to 
scale a precipice w ith crumbling sides.'**8 Fears about middle-class 
confinement emphasised how psychological perceptions could be shaped by 
social interests, in a way that was rarely extended to the propertyless mad. 
But the anxiety itself was generated by the way that private asylums 
continued to be 'D a rk  Places', shaped by their longer history as locations for
the annihilation of personality, open to explicit abuse, but also by their 
contemporary position as places which, no m atter how enlightened, contained 
the more embarrassing phenomena of middle class madness, and where 
seclusion itself needed to be secluded, or at least not made the object of 
public display.
The establishment of the Lunacy Commission in 1845 formed part of a
49developing national structure of inspection and surveillance. Anxieties 
about confinement formed a palimpsest o f overlapping associations -  
reproducing the kind of fears that had been sounded since the middle of the 
eighteenth century, while transposing them into  a different register as the 
concept of insanity shifted itself. The perception of the insane during the 
eighteenth century swung between seeing them as manifestations of bestial 
unreason, or of excessive sensibility and thus bearers of a kind of privileged 
testimony. But the dominant fears about wrongful confinement, which were 
carried into the nineteenth century, laid the emphasis on wrongful, and the 
sympathy for the sane victims of conscious conspiracy. Confinement might 
push the victim  over the edge into madness, but the edge itself was there: 
'What must a rational mind suffer when it is treated in such an irrational 
manner?* demanded a much publicised letter to  T h e  Gentleman's Magazine in 
1763 highlighting the plight of the wrongly com m itted.*0 And even in Mary 
Wollstonecraft's The Wrongs of Woman, where the madhouse is used as a 
metaphor for women's imprisonment and lack of identity in marriage, the 
heroine describes herself as 'a wretch condemned to reason on the nature of 
madness, by having wrecked minds continually under [m y ] eye, and almost 
wish [m yself] mad, to escape the contemplation of it  This 'whips and
chains' image of the private madhouse, was kept alive as a memory into the 
mid-nineteenth century, even as it echoed real abuses that were taking place
-  the number of private madhouses in England trebled between 1808 and 
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The spate of much publicised wrongful confinement cases during the 
1850s emphasised this continuing malpractice and profiteering, but 
increasingly came to  debate the authority of the medical profession and in 
this respect they anticipated the anxieties emphasised by Hard Cash, and 
echoed those of Conolly*t Indications, though Conolly was by now on the other 
side of the table.5* Thus John Perceval, Chairman of the Alleged Lunatics 
Friends Society, a body which had been set up in 18*»5, and which intervened 
in individual cases and collected evidence of m alpractice that was cited as 
evidence to the 1858 Select Com m ittee, argued against Shaftesbury's case 
that abuses were still the outcome of insufficient state control, by claim ing 
that the very definitions of insanity had become inseparable from the 
interests of the medical profession. 'I would first refer to the danger to 
which the liberty of the subject is exposed through unjust or unnecessary 
efforts being made to confine him .. .  I think patients have sometimes to be 
protected against medical advice and experiments as well as any other 
54danger', he stressed.
The debates about confinement, definitions of insanity, and the liberty 
of the subject that surrounded the Select Com m ittee Enquiry provided an 
immediate reference point for The Woman in W hite, even as the novel 
inverted many of the assumptions within which the debates were set though 
more tacitly than did Hard Cash. But Collins also made -  perhaps 
unconsciously -  a more particular inversion in naming his villain Percival 
Clyde. The figure of Percival C lyde  is a neurotic -  victim  of what Fosco 
terms 'your English spleen', who uses his own stolen position of rank and 
power to steal his wife's property and identity by substituting her for a dead 
woman and confining her in an asylum. John Perceval, son of the
assassinated Prim e Minister, Spencer Perceval, was not only a campaigner on 
behalf of alleged lunatics who gave evidence to the Select Com m ittee, but an 
ex-patient who had been confined himself, and who, between 1832 and 1840, 
published an extraordinary document, A  Narrative of the Treatment 
Experienced by a  Gentleman, during a State of Mental Derangment, Designed 
to Explain the Causes and the Nature of Insanity*. Perceval had suffered from 
extended bouts of insanity between 1830 and 1832 and was confined in Fox’s 
asylum, Brislington House and in Ticehurst Asylum , both enlightened 
institutions.**
Perceval’s Narrative offers a glimpse into the secluded private asylum, 
but unlike Tuke's Description of the R etreat, o r any other official writings, it 
also provokes an extraordinary exploration of the meaning of insane 
delusions, as he describes his experience of confinement, and attempts to 
reconstruct the process of his madness, to work out 'how he came to  be there, 
so strangely poring over it '. In  the name of humanity, then, in the name of 
modesty, in the name of wisdom, I entreat you to place yourselves in the 
position of those whose sufferings I describe, before you attempt to discuss 
what course of conduct is to  be pursued towards them.'*6 And his analysis of 
madness goes far beyond the perspective of moral management, as Perceval 
reconstructs how his delusions grew out of his own over-zealous 
evangelicalism, and took the form of a transcendent paternal authority to 
which he was perpetually an inarticulate other, an experience that was 
compounded by the treatment in the asylums, where he imagined that his 
keepers were avenging angels. Like a spectator at the play of his own 
delusions, he attempts to work out the sense that underlies them: 1 mention 
these facts to  show the reasonableness, if I m ay so call It, of m y lunacy, if it 
was entirely lunacy; to speak more clearly, to show the reality of the 
existence of that power, by the use or abuse of which, I became insane. If by
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the abuse of it, because the Lord confounded me for my disobedience, if by 
the use of it, because, though real, it was the spirit of delusion.'57
1 suffered from an habitual error of mind, .. . that of failing to doubt, 
and of taking the guilt of doubt upon my conscience.'58 Perceval learns that 
it is necessary to discover the uses of doubt in order to disentangle himself 
from a complex network of delusion; to  understand what kind of metaphorical 
drama his delusions represented, as a means of unpicking their emotional 
power: 'I suspect that many of the delusions which I laboured under, and 
which other insane persons labour under, consist in their mistaking a 
figurative or poetic form of speech for a literal one; and this observation may 
be important to those who attend to their cure .. .  The spirit speaks 
poetically, but the man understands it literally .. . and his imagination not 
being under his own control, he in a manner feels it .'5* Perceval's N arrative  
is a marginal text, and it is tempting but too simple to see it as prefiguring 
later psychoanalytic interpretations. Y e t it develops its analysis of the 
significance of insanity by drawing of) the literary conventions of the 
confession, conventions which Collins was to exploit in his first contemporary 
novel, Basil, A  Story of Modern L ife . And in its argument for the need to 
decode the meaning of derangement, the Narrative provides a clue to the 
meaning of the unconscious that also hovers on the margins of mid-nineteenth 
century psychological debates.
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Constitutions of Consciousness and Clues to Identity
In Indications of Insanity Conolly had emphasised the difficulty of 
laying down fixed criteria for establishing unsoundness of m ind. He had also 
argued that any understanding of insanity depended on analysing 'the 
constitution of the human understanding', that it was essential to relate, 
before one could distinguish, the healthy and morbid workings of the 
consciousness.60 The cultural significance of madness in the mid-nineteenth 
century was shaped by the development of the asylum system and the 
hypotheses of moral management, in which the belief in  the ability to 
reconstitute the social identity of the insane was a concom itant of the 
process by which definitions and perceptions of insanity itself became aligned 
with the perception and definition of powerless groups -  particularly women 
and the casual poor -  as potentially vulnerable and pathological; a process 
which, during the second half of the nineteenth century, undermined the very 
optimism on which it had been founded. It also articulated and contributed to 
an extensive range of physiological, psychological and social debates about 
the constitution of identity, the relationship between personal and social 
organisation, between the history of the individual and of the species.
Eighteenth-century materialist and associationist theories exerted a 
powerful influence on early nineteenth-century physiological psychology, 
which argued that the mind could not be considered separately from the 
brain, nor its  structure from its function. But they were transformed in the 
context of new hypotheses and paradigms, most notably the 'Development 
Hypothesis' itself, which emphasised that the individual organism could only 
be understood in a collective social context, as a moment in a longer 
narrative of change. They had a salient bearing, too, on the analysis of the 
internal workings of the consciousness, and of the significance of natural or 
artificially induced states of 'unconscious cerebration'! dreams, trance,
delirium, somnambulism; pressed into service to establish the perimeters of 
self-control, but also explored to analyse the workings of memory, the 
intractability of the past, the relationship between conscious and unconscious 
activity . These debates were marked, moreover, by cognitive ambivalence. 
O n  the one hand they shared the sense that developing scientific knowledge 
worked as a process of imaginative projection, that it was a heuristic 
construction of the world that needed to discard as well as use empirical 
evidence, and a w ay of breaking free of the vestiges of residual assumptions. 
Yet on the other hand they continually established their privileged authority 
as science by differentiating between truth and fiction, official and unofficial 
kinds of knowledge in a way that paradoxically mystified dominant 
perceptions even as it invested marginal ones with occult connotations. 
Household Words voiced this kind of equivocation between receptiveness and 
scepticism in a discussion of the analysis of 'spectral illusion' as a subject of 
psychological investigation, 'New Discoveries in Ghosts': 'It behoves us in the 
present day .. to learn how we can keep our tempers free from prejudice, and 
not discredit statements simply because they are new and strange, nor, on the 
other hand, accept them hastily without sufficient proof.’61
Collins continually exploits the tenuousness of this balance by his use of 
experiments, records, legal testimonies and diaries as evidence to prove, and 
at the same time to  display the subjective construction o f^th e  objective 
truth . And the struggle to separate ou t thoughts, to distinguish between valid 
and delusory perceptions, not only to  doubt whether one can trust the 
evidence of the senses, but to be confused about precisely what that evidence 
consists in, even as i t  is finally relied on, is a recurrent aspect of this. The 
most specific form i t  takes is in the development of the dilemma that Robert 
Audley expresses in Lady Audley*s Secret: the problem both of how to 
interpret Lady Audley herself and the evidence that leads to her guilt: 'Was
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it a monition or a monomania? ... What if this chain that I have constructed 
link by link is woven out of m y own folly?'6^ It is a dilemma that stresses 
that all perception is shaped by the projections of the viewer, who worries 
over whether he is making the correct associations, and who does not know 
how to interpret apparently irrational feelings of anxiety and apprehension, 
and I w ill be coming back to this; but in elaborating it Collins, like Mary 
Braddon, draws on a precise pathological terminology and set of perceptual 
codes that he both inverts to explore the provisional nature of subjective 
identity and exploits through the development of physiological conventions 
that can then be broken down or shown to be unreliable as markers of 
identity.
One starting point for this is precisely the distinction between 
'monition' and 'monomania', and linked with this, between monomania and 
'moral insanity', since it was in setting up the categories and drawing the 
distinctions between these terms that many legal as well as psychological 
writings attempted to approach and resolve the vexed questions, not only of 
how to establish 'unsoundness of mind', where temporary derangement might 
end and fully fledged insanity begin (crucia l in establishing whether 
confinement was justified), but also of the problem atic relationship between 
insanity and criminal responsibility, guilt and absolution.6^ Th e  concept of 
monomania, which was a development of the earlier humoral category of 
melancholia (as opposed to mania), was firs t discussed by the influential 
French alienist Esquirol and by Pinel. But it  was developed most fully in 
England by James Cowles Pritchard in his Treatise  on Insanity and Other 
Disorders Affecting the Mind (1835) and O n  the Different Form s of Insanity 
in Relation to  Jurisprudence (1842), and by the mid-nineteenth century had 
become a widely used term that could be stretched to mean any kind of 
irrational obsession. Pritchard opened his Treatise  on Insanity with the
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ubiquitous assertion that it was d ifficult to pin it down, but quickly went on 
to modify Locke's observation that 'madmen do not appear to have lost the 
faculty of reasoning; but having joined some ideas together very wrongly, 
they mistake them for truths, and they err, as men do that argue right from  
wrong principles'.6^ This was only one aspect of madness, he argued, 
claiming instead that insanity needed to be divided into two basic categories, 
intellectual and moral. Intellectual insanity was then subdivided into 
monomania, 'in which the understanding is partially disordered or under the 
influence of some particular delusion, referring to one subject, and involving 
one train of ideas, while the intellectual powers appear, when exercised on 
other subjects, to be altogether unimpaired'; mania, or raving madness, 'in 
which the understanding is generally deranged', and incoherence, or 
dementia.65 A ll of these were different kinds of cognitive disorders in which 
people might act irrationally, but not necessarily pervertedly. And 
monomaniacs could pull themselves back over the boundary into sanity by 
recognising the madness in themselves, vigorously exercising the w ill to 
control it. 'The affection of the brain that causes these delusions is not 
madness', argued John Barlow in Man's Power over Himself to  Prevent and 
Control Insanity, 'but the want of power or resolution to examine them is.'66
Monomania, with its stress on the possibility of self control, was 
compatible with moral treatment, although how exactly one defined 'partial' 
was open to question.67 But 'm oral insanity' suggested a lack of reciprocity 
by virtue of its very self-possession, and with this, propriety itself became a 
possible sign of villainy and the new locus for the 'wil<f aspect of madness. 
Moral insanity, argued Pritchard, in a definition cited in a discussion of its 
implications in Fraser's Magazine in 185), consisted in 'a morbid perversion of 
the feelings, affections and active powers, without any illusion or erroneous 
conviction impressed upon the understanding: it sometimes co-exists w ith an
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apparently unimpaired state of the intellectual faculties'.6* And by replacing 
intellectual derangement with moral perversion he not only changed the 
meaning of madness, but turned it into an infinitely moveable feast. Moral 
insanity now still implied mental disease, but one 'which has completely 
removed all the barriers which separated vice from insanity and thrown the 
subject of madness into the direct confusion', commented Th e  Quarterly 
Review, discussing Benjamin Brodie's Psychological Inquiries in 1854.69 This 
meant that defining madness explicitly invoked a moral judgement, giving a 
new meaning to the older notion that it represented the expression of deviant 
or transgressive impulses, that it was basically the same as badness: 
'Excessive intensity of any passion is disorder in a moral sense', wrote 
Pritchard.70 But as insanity was criminalised, so crime was pathologised. 
Crim inal lunatics, as lunatics suffering from moral insanity, could not be held 
responsible for their actions; though Pritchard stressed that moral insanity, 
like monomania, was the product of inadequate self-discipline -  that there 
was no clear boundary between them. Like his contemporaries, Pritchard's 
analysis proceeds by dramatically describing case histories, such as that of 
'an only son of a weak and indulgent mother [w ho] gave himself up habitually 
to the gratification of every caprice and passion of which an untutored and 
violent temper was susceptible .. .  Every instance of opposition or resistance 
moved him to acts of fury .. .  When he became of age he succeeded to  the 
possession of an expansive domain. An act of notoriety put an end to his 
career of violence. Enraged with a woman who had used offensive language 
to him, he threw her into a well . . . '7 * He notes: 'A  female modest and 
circumspect becomes violent and abrupt in her manners, loquacious, 
impetuous, talks loudly and abusively against her relations and guardians, 
before perfect strangers .. .',77 and stresses that the disease often took the 
form of 'an unusual prevalence of angry or malicious feelings which arise 
without provocation or any of the ordinary incitements'.71 Sensation fiction
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drew on these categories but also took the opportunity to realign them; it was 
Lady Audley who displayed most self-possession in gaining control of her 
husband's estates, and in the process pushed her superfluous former husband 
down atuell. But the categories themselves were also articulated through 
melodramatised psychological conventions.
In the satirical caricature of Conolly in Hard Cash, Indications becomes 
The Incubation of Insanity; and ironically it was the combination of these 
notions -  of how the latent signs of insanity might be indicated on the body, 
but also of how they might be lurking, incubating secretly to make a 
predictable or unexpected appearance -  that lay behind many causal 
hypotheses.7** In his Treatise on Insanity Pritchard had distinguished between 
moral and physical causes of insanity, moral here denoting everything not 
immediately traceable to an organic cause, and these were then each broken 
down into 'predisposing' and 'exciting' categories.7^ But this distinction 
disintegrated in the analysis of the relationship between the structure and 
function of the mind, while the interpretative methods that represented the 
categories drew on conceptual metaphors derived from each other. They 
took place moreover in the context of the distinct but overlapping 
interpretative codes of physiognomy and phrenology which by the mid­
nineteenth century had become well established across psychological, 
aesthetic and fictional discourses.
The idea of a semiotic system in which outward signs were the index of 
latent emotional or moral traits was already well established by the beginning 
of the nineteenth century. Th e  tradition of classical physiognomy derived 
from Aristotle and based on humoral theory, combined in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries with a model based on animal analogy.76 But it was the 
work of Caspar Lavater at the end of the eighteenth century that was to be 
the main reference point for nineteenth-century applications. Lavater did
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no t fundamentally modify its idealist basis, nor did he claim that 
physiognomy constituted a science. He did, however, m aintain that the face 
constituted a symbolic system in which each feature, individually and in 
combination, expressed a nature that had a universal meaning. Indeed one of 
his starting points was to assert that popular responses to and preconceptions 
about what people look like formed a folk science that would one day be 
elevated to a systematic level. He defined 'physiognomical sensation' as 
'those feelings which are produced at beholding certain countenances and the 
conjectures concerning the qualities of the mind, which are produced by the 
sta te  of such countenances, or of their portraits drawn or painted', and went 
on: 'Let any person, but for two days, remark all that he hears and reads 
among men, and he will every day hear and read .. .  "You might have read it in 
his eyes" -  "The look of the man is enough" -  "He has an honest countenance" 
-  . . .  "He has evil eyes" .. .  "He cannot look any person in the face" . . .  The 
v e ry  judgments that seem to militate against the sciences are but exceptions 
w hich  confirm the universality of physiognomical sensation.'77
None the less, the proliferation of popular treatises on physiognomy 
w hich  took Lavater as their starting point assumed that it conferred 
scientific credibility to already existing preconceptions. And a more 
elaborate version of a comparable self-fulfilling process was at work in the 
use of physiognomic portraiture for the definition and interpretation of 
insanity. Lavater had focussed on movable expression and posture as well as 
on facial structure in his analysis of the physiognomy of insanity. So did 
Pinel and Esquirol in their extensive use of the method (developed by 
Alexander Morison's Physiognomy of Insanity*) for classifying
psychopathological types, but all these methods relied on existing techniques 
of portraiture. This use of physiognomic portraiture thus helped to fix the 
insane in asylums as specimens of themselves to be deciphered by the
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investigating gaze which 'fixed and rendered permanent that which might 
have passed away', since the artistic representation of forms became the 
referential model shaping the perception of individuals, a process which 
gained a compatible though different kind of legitimacy as medical 
photography evolved out of photographic portraiture while claiming that it 
fixed the image as a trace of the real.7*
But the interpretation of physiognomic signs was also developed as a 
means of going against the grain  of established representational conventions, 
establishing the authority of an aesthetic that stressed m ultiplicity, 
eccentricity, even grotesqueness, to be on a continuum with normality, not a 
morbid deviation from it . Charles Bell's Essay on the Anatomy of Expression 
in Painting (1806) had echoed 'eighteenth century' images of madness, 
stressing its animality and placing the mad half way up the hierarchical chain 
of being by extending existing conventions, but Darwin later interpreted this 
in The Expression of the Em otions to mean that insanity signified a more 
intense kind of human emotion, which le~d to his argument that the most 
human of expressions are those which have the closest animal equivalents.79 
Bell's work also provided an im portant reference point for Pre-Raphaelite 
aesthetics. Holman Hunt recommended The Anatomy and Philosophy of 
Expression as Connected w ith  the Five A rts to Millais in 1848, and both 
employed Bell's physiognomic methods as one means of developing a 
naturalism that broke with the 'artificiality' of received conventions as a 
means of developing their own. Bell's technique and theory of anatomy was 
in many respects compatible w ith  the principles that Ruskin outlined in 
Modern Painters; that truth to  nature might invoke an ideal but that this did 
not demand a passive idealism o f representation -  that that 'truth' consisted 
precisely in the expression o f violent, subtle and complex emotions.*® 
Collins's use of the 'physiognomic sensation' runs through a spectrum at one
56
end of which is simple debunking. 'The personal appearance of Miss Wigger', 
comments the narrator in The Ev il Genius, 'might have suggested a modest 
distrust of his own abilities to Lavater, when that self-sufficient man wrote 
his book on physiognomy. Whatever betrayal of her inner self her face might 
have presented in the distant time when she was young was now overlaid by a 
surface of flabby fat which, assisted by green spectacles, kept the virtues (or 
v ices) of this woman's nature a profound secret u ntil she opened her lips.'81 
B ut it is generally used to qualify expectations of a  revealed self, and this 
takes place in a cultural context in which physiognomy operated as a cipher 
w hich itself had various kinds of interpretative uses and meanings.
Phrenology was sometimes described as a subdivision of physiognomy, 
but although, like physiognomy, it  claimed to offer a  means of reading latent 
character in manifest physical signs, it used interpretative devices which 
offered a contrasting analysis not only of the meaning of appearance, but also 
o f the workings of the consciousness and the constitution of identity. 
Physiognomy saw the face and body as an expressive mask on which the inner 
dram a of identity was stamped, an essential self, but one that could be 
moulded and modified by experience and history. Th u s  Bell stressed that the 
face could express a wide range of intense emotions, and suggested a process 
o f  projection was essential to interpret its dynam ic meaning. This point 
about the flexibility of the significance of physiognomy was also made by E.S. 
Dallas in The Cornhill in 1861.82 Phrenology, o n  the other hand, was 
interested in the skull, the surface of the brain, as an index of different 
organs which signified different psychological propensities, localised, but 
juxtaposed, like interacting pieces of a mosaic. It w as first developed at the 
end of the eighteenth century by the Viennese physician Franz Joseph Gall as 
a theory of the brain and a science of character based, as Roger Cooler has 
explained, on the following tenets: '(i) the brain is th e  organ of the mind; (ii)
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the brain is not a homogenous unity but an aggregate of mental organs; (iii) 
these mental organs or physical faculties are topographically localised into 
specific functions; (iv ) other factors being equal, the relative size of any one 
of the mental organs can be taken as an index to that organ's power of 
manifestation; and (v ) since the skull ossifies over the brain during infant 
development, external craniological means can be used to diagnose the 
internal state of the mental faculties'.*3
In England phrenology was popularised by George Combe, an ambitious 
Edinburgh lawyer, who drew on the ideas of Gall's pupil, J .G . Spurzheim, and 
whose Constitution of Man became the fourth most popular book of the 
second third of the nineteenth century, after the Bible, The Pilgrim's
9U
Progress and Betteredge's handbook Robinson Crusoe. Th e  Constitution of 
Man was both a treatise on the structure and function of the brain and a 
manual of proper living, self-management and moral conduct; and phrenology 
achieved an immensely powerful authority during the first half of the 
nineteenth century both as a liberating, radical kind of knowledge of the self 
that could be made a part o f  a Utopian science of society, and as a more 
utilitarian model of containment, classification and control. Combe's 
topography made a basic distinction between 'Feelings' and Intellectual 
Faculties'. The feeling category was subdivided into 'propensities', including 
amativeness, combativeness, acquisitiveness, secretiveness; and 'sentiments', 
such as self-esteem, pride, covetousness, veneration. The intellectual 
faculties subdivided into 'external senses', 'faculties which perceive 
existence', and 'faculties w hich perceive the existence of external objects'.®* 
Each individual character was constituted from the combination of these 
faculties and propensities -  personality traits could be accounted for by the 
over or under development of particular organs. It was phrenology's claim to 
scientific accuracy that was criticised by Dallas in 1861; 'Every faculty of
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the mind had its principality on the brow .. .  Here was W it castled high on the 
head ... Murder lurked behind the ear; Love sought the shady reaches of the 
back hair .. . It was a strange topography and it was a s till stranger psychology 
... There was no doubt or ambiguity about the system . . .  Phrenology makes a 
pretence of science, affects precision and leaps to  conclusions.'*6 But 
earlier, though it was claimed that each organ had a function and a meaning, 
this did not necessarily mean that the head constituted a natural language. 
Rather, it made up a precise sign system that could be read by the skilled 
observer: 'No sphere of speculation is more beset w ith difficulties than this', 
Combe argued in considering how to read the cu ltu ra l significance of 
expression in Phrenology Applied to Painting and Sculpture, 'and in none are 
the judgments formed by the different observers of the  same subject more 
strikingly various, or more frequently contradictory'.87
Phrenology also provided the means of classifying insane types and the 
terms for arguing for the possibility of reforming them that had an important 
bearing on nineteenth-century psychology. Andrew C om be had argued in 
Observations on Mental Derangement in 1831 that 'm ental derangement is 
always symptomatic of cerebral disease', but this was m odified in the context 
of a general theory of personality and society which explained insanity or 
criminality in terms of the over or under development of particular 
emotional, intellectual and moral propensities, which d ire c tly  contributed to 
the framework of moral management.88 Spurzheim had stressed the adaptive 
qualities of the various faculties: 'I am intimately convinced that no faculty 
itself can be bad, and that all the innate powers of man have some aim', and 
this is taken up by Th e  Zoist: 'If all criminals are objects of pity let us feel it
89our duty to ameliorate their character and not to strangle them.' Many of 
the superintendents of county asylums and advocates o f moral management, 
including William Ellis, John Conolly, W .A .F . Browne, Forbes Winslow and
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Daniel Noble, were active members of phrenological societies.^® Phrenology 
always had an uneasy relation to the orthodox scientific establishment, but 
its presuppositions shaped the terms of the debates on the relationship 
between structure, function and adaptation that would be developed in mid­
nineteenth century social and psychological theory. Certain elements, too, 
contributed to the development of neurophysiology during the second half of 
the nineteenth century -  particularly the w ork of Pierre Broca, J .H . Jackson 
and David Ferrier, whom Collins cites in H e art and Science in 1883.^* And it 
interacted with early nineteenth century development of associationist 
psychology and sensationist philosophy and the analysis of the structure and 
workings of the nervous system, which investigated how sensations and 
perceptions became impressed on the mind, how they became thoughts and 
feelings.
Locke, whom Conolly took as his starting-point in Indications of 
Insanity, had argued that all knowledge and a ll experience sprang from the 
combination of perceptions and sensations caused by external stimuli. These 
could be combined or associated to produce complex ideas in different ways: 
by combination into one compound, by the juxtaposition of two ideas to 
connect them by resemblance without uniting them, and by separating ideas 
and perceptions and thus forming abstractions. Thus madness or derangement 
consisted, we have seen, in joining ideas together wrongly, or forming an 
error of judgement, but Locke also argued that to a large extent the 
association process took place automatically, or unconsciously, and could 
easily produce a bizarre or unexpected complex of thoughts: T h is  wrong 
connection in our Minds of Ideas in themselves, loose and independent of one 
another, has such an Influence, and is of so great force as to set us awry in 
our Actions, as well as Moral as Natural Passions, Reasonings and Notions 
themselves, that there is not any one thing that deserves to be more looked
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after'. David Hartley's Observations of Man -  His Frame, D uty  and 
Expectations (1749) shifted the emphasis away from Locke's epistemological 
abstraction and introspection, and towards an analysis of the relationship 
between the workings of the cognitive faculties and the operation of physical 
vibrations along a continuum between the nerves and the brain. For H a rtle y , 
there was a relationship of repetitive association between ideas, sensations
and muscular reflexes and motions, which linked these with abstract faculties 
93such as memory, imagination and will.
M ill, Bain and Spencer's work emerged from  this intellectual tradition, 
but associationist theory was elaborated in a context that had a direct 
bearing on early nineteenth-century physiological psychology in the complex 
interconnections between medicine and philosophy in late eighteenth-century 
Edinburgh. Robert Whytt's work on nervous disorders attempted to narrow  
the vague use of the term down to hysteria and hypochondria, as products of 
the 'unnatural sensibility of the nerves', and the breakdown of the working of 
a delicate web of fibres that connected the brain and the nervous system, a 
skein of sympathies in which 'nothing makes more sudden and surprising 
changes in the body than the several passions of the mind'. He emphasised 
that extreme physical sensations were reactions to intense emotions, and 
usually served 'the principle of preservation, without which we should cherish 
within our bodies such causes as would often end in our r u i n ' . S u c h  theories 
of sensibility and sympathies had an important bearing on the work of e arly  
advocates of moral management such as Thomas Arnold and John Haslam, 
while interpretations of associationist philosophy developed by Thom as 
Brown, DugoJd Stewart and William Hamilton emphasised the connections, as 
well as the distinctions, between chains of association as the basis not only of 
imagination but of all new kinds of thought and knowledge. Stew art 
emphasised that the power of the mind to arrange thoughts in new
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combinations, drawing on dreaming and fantasy, was the basis of humour, 
poetry and science, but his work is cited by Pritchard to demonstrate, as 
Conolly did, that insanity involved a suspension of the power of correct 
association.95
John Abercrombie's Inquiries Concerning the Intellectual Powers and 
the Investigation of Truth  (1830) and Conolly's Indications of Insanity each 
provided a synthesis and development of these ideas that became an 
important reference point for mid-nineteenth century psychological debates 
though Conolly was more specifically concerned w ith  the problematic 
analysis of insanity.9* As its title  implied, Intellectual Powers combined a 
complex epistemological discussion of the nature of knowledge, of how to 
distinguish true and false reason and establish 'intellectual power over the 
self', with a more descriptive psychological investigation, so that there is a 
continual tension between the analysis of different associative mechanisms, 
including dream and delusion, and a concern to distinguish between real and 
false perceptions. Following Brown, Abercrombie makes an important 
distinction between simple and relative associations, which implied that
associations should be classified according to whether they were made 
97voluntarily. Under voluntary associations, or memory, he separates 'natural 
or philosophical', 'local or incidental' and 'arbitrary or fictitious' associations, 
and argues that the 'culture and improvement of the attention and memory' 
consists in learning 'habits of correct association', a point also emphasised by 
C o nolly .* '
This had an important bearing on Abercrombie's analysis of dreaming, 
where 'the ideas or images in the mind follow one another according to 
associations over which we have no control'.99 He reiterates a widespread 
ambivalence between fascination with the mental processes that dreaming 
represented, as endlessly recounted through vivid case histories, while pulling
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back from active interpretation of the mechanisms at work within the dreams 
themselves, seeing them instead as aberrant, or morbid states of 
consciousness. Both Abercrombie and Robert MacNish, whose Philosophy of 
Sleep (1830) was one of the most important phrenological analyses of 
dreaming, stress that dreaming is both ’a suspension of the judgment' and 'an 
active state of memory, imagination etc.'.*®® It is thus a threat to the 
consciousness, while at the same time representing a particular kind of 
thinking process by allowing forgotten or hidden associations to emerge. 'It is 
undoubtedly owing to the faculty, sometimes possessed by sleep, of renewing 
long forgotten ideas, that persons have had long forgotten facts 
communicated to them in dream s',1®1 MacNish pointed out, and Abercrombie 
outlined distinct kinds of dream association: recent events and emotions 
mixed up with each other and with past ones 'though in other respects they 
were entirely unconnected'; 'trains of images brought up by association with 
bodily sensations'; 'dreams consisting in the revival of old associations, 
repeating things which had entirely passed out of mind, and which seemed to 
have been forgotten'; and dreams which embody a strong 'propensity of 
character or a strong mental emotion' and are fulfilled apparently by 
coincidence.*®2 This explanation of the premonitory or prophetic power of 
dreams is taken up by John Addington Symonds, Sleep and Dreams (1851).103
Symonds takes Abercrombie's stress on the need to  be able to 
distinguish between reality and fantasy as his starting point, by arguing that 
in sleep images 'do not arise with the stamp of the past upon them, as in our 
waking hours, and they are combined together in fantastic associations 
without any control of the w ill', but goes on to suggest that the line between 
fantasy and reality is constantly shifting in accordance with the different 
kinds of associative processes at work in dreaming.*®<> Moreover, although 
dreams do not have a literal cognitive or prescient meaning, and most cases
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of dream prophecy can be ascribed to coincidence, they can nonetheless 
express emotional predispositions that can reinforce their obsessive hold in a 
way that determines their own outcome: 'Some dreams work their own 
fulfilment. The mind vehemently possessed of an idea thus received, almost 
instinctively acts up to  i t . '10^ This is one starting point for Collins's complex 
manipulation of theories of dreams and delusions.
Physiological dream  theory was more interested in identifying the 
alternative associative processes at work in dreaming than in actively 
interpreting their internal structure or significance. As dreams, too, taking 
place during regular sleep, they provided a safer access to unconscious 
thought than the m ore disruptive phenomena of somnambulism and 
hallucination, where hidden aspects of the self and traces of the past made 
unsolicited intrusions o n  the present, and on the conscious mind's ability to 
regulate its own associations. Hallucination or 'spectral illusion' was a 
relatively clear-cut phenomenon, in which, Symonds argued, 'individuals turn 
out to be the subject o f  a peculiar nervous disorder, that destroys the balance 
between the perceptive and conceptive faculties'.106 Materialist 
explanations of 'ghosts' had become widely established by the mid-nineteenth 
century -  'On Visions and Dreams' in Fraser's Magazine in 1862, for example, 
cites Ferriar's Sketch Tow ards a Theory' of Apparitions (1813) as well as 
Abercrombie, in distinguishing between optical illusions and the projection of 
subjective images, and notes: 'Any state of excitem ent, sensibility or 
irritation, may make our mental concepts take a phantom shape ... and 
considering that all our thoughts are visions, it is only a wonder that we are 
not more haunted by spectres than we are.'107 But the state described by the 
term 'double consciousness' -  a state of trance or somnambulism where 
subjects would express repressed desires, long forgotten abilities or memories 
-  opened up a set of questions that could not be adequately resolved within
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phrenological or associationist frameworks, except as states of partial 
insanity and the product of the physical divisions of the mind. Double 
consciousness was 'only the alteration of healthy and morbid conditions of 
mind*, Symonds argued, 'even though in the m orbid state there might be 
achievements of memory and the other mental facilities not attained to in 
the waking condition', while Abercrombie, fo llow ing Combe and MacNish, 
noted the phenomenon, but did not attempt to explain it.*®*
It was in the development and discussion of mesmerism, or animal 
magnetism, that the meaning of these aberrant states, reached through 
'artificial somnambulism' or induced trance, could be discussed in a way that 
connected discussion of nervous disorders with a broader theory of the psyche 
and saw unconscious and 'morbid* states as providing a clue to the regular 
workings of the mind. But they were entangled debates, in which discussion 
of the phenomenon itself was inseparable from disputes over the validity of 
its claims to credibility, and on the nature of the  power that it was thought 
to  manifest -  power of the mesmeriser over the mesmerised as well as of the 
'sensitive subjects' themselves. The problem, as 'What is Mesmerism?* in 
Blackwoods in 1851 stressed, was how 'to lay down accurately what is claimed 
fo r it -  not vaguely, as I find it  in letters and lectures, where that which is 
asserted at one time as its power is denied at another; but to speak clearly of 
its congruent powers or asserted powers, w ithout vacillation; then to follow 
these powers to their consequences -  their necessary consequences -  if they 
be powers at all; and to draw conclusions arising from  the two natures upon 
which it works -  or perhaps is worked upon -  m ate ria lity  and spirituality*.109 
Mesmerism could be used to support widely differing theories -  of the self, of 
the nature of derangement, and of reality. A t  tim e s it could almost function 
as a 'wild' term around which opponents and adherents alike clustered, using
it or refuting it to advance their own positions in a variety of ways, and in a 
variety of cultural contexts.
Mesmerism, or animal magnetism, made its original cultural and 
political impact in pre-revolutionary France, when Franz Anton M esmer 
arrived from Vienna in 1778, and a year later published Sur la Decouverte du 
Magnetisme Animal. Mesmer's discovery claimed to offer a simultaneously 
utopian and scientific model that illustrated a connection between the body 
and the surrounding world; a cure for physical and psychic ills and thus a 
prescription for social harmony -  and to that extent it formed a link w ith , and 
rearticulation of, much older transcendental and vitalist concepts. He argued 
that a universal energy, force or fluid 'of an incomparably rarified nature ', 
existed, which ebbed and flowed according to precise laws, and which form ed 
'a mutual influence between the Heavenly bodies, the Earth, and A n im ate  
Bodies'.11® And since all material and organic substances were governed by 
these laws, understanding them could form the basis for an all-em bracing 
theory of influence and control. Diseases, above all nervous disorders, were 
caused by the misdirection of this energy, or 'fluid', through the body, w hich 
worked in an analogous w ay to a magnet. Massaging the body's 'poles' would 
induce a crisis involving trance or somnambulism, and the patient would pass 
through this to a state of harmony and health.111
Mesmer maintained that the magnetic force was a material power, but 
it  was often interpreted and described in terms that blurred the boundaries 
between the physical and the metaphysical, the literal and the metaphorical, 
in its original inception, and more markedly in its impact in England from  the 
late 1830s where its cognitive ambiguity both contributed to and sprang fro m  
its increasingly marginalised scientific and medical status. Yet mesmerism 
grew out of, even as it challenged, mainstream physiological psychology in 
England, and reflected as w ell as questioned its concerns. Dickens's close
66
friend John Elliotson's development of artificial somnambulism to disclose 
and cure nervous disorders grew  directly out of his physiological interest in 
phrenology as a model for social harmony and self-regulation. He founded 
and was the first president of the Phrenological Society in 1824, and in 1843 
founded The Zoist: A  Journal o f Cerebral Physiology and Mesmerism and 
their Application to  Human W elfare, which combined discussion of the 
medical use of mesmerism (to  enable painless operations and to cure specific 
disorders) with phrenological discussions about the propensity to crime and 
insanity and the need for m oral tre a tm e n t.* ^  Like Mesmer's follower 
Puysegur in France, Elliotson used strictly empirical criteria of certification, 
and it was partly for this reason that he concentrated so much on case studies 
and displays of mesmerism e fficacy. They were displays, however, that 
served to compound its disreputable status as occult trickery in the eyes of 
the medical and scientific establishment.113
Elliotson had first developed the technique of artificial somnambulism 
in the treatment of nervous disorder in the late 1830s in the course of his 
work at University College Hospital, using it as a means of treatment based 
on the premise that the trance could precipitate and prefigure the course of 
an illness and thereby hasten the process of cure. Th is  method, however, was 
developed as a means of divining extraordinary psychic powers, and of 
controlling the states of mind opened up by the manipulated 'double 
consciousness' -  culminating in clairvoyance, which Elliotson considered to be 
magnetism's most developed stage. His outline of this process in Human 
Physiology (which he amended in the fifth edition in 1840 to include a 
defence of mesmerism) follows a summary of conventional theories of dreams 
and double consciousness, but goes on to quote G a ll in maintaining that 'all 
the nervous system is an identity and a totality -  a pure transparence without 
cloud, an infinite expansion w ithout bounds or obstacles', linking this with
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Dugald Stewart's point that it was the fact that mesmerism worked that was 
important, not how it worked.114> Elliot son was attacked w ith  growing rigour 
by medical and academic authorities nonetheless, culm inating in the scandal 
surrounding his treatment of the Okey sisters, which combined the exhibition 
of the medical use of the mesmeric trance with demonstrations of 'ecstatic 
delirium' and its clairvoyant powers. Here charges of sexual manipulation, 
the abuse of medical power and pseudo scientific imposture merged together. 
The Lancet took a particularly vehement line in attacking Elliotson, who 
resigned his position at University College in 1838.115
It was mesmerism's ambiguity, and its variety of possible uses as a 
language to invoke processes of dominance and subordination, hidden forces 
within the self, traces of the past, links between the body and the 
environment and the transference of identity which contributed to its 
attraction for writers such as Dickens, B u lw er-Lytto n, Browning and 
Collins.*16 For Collins this culminates in Th e  Moonstone, where mesmeric 
methods are simultaneously exploited and scrutinised in the context of a 
complex narrative investigation of the workings of the unconscious and the 
cognitive processes through which it can be known. The novel was published 
in the year that Elliotson died, and Collins was too young to  be caught up in 
the movement to the extent that Dickens and Bulw er-Lytto n  were, though he 
would have been clearly familiar with it through his friendship with Dickens, 
whom he accompanied on a visit to the de la Rues (Madame de la Rue was 
magnetised by Dickens for hysterical attacks) in Genoa in  1853.117 During 
the previous year, too, he had written a series of short reports of private 
mesmeric displays -  'Magnetic Evenings at Home' for Th e  Leader: 'Here was 
some strange influence working on the intellectual faculties, the nerves, and 
the whole vital principle -  the question is -  How did it w ork? I cannot tell . . .  
I have a thinking machine about me, commonly called a 'brain' -  by what
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process is it set working? What power, when F am asleep, when m y will is 
active and I am awake?'1** G .H . Lewes replied in 'The Fallacy of 
Clairvoyance', stressing that mesmerism could largely be explained as 
autosuggestion and that 'the fallacy of clairvoyance is, I take it, the 
interpretation of a dreaming power for a seeing power'.119 In reply, Collins 
emphasised that he wished 'to vindicate the special experiment ... as a 
genuine experiment'.*2®
Lewes's point that mesmerism was able to work because of the 
heightened suggestibility of its sensitive subjects was taken up by those who 
developed its techniques as well as those who opposed its claims.*2 * James 
Braid had developed many of Elliotson's hypotheses, but denied the existence 
of a material 'fluid' and developed the practice of hypnotism, which stressed 
the importance of suggestibility in a way that would be taken up in Paris by 
Charcot, who developed the technique as a means of probing the unconscious 
causes of neurotic symptoms.*22 These were different interpretations of the 
unconscious state disclosed by mesmerism and the sense of a continuous, 
coherent personal identity. The concept of suggestibility, for example, was 
reiterated by William Carpenter in Mesmerism, Spiritualism, e tc  in 1877, 
where he argued that the trance arose from  'a special rapport between the 
"mesmeriser" and his "subject"; and that this was clearly explicable by the 
"expectancy" under which the subject passed into the state of second 
consciousness', to reinforce Braid's point that there was no difference 
between mesmerism and hypnotism.*2^ This, however, developed out of his 
own theory of 'unconscious cerebration' and its role in the shaping of identity. 
Carpenter, like Elliotson, founded his career in the development of cerebral 
physiology, but it took a mainstream course and by the mid nineteenth 
century he had become, with Bain, a leading figure of physiological
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psychology, reassessing associationist psychology in relation to evolutionary 
. h « r y . 12'
In Carpenter's psychology, as in Bain and Spencer's, associationist
methods and presuppositions about the individual consciousness have a
homologous relationship to collective, social and organic processes of change,
but in a way that emphasised the importance of linear continuity between
past and present in analysing the workings of memory and the significance of
unconscious states. In The Foundations of a Creed, G .H . Lewes argued that
traces of the past were always present in the self, but unevenly and
discontinuous!)-, and that the mind could not be seen in isolation from the
social organism nor reduced to individual perception and sensation: 'The mind
is not a passive recipient of external impulses but an active co-operant ... It
is a variable mechanism which has a history. What the senses inscribe on it
are not merely changes in the external world, but these characters of
preceding inscriptions. The sensitive subject is no tabula rasa. .. .  but a
palimpsest'. 12^ However, in Principles of Mental Physiology (1879) developed
from a section of the earlier Principles of Human Physiology (1899),.
Carpenter's model of the self as layers of past impressions draws different
implications. H e  cites Abercrombie in his analysis of memory and its role in
forming the sense of personal identity, but argues that the principle of
association can be extended to include unconscious memory:
And as our ideas are thus linked in 'trains' or 'series' 
which further inosculate with each other like the 
branch line of a railway .. .  so .. .  an idea which has 
been 'hidden in the obscure recesses of the mind' for 
years -  perhaps for a lifetime -  and which seems to 
have faded completely out of the conscious memory, 
may be reproduced, as by the touching of a spring, 
through a nexus of suggestions, which we can 
sometimes trace-out continuously, but of which it does 
not seem necessary that all the intermediate steps 
should fall within our cognisance. *26
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He goes on to argue that 'there must be in addition a recognition of the 
reproduced state of consciousness'. This 'consciousness of agreement 
between the present and our past mental experiences, constitutes the basis of 
our feeling of personal identity'.*27 Carpenter therefore argues that 
although the process of association in recall might be an erratic one, the 
reappropriation of the past through recognition is essential for personal 
coherence. This affects his analysis of unconscious activity , those forms of 
reflexive, or automatic action, which, like the 'double consciousness' are 
never fully recognised by the consciousness, and thus emerge like a 
'succession of fantasies presented to us in the play of the Im agination'.128 
This 'unconscious cerebration' is both powerful and threatening because it 
directly affects the formation of emotional states without the intervention of 
conscious memory or will:
Here again, it would seem as if the material organ of 
those Feelings tends to form itself in according to the 
impressions habitually made upon it} which may be 
completely unaware of the changes which have taken 
place in it, as we are by those by which passing events 
have been registered in our memory, until some 
circumstance calls forth the unconscious 
manifestation, which is the 'reflex' of the new 
condition which the organ has acquired. And it is 
desirable, in this connection, to recall the fact that 
the Emotional state seems often to  be determined by 
circumstances of which the individual has no 
Ideational consciousness, and especially of the 
emotional states of those by whom he is surrounded; a 
mode of influence that acts with particular potency on 
the minds of Children, and which is most important to 
their Moral education. I **
This forms the starting point for a set of ideas which are put to  complicated 
use in The Moonstone.
Carpenter represented the dominant strand of the analysis of 
unconscious states, but the significance of both connections and breaks 
between them was developed in E.S. Dallas's extraordinary and eclectic 
analysis of the internal workings of the unconscious and the way it  produces
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aesthetic pleasure, and which was part of a broader analysis of the social role 
of literature w ith in  a process of historical change. The Gay Science. Dallas 
drew on an enormous range of philosophical and psychological debates in 
developing ’a science of the laws of pleasure', but in particular he developed 
his former teacher William Hamilton's analysis to stress the dynamic process 
of latent thought, in a way that brings together the language of dreaming, 
abnormal psychic states and metaphorical transformation in poetry, to 
elaborate his concept of the 'hidden soul' and of 'the play of thought'.1'50 He 
argues that the imagination consists in a symbolising capacity that echoes the 
workings of the  unconscious: 'a secret flow of thought which is not less 
energetic than the conscious flow, an absent mind that haunts us like a ghost 
or like a dream and is an essential part of our lives'.*5*
Like C arpe n ter, Dallas notes that 'the mind never forgets', but in his 
analysis a lost recollection is neither simply a missing link in a chain of 
associations, nor a threatening force to disrupt present coherence, but a 
necessary stage in  the production of all new significance. He argues that the 
boundaries between conscious and unconscious can never be drawn: 'Between 
the outer and the inner ring, between our conscious and unconscious 
existence, there is a free and constant but unobserved traffic forever carried 
on. When the am ount of thought flows from within our ken to beyond our ken 
we forget it, w e  know not what has become of it. A fte r a while it comes 
back to us changed and grown as if  it were a new thought and we know not 
whence it com es.'*5^ So while Dallas, like others, acknowledges the 
importance of m em ory in forming identity, it is in precisely those areas of 
consciousness th a t cannot be drawn back on a chain of logical associations 
that new ideas emerge through a process of metaphoric transformation, a 
process, however, whose productiveness lies in its very secrecy: 'It is 
memory, but it is memory automatic and unconscious. It is reason, but is the
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reason of the hidden soul .. . It is, in a word, the whole power of the mind, but 
it is that power working in secret.' In this way Dallas moves beyond the 
spatial and localised model of the m ind, and stresses how significance arises 
from the way in which the mind follow s the missing clues of the gaps and 
lapses of memory. It is this secrecy, too, that lies behind aesthetic pleasure, 
a pleasure that is essentially popular and can never be based on a boundary 
between higher and lower forms. Those psychic mechanisms of hidden 
transformation are common to fantasy in dreaming and in art and they are 
identified by what Dallas terms the weird; and it is this sense of the 
inexplicable or bizarre that makes a rt poetic rather than drama or beauty 
that lies behind art's 'appeal to the secret heart, to ally itself with unknown 
delights ... we always find that [the poetic] must pierce to the Hidden Soul 
and engage it in Hidden Pleasure'. * ^
Inheritance, Adaptation and Destiny
Collins's novels continually conjure with identity. The self is a stage on 
which others' preconceptions and perceptions are projected and enacted. It is 
a collection of external physical signs, and a subjectivity struggling to gain 
coherence, containing secret and forgotten traces. In Collins's novels, too, 
the self is always formed through the different kinds of legacies it inherits 
from the past through its family history which sets it in a network of obvious 
or hidden connections. The problem of how to know the past and how it 
shapes the future, together with the sense of 'something obscurely 
threatening ... which time was holding over our heads', is often linked with 
this mystery of how to place the individual within a family history and a 
fabric of social relations. And it is w ith  these motifs too -  lost children, the 
disclosure of illegitimate origins, the discovery of immediate or distant 
kinship -  that it is most clear that C o llin s is both drawing on a familiar stock 
of fictional conventions, while exploiting the connections that they suggest
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between the inheritance of property and identity, of wealth and morbid 
symptoms. Apparently irrational fears, anxiety about the future or the 
burden of an imaginary inheritance, are both real dangers and signs of 
monomania. Th e  sense of an impending fatality clashes with the 
manipulation o f coincidence, the notion that the only sure determinant is 
chance.
The concept of the hereditary transmission of insanity was not a new 
one at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but exactly w hat this meant 
and how predispositions might emerge was open to d ifferent kinds of 
interpretation and emphasis. Pritchard identified hereditary factors as one 
of the 'predisposing' physical causes of insanity, that could lie  dormant, or 
develop with the development of the individual or be excited by 
environmental causes.135 Thus changes of the environment might either 
exacerbate o r alleviate a hereditary predisposition, and during the first half 
of the nineteenth century hereditary predisposition was often seen as one 
factor amongst many that might lead to insanity. For the notion of 
'hereditary predisposition' focussed, indeed, on inheritance in  a way that 
suggested that continuous legacy itself was morbid. And though 'nervous 
disorders' m ight increase or be exacerbated by the frantic pace of modern 
life, mental m alady, leading to decline, was likely to be the legacy of the 
inbred upper classes as much as the excesses of the unruly working class.
Feudal stagnancy, the weight of an unchanging past, thus bred a 
decadence w hich  might lead to physical or mental degeneration. 'It is of 
little  real im portance whether it be a predisposition or the malady itself, 
which descends and becomes hereditary', noted George M an Burrows in 
Commentaries on Insanity in 1828. 'But no fact is more incontrovertibly 
established than that insanity is more susceptible of being propagated; or, in 
other words, th a t a specific morbid condition sometimes exists in  the human
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constitution, which, by intermarriage .. .  m ay be perpetuated ad infinitum.' 
The idea is assumed to have gained a widespread currency in 'Idiots Again' in 
Household Words, which stressed how apparent mental defectiveness among 
paupers is often the result of malnutrition and can be alleviated by nurturing, 
but which opened: 'People whose ancestors came in at the Conquest, are apt 
to have one idea overruling all others -  that nobody is worthy of their alliance 
whose ancestors did not come in at the Conquest. O f course, this has been an 
idea ever since the Conquest began to be considered an old event; and, of 
course, there have been fewer and few er families who had a right to it . Of 
course, also, those families have interm arried, and the intermarriage has 
been more and more restricted. Another "of course" follows, on which we 
need not enlarge . . . '^ 37
But by the 1860s the concept of continuous inheritance had become 
reinterpreted within evolutionary theory, which focussed on the relationship 
of the individual to the collective species as much as the family and on the 
interrelationship between the structure of the organism, its function, and its 
mode of adaptation. Not descent alone but descent with modification was 
emphasised now, and with it the question of whether characteristics which 
had been acquired by adaptation to the environment could be inherited by 
succeeding generations; questions which had a significant bearing on the 
implications of the ways in which organic metaphors were deployed to 
conceptualise social forms, divisions and processes of change. The 
widespread discussion of Darwin's On the O rig in  of the Species by Means of 
Natural Selection following its publication in 1859 is the clearest indication 
of how crucially evolutionary ideas permeated and transformed mid­
nineteenth century culture. But w riters extrapolated from Darwin in 
different ways and for very dissimilar reasons, and Darwin's work itself grew 
out of a complex intellectual context. In Darwin's theory of natural selection
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the role of chance is a crucial determinant in the evolutionary process; he 
stresses the uneven and contradictory process of evolution through a process 
of adaptation and modification that drew on and combined disparate and 
anomalous elements. But this took place in a cultural context that 
emphasised the progressivist assumptions that Darwin's theory questioned, 
and which drew on the ideas of his predecessor Lamarck who, w ith  von Baer, 
had argued that evolution was marked by the increasing d rive  towards 
differentiation and complexity, and that modification took place as a result 
of the inheritance of acquired characteristics which thus became structural 
features.138
This had an important bearing, for example, on the w ay in which 
Herbert Spencer incorporated evolutionary concepts into his social and 
psychological theory; it was he, not Darwin, who coined the term  'survival of 
the fittest' in Social Statics in 1851.* * Spencer's psychological theory had 
been developed in the intellectual frameworks of phrenology and 
associationism, and although he modified these, as Carpenter did, to take 
account of evolutionary ideas, to focus on long-term  processes o f change and 
on the nature of the relationship between the internal structure  of the 
organism and the environment, his theory of adaptation retained all the 
moralistic and prescriptive attributes of the phrenological traditio n  that he 
sought to replace. Like Darwin, and Lewes, Spencer refuted teleological or 
humanistic explanations of change, but his work did not echo their 
epistemological challenges, and his organic model extrapolated fro m  a social 
one to naturalise a competitive, individualist ideology. W hile Lewes 
developed organkqt theory selectively and dialectically to explain social and 
psychological structures, Spencer's use of Lamarck and von Baer's principles 
had particular implications for his social theory, overturning ce rta in  aspects 
of earlier progressive liberalism and reinforcing others.
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The first of these principles, that progress was marked by increasing 
complexity -  a complexity marked by increasing differentiation -  meant that 
perpetuating social and sexual divisions, separating fit and unfit, became its 
in-built feature, universally applicable across all practices: 'This law of 
organic progress is the law of all progress', he argued in 'Progress, Its Law 
and Cause', 'whether it be in the development of the Earth, in the 
development of life upon its surface, in the development of Society, of 
Government, of Commerce, of Language . . .  this same evolution from the 
simple to the complex, through successive differentiations, holds throughout'; 
and this underpinned his argument that willed endeavour could become an 
element of evolution. But the second principle, that evolution took the 
form of 'the continuous adjustment of internal relations to  external relations', 
or that environment determines the individual organism and thus becomes an 
organic feature which can be passed on to successive generations, turned 
environment into a force of destiny.14,1 Psychical transmission also followed 
this path of organic evolution through the inheritance of acquired nervous 
tendencies; Spencer argued in Th e  Principles of Psychology: 'Hereditary 
transmission ... applies not only to physical, but to psychical peculiarities. It 
is not simply that a modified form of constitution produced by new habits of 
life, is bequeathed to future generations; but it is that the modified nervous 
tendencies produced by such new habits of life, are also bequeathed: and if 
the new habits of life become permanent, the tendencies become 
permanent.' It was this determinism, combined with reinterpretations of 
the evolutionary paradigm, that contributed to theories of degeneration at 
the end of the nineteenth century.
The apparent growth of insanity with modern life had been the worrying 
concomitant of progress since the late eighteenth century and an anxious 
undercurrent of moral management, though it  was also pointed out that it
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was the methods of classification that had expanded rather than the numbers 
143of the insane themselves. In his article on 'Lunatic Asylums' in 1857, 
Andrew Wynter stressed that 'mental ruin springs rather from mental 
torpidity than from mental stimulation', but against a growing fear that 
'lunacy is on the increase': 'Is it true that civilization has called to life a 
monster such as that which appalled Frankenstein? Is it a necessity of 
progress that it  shall ever be accompanied by that fearful black rider which, 
like Despair, sits behind it? Does mental development mean increased 
mental decay?' Over the next twenty years, specific debates on insanity 
absorbed and helped to shape the terms of an organicist social theory that 
overturned its earlier progressivist assumptions, replacing it w ith a concept 
of degeneration which by the 1880s had become almost a ubiquitous feature 
of biological, psychological and social theory. John Conolly's son in law, 
Henry Maudsley, was the most influential advocate of degenerative theories 
of insanity in Britain, and replaced the earlier hopes of moral management 
with the Nemesis of a resistless Fate: ' . . .  that dread, inexorable destiny 
which has so great and grand a part in Grecian tragedy, and which Grecian 
heroes manfully contended against, although fore-knowing that they were 
inevitably doomed to defeat, was in some degree an embodiment of the deep 
feeling of the inevitable dependence of a man's present being on his 
antecedents in the past'.1<>5 This was reinforced in the context of the 
growing social, economic and political divisions of the late nineteenth 
century, as the concept of degeneration gained a new legitim ation by 
reinterpretations of the earlier 'Development H ypothesis'.*^ E. Ray 
Lancaster, in particular, argued in Degeneration in 1880 that some species 
represented not advanced versions of their earlier selves but atrophied forms 
of higher species, atrophy being defined as 'a gradual change in the structure, 
in which the organism becomes adapted to less varied and less complex 
conditions'.1^  This overturned one aspect of Spencer's emphasis on progress
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being marked by differentiation, but not that acquired characteristics were 
transmitted, and now perceptions of social development involved not simply 
differentiating social divisions; the 'unfit' now were fit for their simple and 
degraded environment, and could flourish there in ever increasing numbers. 
It was this new paradigm which came to dominate social theory, above all 
determining the perception of the 'residuum' flourishing at the heart of the 
nether world of a divided London. ****
Maudsley's theories directly contributed to this model, but they did so 
by focussing on those particularly vulnerable points in the process of 
adaptation and transmission -  pauper lunatics and nervous women -  drawing 
on perceptions that had already been established by the mid nineteenth 
century. In particular Maudsley was influenced by French psychopathologists 
B.A . Morel and Jacques Moreau. Morel's Treatise on the Physical, 
Intellectual and Moral Degeneracy of the Human Race had argued in 1857 
that the simultaneously physical and moral taint of degeneration was 
triggered by environment and accumulated through descent: 'The first 
generation of a degenerate family might be merely nervous, the second would 
tend to be neurotic, the third psychotic, while the fourth consisted of idiots 
149and died out'. Maudsley modified this, stressing that idiocy was
'manufactured' by successive breeding and intemperate moral conditions: 
'Idiocy is, indeed a manufactured article .. .  Many cases are distinctly 
traceable to parental intemperance and excess ... Insanity in the parent may 
issue in idiocy in the offspring, which is, so to speak, the natural form of 
mental degeneracy when it goes unchecked through generations.'*50 Morel 
saw the insane as atavistic throwbacks -  'morbid deviations from a primitive 
human type'*5* -  and while Maudsley also follows Darwin, and cites Esquirol 
in arguing that in madness 'man is seen in all his nakedness ... he lends not to 
his passions the chart** which seduces, nor to his uicss the appearance which
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deceives', he follows Morel in stressing the essentially morbid nature of 
madness by extending Pritchard's concept of moral insanity. ^  The 
boundary between madness and crime is now completely removed, both are 
seen as simultaneously compounded by morbid city  conditions. Thus in 
Responsibility in Mental Disease he fuses the insane and the casual poor into 
a single image of a pathological otherness: 'A  distinct criminal class of 
beings, who herd together in our large cities in a thieves' quarter, giving 
themselves up to intemperance, rioting in debauchery, without regard to 
m arriage ties or the basis of consanguinity, and propagating a criminal 
population of degenerate beings.' This class constitutes 'a degenerate and 
m orbid variety of mankind, marked by peculiar low physical and mental 
characteristics'.15"5 These symptoms include, in a reinterpretation of 
physiognomic conventions, such signs of degeneration, as 'an irregular and 
unsym m etrical conformation of the head, a want of regularity and harmony 
of the features ... malformations of the external ear are sometimes observed 
.. .  There  are fits, grimaces, and other spasmodic movements of the muscles 
of the face ... In other cases there are peculiarities of the eyes, which, 
though they may be full and prominent, have a vacillating movement ...,15<>
Sim ilarly, debates on the potentially pathological nature of the female 
body took on more urgent connotations as they became a crucial part of 
degenerative discourse, though they were developed in ways that could use 
the same paradigm to advance opposing political positions, drawing out the 
earlier ideological ambivalence towards definitions of insanity and 
fe m in in ity .155 The encouragement of women's physical and mental 
capacities was threatening, but so, in another register, was their neglect -  
both energy and lassitude were now more explicitly potentially morbid. The 
concept of hysteria, as it developed with the expansion of the medical 
profession in the mid nineteenth century, had been linked, paradoxically, with
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both suppression and energetic self-expression.156 On the one hand Robert 
C arter maintained in On th e  Pathology and Treatm ent of Hysteria in 1853 
that it was attributable to  inadequate education and sexual suppression,157 
on the other F .C . Skey put foward the predominant line in 1867 that while 
hysteria 'is most prevalent in the young female members of the upper and 
middle classes, of such as liv e  a life of ease and luxury', nonetheless 'it will 
often select for its victim a  female member of a family exhibiting more than 
usual force and decision of character, of strong resolution, fearless of danger, 
bold riders, having plenty o f  what is termed nerve*. 158 So although a few 
years later Maudsley conceded that 'the range of activity of women is so 
limited and their available paths of work so few ... that they have not, like
1 59men, vicarious outlets fo r feeling' in The Pathology of Mind, a 
controversial article in Th e  Fortnightly Review, 'Sex in Mind and Education', 
reversed this argument, claim ing instead that women's bodies contained a 
fixed amount of nervous em ergy which could drain away at either end through 
menstruation or 'unnatural m ental exertion'.16® Here the maintenance of the 
species depended on the enforced segregation of environment and the 
transposition of the resulting characteristics into organic features.
So by 1873, although morbid nervous tendencies were particularly 
associated with a growing population of 'other' groups, the very attempt to 
establish perimeters around these exerted a pressure that took the form of a 
continual return of the repressed. For the boundaries of insanity were still 
blurred, and the attempts to identify their problematic borderlands and 
detect the signs of madness within meant that it was the potential 
strangeness within sanity th a t was seen, rather than the familiarity of the 
mad. For Andrew Wynter in  Th e  Borderlands of Insanity, in 1875, madness 
now took the form of a vast social unconscious lurking in the wings: 'There is 
an eminent amount of latent brain disease in the community, only awaiting a
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sufficient exciting cause to make itself patent to the world.'*61 And as the 
implications of moral insanity came to occupy the territory previously 
inhabited by partial and intellectual insanity (Maudsley noted 'the effect 
which a severe attack of insanity sometimes produces on the moral nature of 
the individual .. . His intellectual faculties are as acute as ever, but his moral 
character has changed'), that borderland comes to be seen increasingly as a 
breeding ground rather than a buffer state.162 O nce  again, eccentricity or 
bohemianism in the male upper middle class give rise to anxiety about their 
sanity, and the links between genius and madness are  stressed, but nervous 
tendencies do not now even ambivalently signal advance, but are the signals 
that progress itself compounds its own atavistic traces, of which the signs are 
everyw here, f t  is of great importance then to  recognise a borderland 
between sanity and insanity, and of greater importance still . . .  to study 
carefully the doubtful cases with which it is peopled', wrote Maudsley, ' .. . 
There are many people who, without being insane, exhibit peculiarities of 
thought, feeling and character ... they bear in their temperament the marks 
of th e ir peculiar heritage'.16^ In Collins's fiction physiological metaphors 
combine with competing models of inheritance, evolution and transmission. 
The w eight of various kinds of real and imaginary inheritance runs throughout 
his w o rk, taking the form of an implied fatality to be resisted and fulfilled in 
ways th a t can clash or merge with the hopes of a m oral management that is 
always its concomitant. In the 1890s this takes the form of exploring the 
position of the sons of ancient families, beginning w ith  his first contemporary 
novel, Basil, A  Story of Modern Life.
82
C H A P T E R  TW O
N ER VO US FAN C IES  O F  H Y P O C H O N D R IA C A L  B A C H ELO R S : 
BASIL. A N D  T H E  PROBLEMS O F  M ODERN L IF E
We hypochondriacks may console ourselves in the hour 
of gloomy distress by thinking that our sufferings mark 
our superiority.
James Boswell1
In the ravelled skein, the slightest threads are the 
hardest to follow: in analysing the associations and 
sympathies which regulate the play of our passions, 
the simplest and homeliest are the last that we detect. 
It Is only when the shock comes and the mind recoils 
before it .. . that w e really discern what trifles in the 
outer world our noblest mental pleasures, or our 
severest mental pains, have made a part of ourselves -  
atoms which the whirlpool has drawn into its vortex, 
as greedily and surely as the largest mass!
Basil, A  Story of Modem L ife 2
Basil, A  Story of Modem L ife  is a modern tale of terror and the story of 
a fallen man. It is the confession of an insecure melancholic, the younger son 
of an ancient family which 'dates back beyond the Conquest'.3 It  
reconstructs the hero's chance encounter and instant romantic obsession with 
a linen draper's daughter and his descent to a nether world of unconsummated 
probationary marriage into the petit-bourgeois Sherwin family -  a nightmare 
world of anxiety-producing newness, frustration, false clues and misleading 
signs. It reveals Basil's discovery, on the night of the expiry of the false 'long 
engagement', of his wife's seduction by the villain, the Sherwins' mysterious 
and indecipherable confidential clerk, Robert Mannion. And this revelation 
discloses a further one, th a t Mannion is fixed, monomaniacally, on 
persecuting Basil in revenge for his own life-long persecution -  his 
inheritance of the stigma of felony from his father, who uXW employed 
by Basil's father and hanged fo r forging Basil's father's name. Basil discovers
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this, too, as a result of his own disintegration -  brought about by the 
temporary derangement of brain fever on the one hand, his disinheritance and 
ostracisation on the other. It is from this position of namelessness and 
placelessness that he reconstructs his narrative, a narrative that also needs 
to disintegrate before he can be reintegrated into the fam ily, but a family 
that seems to have lost the means of renewing itself legitim ately.
Basil takes up many of the conventions of the self-conscious tale of 
supernatural terror. It places the hero in a series of intense and traumatic 
situations and explores not only the objective threats and fears that they 
generate but his own psychological and physiological responses to them. 
Moreover it does this in a way that turns both the manipulation of 
psychological states and the psychological means of explaining them into 
devices to produce shock, indeterminacy, and anxiety. It pushes these 
conventions further, anticipating what becomes e xp licitly  known as the 
sensation novel in the 1860s, not simply by naturalising psychic tensions and 
transposing them into a familiar domestic setting, but by transforming the 
anxieties within the family into sources of suspense and terror, and by 
winding up the pitch of the response to this by blurring the distinction 
between 'monition' and 'monomania'. But the novel does so in a way that 
retains important elements of the earlier conventions.
The Westminster Review's analysis of the evolution of narrative forms, 
'The Progress of Fiction as an A rt', suggested that Basil was symptomatic of 
a degenerate sensibility by its very lack of an objectively terrifying referent 
-  I t  was the fashion then to construct a story out of strange and unnatural 
circumstances, it is the fashion now to elaborate it out of overwrought 
feelings and morbid sensibilities'.3 But it then went on to  suggest that it was 
the explicit manner in which the novel focussed on the hero's sexual obsession
and used the seduction scene as one of its main sources o f terror which meant
that 'M r Collins has given us nothing which can "take men from the passions 
and miserable troubles of life into a higher region" ... The incident which 
forms the foundation of the whole, is absolutely disgusting; and is kept so 
perseveringly before the eyes of the reader in all its hateful details that all 
interest is destroyed in the loathing it occasions.'^ Yet it was also this very 
intensity of emotion and sensation that prompted sympathetic as much as 
hostile critics to discuss the novel as a kind of 'neo-Gothic' fantasy: In  truth 
the author of that work ought to have been called Mr Salvador Fuseli', 
remarked Bentley's Miscellany, contrasting Basil with Thackeray's Henry 
Esmond, 'there is nothing either of Wilkie or Collins about it'. And concluded: 
'There is a startling antagonism between the intensity of the passion, the 
violent spasmodic action of the piece, and its smooth, commonplace 
environment.'^
Basil, moreover, was the book with which Collins hoped to make his 
debut as a serious contemporary novelist and despite its obvious risks it was 
not universally condemned; it certainly won Dickens's admiration.6 Collins 
also took the opportunity to outline certain aesthetic principles in the 
Prefaces to the first and revised editions. These, very broadly, corresponded 
with the tenets of Ruskin and the Pre-Raphaelites, and emphasised the 
importance of bringing together the transcendent and the mundane as a 
central element in generating suspense: 'M y idea was, that the more of the 
Actual I could garner up as a text to speak from , the more certain I might 
feel of the genuineness and value of the Ideal which was sure to spring out of 
it ... By appealing to genuine sources within the reader's own experience, I 
could certainly gain his attention to begin with; but it would only be by 
appealing to other sources (as genuine in their way) beyond his own 
experience, that I could hope to fix his interest and excite his suspense, to 
occupy his deeper feelings or to stir his thoughts.'7 This intense realism was a
means, too, of revitalising stale fictional conventions: 'Directing my 
characters and my story, then, towards the light of Reality whenever I could 
find it , I have not hesitated to violate some of the conventionalities of 
sentimental fiction.'*
And in order to achieve these different kinds of interest Collins began 
to develop a set of narrative techniques that put a range of psychological 
models and conventions to specific uses as fictional strategies. They are used 
as means of alternately invoking the 'actual' and breaking it down; of creating 
patterns of sympathy and identification with the protagonist or of setting up 
a critical distance from him, or as means of summoning up a threatening 
other. Basil clearly includes many of the elements that are to be found in 
such late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century confessional stories as 
Godwin's Caleb Williams, Hogg's Confessions of a Justified Sinner, Mary 
Shelley's Frankenstein, and more tacitly and in a different vein, De Quincey's 
Confessions of an English Opium Eater, first published in 1821. It  is an 
obsessive story of pursuit, revenge and retribution. It sets up a pattern of 
opposition and replication in which pursuer and pursued, victim  and 
persecutor become caught in a self-sustaining struggle. It exploits the 
anxiety, the sensations of the hero, and explores the way in which the outcast 
or deviant figure is created by the class divisions generated by the power 
relations of the dominant order. But the novel turns these patterns round 
even as it reproduces them, for here it is the privileged upper-class son who 
is caught up in an imposture, self-created by his own family and class position 
as he is duped by the villain and as his sanity breaks down. So the patterns of 
authority and persecution are internalised by the next generation, and now 
become differently combined. The hero occupies a place, but a place that 




Basil, and two shorter pieces written during the 1850s -  'Mad Monkton' 
(1855) and A  Rogue's Life (1856) -  each take as their starting point the 
problematic position of sons of ancient families whose real power has waned 
and which is primarily perpetuated in various symbolic forms which can be 
internalised into a morbid psychic inheritance. Antonina O r the Fall of Rome 
had taken 'the mightiest empire the world has ever seen, sunk to the 
weakness and imbecility of old age' as its subject, and had viewed the 
degeneration of the powerful from the safe distance of historical
9
reconstruction. But in Basil the process of the decline of the landed 
patriarchal family is mediated through the hero's subjective disintegration. 
And the figure of Basil fulfils his dual narrative role as sympathetic and 
gullible hero by both invoking and im plicitly satirising Romantic sensibility as 
embodied in the figure of the melancholic upper class youth, vulnerable to 
the 'English malady', the man of feeling and acute perception. Basil is 
constructed as a figure in the narrative by his own internalisation of others' 
projections, and as a melancholic hovering on the brink of monomania. He is 
a *hypochondriac' in both senses of the term ; nervous sensibility merges into 
the morbid interpretation of imaginary symptoms.10 But the signs which he 
cannot decipher include the 'modern' conventions of the sexual double 
standard -  his transgression is in marrying Margaret rather than seducing her. 
And the tension of the narrative is generated by the impact of these obscure 
social clues on his own immediate sensations.
The novel thus takes the form of a confessional case study which 
involves both empathy and estrangement as the reader follows the 
reconstruction of Basil's earlier, gullible self, and 'analyses the associations 
and sympathies that regulate the play of [his] passions'; and it does this by 
drawing on those contemporary psychological ideas that have the clearest 
links with the associationist tradition. But it is never clear in Basil where
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narrative authority resides, and how the figure and the text should finally be 
read. Basil's gullible self is framed by his later reassessment of it , but this in 
turn is framed within a perspective that extends beyond the perimeters of the 
first person narrative; it takes the form of an authority that is ubiquitous but 
absent. This authority in the narrative directly corresponds to the benign 
scrutiny of moral management, but here it is mapped onto the declining 
power of the patriarchal family and thus at first holds that fam ily structure 
up from within. It is linked, too, initially, with Basil's sensibility and thus 
creates an equivocal perspective that is crucial to build up Basil as a social 
self in order to generate the necessary tensions in the narrative that in turn 
precipitate his breakdown.
This means, too, that in Basil the conditions of writing and the control 
of it are not only part of the structuring of narrative time itself but are also 
explicitly bound up with the process of exploration and breakdown of identity 
as memory, desire and projection that is at work in the text. Th e  main body 
of the story consists of Basil's confession, written from a remote cottage and 
pursued by the shameful memory of the past which drives him to write the 
narrative and the threat of the enemy that has been produced by it. The 
antagonist's oppositional narrative is embedded within Basil's reconstruction 
and three quarters of the way through the story the process of continual 
recall breaks down, to be replaced firstly by Basil's disintegrating diary, then 
by letters. Basil is thus set firstly in the context of his own fam ily and then 
against Mannion in a way that both counterposes and reproduces the patterns 
of displacement, transgression and exclusion that he enacts. He is both 
caught between class boundaries and is the stage on which the struggle 
between them is acted out, and his failure to negotiate these boundaries is 
marked by lack of sexual power. As younger son, moreover, trapped in a 
'feminised' position of perpetual childhood, his dislocated place in the
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patrilineal line is expressed in his lack of self-possession, and his inability to 
read and to interpret the psychological motivation and social signs that he 
has to negotiate. H e  thus represents the weak point in the family history in 
his very attempt to m arry out of the declining family circle ; he is the 
im plicit as Mannion is the explicit threat, and the two become bound together 
in an opposition that becomes mutually sustaining.
The opening of the confession is crucial here as the narrator is setting
up the terms on which his past may be reconstructed and reinterpreted and
placing himself in relation to the authority of the reader, who becomes both
analyst and judge, prefiguring and echoing the patterns of controlling
observation unfolded in the story. But he is also setting up the narrative
itself as a morally im proving story. The story begins: 'What am I now about
to write? The history of little  more than the events of one year, out of the
twenty four years of m y life. Why do I undertake such employment as this?'
and in addressing an absent reader while becoming his own interlocutor and
thus in a sense substituting himself for the reader, Basil's lack of unity is
suggested from the s ta rt. This is consolidated:
Perhaps, because I think that my narrative may do 
good, because I hope that, one day, it may be put to 
some warning use. There have been men who, on their 
death-beds, have left directions that their bodies 
should be anatomised, as an offering to science. In 
these pages, written on the death-bed of enjoyment 
and hope, I give my heart, already anatomised, as an 
offering to  human nature.
Perhaps w hile  desiring to write a confession, I desire 
to write an apology as well .. . When these pages are 
found after m y death, they perhaps will be calm ly read 
and gently judged, as relics solemnized by the atoning 
shadows o f the grave. Then, the hard sentence against 
me, may be repented of; the children of the next 
generation of my house may be taught to speak 
charitably o f m y memory; and may often, of their own 
accord, think of me kindly in the silent watches of the 
night.*1
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As with most confessions, the act o f speaking or writing of past 
transgressions creates the preconditions of th e ir absolution, and the reader's 
provisional identification is paradoxically made possible by the critical 
distance of the remembering voice. The present self is both the wiser 
product of past culpability and a reformed T  which looks at the past self as a 
renounced identity. Basil thus offers both a cautionary tale, a case history 
and an 'already anatomised' heart for scientific investigation. He is on his 
death-bed, yet has already conducted the post-m ortem , just as the readers of 
the narrative are future members of the fam ily line the continuation of which 
he himself threatens, and which he has been blanked out of (his father casts 
him out through tearing his page from the fa m ily  chronicle). So the position 
from which he is writing is not only imminent death but actual namelessness.
This opening, where Basil self-consciously and rather ridiculously 
announces himself and yet has no place to  occupy, structurally, in the 
narrative, produces a qualifying distance in his account which works 
differently from many other kinds of confession. This sets up the question of 
how to take the narrator seriously as a problem from the beginning of the 
novel. In William Godwin's Caleb Williams and James Hogg's The Private 
Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner, the central voice is set in a 
consistent though not necessarily coherent relation to the external authority 
which vindicates it; for Caleb Williams rational liberalism, for the Justified 
Sinner divine judgment -  though this is im p lic itly  repositioned as insane 
delusion by the Editor's narrative in the la tte r .12 But the opening of Basil 
resists any easy identification with the hero without offering any coherent 
alternative perspective to it. And this tacitly qualifies the means by which 
the mystery and sensation of the main body o f the story -  the hero's non- 
sexual entanglement, his own forced imposture to this family as well as the 
imposture of the Sherwins, manipulated by Mannion -  will be generated and
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read. This qualification is compounded, too, by Basil's remembrance o f his 
childhood and his description of his family and class history. Here his 
account of his development as a melancholic, 'sensitive' but imperceptive 
young man draws on and mingles the concepts of an inherited identity and a 
constructed one, of inbreeding and moral management. Basil's final recovery 
and reassimilation into the family with which the story concludes is f irm ly  
set 'in the shadowed valley of Repose', and here home becomes a safe place, 
an asylum, but also a kind of pastoral stasis.13
But the preconditions of this process are set up at the beginning in the 
way in which the figure of the father becomes both the benevolent keeper 
and the bearer of an exclusive lineage, so that the shaping of a social identity 
through a family history also becomes the means of its disintegration. Thus 
the father is the transcendent source of meaning in the first part of the 
recollection but he is presented initially by Basil as being completely bound 
up with his genealogy and this is described negatively, as absence, or as 
latent traits working in opposition to popular physiognomic conventions: 'His 
was not that conventional pride, which the popular notions are fond of 
characterising by a s tiff, stately carriage, by a rigid expression of features .. .  
It was that quiet, negative, courteous, inbred pride, which only the closest 
observers could detect; which no ordinary observers ever detected at a l l . '1^ 
This displacement of cognitive conventions is compounded by the father's 
consciousness of his ancestors; they are built up as the only objects of value, 
taking the place of w ealth: 'They were the very breath of his life; the deities 
of his social worship; the fam ily treasures to be held precious beyond all lands 
and all wealth, all ambitions and all glories, by his children and his children's 
children to the end of their race.'15 Basil, who 'could inherit none of the 
landed property of the fam ily' is doubly displaced by this himself, and he 
occupies a 'feminine' position in that he is simultaneously symbol of, and
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substitute for, inherited property.16 This means too that he literally lacks
self-possession; he describes his upbringing as a series of empty roles: 'The
story of my boyhood and youth has little  to interest -  nothing that is new. My
education was the education of hundreds of others in my rank of life.'17 But
any possibility of an alternative rebellious identity -  such as that of his
brother, the profligate, self-confident heir -  is cancelled out by the process
through which his father educates his 'moral sense', in attempting to train
him to fill his family position:
I believe in his own way he loved us a ll; but we, his 
descendants, had to share his heart w ith  his ancestors -  
we were his household property as w ell as his children.
... We were taught by his direction, that to disgrace 
our fam ily, either by word or action, was the one fatal 
crime that could never be forgotten and never be 
pardoned. We were formed under his superintendence, 
in principles of religion, honour, and industry; and the 
rest was left to our own moral sense, to our own 
gratitude, to our own comprehension o f the duties and 
privileges of our station. There was no one point in his 
conduct towards us that we could complain of; and yet 
there was something always incomplete in our 
domestic relations.
It may seem incomprehensible, even ridiculous, to 
some persons, but it is nonetheless tru e , that we were 
none of us ever on intim ate terms w ith him. I mean by 
this that he was a father to us but never a companion.
There was something in his manner, his quiet and 
unchanging manner, that kept us almost unconsciously 
restrained.*®
So it is not surprising to find that the sense of embarrassment that he feels in 
father's presence as a child is directly transposed at the moment of his 
secret, false, wedding to Margaret by his 'morbid fancy' which he can only, 
then, interpret as 'wild and monstrous, as if it had been produced by a dream 
-  an impression that my father had discovered m y secret, and was watching 
me from some hidden place in the church; watching me through the service to 
denounce and abandon me publicly, at the end'.19 The symptoms themselves 
are recognised as morbid almost on the condition that here their significance 
is left unexplained.
92
Basil's simultaneous subjection to and self-construction through the 
perceptions of others (he feels, for instance, that he still exists while in exile 
through his sister's remembrance of him though he has been erased from  the 
official family m emory) turns the methods of moral management into ta cit 
restrictive self-control, and thus become the means by which the hero is set 
up as an ineffectual b ut sympathetic agent. In The Woman In White it  also 
becomes the model through which a new middle class resolute m asculinity 
can emerge and disentangle the ravelled skein of the self and the narrative. 
But here, though Basil notes how, just before his illic it marriage, 'b itte r 
thoughts against my father rose in my mind -  bitter thoughts against his 
inexorable family pride, which imposed on me the concealment and secrecy, 
under the oppression o f  which I had already suffered so much -  b itte r 
thoughts against those social tyrannies ... which my father now impersonated, 
as it were, to my ideas', such a quest is frustrated by the final narrative 
resolution.20 Instead the  lower middle class itself is pathologised, embodying 
a predatory modernity, and an unlicensed female sexuality as it is turned into 
a force of terror. Basil first sees Margaret Sherwin when he impulsively gets 
on a passing omnibus -  a 'perambulatory exhibition-room of the eccentricities 
of human nature'; a place of the disturbing mingling and juxtapositioning of 
classes and types and of unsolicited associations.21 The Sherwins' household 
is in a limbo-like place of unfixed identities; 'a suburb of new houses, 
intermingled with wretched patches of waste land, half built over . . .  Its 
newness and desolation of appearance revolted me'.22 And the means by 
which Basil traces his history back to the traumatic events w hich 
precipitated his breakdown is bound up with the means by which the m ystery 
is created and disclosed, a mystery that in another sense is no secret since its 
outcome is already known. In order for this to happen particular perceptual 
assumptions and interpretative codes need to be invoked and frustrated, and
these manipulate the assumptions of physiognomy, employ different kinds of 
associations, elicit dreams and invoke particular methods of deciphering their 
significance.
For it is Basil's lack of control over the codes that govern effective
interpretation and his inability to distinguish between different methods of
associating which are the means by which he is manipulated. But this
involves the inability to make connections between different kinds of
associations, and here the novel anticipates processes which are to be
developed in The Woman in White. The hero's wise voice of the present
makes retrospective interjections: Throughout the whole of that period I
walked on surely, step by step, to the verge of the abyss; and never once
suspected which course I was taking, never once detected the signs which
vainly rose to caution me back, on either side of m y path.'23 This implies,
though, a set of signs that have already been interpreted, which in turn
conceal another story, which the moralised voice o f the confession cannot
bring itself to utter. He notes of his first meeting w ith  Margaret:
Remembering what I do, I am ashamed to write, 
ashamed to think of what I said ... Hitherto, I have 
spoken the stem truth, sacrificing myself to my 
confessions unhesitatingly ... but here, at that very 
part of m y story where it might be imagined that I 
would w rite  minutely and circumstantially with most 
readiness and most ease -  here, for the first and the 
last tim e, I must generalise and must hurry on. I can 
give no good reasons for the sensations that now 
influence me: I cannot analyse them, and I would not 
if I could.2’
This introspection contributes to the way that the naive Interpretations are 
read, and here Basil attempts to make use of psychological methods, but 
incompetently. He reads the world as a set of signs to be interpreted but the 
interpretations are all somehow displaced, or askew. Thus the Sherwins' 
drawing room, with its terrible newness, expresses their nouveau riche 
brashness, but conceals its secret, the displaced gentility of Mannion.
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Looking at it Basil feels that he is exposed to the 'glare' of the vulgar objects,
so that he becomes the 'nervous man' that he presents as a figure in the
scene; harried not simply by modernity but by the weirdness of it and
extending the revulsion he experienced in the suburban street:
Everything was oppressively new. The brilliantly- 
varnished door cracked with a report like a pistol when 
it was opened; the paper on the walls, with its gaudy 
pattern of birds, trellis-work, and flowers, in gold, red 
and green on a white ground, looked hardly dry yet; 
the showy window-curtains of white and sky-blue, and 
the still showier carpet of red and yellow, seemed as if 
they had come out of the shop yesterday; the round 
rosewood table was in a painfully high state of polish;
... Never was a richly-furnished room more 
comfortless than this -  the eye ached at looking at it.
There was no repose anywhere. The print of the 
Queen, hanging lonely on the wall .. . glared on you: 
the paper, the curtains, the carpet, glared on you: the 
books, the wax-flowers in glass cases, the chairs in 
flaring chintz-covers, the china-plates on the door, the 
pink and blue glass vases and cups ranged on the 
chimney piece, the over-ornamented chiffoniers with 
Tonbridge toys and long-necked smelling-bottles on 
their upper shelves, all glared on you. There was no 
look of shadow, shelter, secrecy or retirement in one 
nook or corner of those four gaudy walls. A ll 
surrounding objects seemed startingly near to the eye; 
much nearer than they really were. Th e  room would 
have given a nervous man a headache, before he had 
been in it for a quarter of an hour.25
The deciphering of faces and figures takes this disorientating process 
further. Mannion baffles him because he can get no interpretative purchase 
on his face, yet it  is presented as a mask concealing an inner nature in a way 
which uses physiognomic signs to invoke the melodramatic conventions of 
‘smooth faced villain,' by making blankness and regularity itself significant: 
•Viewed separately from the head (which was rather large, both in front and 
behind) his face exhibited, throughout, an almost perfect symmetry of 
proportion ... Such was his countenance in point of form; but ... in expression 
-  it was, as I beheld it, an utter void. Never had I before seen any human 
face which baffled all inquiry like his. No mask could have been made 
expressionless enough to resemble it; and yet it looked like a mask.'26 Thus
it is 'so unexpressive that it did not ever look vacant -  a mystery for your 
eyes and your mind to dwell on -  hiding something' onto which Basil at first 
projects his own romantic story: I f  there really had been some romance 
connected with Mr Mannion's early life -  if that strange and striking face was 
indeed a sealed book which contained a secret story, what a triumph and a 
pleasure, if Margaret and I should succeed in discovering it together!'27 But 
while this method defuses the very attempt to generate suspense, it reflects 
back more emphatically on Basil's obsessional but unsuccessful attempt to 
follow clues: 1 felt towards him much as a man feels in a labyrinth, where 
every fresh failure in gaining the centre only produces fresh obstinacy in 
renewing the effort to arrive at it.*2® It also suggests that Mannion functions 
as a 'blanked out' version of his own father, whom 'ordinary observers never 
detected', and who silently rules through surveillance.
The Sherwins' social insecurity, on the other hand, is continually 
manifested as a set of nervous disorders which signify their lack of self- 
possession but in a way that can again be misinterpreted. Sherwin's desperate 
attempt to achieve propriety belies, as it signals, his upward mobility, and is 
written on his face: 'A ll his features were singularly mobile: they were 
affected by nervous contractions and spasms which were constantly drawing 
up and down in all directions the brow, the mouth and the muscles of the 
cheek ... His lips were thin and colourless, the lines about them being 
numerous and strongly marked. Had I seen him under ordinary circumstances,
I should have set him down as a little-minded man.'29 The perception of Mrs 
Sherwin is more complex: she is a ghostly presence who expresses the 
family's inner drama, finally making a death-in -life  appearance after Basil's 
breakdown, and she functions as an 'apparition' whose 'nervous disorders' 
express the unspoken manipulations within the family only through a process 
of physiognomic interpretation which takes the form of active projection, and
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where each physical sign becomes morbid only in moving beyond its 
immediate physical referent. This active reading of Miss Sherwin's face as a 
drama w hich suggests a history is set against his later reading of Mannion as 
a closed rom antic novel:
Her pale, sickly, moist-looking skin; her large, mild, 
watery, light-blue eyes; the restless, vigilant timidfHof 
her expression; the mixture of useless hesitation and 
nervous, involuntary activity in every one of her 
actions, all furnished the same significant betrayal of 
a life of fear and restraint; of a disposition full of 
modest generosities and meek sympathies, which had 
been crushed down past rousing the self-assertion, past 
ever seeing the light. There , in that mild wan face of 
her's -  in those painful startings and hurryings when 
she moved; in that tremulous faint utterance when she 
spoke -  there, I could see one of those ghastly heart- 
tragedies laid open before me, which are not to be 
written, but which are acted and re-acted, scene by 
scene, year by year, in the secret theatre of home.-™
Here the same model can be invoked to produce various meanings, or lack of 
meaning while breaking down the boundary between viewer and object.
These different kinds of extrapolation are pushed much further and 
become m ore explicit in Basil's perception of the poles of femininity in the 
novel, his sister Clara, and Margaret Sherwin. Basil's first view of Margaret 
is reconstructed as obsession arising from projection; it works through 
inference and the condensation of meanings, as he sees her as a collection of 
parts and fragments of clothing, bound together by his desire. Clara, on the 
other hand, is reified rather than fetishised, and thus becomes a metaphoric 
expression of a desire for a perpetual childhood of safety, seclusion and 
personal ca lm , outside history. For Basil, images of safety and danger, 
secluded childhood or terrifying progress, find their allegorical expression and 
equivalents in archetypal female figures, figures who thus become 
inextricably bound up with his emotional response to social and cultural 
meanings and codes. He compares Clara with 'modern women' who 'appear to 
be ambitious of morally unsexing themselves before society ... women of this
exclusively modern order like to  use slang expressions in their conversation;
assume a bastard-masculine abruptness in their manners, a bastard-masculine
licence in their opinions Clara condenses the softer side of moral
management, as Basil's sensibility, with a retreat into a family past and a
mythic moral childhood, but w hat is equally important is the explicitness with
which these emotional associations are made clear:
Few men have not their secret moments of deep 
feeling -  moments when, amid the wretched 
flippancies and hypocrisies of modern society, the 
image will present itse lf to their mind of some woman, 
fresh, innocent, gentle , sincere; some woman whose 
emotions are still warm and impressible, whose 
affections and sympathies can still appear in her 
actions, and give the  colour to her thoughts; some 
woman in whom we could put perfect faith and trust 
as if we were children; whom we despair of finding 
near the hardening influences of the world; whom we 
could scarcely venture to look for, except in solitary 
places far away in the country; in little  rural shrines 
shut up from society, among woods and fields and 
lonesome bo u nd a ry-h ills .^
Yet just as Mrs Sherwin acts as an exaggerated transformation of 
Basil's own position within his fam ily, so Clara's symbolic significance is 
generated by her concealment o f  self; the line between the petit-bourgeois 
'secret theatre of home' and the gentrified 'rural shrines shut up from society' 
has to be continually reasserted and redrawn in order for both to make sense: 
'The strong and deep feelings of m y sister's nature lay far below the surface -  
for a woman, too far below i t .  Suffering was for her silent, secret, long- 
enduring; almost entirely void o f  any outward event or development ... the 
very strength of her emotions was in their silence and their secrecy . . . ' ^  
Thus all three women are 'nervously' susceptible to the influences around 
them: Mrs Sherwin's neurotic disorders express the corruption of which she is 
the innocent victim ; Margaret's hysterical passion, eventually breaking out in 
typhus fever, indicates her 'own' moral corruption; Clara's suppression both 
represses emotion and expresses an imaginary emotional unity. But no single
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psychological model can make sense of all of them. The figure of Mrs 
Sherwin suggests that suppression itself is morbid, while Margaret's incipient 
hysteria implies that unrestrained passion feeds on and breeds itself -  the 
counterpoint of which is Clara, whose idealisation is founded on self- 
restraint.
In conjuring up these projected images so explicitly , the figures of 
Margaret and Clara lead into a more self-conscious exploration of the ways in 
which archetypes of femininity work through male projection and fantasy, 
and this emerges most clearly in the dream Basil has the night after meeting 
Margaret. This is the first of a series of different kinds of 'deranged' states 
of consciousness that are put to various uses in Basil, and they anticipate 
many of the processes which are to be developed in Th e  Woman in White and 
Armadale. The use of dream clearly has a specific kind of function in the 
story as an embedded narrative, which on the one hand suggests that the 
explicit authority of the narrator is undermined, opening a space for the 
emergence of unsolicited thoughts and emotions, on the other is a more 
detached premonition or warning interjected into the main body of the story. 
The early dream in Basil combines these obvious functions; what qualifies it 
is the w ay that Collins uses and develops specific aspects of dream theory in 
relation to  the 'privileged' knowledge offered by the dream text itself, and 
the relationship between waking and dreaming states that they suggest. The 
dream itself is both the explicit expression of sexual desire and a moralised 
comment on it  -  a text that has already been interpreted. Basil dreams of a 
landscape that is both a symbolic female body and an iconic moral hierarchy: 
'On one side it was bounded by thick woods, whose dark, secret depths looked 
unfathomable to the eye: on the other by hills, ever rising higher and higher 
yet, until they were lost in bright, beautifully white clouds, gleaming in 
34refulgent sunlight.' Tw o women emerge from the woods and hills,
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predictably dark and fair respectively, and 'I was drawn along in the arms of 
the dark woman with my blood burning and my breath failing me, until we 
entered the secret recesses that lay amid the unfathomable depths of 
trees'.33 The landscape of secret, remote woods that Clara's image had 
suggested, is translated here into sexual engulfment and spiritual defilement.
It is the unreserved quality o f the dream that gives it a sophisticated 
role in the narrative as simultaneously an expression of suppressed desire and 
an allegorical warning in a way that blurs the boundary between the two kinds 
of knowledge. In the first place, it is clearly presented, following 
contemporary conceptions of dreams elaborated, for example, by MacNish 
and Abercrombie, as the temporary suspension or loss of self-control, and as 
the failure of the dreamer to be able to restrain his own growing sexual 
obsession, his passion, which was 'deteriorating ... in its effects on the 
exercise of my mental powers, and on my candour and sense of duty in my 
36intercourse with home ...' H o w  could I best crush the desire to see her? ... 
Had I resolution enough to wear m y heart out by hard, serious, slaving study? 
... I sat by my open window, striving with my burning love thoughts of 
M argaret; striving to think collectedly and usefully -  abandoned to a struggle 
ever renewing, yet never changing .. .  A t  last I began to think less and less 
distinctly ... Thoughts and sensations which had been more and more weakly 
restrained with each succeeding hour of wakefulness, now rioted within me in 
perfect liberation from all control.'3^  Thus Basil's dream is clearly marked, 
following Abercrombie, by 'the loss of power over the succession of the 
thoughts', and combines the associative processes that he outlines as 'recent 
events and emotions mixed up w ith past ones though in other respects they 
were entirely unconnected', and trains of images brought up by association 
with bodily sensations.3* But at the same time it is clearly suggested that it
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is in turn conditioned by Basil's self-imposed struggle with himself which in 
turn precipitates the breakdown of his tenuous self-control.
And this conditions the way that the dream is interpreted in the double 
narrative reassessment of it, and how the expression of desire becomes 
framed as a 'prophetic' text whose meaning is both resisted and confirmed by 
the way that Basil dismisses it. On immediately waking, the naive Basil asks 
'Was it warning of coming events, foreshadowed in the wild visions of sleep? 
But to what purpose could this dream, or indeed any dream, tend? Why had it 
remained incomplete, failing to show me the visionary consequences of my 
visionary actions? What superstition to ask!'39 Basil's expectation, then, is 
that a 'prophetic' dream should take the form of a moral tract (w hich, indeed, 
the 'text' of the dream itself, in one sense, does), but within the context of 
this naive assessment, it is suggested that Basil's 'divination' or prophetic 
reading of the dream should take the form of exegesis rather than passive 
reception. De Quincey had pointed out in The Confessions o f an English 
Opium  Eater that this was the more accurate sense of 'prophetic' readings as 
elaborated in Biblical dream interpretation. T o  unveil or decipher what is 
hidden -  that is, in effect, the meaning of divination ... in the writings of St 
Paul the phrase "gifts of prophef.y" never once indicates w hat the English 
reader supposes, but exegetic gifts, gifts of interpretation applied to what is 
dark, of analysis applied to what is logically perplexed, of expansion applied 
to what is condensed J .A . Symonds (who refers to De Quincey in his
analysis but to stress simply that dreaming involves a suspension of judgment) 
developed Abercrombie's point about how dreams can precipitate their own 
outcome by stressing how 'the mind, vehemently possessed of an idea thus 
received, almost instinctively acts up to it and Basil echoes this in his 
'wiser' reassessment of the dream, suggesting too that the fem ale images are
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archetypal projections of the 'real' Margaret and Clara transformed Into
symbolic polarities which determine his perception of them :^1
As I looked out on the reviving, reassuring sunlight, it 
was easy to dismiss as ridiculous from my mind, or 
rather from my conscience, the tendency to see in the 
two shadowy forms of my dream, the types of two real 
living beings, whose names almost trembled to 
utterance on my lips; but I could not also dismiss from 
my heart the love-images which that dream had set up 
there for the worship of the senses. Those results of 
the night still remained with me, growing and 
strengthening every minute.**2
But this, and Basil's subsequent behaviour after the dream, also overturns the
implications of Symonds's argument, in particular his discussion of the
relation between waking and dreaming states. Symonds, with others, stressed
that the inability to 'wake up' properly from a dream constituted a kind of
insanity since the mind becomes completely possessed by the dream, and so
the whole world turns into a fantastic projection:
The healthy waking of the mind is the resumption of 
the form of consciousness which existed previous to 
sleep. The objects before the eyes have the same 
aspect and the same associations; the thoughts return 
to the same channel; the occupations of the previous 
day and those projected for the ensuing day, are 
remembered, and there is no confusion of personal 
identity. But a man may wake up to that outward 
world, and that world is all changed to him ... Alas! 
how delicate and fragile a thing is perception! He is 
awake, and he looks around his chamber in which he 
has every day hailed the morning sunshine ... He looks 
out on a new world projected from his own inner being.
By a melancholy power, a fatal g ift, of appropriating 
and assimilating the real objects perceived by his 
senses, he takes possession of them, nay, disembodies 
them, and fuses them into his imaginary creation ...
They are all shadows; no more the flesh and blood 
realities of his heart; they are metamorphosed into the 
unsubstantial figures of a distempered imagination.** 3
In Basil, on the other hand, the waking up and the reviving, reassuring 
sunlight prompts him to resist the possible significance of the dream even as 
it breaks down his resistance to Margaret, and this becomes the first stage in 
a process wherein he is unable to follow clues, distinguish and analyse the
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logic of different kinds of 'associations and sympathies which regulate the 
play of his passions', except as a process of retrospection.
The first dream is clearly framed as 'unconscious' revelation through 
the retrospective narrative analysis, and it is this focus that partially
disintegrates in being pushed to its limits in the controlled insanity of brain
uu
fever. Basil's collapse replays the pattern of the breakdown of self-control 
of the earlier dream in exaggerated form as he struggles to be his own moral 
manager after hearing himself described as mad: 'M AD ! -  that word, as I 
heard it, rang after me like a voice of judgment .. .  I strove hard to separate 
my thoughts; to distinguish between my recollections; to extricate from the 
confusion within me any one idea, no matter what -  and I could not do it . In 
that awful struggle for mastery over my own mind, all that had passed, all 
the horror of that horrible night, became as nothing to me.'1*5 Here all past 
events and impressions are drawn into a vortex of mingled associations which 
form a replaying of a past and a rewriting of a history in which Basil, now 
agent as well as passive voyeur, 'toiled and struggled back, over and over 
again, to seek once more the lost events of the End, through the events of the 
Beginning'.^6 This is still reinterpreted through a retrospective narrative 
framework, which is to disintegrate as narrative time and story time merge 
in the increasingly elliptical diary, but the terms of reference of the 
narrative have been irrecoverably altered by delirium -  it is only by looking in 
at a 'world projected from his own inner being' that Basil is able to 
disentangle the clues of his waking delusion.
The process of Basil's delirium takes the form of a lifting of a veil and 
of an analysis applied to what is perplexed, and this qualifies as it licenses 
the unrestrained visions. It also echoes elements in the process of analysis
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that John Perceval struggles towards in his Narrative of derangement, for 
here, too, it is only by recognising the value of the uses of doubt that Basil 
can disentangle his self-created duplicity by recognising the plots that 
surrounded him . This process is rendered ironic, however, for here the truth 
has been partly determined by delusion, and the most dangerous delusions of 
all are those which cannot perceive their own irrational traces. And it 
means, too, that there will always be an element that cannot be recalled, a 
trace that remains hidden:
It  was as if something were imprisoned in my mind, 
and moving always to and fro in it -  moving, but never 
getting free.
Soon, these thoughts began to take a form  that I could 
recognise. In the clinging heat and fierce seething 
fever, to which neither waking or sleeping brought a 
breath of freshness or a dream of change, I began to 
act my part over again, in the events that had passed -  
but in a strangely altered character. Now , instead of 
placing implicit trust in others, as I had done; instead 
of failing to discover a significance and a warning in 
each circumstance as it arose, I was suspicious from 
the first -  suspicious of Margaret, of her father, of her 
m other, of Mannion, of the very servants in the house.
In the hideous phantasmagoria of m y own calamity 
into which I now looked, my position was reversed.
Eve ry event of the doomed year of my probation was 
revived. But the doom itself; the night-scene of 
horror through which I had passed; the brief terrible 
catastrophe of the weary drama of wickedness and 
deceit, had utterly vanished from my memory. This 
lost recollection, it was the unending toil of my 
wandering mind to recover; and I never got it back.
None who have not suffered as I suffered then, can 
imagine with what a burning rage of determination I 
followed past events in my delirium, one by one, for 
days and nights together -  followed, to get to the end 
which I knew was beyond; but which I never could see, 
not even by glimpses, for a moment at a time.**7
The endless reconstruction of a past that refuses to reveal its own 
secrets, where Basil's 'restless memory recoiled before the impenetrable 
darkness which forbade it to see further', suddenly dissolves into a series of 
hallucinations which borrow from and comment on their own sources, above 
all De Quincey's analysis of induced derangement, The Confessions of an
English Opium E a t e r .^  In his analysis o f T h e  Pains of Opium' De Quincey 
discussed in detail the way that opium disrupted the workings of the 
consciousness in a way that was frequently referred to in mid-nineteenth- 
century psychological theory. Firstly, he noted, 'a sympathy seemed to arise 
between the waking and dreaming states of the brain' so that 'whatsoever 
things capable of being visually represented I did but think of in the darkness, 
immediately shaped themselves into phantoms of the eye'. Secondly, 'a deep- 
seated anxiety': 'I seemed every night to  descend -  not metaphorically but 
literally to descend -  into chasms and sunless abysses, depths below depths, 
from which it seemed hopeless that 1 could ever re-ascend.' Thirdly the sense 
of space and time was distorted: 'Buildings, landscapes, etc, were exhibited 
in proportions so vast as the bodily eye is not fitted to receive'; and finally, 
the forgotten events of childhood re-emerge, removing the V eil between our
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present consciousness and the secret inscriptions on the mind'. These forms 
are directly reproduced in Basil's delirium , and here too the allegorical 
landscape of the earlier dream is transformed into an extraordinary 
conflation of omniscient vision, e&foological punishment, and metaphorical 
transformation as he enacts the earlier drama of engulfment and defilement 
and offers an exegesis of his earlier narrative. This is worth quoting at some 
length:
Giant phantoms mustered by millions, flashing white 
as lightning in the ruddy air. Th e y  rushed on me with 
hurricane-speed; their wings fanned me with fiery 
breezes; and the echo of their thunder-music was like 
the groaning and rending of an earthquake, as they 
tore me away with them on their whirlwind course.
Away! to a C ity  of Palaces, to measureless halls, and 
arches, and domes, soaring one above another, till 
their flashing ruby summits are  lost in the burning 
void, high overhead. On! through and through these 
mountain-piles, into countless, limitless corridors, 
reared on pillars lurid and rosy as molton lava ... Still 
on and on; faster and faster, for years, days, centuries 
together, till there comes, stealing slowly forward to 
meet us, a shadow -  a vast, stealthy, gliding shadow -  
the first darkness that has ever been shed over that 
world of blazing light! ...
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A silence, like no silence ever known on earth; a 
darkening of the shadow, blacker than the blackest 
night in the thickest wood -  a pause -  then, a sound as 
of the heavy air being cleft asunder; then ... an 
apparition of two figures coming on out of the shadow 
-  two monsters stretching forth their gnarled yellow 
talons to grasp at us; leaving on their track a green 
decay, oozing and shining with a sickly light ... Each 
laid a talon on m y shoulder -  each raised a veil that 
was one hideous network of twining worms. I saw 
through the ghastly corruption of their faces the look 
that told me who they were -  the monstrous iniquities 
incarnate in monstrous forms; the fiend souls made 
visible in fiend shapes -  Margaret and Mannion! ... 
Anon, the lake of black waters heaved up and 
overflowed, and noiselessly sucked us away into its 
centre depths -  depths that were endless; depths of 
rayless darkness, in which we slowly eddied round and 
round, deeper and deeper at every turn .50
This is Collins's most explicit exploitation of the internal configurations 
of hallucination, explicit because as a hallucination it remains partially 
controlled even as it represents breakdown, as De Quincey's confessions do. 
But the second breakdown, the breakdown of the narrative, though less 
flamboyant, is inextricably bound up with the story's inability to achieve 
either a fictional or an ideological resolution of the contradictions that have 
formed the narrative tensions from the start. Basil's recovery from brain 
fever leads to further ostracisation as his father disinherits him; the figure of 
Mannion that he encounters in the wildness of Cornwall has become the 
monstrous vision of the delirium by assuming a mask of disfigurement that 
Basil himself has imposed. The wildness of Cornw all, too, with its rocks and 
cliffs, lieyond the railways' of modern civilization, forms a setting where 
Basil can engage in the final conflict with Mannion that replicates the 
landscape of the delirium. It too becomes a projected image of suppressed 
tumult -  a self-conscious evocation of wildness: In  one of the highest parts 
of the wall-side of granite thus formed, there opened a black, yawning hole 
that slanted nearly straight downwards, like a tunnel, to unknown and 
unfathomable depths below, into which the waves found entrance through
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some subterranean tunnel ... But, high as they leapt up in the rocky walls of
the chasm, they never leapt into sight from above.'51 It is here that Basil
finally eliminates Mannion, by flinging him into the abyss, but Mannion then
replaces Margaret as the focus for his monomania as he becomes increasingly
unable to obliterate his memory. T h e  frightful scene that I witnessed
yesterday still holds the same disastrous influence over me', he notes in the
journal. 1 have vainly endeavoured to think, not of Mannion's death, but of
the free prospect which that death has opened to my view. Waking or
sleeping, it is as if some fatality kept all my faculties imprisoned within the
black walls of the chasm.'52 Increasingly the journal becomes 'the only
safeguard that keeps me in my senses', and this use of immediate testimony
in the present reveals the earlier retrospection of the confession to be a
means not only of self-analysis but of warding off impending disintegration.55
Th e  diary breaks off and the story is taken up by letters recounting his
rediscovery by his family, his recovery and assimilation 'in the shadowed
valley of Repose' in which the family, in becoming his asylum, is simply an
extension of itself. And thus the only conclusion that the story can offer is a
statement of suspended animation, which, 'in the interests of A rt ' as well as
o f Reality leaves its loose ends hanging open:
How are the pages which I am about to send you to be 
concluded? In the novel-reading sense of the word, my 
story has no real conclusion. The repose that comes to 
all of us after trouble -  to me, a repose of life: to 
others, how often a repose only in the grave! -  is the 
end which must close this autobiography: an end calm, 
natural and uneventful; yet not, perhaps, devoid of all 
lessons and all value. Is it fit that I should set myself, 
for the sake of an effect, to make a conclusion, and 
terminate by fiction what has begun, and thus so far 
proceeded in truth? In the interests of A rt as well as 
the interests of Reality, surely not!***
It is impossible to locate any source of stable authority in the narrative 
voice in Basil. The only means of making sense of its shifts in tense and 
register, or of setting up any kind of implied hierarchy of narrative frames, is
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by reference to a qualified and ambivalent moral management. Yet it is the 
controlling gaze of the father that is clearly shown to be the source of Basil's 
imposture from the s ta rt. Similarly, the villain, Robert Mannion, is only 
unambiguous as a villa in  in so far as he can be fitted into the conceptual 
framework of moral insanity, which enables his self-possession and control 
over others to be pathologised and excluded from sympathy. But it  is 
necessary for the doctor in the public hospital where Mannion is sent after 
being mutilated by Basil to underwrite this definition, vaguely offering two 
physiological explanations for his crim inality: Tilther there has been madness 
in his family, or his brain has suffered from his external injuries. Legally, he 
may be quite fit to be at large, for he will be able to maintain the appearance 
of perfect self-possession in the ordinary affairs of life. But morally, I am 
convinced that he is a dangerous monomaniac.'55 Mannion remains a 
negative antagonist, com ing back from Basil's father's repressed guilty past 
to avenge his own father's death. But like the nameless monster in 
Frankenstein his own confessional story -  a letter to Basil -  directly 
replicates the overall narrative structure while creating an opposing 
ideological framework which explicitly challenges the dominant one, though 
it can never overturn it .  Mannion's story is a negative reflection of Basil's, 
he is formed by the same patterns of judgment, surveillance and inheritance, 
which now become forces of exclusion. And this turns into a critique of the 
other legacy of moral management -  the belief in self-help and competitive 
individualism:
The ambition which -  whether I was a hack-author, a 
travelling portrait-painter, or an usher at a school had 
once whispered to me: -  low down as you are in dark, 
miry ways, you are on the path which leads upwards to 
high places in the sunshine afar off; you are not 
working to  scrape together wealth for another man; 
you are independent, self-reliant, labouring in your 
own cause -  the daring ambition which had once 
counselled this, sank dead within me at last. The
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strong, stern spirit was beaten by spirits stronger and 
sterner yet -  Infamy and V u i t "
Basil is Collins's most explicit exploration of the internalisation of 
social power, sexual obsession and the breakdown of consciousness and 
identity. The questions and concerns that he raises here are both elaborated 
and transformed in the 1860s as they are put to  work in new narrative 
contexts, and to create specific kinds of indeterminacy and suspense through 
more complex kinds of social relationships. But in the 1850s the figure of the 
hypochondriacal bachelor makes another appearance in 'Mad Monkton', the 
obsessed victim  of a family story, and is debunked and satirised in A  Rogue's 
L ife . Despite his admiration of Basil Dickens had rejected 'Mad Monkton' for 
Household Words on the grounds that it explicitly dealt with the sensitive 
subject of hereditary insanity in a way that could be read as reinforcing the 
very kinds of superstitions that the journal wanted to  dispel , despite its own 
discussion of the morbid inheritance of ancient families in Idiots Again'.57 
'Mad Monkton' does more than this though -  it rew rites Poe's tale of mystery 
in which the ancient family line, the m aterial property, and the 
hypochondriacal sensibility of the heir become, lite ra lly , morbid extensions of 
each other -  T h e  Fall of the House of Usher'.
'Mad Monkton', like 'The Fall of the House of Usher', is narrated by a 
sympathetic friend who sees the protagonist's morbid obsessions as a form of 
hypochondria which he attempts to analyse, but finally gets caught within 
monomaniacal obsessions of the hero, which thus 'work their own fulfilment'. 
In both, the very self-consciousness of the analysis of the psychological 
processes by which the delusions are generated serves simply to reinforce 
them -  Usher fears fear of the future as much as the future itself, and the 
narrator comments at the opening: There can be no doubt that the 
consciousness of the rapid increase of my superstition -  for why should I not
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so term  it? -  served mainly to accelerate the increase itself. Such, I have 
long known, is the paradoxical law of a ll sentiments having terror as a 
basis.'5* But in Poe's tale the narrative voice is caught up within the psychic 
obsession from the beginning -  the whole story is 'hypochondriacal' in a w a y 
that is subjected to a new kind of scrutiny in 'Mad Monkton'. T h e  Fall of th e  
House of Usher' assimilates a late eighteenth-century rhetoric of nervous 
sensibility to explain Usher himself, the responses of the narrator, and the 
collapse of the family line with the house at the end. It echoes W hytt's 
discussion of how the nerves constitute a web-like structure of sympathy both 
between parts of the body and between individuals, manifesting itself as a set 
of vibrations which become morbid through intensification. Usher's 
hypochondria: 'Displayed itself in a host of unnatural sensations ... H e  
suffered much from a morbid acuteness of the senses; the most insipid food 
alone was endurable; he could wear only garments of a certain texture ... his
59eyes were tortured by even a faint light ...' And while the narrator 
subjects him to phrenological and physiognomic readings, his own perspective 
from the beginning is saturated by the dream-like atmosphere of the place in 
which the physical is inextricably bound up with the moral: 1 wondered to
find how unfamiliar were the fancies which ordinary images were stirring
,60up.'
In 'Mad Monkton', too, the decline of the family is expressed by the 
physical decay, the morbid stagnancy of the environment which thus becomes
projection and cause of the hero's hypochondria. But the terror is 
generated by being removed a stage further than in Poe's story. The narrator 
plays the role of analyst, voyeur and detective, whose relationship with his 
subject goes through distinct interpretative phases, in which m oral 
management is finally overpowered by internalised inheritance and s e lf- 
sustaining mythology as the narrator attempts to track the cause of the
10
monomania by investigating the fam ily history. A t  first the Monkton family 
is presented as a product of local legend, as manifesting the vaguely defined 
'taint' of hereditary insanity. The legend is internalised by the Monktons 
themselves, who become deviant members of the gentry community, 
expressing its values in an extreme form in by failing to adapt: T h e  members 
of [the Monkton fam ily] shrank from exposing their calam ity to others, as 
they must have exposed it if they had mingled with the busy world about 
them ... at intervals almost every form of madness appeared in the family, 
monomania being the most frequent ...'** In the second, the narrator 
encounters Monkton directly and contemplates his obsession with the legend 
that the family will die out if all its  members are not buried in the family 
vault, which lies behind his apparently monomaniacal quest for the lost body 
of a profligate uncle whose spectral apparition he periodically sees. Here the 
narrator draws not on the rhetoric of nervous sensibility so much as on 
monomania and spectral illusion, separating Monkton's lucid and deluded 
selves. Monkton's spectral illusions are detached both from narrator and the 
protagonist, who does not lack the power to examine them, but cannot rid 
himself of their emotional power. A t  the same time the form the monomania 
takes -  that all the members of the family should be included in the vault -  
compounds its stagnant degeneration. This replaces spectral illusion as a 
morbid symptom:
This set me thinking about the extent of his madness, 
or, to speak more mildly and more correctly, of his 
delusion. Sane he certainly was on ordinary subjects, 
nay, in all the narrative parts of what he had said to 
me on that very evening he had spoken clearly and 
connectedly. As for the story of the apparition, other 
men, with intellects as clear as those of their 
neighbours, had fancied themselves pursued by a 
phantom, and had even written about it in a high strain 
of philosophical speculation. It was plain that the real 
hallucination in the case now before me, lay in the 
conviction of the truth of the old prophesy, and on his 
idea that the fancied apparition was a supernatural 
warning to him to evade his denunciations. And it was 
equally clear that both delusions had been produced by
I l l
the lonely life he had led acting on a naturally 
excitable temperament, which was rendered further 
liable to moral disease by the hereditary trait of 
insanity.62
The narrator uses Monkton's ability to 'speak clearly and connectedly' as 
proof of his sanity, but while never losing his detached, retrospective voice, 
finds that the distinctions between associations cannot be maintained as they 
discover the uncle's rotting body, attempt to bring it home, and lose it at sea. 
Monkton, falling into melancholy, dies, and the narrator concludes by 
contemplating the involuted framework set up at the beginning. Th e  belief in 
self-control and moral management of the narrator is progressively broken 
down as he is drawn into the 'supernatural' framework of the obsession, but it 
never completely dissolves.
Basil and 'Mad Monkton' both explore the tenacity of the past by 
intermingling social, psychic and physical inheritance. In both it is the way in 
which identities disintegrate through the subject's sensory incorporation of 
others' projections and expectations that generates not only sensation and 
suspense, but also a sense of claustrophobia, of the morbidness of inheritance 
itself. The satirical confession of a gentleman convict, A  Rogue's Life, 
breaks free of this stagnancy as the hero facetiously describes his social 
transformation through crim e, and the story parodies the involuted self- 
analysis of Basil by turning case history and moral tale into a pastiche of the 
exemplary story of self-help and progressive liberalism: 'I am an example of 
the workings of the social system of this illustrious country of o u m  on 
individual nature; and if I may say so without unbecoming vanity, I should like 
to quote myself for the edification of my countryman.'6* Collins's w riting in 
the 1850s often takes a single sensation or situation as its focus, and develops 
a set of psychological references and narrative strategies to explore these as 
far as possible within the limits o f the specific generic form. A  Rogue's Life  
facetiously parodies the confessional form of Basil and by doing this it also
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subverts the doubling of hero and villain. Here the hero assumes a se lf- 
possessed, healthy criminal identity which even finally becomes respectable 
in the process of casting off a past. In these novels both inheritance and 
moral management become vehicles for the taking apart of social self, but in 
each the central male subject either regresses, dies, or becomes a healthy 
exile. This is an impasse which is broken in The Woman in White as the 
propertied woman becomes the point of disintegration and the stage for the 
professional middle-class man's social transformation. But it is an impasse 
which is negotiated by developing a set of psychological conventions as 
narrative strategies within the specific context of Household Words. And it 
results not only in Collins's most successful sensation novel, but his most 
ambitious exploration of the relationship between social perceptions, power 
and subjectivity.
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C H A P TE R  T H R E E  
T H E  W OM AN IN  W HITE»
R ESEM B LA N C E A N D  D IF F E R E N C E  -  P A TIE N C E  A N D  R ES O LU TIO N
What had I done? Assisted the victim  of the most 
horrible of all false imprisonments to escape; or cast 
loose on the wide world of London an unfortunate 
creature whose actions it was my duty, and every 
man's duty, mercifully to control?*
Walter Hartright asks himself this question immediately after encountering 
the mysterious figure on the road to London, at the beginning of the second 
episode of the serialisation of The Woman in White. The immediacy of the 
'sensation' produced by the sudden appearance of the spectral woman is both 
elaborated and qualified by the double problem that Hartright ponders on 
discovering that she is a fugitive from a lunatic asylum; the problem not 
simply of whether she is mad, but of whether her derangement is of the kind 
to justify confinement in the light of his own observation of her behaviour. 1 
cannot say with truth that the terrible inference which those words suggested 
flashed on me like a new revelation', he remarks. 'But the idea of absolute 
insanity which we all associate with the very name of an Asylum, had, I can 
honestly declare, never occurred to me in connection with her.'2 Thus the 
shock of first seeing the woman in white becomes a greater mystery as she is 
placed in a new light, though this is not a 'new relevation'; the mystery of 
how to see is linked to the problem of how to frame and place her. Yet the 
two contrasting notions of what she might be: 'victim  of false imprisonment', 
or unfortunate creature, in need of constraint, imply not simply different 
degrees of madness, but different conceptions of what it means to be mad. 
And yet again 'absolute insanity' itself is a term constructed by the
114
institution which contains it , while the question that Hartright is forced to 
consider makes him distrust the validity of his own senses.
In this way both the sensation of the sudden encounter w ith, and the 
mystery of the identity of, Anne Catherick are compounded out of a set of 
suggestions and inferences which in certain respects can never be fully 
explained or satisfied by the narrative resolutions which are offered. The 
process anticipates the contradictions and ambiguities set up by the story as 
a whole, which plays with distinct forms of psychological discourse which are 
exploited, subverted and transformed in different ways as they are put to 
work as narrative strategies in the text. By this process The Woman in White 
becomes a complex investigation of the interaction of psychic and social 
forces; an exploration of the ways in which social identities are formed by 
and within particular frameworks of perception, which in turn determine and 
are determined by, social and sexual hierarchies. In this chapter I want to 
explore how this works.
On an obvious level as a sensation novel, The Woman in White plays
with the relationship between ways of seeing, modes of identity and forms of
power. Collins uses the dual device of doubling and substituting Laura Fairlie
and Anne Catherick's identities in the Asylum not only to question the
enigmatic definitions and borderlands of insanity in the 'whited out', drained,
figure of Anne, but also to explore how Laura's subjective self is broken down
and rebuilt through the controlling interests and perceptions of others. And
this in turn breaks down any stable division between the resonances of 'home'
and 'asylum' as places of safety and danger. After her rescue from the
Asylum, stripped of family, property, husband, all social assets, Laura is
described by Walter, relating her to Annes
The fatal resemblance which I had once seen and 
shuddered at seeing, in idea only, was now a real and 
living resemblance which asserted itself before my
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own eyes. Strangers, acquaintances, friends even who 
could not look at her as we looked, if she had been 
shown to  them in the first days of her rescue from the 
A sylum , might have doubted if she were the Laura 
Fair lie  they had once seen, and doubted without 
blame.3
Laura has in a sense ’become' Anne Catherick once the social and 
psychological contexts that divided them have broken down; she can only 
regain her place and her identity when she can be shown to others in the 
revived light of the  past.
This takes place, however, in the context of a range of forms of 
reconstruction at work in the narrative as a whole. Laura, the bearer of 
wealth, is cast in different lights by others, but never writes herself. The 
fight over how to  possess and repossess her is bound up with the struggle 
carried on by other figures in the novel: the struggle over how to see, over 
the control of tim e  and memory, and over the control of writing; a struggle 
bound up with the  battle for self-management and self-definition. This in 
turn depends on manipulating and soliciting the reader's perception and 
knowledge. The reader is told at the start that the story will be unravelled 
through the subjective perspective of the linked testimonies of the different 
narrators -  that their eye witness accounts are empirically accurate but 
partial. Suspense and excitement are generated and maintained by the way 
that the reader's view  is limited at any one time to the perspective of each 
individual narrator whose testimonies are at once reliable and unreliable, and 
whose means of making sense of the world needs to be continually questioned. 
Y e t actually the narrative forms a more ambiguous embedded chain, wherein 
each individual utterance gains meaning from the way it has been placed in 
the chain, and w hich is presented as continual progression but which is in 
reality a continual, contradictory prodess of reappropriation and redefinition. 
These narrative paradoxes point to a more general ambiguity; for both the 
cognitive fram ework and the process of detection through which the 
mysteries of Anne Catherick and
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Percival Clyde's identities are unravelled in order to reconstruct Laura 
involve a process of realignment within a framework which is essentially and 
ironically compatible with the one through which she is taken apart.
It was the fictional, cultural and ideological constraints on the novel 
which created greater scope for psychological complexity in the narrative 
form of Th e  Woman in White. Basil and 'Mad Monkton' had both used images 
of madness and the breakdown of identity in pushing a reformulated set of 
supernatural terror conventions to their lim it , set within a reconstructed 
narrative framework that defused suspense though not intensity of 
experience. The Woman in White was w ritten  under particular cultural 
pressures -  it  was essential that it should be a compulsively readable story if 
its serialisation was to secure the circulation of the newly-launched A ll the 
Year Round.4 It needed also, as Miss Oliphant was later to point out, to be a 
book 'abounding in sensation', but one in which 'everything is legitimate, 
natural and probable ... and there is almost as little  in this highly-wrought 
sensation novel as if it had been a domestic story of the most unexciting 
kind'.5 Collins develops many of the methods and concerns of Basil in The 
Woman in White, and in apparently defusing them, actually takes them 
further. The novel continues to exploit contemporary psychological methods 
by using them to produce the very anxiety and fears that they were developed 
to analyse, that puts it on a continuum w ith the earlier fiction, but in the 
treatment of insanity the novel is both constrained and presented with a new 
set of opportunities by the discursive framework of insanity which had been 
set up by Household Words -a  domesticated, feminised insanity, set within the 
optimistic paternalistic framework of moral management.
Collins negotiates these constraints firstly  by putting the flickering, 
unstable figure of Anne to different uses in the text as a problematic uncanny 
figure who hovers on the boundary between madness and sanity, rationality
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and superstition, literal and figural modes of representation. Joseph 
Posselthwaite, the pupil at Limmeridge School who functions as the voice of 
'popular superstition', is familiar with what Marian sarcastically refers to as 
the 'manners and customs' of ghosts. He works within a naive traditional 
structure of knowledge that determines how he sees 'the ghaist of Miss 
Fairlie': 'A ll in white -  as a ghaist should be ... Away yonder, in t^ irk y a rd  -  
where a ghaist ought to be ... But while this is debunked by M arian and 
Hartright, the uncertainty of what Anne does signify, and how her testimony 
should be listened to , like their own apparently irrational forebodings, is 
given a significance but one they can only decipher as 'unsoundness o f mind'. 
While her contrast with Laura, and the breakdown of the difference between 
them means that the cultural connotations -  'the idea of insanity which we all 
associate with the name of an asylum' form a pattern of contrasts w hich are 
undermined by the novel while remaining one of the bases for its effects. 
Anne Catherick, the propertyless outcast, appears ghostly because, in another 
way, she is Laura's ghost. Simultaneously her other and double, she is the 
trace, the shadow and the mirror of the social and subjective transformation 
which Laura undergoes -  undergoes explicitly in the way her identity is taken 
to pieces, and tacitly in the way it is built up, so that 'the most horrible of all
rj< A
false imprisonments' merges, while being set against, 'merciful control'.
In order to work in this way Th e  Woman in White orchestrates a very 
precise set of allusions to contemporary debates on confinement, definitions 
of insanity and the treatment of the insane within a narrative that enables 
shifting connotations to  be produced by overlapping models of feminine 
identity through distinct kinds of masculine manipulation. By setting up 
Laura's obviously wrongful confinement against Anne's, which is also 
problematic, though not in quite the same way, Collins interweaves the 'older' 
resonances of fears of confining the sane in madhouses in order to steal their
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property by bereaving them of social identity that is suggested by his use of 
the late eighteenth century case of the Marquise de Douhault, with 
contemporary questions about what justified confinement that surrounded the 
Parliamentary Select Committee Enquiry into the Care and Treatment of 
Lunatics and their Property of 1839-60. But these associations also make up 
a palimpsest of allusions that take them beyond the immediate perimeters of 
the debates on private asylums as a source of sensation, emphasising the 
tensions of these debates, and linking them with the image of domesticated 
insanity -  a reformed madness personified in the inmate of an asylum 
modelled on a stately home -  the model county asylum.
In Chapter One I argued that the late 1850s were a contradictory 
moment in the lunacy reform movement, which in a paradoxical way had 
helped to shape the very anxieties that it had attempted to institutionalise 
out of existence. Predominantly, the legacy of progressivist, paternalistic 
liberalism seemed secured. The practice of moral management and the non­
restraint system had domesticated madness itself as it contributed to the 
reform of the private madhouses and the development of the county asylum 
system; the study and treatment of insanity had become a respectable, 
professionalised and rapidly expanding branch of the medical profession -  as 
exemplified above a ll by Conolly's career. Ye t the shaping of insanity within 
a new kind of institution and a new kind of public professional relation did not 
dissipate the fears of confinement -  merely shifted the focus of the fears, 
and linked it w ith  the debates on madness itself. 'Wrongful confinement' 
became more ambiguous now -  applying beyond the victims of conscious 
conspiracy. The problematic borderlands of insanity could be used by the 
medical profession to argue for increased specialised surveillance and 
control, but also, by those who saw the plight of the possible victim's medical 
manipulation, against it. Reade's conflation of modern and corrupt asylums,
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his descriptions of mad-doctors as 'soul murderers who make their lie a truth', 
depended on collapsing together different images and institutional processes. 
This might have been disclaimed by Dickens but it echoed a widespread set of 
fears about the danger of medical expertise legitimising corrupt motivations 
that essentially sprang from the tensions within the liberalism of the reform 
movement itself. Thus A ll the Year Round, discussing the reports of the 
Commissioners in Lunacy in 1862, two years after the serialisation of Th e  
Woman in White, and before Hard Cash, modified the almost uncritical 
admiration of the reform movement of Household Words on the one hand and 
Reade's fears of conscious conspiracy on the other, and like John Perceval 
and the Conolly of Indications of Insanity, stressed the dangers of total 
medical control for the liberty of the subject, which 'fixes and renders 
permanent that which might have passed away'.7 The difficulties of 
establishing precisely what constituted 'unsoundness of mind' and whether it 
justified confinement did not depend on the conscious corruption of the 
medical profession but on the context in which these judgments inevitably 
take place:
Let us at once declare that w e  do not for an instant, 
or in the remotest degree, attribute to Dr Winslow, or 
to any other of these medical gentlemen, a conscious 
action under mercenary motives. The public danger 
arising from their influence would be infinitely 
insignificant if the fact were so. They are highly 
trained men, who have honestly devoted themselves to 
a special study of the most d ifficu lt questions that can 
occur to a physician. There is no clear dividing-line 
between sickness and health o f mind; unsoundness of 
mind is, no doubt, as various and common as 
unsoundness of body ... Every natural defect of temper 
is unsoundness ... But we do not condemn our bodies as 
unfit for use when there are corns on our toes, or when 
the sallow tinge on our cheeks supplants the line of 
health ... so it is with the m ind. Every man has his 
weak place, his twist, his hobby ...
What opinion are we to ftfrm upon the whole case of 
the facility with which a m ad-doctor can insensibly 
adapt his theories to either side? Even in the less 
uncertain fields of science, w e have seen in great 
criminal trials eminent chemists as well as eminent
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mad-doctors retained for the prosecution. The value 
of the skilled witness has usually its visible measure in 
questions of material fact that concern the body. In 
questions that concern the mind, the less heed we pay 
to the theorist, and the more distinctly we require 
none but the sort of evidence patent to the natural 
sense of ordinary men in determining what citizen 
shall suffer the privations, or what criminal shall enjoy 
the privileges of unsoundness of mind, the better it 
will be for us. Let us account no man a lunatic whom 
it requires a mad-doctor to prove insane.*
This echoes the starting point for Walter Hartright's dilemma on 
hearing of Anne's alleged insanity in The Woman in White just as it picks up 
on John Perceval's argument to the Parliamentary Select Com m ittee that
non-specialists should be involved in the commitment of the supposed 
9
insane. 'The natural sense of ordinary men' is dissected in the novel. Yet 
Collins nonetheless assumes a tacit identification with Hartright's view  of 
Anne which is, in one register, explicitly confirmed -  that of the middle class, 
liberal, well informed observer. This works in the treatment o f the 
confinement and substitution of Anne and Laura, in the effect on 
confinement on Laura and in the perception of Anne. Both women are 
victims of 'wrongful' confinement conspiracies, echoing John Perceval's 
arguments amongst others that those who have power over the alleged insane 
'may be influenced by corrupt motives, such as the desire to possess 
themselves of a ward or kinsman's estate, or to get a person out of the way 
who interferes with their selfish gratifications'.10 They are both confined, 
however, with the unconscious complicity of not only the medical profession, 
but the broader institutions of middle class common sense -  the law and the 
family, all of whom are unable to recognise Laura once she has been 
pronounced 'socially, m orally, legally -  dead'.11 The asylum in which Anne 
and Laura are confined is a respectable private establishment, an 
uncontroversia! non-restraint institution, that could have been indirectly 
modelled on one of Fox's establishments, or even one of Conolly's, each
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patient with her own keeper, though it is in a London suburb, not a rural 
retreat.12 Its proprietor is neither a corrupt profiteer, nor a 'Wycherley' 
figure, sinisterly collecting mad specimens, but a bland individual who happily 
opens his doors to Marian, and whose indirectly reported explanation of the 
changes in Anne/Laura, reinforces Hartright's doubts about stable identities 
and definitions, but within the framework of a medical opinion that bases its 
authority on physiognomy. It is emphasised that 'such changes, no doubt, 
were not without precedent in his experience of persons mentally afflicted. 
Insane people were often, at one time, outwardly as w ell as inwardly, unlike 
what they were at another; the change from better to  worse, or from worse 
to better, in the madness, having a necessary tendency to produce alterations 
of appearance externally.'1^  This echoes Alexander Morison's point that 'the 
appearance of the face ... is intimately connected w ith , and dependent upon 
the state of the m ind'.1 ^
The instability of the definition and perception of insanity, and the 
'facility with which a mad-doctor can insensibly adapt his theories to either 
side' is pressed into service to transform Laura in a way that echoes the 
process by which Conolly himself was able to twist the implications of his 
own Indications of Insanity into their opposite. But w ith Anne the asylum 
works as a crucible in a different way, for, although her confinement is never 
justified, she is built up through a set of conventions and allusions as a person 
of 'unsound mincT as an ideal patient of a model county asylum. The article 
on T h e  Cure of Sick Minds' in Household Words describes the case of 'a young 
woman, liable to returns of insanity [who] left her home at four o'clock one 
wet morning and ... hurried to the asylum ... She said she dreaded being at 
home, for they treated her badly when mad. She knew the asylum was the 
best place, and she came as fast as she could, to get help in time In
one way Anne's escape from the madhouse -  'the most horrible of all false 
imprisonments’ -  reverses this, but it also in a curious way reinforces it.
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Because from the start Anne's peculiar mental condition is suggested by 
the way that she is set up as a model patient of moral management. She 
suffers from monomania, able to control herself though not to recognise the 
extent of her delusions. Like the female patients that Dickens describes in 'A 
Curious Dance Round a Curious Tre e ' -  she is bizarre in the way that she goes 
through the motions of passive propriety which in the process become 
transformed into the mark of hovering on the brink of self-possession. What 
is weird about Anne is her obedience and docility, her perpetual childlikeness, 
which is also the sign of her ambiguous class identity, echoing the shadowy 
class transformation of moral management: 'There was nothing wild, nothing 
immodest in her manner: it was quiet and self-controlled, a little  melancholy 
and a little touched by suspicion; not exactly the manner of a lady, and, at 
the same time, not exactly the manner of a woman in the humblest rank of 
life .'16 Her obsession with wearing white -  instilled into her in the 'asylum' of 
the substitute home at Limmeridge House turns Conolly's notion of this 
'really proper feeling' as a means of therapy: 'many of the women should be 
indulged in wearing neat articles of dress', into his opposite and 
simulacrum.17 Her weakened intellectual faculties are explained in the First 
Part of the narrative through the kind of combination of phrenological and 
associationist criteria that Conolly uses in Indications of Insanity; her 
monomania takes the form of not being able to impose coherent criteria on 
her own associations, which can be modified by education. The late Mrs 
Fairlie cites a doctor's opinion 'that she w ill grow out of it. But he says her 
careful bringing up at school is a matter of great importance just now, 
because her unusual slowness in acquiring ideas implies an unusual tenacity in 
keeping them, when they are once received into her mind.'18 These have 
become 'fixed and rendered permanent'; Hartright notes: 'The old grateful 
sense of her benefactress's kindness was evidently the ruling idea still in the
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poor creature's mind -  the narrow mind which had but too plainly opened to 
no other lasting impression since that first impression of her younger and 
19happier days.' Yet they can also be modified and controlled by benign 
surveillance: 'I appealed to the only anxiety she appeared to feel, in
connexion w ith  me and with my opinion of her -  the anxiety to convince me 
of her fitness to  be mistress of her own actions.'2®
What Anne  represents, then, is the defusing and domestication of mania 
into monomania or partial insanity, able to control itself and not justifying 
restraint, or even, necessarily, confinement.21 But she also suggests the 
pathologisation of feminine passivity. And as Laura's other and double she 
anticipates a  process that the figure of Laura then silently infers as each 
absorbs the other's connotations. Laura and Anne's doubleness is set on a 
strictly physiological as well as a figurative level. Hartright notes the 
similarities, as if  he was writing a physiognomic report, 'in the general 
outline of the countenance and in the general proportion of the features; in 
the colour of the hair and in the little nervous uncertainty about the lips; in 
the height and size of the figure and the carriage of the head and body ..,'.22 
Anne is differentiated from Laura by 'sorrow and suffering' rather than, 
primarily, fa cu lty  or constitution, and conversely, it is Laura's delicacy of 
constitution and faculty that is paradoxically both emphasised and denied as 
being particularly vulnerable to the changes brought about by confinement: 
'Faculties less delicately balanced, constitutionffless tenderly organised, must 
have suffered under such an ordeal as this. No man could have gone through 
it and come out unchanged.'23
This contradictory suggestion that Laura's vulnerability is both 
constitutional and constituted by social role and social expectation as the 
bearer of the family wealth becomes further complicated by Anne and 
Laura's position in the Fairlie family, which is, tacitly, the •bleached' version
of which the 'white' Anne is the extrem e. Anne is finally explained by 
Hartright in hereditary terms, as the  bearer of the biological and moral 
Nemesis of the father's excesses: There  rose on my memory the
remembrance of the Scripture denunciation ... "The sins of the father shall 
be visited on the children" ... With w hat unerring and terrible directness the 
long chain of circumstances led down from  the thoughtless wrong committed 
by the father to the heartless injury committed on the child!'2** But in fact 
the chain of circumstances is far fro m  direct or unerring, for the Fairlie 
family as a whole, not just its illegitim ate stain, is incipiently morbid, in a 
way that mingles and resists distinct codes of inheritance and transmission. 
Here Laura is set in different fam ily  oppositions -  against Anne her half 
sister, her other half sister Marian, her uncle Frederick and Eleanor her 
formerly wayward aunt, now wife of Fosco.
Each opposition produces a distinct implication, which together resist 
as well as reinforce a straightforward physiological notion of feminine 
vulnerability, while linking sensibility and nervous weakness. The inherited 
weakness of the family, for instance, is all from the father's side -  the dark 
and energetic Marian takes after her m other. It is qualified also by the way 
in which cm implied rhetoric of 'nervous disorder' is juggled with, dislodging it 
from its sexual referent while still using it as a source of tension. Frederick 
Fairlie's excessive sensibility echoes Laura's vulnerability in a way that 
makes his disturbing androgyny generate a sense of unreality: 'His beardless 
face was thin, worn and transparently pale, but not wrinkled ... ', notes 
Hartright. 'Upon the whole, he had a frail, languidly-fretful, over-refined 
look -  something singularly and unpleasantly delicate in its association with a 
man, and at the same time, something which could b y no possibility have 
looked natural and appropriate if it  had been transferred to the personal 
appearance of a woman.’25 This takes the image of the upper class
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'hypochondriacal bachelor' a stage further than Basil and 'M ad Monkton', 
turning artistic sensibility into a caricatured decadence that is both the sign 
of physiological degeneration and self-indulgent, idle affectation. 'We all say 
it's the nerves and we none of us know what we mean when we say it ', Marion 
points out, and Fairlie's 'nerves' both parody their earlier reference-points
turn Limmeridge House into the 'private asylum' of a nervous patient, an 
image of seclusion and repose where nothing is allowed to  irritate, a 
claustrophobic retreat prefiguring the patterns of confinement and 
observation that are to be enacted at Blackwater. But to get a coherent view 
o f the way that Collins simultaneously weaves and unpicks this set of 
psychological and cognitive assumptions it is necessary to look at the way 
that the narrative itself is controlled and manipulated in more detail.
The tensions of The Woman in White hinge on the destruction and re­
forming of Laura's identity, but the narrative devices by which i t  generates 
and resolves them make it also the story of Walter Hartright's social and 
psychological transformation -  of his progress from marginalised lower- 
middle class drawing master to the father of the heir of Limm eridge and 
revitaliser of the stagnant and incipiently morbid Fairlie family. As his name 
obviously and emblematically suggests, Hartright operates as the voice of 
safety, of normality and of 'right feeling' in the novel. He is the narrative 
figure who enables fictional and ideological resolutions to be achieved by 
presenting them as the outcome of his own resolution. A t the same time The  
Woman in White is the story of how Hartright's new subjective identity is 
constructed in order to achieve this closure; how he learns to control the past 
and thus the present instead of being incapacitated by anxiety about the 
future, that ominousness which is such an important source of suspense in the
and become the means (n Fairlie abdicates his paternal as much as his 
 
patriarchal role, leaving his niece the more vulnerable.26 They also help to
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first part of the novel; how he becomes both his own and Laura's moral 
manager, and thus successfully opposes the power, also manifested as a form 
of moral management, of Fosco.
A t the beginning of his narrative Hartright is a domesticated artist, a
landscape painter dependent on teaching, a male governess figure, drained of
social and sexual meaning or effectiveness, who can live almost invisibly at
the heart of the patron's fam ily. 1 had trained myself to leave all the
sympathies natural to my age in my employer's outer hall', he writes of his
arrival at Limmeridge. 'I had long since learnt to understand, composedly,
and as a matter of course, that my situation in life was considered a
guarantee against any of m y female pupils feeling more than the most
ordinary interest in me, and that I was admitted among beautiful and
captivating women much as a harmless domestic animal is admitted amongst
them.'27 By the opening o f the Second Part -  when he has rediscovered the
'whited out' Laura and experienced the double shock of recognising her face
above her own gravestone and seeing its transformation 'into' Anne
Catherick, it becomes clear that his radical opposition to established
privilege merges into his possession of Laura, and that the means and end of
his gaining power, is founded on her social obliteration:
Forlorn and disowned, sorely tried and sadly changed; 
her beauty faded, her mind clouded; robbed of her 
station in the world, of her place among living 
creatures -  the devotion I had promised, the devotion 
of my whole heart and soul and strength might be laid 
blamelessly, now, at those dear feet. In the right of 
her calamity, in the right of her friendlessness, she 
was mine at last! Mine to support, to protect, to 
cherish, to restore. Mine to love and honour as father 
and brother both. Mine to vindicate through all risks 
and all sacrifices -  through the hopeless struggle 
against Rank and Power, through the long fight with 
armed Deceit and fortified Success, through the waste 
of my reputation, through the loss of my friends, 
through the hazard of my life.28
But the securing of that position of possession and power by rebuilding the 
social recognition of Laura, by becoming honorary father and brother and by
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realigning the cognitive framework through which she is seen, depends in turn 
on Hartright being able to see differently, partly by appropriating others' 
perceptions -  above all, those of Marian Halcombe who is also, though in a 
different way and context, struggling for control. 1 answer for my self- 
control', he states before the final conflict with the villa in. 'My nerves were 
firmly strung, and I felt all the strength of my resolution stirring in me 
vigorously from head to foot.'29 But this new-found masculine vigour is the 
product of a complex process, and the reversal of his own earlier situation.
This means that two orders of narrative are at work in the novel -  the 
process by which Hartright discloses the mysteries of the past, and the 
process by which he covers his traces. 'This is the story of what a Woman's 
patience can endure and of what a Man's resolution can achieve', the 
Preamble opens, but the actual pattern of perception and control manifested 
in the First Part of the novel is Hartright's passive mediation of sensation and 
Marian's resolution; Marian describes herself as 'a woman, condemned to 
patience, propriety and petticoats, for life'.30 There is thus no 
straightforward movement of narrative authority at work in the text, and 
while the relationship between the control over writing and the consolidation 
of social identity is more explicit here than in any of the stories I have 
considered so far, this relationship can be mutually undermining as well as 
reinforcing, in accordance with the link between the social and psychological 
frameworks through which they work.
In the Preamble Walter Hartright appears to be the overall narrator and 
thus the central authority of The Woman in White. A s General Editor he 
selects, organises and arranges the narratives of others (including his own 
specific narrative) but in such a way that they seem to te ll their own story. 
He seems to be replacing divine judgement with empirical evidence that 
emerges as both reliable and relative; absolute m orality with contingent
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experience, wherein the corruption of the Law is replaced by the analysis of
the Reader, but within the framework of credibility which the Law confers.
But the Law is still, in certain inevitable cases, the 
pre-engaged servant of the long purse; and the story is 
left to be told, for the first time, in this place. As the 
Judge might once have heard it, so the Reader shall 
hear it now. No circumstance of importance, from the 
beginning to the end of this disclosure, shall be related 
on hearsay evidence...
Thus, the story here presented will be told by more 
than one pen, as the story of an offence against the 
law is told Court by more than one witness -  with 
the same object, in both cases, to present the truth in 
its most direct and intelligible aspect; and to trace the 
course of one complete series of events, by making the 
persons who have been most closely connected with 
them, at each successive stage, relate their own 
experience, word for w ord.^l
By this use of passive tense, claiming the neutral authority of the Law even 
as he reveals its interests, the voice of Hartright controls the story the more 
as it appears to be its passive medium. He stresses that his authority is based 
on contingency: 'When his experience fails, he will retire from his position as 
narrator', yet in the Second Part he continuously uses 'hearsay evidence', and 
controls the comings and goings of other narrators as well as the story's 
beginning and end. But the changing relationship between Hartright the 
General Editor and Hartright the specific narrator, or the voice that frames 
the story and the narrative utterance itself, becomes increasingly embroiled 
as the novel progresses.
I have suggested that if one takes the narrative of The Woman in White 
as a whole it seems that two processes are taking place simultaneously: 
Hartright's editing and reorganising 'one complete series of events' as a chain 
which forms a narrative totality and is based on a linear set of logically 
connected associations, and the process of reperception and detection that he 
goes through himself, which forms a more tangled web. But although the 
revelation of the former depends partly on making the latter explicit, the two
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narrative  functions are fudged at crucial moments of the story, and this is 
intim ately connected with the contradictory way that the past is 
reconstructed and Laura restored. It is also crucially bound up with the other 
narrative  relations that are at work in the novel.
So in taking the form of an embedded chain the narrative progresses 
both along and 'inwards', and this in turn produces a hierarchical order of 
specific narratives. F irstly, Hartright as General Editor who presents the 
various narrative testimonies as evidence claiming the legally and empirically 
verifiable  authority of truth; then Hartright the specific narrator, who is on a 
level, supposedly, with the other specific narrators -  Gilmore, Marian, 
F a irlie , Mrs Michelson, Hester Pinhorn, the Doctor, Jane Gould, 'The 
Tom bstone', Count Fosco. Within this are embedded other narratives, in the 
form  of letters, dreams or reported speech. But the degree of embedding 
only partially determines the degree of credibility of each narrating instance, 
and are themselves partly determined by the psychological frame within 
w hich the figures themselves are set.
The powerless Anne Catherick and the powerful Fosco are contrasting 
examples of this. Anne's one autonomous narrative takes the form of a 
dream  related in a letter ('feeble, faint and defaced by blots') to Laura 
warning her of Clyde's wickedness. This attempts to claim credibility by 
drawing on Biblical authority: 'Do you believe in dreams? I hope for your 
sake, that you do. See what Scripture says about dreams (Genesis XL.8, 
S .I.29; Daniel IV. 18-25); and take the warning I send you before it is too late', 
but loses reliability for Hartright and Marian by being triply embedded -  in a 
dream , in a letter, in a. deranged person.32 Here, as I have suggested, this 
very process of embedding gives it a perverse kind of authority as a means of 
'foreshadowing' by making the associations that Marian and Hartright's 
rationality refuse. It contributes to Anne's general uncanny role in the text,
but also prefigures Marian's own dream. v ith  Fosco, on the other hand, the 
pattern takes a different fo rm . His fin*! narrative has a structurally 
ambiguous position, being both embedded within Hartright's specific narrative 
and being * specific narrative in its own right; but as a figure in Marian's 
narrative, he has the social and psychological power to burst through the 
frame through which she seos him , breaking down her sense of the reliability 
of her own senses and finally snatching the pen from her hand. PH pick up 
this thread again later, but first it is necessary to investigate the way in 
which distinct and overlapping methods of perception, control of others and 
self-control operate in the specific and implied perspectives of Hartright, 
Marian and Fosco in the First Part, before considering how they are 
reappropriated through the control of time and memory in the second half of 
the novel.
There are two interrelated features of Hartright's early method of 
Perception, which, in creating ominousness, anxiety and ambiguity, generate 
and imply the sense of his powerlessness and absence of self-control, in a way 
that elaborates many of the patterns at work in Basil's consciousness, but 
from the standpoint of petit-bourgeois interloper rather than displaced 
upper-class younger son. L ike  Basil, Hartright projects meaning into figures 
and events in the light of his own preconceived expectations, and has his own 
identity undermined when they are undercut by his sense of the strange and 
anomalous -  this is one of the chief sources of the sense of uncanniness and 
mystery in the early part of the story. Hartright's perceptual universe -again 
like Basil's -  1» dominated by a particularly naive interpretation of 
•ssociationist and physiognomic methods and assumptions, linked to his 
problematic social and sexual position, which need to be reconciled and 
realigned if he is to see to some purpose and act resolutely. Thus the early 
Hartright's 'common sense' notion of normality is created paradoxically out of
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doubt, uncertainty and insecurity. Pve already introduced how this works in 
his first encounter withyand assessment of, Anne, and in the generalised ways 
in which the boundaries between ’home' and 'asylum' are undercut in the novel 
by the anticipating of the asylum at Blackwater Park, and the foreshadowing 
of Blackwater at Limmeridge, which is a safe, fam iliar asylum, the place of 
Anne's early moral treatment, but nonetheless claustrophobic in its seclusion. 
These in turn express and contribute to his whole mode of perceiving and 
operating.
A t the opening of the novel Hartright's inability to interpret Anne is the 
product not only of her own ambiguity, but of the shock to his faculties, and 
his own inability to control this, that the encounter with Anne had 
precipitated, but not caused. I t  was like a dream. Was I Walter Hartright? 
. . .  Had I really left, little more than an hour since, the quiet, decent, 
conventionally-domestic atmosphere of my mother's cottage? I was too 
bewildered -  too conscious also of a vague sense of something like self 
reproach, to speak to my strange companion for some minutes.'33 This 
anxiety and insecurity, consistently presented as Hartright's inability to 
interpret any perception that cannot be aligned within established 
associations as one form or other of partial insanity, is increased by the very 
retreat-like repose of-Limmeridge. Here it becomes clear that the seclusion 
and isolation does not only compound Frederick Fairlie 's hypochondria but 
also Hartright's own insecure self-control, which also verges on the 
hypochondriacal. It takes the form, firstly, of loss of memory and control 
over the perception and marking of time: 'A confessed sensation of having 
suddenly lost my familiarity with the past, without acquiring any additional 
clearness of idea in reference to the present or the future, took possession of 
m y mind. Circumstances that were but a few days old, faded back in my 
memory, as if they had happened months and months since.'34* This is linked
132
to the lack of control over his 'feminised' social situation and over himself. 
Even as he teaches L a u ra  and Marian to 'represent Nature' in water-colours 
as part of their feminine formation, this saps his own masculinity and self­
management: 1 had just enough work to do, in mounting my employer's 
drawings, to keep my hands and eyes pleasurably employed, while my mind 
was left free to enjoy th e  dangerous luxury of unbridled thoughts.'35
A t  this opening stage then, finding himself in an unaccustomed position
of privilege and idleness, Hartright both senses that 'unbridled thoughts' are a
'dangerous luxury' and is unable to bridle them. He has the consciousness of
the resolute moral superintendent but not the ability to apply this to himself.
It is the female asylum qualities of the place that sap his resolution, as it has
provided an earlier training ground for Anne. Hartright, in John Barlow's
words, does not want 'the power and resolution to examine' his possible
delusions; his problem is that he can only explain them as derangement.36
This applies obviously to  his developing response to Anne and her warning
dream; it also means th a t he can only read his own mounting anxiety as
monomania. So imm ediately before discovering Anne's 'Dream' letter,
H artright meditates on the significance of his discovery of Laura's
engagement to Percival Clyde, and here his immediate self-control breaks
down: 'Thoughts I had hitherto restrained, thoughts that made my position
harder than ever to endure, crowded on me now that I was alone.' These
thoughts, however, take the form of anxious analysis of his own associations,
which enable them to be both suggested and resisted:
Judging by th e  ordinary rules of evidence, I had not 
the shadow o f a reason, this far, for connecting Sir 
Percival G lyd e  with the suspicious words of inquiry 
that had been spoken to me by the woman in white.
And yet, I did connect him with them. Was it because 
he had now become associated in my mind with Miss 
Fairlie; Miss Fa irlie  being, in her turn, associated with 
Anne C atherick, since that night when I had 
discovered the  ominous likeness between them? Had 
the events o f the morning unnerved me already that I
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was at the mercy of any delusion which common 
chances and common coincidences might suggest to 
my imagination?3?
Like R obert Audley, in Lady Audley's S e c re t, Hartright is unable to
distinguish between 'monition' and 'monomania'. But while for Robert Audley
this is a temporary state of uncertainty, to be replaced by his own sense of
the re liability of circumstantial evidence, for H a rtrigh t 'the ordinary rules of
evidence' cannot help him establish the underlying logic beneath the 'chance'
connection, so he sees himself as the victim o f  a delusion, but in a way that
makes him  feel the more powerless to predict a  dangerous future. The 'sense
of something obscurely impending, something invisibly threatening, that Time
was holding over our heads' or irrational fears o f the future were identified
by Pritchard as a sign of monomania3®. Th is , together with his reaction to
Anne's dream , compounds his own sense of him self as monomaniac and leads
him to prescribe his own self-disciplinary m oral treatment; to use his 'reason'
to 'curb the blind impulse of [his] disordered senses':
Those words and the doubt which had just escaped me 
as to the sanity of the writer o f the letter, acting 
together on my mind, suggested an idea, which I was 
literally afraid to express openly, o r even to encourage 
secretly. I began to doubt whether m y own faculties 
were not in danger of losing their balance. It seemed 
almost like a monomania to be tracing  back everything 
strange that happened, everything unexpected that 
was said, always to the same hidden source and the 
same sinister influence. I resolved, this time, in 
defence of my own courage and m y  own sense, to 
come to no decision which plain fa c t did not warrant, 
and to turn my back resolutely on everything that 
tempted me in the shape of surmise.39
What H a rtrig h t needs to learn is how to draw 'c o rre c t' influences from chance 
associations and hypothetical surmise, but in th e  reconstructed framework of 
his own narrative it never moves beyond the realignment of the process of 
self-regulation implied by moral management.
13«
Hartright's early perception is not straightforwardly naive, however. 
A t particular moments of his opening narrative his method of self-scrutiny 
shifts from contemporary self-consciousness to retrospective assessment, and 
this undermines its status as immediate evidence, on a par with the other 
narratives. This emerges particularly clearly in the contrasting way in w hich 
he sees Marian and Laura. In both cases the perception of their fem ininity, 
or lack at it, is clearly a product of his own projection; but in the case of 
Marian it works as a satirical subversion of Hartright's preconceptions (as 
Marian herself satirically subverts fem ininity); with Laura this process has 
been assimilated within Hartright's own framework.
Doth the perception of Marian and Laura elaborate and manipulate a
particular kind of physiognomic idealism, but with Marian this is done a t
Hartright's expense, in a way that suggests and subverts the idea that natural
beauty is a cultural construction. The shock of Marian's 'ugliness' is derived
from its disturbing conjunction with the 'rare beauty of her form', and the
way that this contradicts 'the old conventional Maxim, that Nature cannot
err'. It also immediately echoes and follows his response to Anne. As
drawing-master, and professional representer of nature, Hartright's response
to Marian's disturbing androgyny, the inverse of Frederick Fairlie's -  the
ability to recognise, but not to reconcile -  tacitly questions the implied
sexual oppositions that enable his vision, even his sanity, to function, again by
the disruption of established trains of association:
The lady's complexion was almost swarthy, and the 
dark down on her upper lip was almost a moustache.
She had a large, firm , masculine mouth and jaw; 
prominent piercing, resolute brown eyes; and thick, 
coal-black hair, growing unusually low down on her 
forehead. Her expression -  bright, frank and 
intelligent -  appeared, while she was silent, to be 
altogether wanting in those feminine attractions of 
gentleness and pliability, without which the beauty of 
the handsomest woman alive is beauty incomplete. To 
see such a face as this set on shoulders that a
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sculpture would have longed to model -  to be charmed 
by the modest graces of action through which the 
symmetrical limbs betrayed their beauty when they 
moved, and then to be almost repelled by the 
masculine form  and masculine look of the features in 
which the perfectly-shaped figure ended -  was to feel 
a sensation oddly akin to the helpless discomfort 
familiar to  us all in sleep, when we recognise yet 
cannot reconcile the anomalies and contradictions of a 
dream.**0
Hartright's physiognomic reading of Marian functions accurately in the
novel in that she does manifest all the energy and resourcefulness that he
reads in her features. But she realigns them in the context of her own
narrative as a desire to be freed from the ^artificial* constraints of
femininity. With Laura, the process at first seems to be reversed, though the
frame still holds, for it  is her very difference from Marian that suggests her
femininity and her powerlessness -her 'whiteness'. Hartright begins by
acknowledging that his representation of Laura is as a memory compounded
as a palimpsest of associations and subjective sensations: H o w  can I describe
her? How can I separate her from my own sensations and all th a t has
happened in the later time?'*** He then describes his own representation, his
portrait, of her, both noting and resisting the signs of inbred weakness and
nervous susceptibility: I t  is hard to see that the lower part of the face is too
delicately refined away towards the chin to be full and fair proportion to the
upper part ... and that the sweet sensitive lips are subject to slight nervous
contraction, when she smiles . . . ' . ^  He then goes on to contemplate his
reading of the significance of the portrait -  a self-fulfilling process that
manipulates the physiognomic sensation itself by replacing the features with
the representation of them and disclosing this and its ideal referent,
following Bell's preempts, as a process of self-projection:
Does my poor portrait of her ... show me these things?
Ah, how few of them are in the dull mechanical 
drawing, and how many in the mind with which I 
regard it! A  fair delicate girl in a pretty light dress, 
trifling with the leaves of her sketch-book, while she
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looks up from it with truthful innocent blue eyes -  that 
is all the drawing can say; all, perhaps, that even the 
deeper reach of thought and pen can say in their 
language either. The woman who first gives life, light 
and form to our shadowy conceptions of beauty, fills a 
void in our spiritual nature that has remained unknown 
to us till she appeared. Sympathies that lie too deep 
for words, too deep almost for thoughts, are touched, 
at such times, by other charms than those which the 
senses feel and which the sources of expression can 
realise. The mystery which underlies the beauty of 
women is never raised above the reach of all 
expression until it has claimed kindred with the 
mystery of our own souls.**2
Hartright's vision of Laura shifts between different implied kinds of 
projection as he switches between his recall of his first impression of her and 
his later analysis of it. But it is a shift between forms of absence, both of 
which mean that *Laura' can only be perceived as 'the visionary nursling of 
[his] own fancy'. From the subjective projections of his own desire to neo­
platonic ideal, she remains a spirit, a ghost, a spectral illusion for Hartright. 
Thus he can only know her through sensations which are but pale reflections 
of an ideal, and which are literally manifested as lack, as 'wanting': 'Mingling 
with the vivid impression produced by the charm o f her fair face and head ... 
was another impression, which, in a shadowy way, suggested to me the idea of 
something wanting. A t one time it seemed like something wanting in her; at 
another, like something wanting in myself, which hindered me from 
understanding her as I o u g h t . ' T h o u g h  this turns out to be, explicitly, a 
premonition of his recognition of Laura's physical association with Anne, it 
conceals within it , as its own trace, the construction of meaning through 
making hidden connections which Hartright's later assessment of his 
impressions makes clear. This means, too, that while his method of seeing in 
general needs to undergo a radical transformation between the two halves of 
the novel, with his vision of Laura there is a fundamental correspondence 
between his memory of his early impression and his later reconstruction; both
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simultaneously work through projection, and function, in associationist terms, 
as drawing correct inferences through comparison.
So Hartright sees others in accordance with their conformity to 
established conventions; by confusing 'sensations' with 'facts' while 
attempting a simplistic kind of linear reasoning, and this builds up the sense 
of mystery, of strangeness within familiarity, at the beginning. With Marian's 
narrative, further into the story, suspense is heightened by the interaction 
between the greater subtlety and acuteness of her perceptions and the 
method by which they are narrated. Marian's perspective is not addressed to 
others as retrospective testimony; it is recorded for herself in her journal, 
which is crucially important as means of observation and memory, as a 
method of self control and means of marking and controlling time.
It also springs from her contradictory position as a perceptive woman, 
in a world where feminine sensitivity means sinking into vulnerability -  and 
this becomes the source of a new kind of tension. Hartrighfs 'feminised' 
place caused him to sink into passivity and lassitude, though aware of the 
need to impose restraint and discipline on himself. Marian's interstitial 
position as 'masculine' poor relation on the other hand, gives her a clear 
insight into the power relations and social conventions at work within the 
family, while also bringing the awareness that she can only retain the toe­
hold of a limited and circumscribed influence by attempting to control those 
codes from within, and this means that the concept of 'self-control' for both 
her and Laura, is fundamentally ambiguous -  as it was for mid-nineteenth 
century feminism. Marian's perception, moreover, goes through various 
stages during the first part of the story. In her first appearance as a figure in 
Hartright's narrative her wit and energy take the form chiefly of her 
resistance to feminine roles -  her jokes about female accomplishments, 
feminine propriety, and so on. Her own narrative falls into two parts, the
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'Limmeridge' and 'Blackwater' sections, both of which trace her mounting 
anxiety, the passage of Laura into an 'other' state, and Marian's own 
emotional or physical collapse; and it is this that contributes to the sense 
that Laura's transformation into Anne Catherick and incarceration in the 
asylum is but a re-enactment of its dress reh&sal -  her transformation into 
Lady Clyde and incarceration in marriage. 'My mind feels almost as dulled 
and stunned by it , as if writing of her marriage were like writing of her 
d e a th .'^  This, however, also involves important shifts in seeing Laura, 
herself and the signs around her, in the 'Limmeridge' and 'Blackwater' 
sections of Marian's journal.
Initially Marian's analysis is dominated by the need to critically qualify 
her own perceptions and to control her sensations and reactions, and although 
she retains her scepticism she comes increasingly to use and analyse 
unconscious, or symptomatic processes. A t first she responds to and treats 
Laura both almost as a possessive lover ('she w ill be his Laura instead of 
mine!') and as a benign keeper: Th e re  was too much colour in her cheeks, too 
much energy in her manner, too much firmness in her v o i c e . A s  Laura 
becomes reconciled to her fate of marriage to Glyde though, this gives way 
to the realisation that it is Laura's passivity which is pathological, not her 
1>ysterical vehemence' against it : ’She used to be pliability itself; but she was 
now inflexibly passive in her resignation ... I should have been less pained if 
she had been violently agitated.'**6 In Marian's journal Limmeridge is a 'safe 
place', dominated by the wishes of the absent father, and a stage where she 
begins to be aware of tensions and manipulations. She begins to see 
expressions and mannerisms symptomatically rather than through a fixed set 
of physiognomic codes; she notes, for instance, Sir Percival's nervous cough, 
and his 'suppressed anxiety and agitation' not only 'in every line of his face', 
but still, after his face had relaxed: 'I saw one of his feet, softly, quietly,
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incessantly beating on the carpet, and I felt that he was secretly as anxious 
as ever.'^7 A t  this early stage, too, Marian uses her journal as a form of self­
regulation, as an attempt to force herself to like Sir Percival despite her 
rising aversion towards and distrust of him: 1 cannot account for the state of 
my own feelings: the one thing I am certain of is, that it is m y duty -  doubly 
my duty, now -  not to wrong Sir Percival by unjustly distrusting him', she 
writes. I f  it has got to be a habit with me always to w rite of him in an 
unfavourable manner, I must and will break myself of this unworthy tendency, 
even though the effort should force me to close the pages of my journal till 
the marriage is over.'**8 Self-regulation, therefore, means stopping writing; 
when she attempts to w rite favourably of Sir Percival, her comments grow 
increasingly sarcastic and strained, finally breaking out in the 
acknowledgement, 'I hate Sir Percival'.^9 This comes to be echoed and 
elaborated at Blackwater Park: I t  did me good, after all that I had sufered
and suppressed in that house -  it actually did me good to feel how angry I
,50was.'
The move to Blackwater and the heightening of tension as the gap 
between narrative time and story time narrows is narrated through Marian's 
increasingly acute perception and analysis of empirical processes which is 
combined with a greater willingness to acknowledge the significance of 
unconscious states. Marian does not always trust her own perceptions, and 
she uses her distrust as a form of self-analysis, and here the friction between 
her impressions and her reflexive analysis of them in the journal is crucial. 
The journal shifts from being a passive receptable of impressions and a means 
of self-regulation, and becomes a vehicle both of confession and analysis. On 
the one hand this means fixing and explaining meanings: 'Putting together 
what I had observed for myself in the library, and what I have just observed 
for myself from Laura's maid, one conclusion seems inevitable. The figure
u o
we saw at the lake was not the figure of Madame Fosco, or of her husband or 
any of the servants.’5* On the other hand though, it means charting her own 
unconscious m ental processes. This emerges most clearly in the premonitory 
'supernatural' somnambulent trance that Marian experiences, for which she 
claims neither divine authority which Anne does for her dream, nor totally 
dismisses it as delusion: 'My eyes closed of themselves; and I passed 
gradually into a strange condition, which was not waking -  for I knew nothing 
of what was going on about me; and not sleeping -  for I was conscious of my 
own repose. In this state my fevered mind broke loose from m e, while my 
weary body was a t rest; and, in a trance, or day dream of my fancy -  I know 
not what to call i t  -  I saw Walter Hartright.'5^ And it is immediately after 
being woken from the trance by Laura's account of a meeting with Anne, that 
Anne's testimony begins to signify.
Marian's trance is presented as a kind of clairvoyance, as a reverie that 
blurs the boundaries of consciousness, and as a fantasy through which she 
transcends the lim its of time and space. But she herself is caught in a double 
bind, since having an acute perception and becoming a 'sensitive subject' to 
the influences around her does not increase her power but makes her more 
susceptible to the manipulating influences of Fosco. Moral management, 
self-regulation, are  the only available means of resisting this, since 'so much 
depends on my discretion and self-control'.55 Marian resists Fosco's power by 
distrusting 'the influence which [he] has exercised over my thoughts and 
feelings', yet it is through this double process of acknowledgement and 
resistance that Fosco's force becomes the stronger, more flamboyant and
pleasurable -  he bounces up against Marian's frame and finally cracks it , as he 
54is to do to Hartright's. Distinct psychological codes are inflated and turned 
into means of manipulation in the figure of Fosco: moral management with 
his wife and Sir Percival, medical manipulation with Laura and Anne,
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mesmerism with Marian. He becomes a magical figure, fat and nimble, old 
and young, through the sheer variety of codes on which he draws as well as 
simultaneously exploiting and revealing them . Marian notes: 1 think the 
influence I am now try in g  to find, is in his eyes. They are the most 
unfathomable grey eyes I ever saw; and they have at times a cold, clear, 
beautiful, irresistcble g litte r in them, which forces me to look at him and yet 
causes me sensations, when I do look, which I had rather not feel.'55 And this 
is explicitly reinforced by the Count himself, who self-congratulatingly refers 
to his 'luminous experience of the more subtle resources which medical and 
magnetic science have placed at the disposal of mankind'.
Thus it is in the paradoxically 'carnivalesque' figure of the upper-class 
villain that the dominant codes both of the narrative and the social order are 
displayed and overturned. With his process of moral management, humans 
and animals become d irec t equivalents, breaking the very boundaries that 
moral management depends on. Sir Percival, the neurotic continually 
teetering on the brink o f  self-control, responds to the Count's stare 'with the 
sullen submission of a tamed animal', just as Fosco subdues the violent 
bloodhound with a w ithering look.57 His domestication of the white mice, 
who crawl fondly over his body, is a parody and commentary on his 
management of his w ife , the formerly flamboyant and undisciplined Eleanor 
Fair lie, who is ruled by the combination of fear and a flattery which feeds on 
what Marian has previously, in relation to  Laura, described as 'that 
despicably-small pride which makes so many women deceitful'.5® Indeed, 
Marian's observation of the transformation of her aunt Eleanor Fairlie into 
Madame Fosco, clothed in her stiff black gowns, is the inversion, the literal 
negative, of the therapeutic framework of moral management that is applied 
'positively' to Anne, m ore ambiguously to Laura. She is represented as the
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subdued, disciplined previously wayward female patient -  the frozen model of
propriety of the model asylum:
As Eleanor Fairlie (aged seven-and-thirty), she was 
always talking pretentious nonsense, and always 
worrying the unfortunate men with every small 
exaction which a vain and foolish woman can impose 
on long-suffering male humanity. As Madame Fosco 
(aged three-and-forty), she sits for hours together 
without saying a word, frozen up in the strangest 
manner in herself .. . A  plain, matronly cap covers her 
head, and makes her look, for the first tim e  in her life, 
since I remember her, like a decent woman ... Clad in 
quiet black or grey gowns, made high about the throat 
-  dresses that she would have laughed at, or screamed 
at, as the whim of the moment inclined her, in her 
maiden days -  she sits speechless in corners; her dry 
white hands (so dry that the pores of her skin look 
chalky) incessantly engaged, either in monotonous 
embroidery-work, or in rolling up endless little 
cigarettes for the Count's own particular smoking. On 
the few occasions when her cold blue eyes are off her 
work, they are generally turned on her husband, with 
the look of mute submissive enquiry which we are all 
familiar with in the eyes of a faithful dog.*9
And on contemplating this transformation Marian arrives at an explicit
analysis of the process of social and psychic suppression on which it rests:
For the common purposes of society the extraordinary 
change thus produced in her, is, beyond all doubt, a 
change for the better, seeing that it has transformed 
her into a civ il, silent, unobtrusive woman who is 
never in the way. How far she is really reformed or 
deteriorated in her secret self, Is another question. I 
have once or twice seen sudden changes o f expression 
on her pinched lips, and heard sudden inflexions of 
tone in her calm voice, which have led m e to suspect 
that her present state of suppression may have sealed 
up something dangerous in her nature, w hich used to 
evaporate harmlessly in the freedom of her former 
life. It is Quite possible that I may be altogether 
wrong in this.°u
The transformed Eleanor Fairlie thus adds another link to the chain of 
women, the web of relationships between feminity and insanity, set up by the 
novel. As frivolous and ridiculous spinster before her marriage she is 
Marian's opposite -  manifesting all the aspects of unrestrained fem inity that 
Marian resolutely distances herself from; a version of Pritchard's definition of
female insanity as breaking the boundaries of propriety in her 'want of self- 
government, continual excitement, unusual expression of strong feelings, 
thoughtless and extravagant conduct' and an echo of Conolly's Eliza  Nottridge 
too -  confined to regulate unseemly exuberance.61 As Madame Fosco, who 
sees Marian as a rival for the Count's affections, she not only functions as the 
shadow of Laura and the negative of Anne, but by exaggerating compatible 
patterns of perception so that they laid bare as a mechanism of control, both 
inverts and exposes them.
Fosco's power is compounded by his perverse attractiveness, just as 
Marian acknowledges, 'The man has interested me, has attracted me, has 
forced me to like him'.62 And he is such a pleasurable, energetic figure 
precisely because of the range of ways that he works against the grain of 
conventions that Hartright's perspective above all depends on. Here there is 
a direct correspondence between the way the figure operates as a fictional 
construct that challenges various physiognomic assumptions and queries 
conventions through his contradictory and anomalous identity, and the way in 
which he *pulls the strings' of the narrative itself while remaining a figure 
within it . 'I had begun to w rite my story when it struck me that my villain 
would be commonplace, and I made him fat in opposition to the recognised 
type of villain', Collins noted in a retrospective assessment of the novel.63 
Fosco resists being a 'recognised type' by the unexpected juxtapositioning of 
different elements, both within himself and in relation to others, and this at 
once reinforces and overturns his villainy. There is clearly a close 
relationship between his sexual power and his 'foreignness' for example, but 
here he eludes any stable stereotypical framework, partly by his opposition to 
Pesca, the other Italian. While the diminutive Pesca, as presented 
patronisingly by Hartright, is made ridiculous and childlike by his 
unsuccessful attempts to imitate English manners and customs and English
common sense and propriety, Fosco's power is derived precisely from his 
command of the language and the codes of 'English common sense' as well as 
his ability to manipulate, through relativising, 'English' morality: 1 have met, 
in my time, with so many different sorts of virtue, that I am puzzled, in my 
old age, to say which is the right sort and which is the wrong. Here, in 
England, there is one virtue. And there in China, there is another virtue.'64*
In this way Fosco 'lays bare the device' of dominant social,
psychological and medical conventions even as he makes use of them to
manipulate the narrative and conjure with Laura's identity. H is diagnosis of
Marian's typhus fever is more accurate than the local doctor's; even as he
uses her physical breakdown as the final means of overpowering her. 'I say
what other people only think, and when all the world is in a conspiracy to
accept the mask for the true face, mine is the rash hand that tears away the
plump pasteboard and reveals the bare bones beneath.'6* Yet it is because of
the 'conspiracy' of shared recognition that Fosco is able to substitute Laura
for Anne; which in turn suggests that Laura's 'true face' is nothing but a
constructed mask, laid over 'bare bones'. Hartright's early physiognomic
reading of Laura's face -  his idealist extrapolations -  are here satirically
undercut by Fosco's more cynical implied phrenology which lays bare the
material base of the mind. It is a materialism that culminates in the
physiological determinism of pharmacology, seen here by Fosco as a means of
transformation and control, not as for Ezra Jennings in The Moonstone, as a
means of psychological investigation, still less of inspiration:
Mind they say, rules the world. But what rules the 
mind? The body. The body ... lies at the mercy of the 
most powerful of all potentates -  the Chemist. G ive  
me -  Fosco -  chemistry; and when Shakespeare has 
conceived Hamlet, and sits down to execute the 
conception -  with a few grains of powder dropped into 
his daily food, I will reduce his mind, by the action of 
his body, till his pen pours out the most abject drivel 
that ever degraded pa per.
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So in the First Part of the narrative Hartright, Marian and Fosco each 
draw out the contrasting implications of a shared discourse of moral 
management as an im plicit perceptual framework of regulation and control. 
Hartright is set within it in a way that undermines his self-possession -  he is 
manifested as an ineffectual moral agent, who can only see the future as an 
obscure and incomprehensible fatality, a transcendent authority which 
excludes him. Fosco makes this explicit, and in the process inverts the 
pattern of moral regulation so that indeterminacy is replaced completely by a 
determined narrative; the hidden tensions of the 'secret theatre' of the family 
stripped down to the workings of marionettes: 'What are we (I ask) but 
puppets in a show box? Oh omnipotent Destiny, pull our strings gently! 
Dance us mercifully off our miserable little stage I F o s c o ' s  villainy 
remains ideologically ambiguous by the very way that it is set up to exploit 
the ambiguity of psychological discourses themselves, to display how social 
and psychic power works, yet also to wield it by pushing the psychological 
codes to their grotesque conclusion.^® But he also expresses what the 
narrative structure itself makes clear -  that history is usually written by the 
winning side: 'If the police win, you generally hear all about it. If the police 
lose you generally hear nothing. And on this tottering foundation you build up 
your comfortable moral maxim that Crim e causes its own detection. Yes -a ll
69the crime you know of. And, what of the rest?' This double perspective is 
achieved by the ambiguous position of Fosco's final narrative -  his letter of 
confession -  both embedded within Hartright's specific narrrative and a 
specific narrative in its own right, as I suggested earlier. In order to analyse 
this, and the process that underlies Hartright's ascendency and his 
reconstruction of Laura, it is necessary to pick up the threads I left hanging 
above, and consider how Hartright's ability to determine the future by
reinterpreting the past is bound up with his control over memory and time, 
and the ideological and fictional contradictions that this engenders.
The control of time is vital in The Woman in White. Collins hastily 
amended his early error in timing, and the central sleight of hand that 
enables Fosco to substitute Laura for Anne lies in his 'stealing' a day. But the 
method by which it is controlled undergoes important modifications at 
different stages of the narrative. In the First P art, it's been seen that 
ominousaess is created by uncertainty about the future, which generates 
present anxiety; derangement is synonymous with the inability to mark or 
control time, and this is achieved by the ways in which the two orders of 
tim e, progression and reconstruction, narrative tim e and story time 
interrelate. The control of time is crucial for Marian's self-control and 
opposition to Fosco. It becomes a subtle form of female resistance -  the way 
that patience can be turned into resolution. Marian stresses: 'The question 
of time^ is our question, and trust me, Laura, to take a woman's full 
advantage of it .. .'.70 Marian's use of her journal as a way of recording and 
verifying information is crucial, particularly in the way that it is bound up 
with her control over her own memory: 'It was almost as great a relief to my 
mind as to Laura's, to find that my memory had served me, on this occasion, 
as faithfully as usual. In the perilous uncertainty of our present situation, it 
is hard to say what future interests may not depend upon the regularity of the 
entries to my journal and upon the reliability of my recollection at the time 
make them.'7  ^ Thus the tension of the narrative increases as she becomes 
increasingly obsessed by the control of time. Her breakdown through fever is 
marked by the gradual convergence of narrative time and story time, finally 
attained when her own writing peters out and Fosco takes the pen from her 
hand:
June 20th -  Eight o'clock ... I count the hours that
have passed since I escaped to the shelter of this room
1*7
by my own sensations -  and those hours seem like 
weeks.
How short a time, and yet how long to me ... Yes, I 
heard the clock strike three ... I remember my 
resolution to control m yself, I wait patiently for hour 
after hour ... Nine o'clock. Was it nine that struck, or 
eight?
My head, I am sadly afraid for m y head. I can write, 
but the lines all run together. I see the words. Laura,
I can w rite Laura and I see that I write it. Eight or 
nine, which was it .™
Here too, the merging of the tw o registers of narrative order is marked by 
the presence of Fosco.
'I trace these lines, self-distrustfully, with the shadov«of after-events 
darkening the very paper I w rite  on.'7^ Hartright's early ambivalence 
towards his own testimony, his awareness that all recall involves retrojection, 
is explicitly overturned in the second half of the novel, where the drive of the 
narrative becomes increasingly to reach Hartright's and the story's resolution. 
But the impossible figure that it represents (where, exactly, can the narrating 
voice be located in this sentence?) is indicative of the narrative paradox that 
is the fulcrum of The Woman In White. The linked chain of evidence that 
makes up the First Part of the story can only be constructed by an authority 
that has been produced by it, and in the Second and Third Parts this is made 
clear in the way in which the tw o  Hartright's, the General Editor and the 
specific narrator, merge. Closer scrutiny of this process reveals that as a 
chain, Hartright's method of presenting the evidence involves all kinds of 
omissions and distortions. Initially he starts out, keeping to the rules that he 
has set up as General Editor, dropping out of the story as he leaves 
Limmeridge and letting Gilmour take it up. But Gilmour's narrative later 
turns out to have been written over four years after the events took place. 
This process of reading is more significant in the case of Marian's journal. 
This seems to be the most authentic and immediate testimony, yet
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paradoxically the device which enhances its authenticity -  Hartright's note, 
which makes it clear that the reader is presented with a selection from 
Marian's absent, fuller journal -  creates the illusion that more has been 
written just beyond the line of vision, in the breaks that interspace the 
testimony.
B y  the beginning of the Second Part, with its merging of the two
narrative roles, Hartright's increased management of himself, his growing
control o ve r the progress of the story and his gradual reconstruction of Laura
is more imm ediately bound up with the appropriation of absent testimonals.
'No circum stance of importance, from the beginning to the end of this
disclosure, shall be related on hearsay evidence.' The statement in the
Preamble is tacitly reversed here. The crucial section of the story -
H artright's analysis of Laura's experience leading to her confinement in the
asylum, and his construction of the chain of circumstantial evidence that
leads to  his discovery of the absent names in the marriage register that
testify to  Sir Percival's illegitimacy (T h a t  space told the whole story') and to
the true  identity of Anne, is dependent on his own interpretation of
testimonals that cannot be presented directly to the reader7 ^  Indeed, in
opposing 'the eye of reason and of law' and 'every received form ality of
civilised society'; and in perpetuating a false deception in order to unmask
the true one by appearing 'in the estimation of others [as] at once the dupes
and the agents of a daring imposture', Hartright becomes the reader's moral
manager, and upturns both narrative construct and psychological
fram ework.75 And this in turn also involves the suppression of memory in
order for H artright to emerge as a resolution agent. The Second Part opens:
I open a new page, I advance my narrative by one 
week.
Th e  history of the interval which I thus pass over must 
remain unrecorded. My heart turns faint, my mind 
sinks in darkness and confusion when I think of it. This
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must not be, if I, who w rite , and to guide, as I ought, 
you who read. This m ust not be if the clue that leads 
through the windings o f the Story is to remain, from 
end to end, untangled in  m y hand.'®
Thus the clue, or thread, which leads through the labyrinth of the story itself 
can only be woven by the deliberate forgetting of part of Hartright's own 
narrative of 9k>w  he came to be th e re  ... poring over it'. And he can only 
transform the ravelled skein of the story into a coherent web, by assimilating 
the separate memories of the witnesses, and turning them into a chain of 
associations which regulate it, as he switches from directly presenting the 
separate narratives as evidence to  the reader, to analysing the different 
testimonials, the accounts of M arian, Mrs Clements, Mrs Catherick, Laura, 
and pieces together Anne's confused associations. 1 shall relate both 
narratives, not in the words (often interrupted, often inevitably confused) of 
the speakers themselves', he notes o f  Marian and Laura's remembrance of the 
confinement, *but in the words of the  brief, plain, studiously-simple abstract 
which I committed to writing for m y  guidance of my legal advisor. So the 
tangled web will be most speedily and most intelligibly unrolled.'77 In the 
case of Mrs Clements this involves replacing open testimony with 
interrogation:
Knowing by experience that the plainest narrative 
attainable from persons who are not accustomed to 
arrange their ideas is the  narrative which goes far 
enough back at the beginning to avoid all impediments 
of retrospection in its course, I asked Mrs Clements to 
tell me, first, what had happened after she left 
Limmeridge; and so, by watchful questioning, carried 
her on from point to point till we recalled the period 
of Anne's disappearance.7*
This in turn leads to the decoding of Anne's knowledge of Sir Percival's 
secret, the realisation that the secret contained another, but that Anne's 
threateningness was itself unconscious -  that she knew a secret existed 
without knowing what it contained. Thus the truth is built up by cross­
currents of delusion. Sir Percival confines Anne because he believes the
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delusion which is 'perfectly in character with [her] m ental affliction', which
in turn 'afterwards fixed in his mind the equally false suspicion that his wife 
79knew all from Anne'.
Hartright discloses that Laura has been confined for another's fear of a
knowledge she never possessed as well as for her property. But the process
by which her identity is restored can never take the form  of the complete
exploration of her m em ory, since this itself would upset the moral treatment
of her cure, through which distressing associations are la id  to rest. 'The fair
companion of your retreat shall not be pursued. She has found a new asylum,
in your heart', Fosco writes to Marian.80 It is in the anonymous safe place of
the London streets that the sinister connotations of the asylum now became
transformed back into friendly ones, as Laura's cure takes the form, in the
first place, of the imaginary reconstruction of the past a t Limmeridge that
could almost be based on combining Conolly's The Treatm ent of the Insane
Without Mechanical Restraints with Samuel Tuke's A  Description of the
Retreat -  'nursing the faculties' by recreating the 'first home', that Hartright
had earlier found so enervating:
The only events of former days which we ventured on 
encouraging her to recal, were the little  trivial 
domestic events of that happy time at Limm eridge 
when I first went there, and taught her to  draw.
Tenderly and gradually, the memory of the old walks 
and drives dawned upon her; and the poor w eary pining 
eyes, looked at Marian and me with a new interest, 
with a faltering thoughtfulness in them, w hich, from 
that m om ent, we cherished, and kept alive. I bought 
her a litt le  box of colours, and a sketch-book like the 
old sketch-book which I had seen in her hands on the 
morning when we first met ...
We helped her mind slowly by this simple means; we 
took her out between us to walk, on fine days, in a 
quiet old C ity  square, near at hand, where there was 
nothing to  confuse or alarm her; we spared a few 
pounds from  the fund at the bankers to get her wine, 
and the delicate strengthening food that she required; 
we amused her in the evenings with children's games 
at cards, with scrapbooks full of prints ... by these, 
and other trifling attentions like them, we composed
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and steadied her, and hoped all things, as cheerfully as 
we could, from time and care, and love that never 
neglected and never despaired of her. But to take her 
mercilessly from seclusion and repose; to confront her 
with strangers, or with acquaintances who were little 
better than strangers; to rouse the painful impressions 
of her past life which we had so carefully hushed to 
rest -  this, even in her own interests, we dared not do. 
Whatever sacrifices it cost, whatever long, weary, 
heart-breaking delays it involved, the wrong that had 
been inflicted on her, if mortal means could grapple 
with it, must be redressed without her knowledge and 
without her help.81
Laura can only finally have her social identity restored and regain her 
property by the recognition of the family and the law which takes place by 
Hartright struggling on her behalf, in control of himself and finally in control 
of the story. But just as Hartright's own resolution springs from social 
obliteration and displacement with Marian as 'help meet', so Laura's 
reconstitution also depends on her class transformation: 'We are numbered no 
longer with the people whose lives are open and known. I am an obscure, 
unnoticed man, without patron or friend to help me. Marian Halcombe is 
nothing now, but m y elder sister, who toils for our household wants by the toll 
of her own hands.'82 Laura's growing self-possession is marked by her 
realisation that she is economically and sexually powerless and treated like a 
child. 'You work and get money, Walter ... why is there nothing I can do? 
You will end up in liking Marian better than you like me', and this is marked 
by Hartright's 'innocent deception' whereby he pays her phantom wages for 
her drawings.83 So just as Anne learnt, as a child , to be a proper lady at 
Limmeridge House, so it is only through poverty and imaginary work that 
Laura can refill her place as member of the landed gentry as Hartright's 
property; a proper 'self-made' woman who has really been made by others in 
the theatre of a simulated family. The Woman In White is Collins's most 
complex and skilful example of the way in which precise psychological 
methods and allusions can be appropriated to produce a compulsively readable
narrative. And it is by keeping within the limits of moral management, 
bending this to incorporate more subversive psychological methods, that the 
novel offers the most elaborate exploration of the contradictions of moral 
management itself. It is these contradictions that form the basis for the 
initial suspense, and they are never fully resolved by providing the means of 
narrative resolution; for masculine resolution is itself revealed to be founded 
on its counterpart -  enforced patience, propriety and petticoats.
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C H A P T E R  F O U R  
SKINS T O  JU M P  IN T O !  
F E M IN IN ITY  AS M A S Q U E R A D E  IN  N O  N AM E
It might be worthwhile, sometimes, to inquire what 
Nature is, and how men work to change her, and 
whether, in the enforced distortions so produced, it is 
not natural to be unnatural.
Charles Dickens, Dorn bey and Son1
Nothing in this world is hidden for ever. The gold 
which has lain for centuries unsuspected in the ground, 
reveals itself one day on the surface. Sand turns 
traitor, and betrays the footsteps that have passed 
over it; water gives back to the te ll-ta le  surface the 
body which has been drow ned.. ■ Look where we will, 
the inevitable law of revelation is one of the laws of 
nature: the lasting presentation of a secret is a
miracle that the world has not yet seen.
No Name2
If you're all rakes, Miss G arth , the sexes are turned 
topsy-turvey with a vengeance; and the men w ill have 
nothing left for it , but to sit at home and darn the 
stockings.
No Name1
I t  will be seen that the narrative related in these pages has been 
constructed on a plan, which differs from the plan followed by my last novel', 
Collins emphasised in the Preface to No N am e. 'The only secret contained in 
this book is revealed halfway through the first volume. From  that point, all 
the main events in the story are purposefully foreshadowed, before they take 
place -  my present design being to rouse the reader's interest in following the 
train of circumstances by which these foreseen events are brought about. 
The narrative of No Name takes the form of an obsessive pursuit of a lost 
social self -  a transgressive quest that culminates in a breakdown that leads 
finally to the restitution of identity and a legitimate social role. The secret
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revealed half way through the first volume is the disclosure of illegitim ate 
origins. But while in The Woman in White this was the final exposure and 
explanation of the villain's pathological behaviour -  and of the meaning of the 
shadowy Anne -  here it is the initial absence, a revelation that creates the 
precondition for a new kind of mystery, as the reader is drawn into 
contem plating the relationship between the outcome and the precipitating 
causes of events, and psychological responses. The strategy works precisely 
because of the uncertainty of the how ' rather than the 'what' of the story, 
and b y the tension that is generated between the means by which events are 
'purposefully foreshadowed' and the processes through which they remain 
indeterminate in order to retain suspense. In The Woman in White a cloud of 
ominous 'foreshadowing' hung over the multiple narrative voices. In N o Nam e 
a range of rhetorics play with and parody the resources of the omniscient 
narrative voice in a way that both reinforces and relativises it . It  is a 
perverse story as well as a story of perversity.
N o  Name opens with a leisurely account of middle-class domestic life , a 
secure, taken for granted world which is made to seem the more nostalgically 
safe and natural by a naturalistic narrative voice that shifts between 
surveying the family with benign tolerance and making premonitory 
interjections, hinting at unsolved mysteries and imminent loss. The sudden 
death o f both parents reveals that the Vanstone sisters, Magdalen and Norah, 
are both illegitimate and disinherited from the family estate, which reverts 
to th e ir uncle, their father's old enemy, and on his death, to their sickly 
cousin Noel. The story traces how the sister's contrasted 'natures' respond to 
suddenly being projected into a hostile environment: Norah by patiently 
subm itting to her fate and becoming a governess, Magdalen by more 
perversely casting herself out onto the world to speculate on the open 
m arket. She moves from one disguised identity to another and with the help
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of her surrogate uncle, the confidence trickster Captain Wragge, succeeds in 
alluring and marrying her cousin under an assumed name, a performance that 
fails with his untimely death. This leads to more disguise, increasing self­
alienation expressed as grow ing hysteria which finally culminates in nervous 
collapse. Norah, meanwhile, qua governess, marries the new heir (another 
cousin) and regains possession of name and inheritance, so that the story is 
finally resolved by the very 'legitim ate' means which were the sources of its 
tension at the beginning.5
No Name is explicitly set up as a sympathetic moral tale and
psychological case history; th e  heroine's name recalls 'in its first association,
mournful ideas of penitence and seclusion'.6 This is initially made clear in
the Preface and is compounded by an omniscient 'moral' narrative voice:
Here is one more book that depicts the struggle of a 
human creature, under those opposing influences of 
Good and Evil w hich we have all felt ... It has been my 
aim to make th e  character of 'Magdalen', which 
personifies this struggle a pathetic character even in 
its perversity and its error: and I have tried hard to 
retain this result by the least obtrusive and least 
artificial of a ll means -  a resolute adherence, 
throughout, to the truth as it is in Nature.7
As in Basil, exile from the fa m ily  and loss of name exposes the forms of
power through which identity is built up within it , but here the focus of a
rhetoric made up of an am bivalently combined moral management and a
discourse of inheritance has shifted. For No Name takes apart social codes
/ *
that make up femininity by starting from the domestic end of the spectrum 
of conventions found in the sensation novel. And this quickly turns into a 
more complex satirical and often comic exploration of the relationship 
between progress and decadence, of what constitutes fitness and what is 
meant by survival. The novel invokes an ambiguous rhetoric of natural 
selection and evolution, in w hich the natural itself is shown to be socially 
shaped, reinforcing class and gender boundaries, yet at the same time 
providing the terms that makes i t ------------------ --------------------------------------------------------\
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possible to question them. In this way 'truth to N atu re ' is a continually 
shifting term in No Nam e, and is used for different purposes in contexts that 
implied various sets of oppositions. It  implies inexorable processes, 'laws' 
that are beyond human intervention, yet the boundary between the natural 
and the social is impossible to pin down. The sisters turn out to be 
illegitim ate, 'natural' children, but there is no 'natural' state or order to 
w hich they can return. It implies an essential self, th e  individual, yet the 
term s through which that individual 'nature' is built up im ply different often 
contradictory models of development.
Initially the tensions and pleasures of No Name depend on making the 
ideological concerns of Th e  Woman in White more e x p lic it. Paradoxically the 
very intrusiveness of the moral voice of the narrator opens up a space in 
w hich the conventions and presuppositions of moral management that were 
the sources of contradiction and coherence in the previous book can be 
pushed to their limits. Both novels hinge on probing the boundaries of the 
social self, and explore how a 'legitimate' identity is in  many ways a trick of 
the light created by the manipulation of self-possession and propriety, 
underpinned by economic interests. 'Shall I tell you w h a t a  lady is?' Magdalen 
asks her maid whom she is training to be her substitute, so that she can pose 
as a servant. 'A lady is a woman who wears a silk go w n, and has a sense of 
her ow n importance.’8 Both novels explore the position o f women stripped of 
property and inheritance, but while in The Woman in  White the literal 
extension and analogue of this position was found in the non-restraint asylum, 
Magdalen and Norah Vanstone have inheritance and identity stolen, not 
through a dubious conspiracy but by the legitimate workings of the law. 
Structurally, Magdalen's plot to reclaim her name puts her in a position 
corresponding to that of Percival Clyde, but the patterns of sympathy and 
identification are reversed, not least because she comes from a position of
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powerlessness. The sisters' litera l illegitimacy is now the dramatic analogue 
of their economic powerlessness as women as well as an anomaly in itself. 
Magdalen's assertion that 'any conspiracy, any deception, is justified to my 
conscience by the vile law  which has left us helpless' might be explicitly 
questioned by the narrator, but not the fact that that law is vile.9
The use of these d ifferent devices as fulcrums for the transformation of 
identity also amends the w ay in which No Name, like The Woman in White, 
undercuts any stable division between 'same' and 'other', wildness and 
dom esticity, putting moral management as the means of that subversion to 
distinctive kinds of use. In both, apparently aberrant or perverse forces are 
threatening because they display the workings of the social conventions that 
create them by setting up boundaries founded on their exclusion, and at the 
same tim e, too, both depend on reinforcing these boundaries by the contrast 
between passive and resolute women. Anne Catherick, the illegitimate 
outcast of unsound m ind, echoed passive domesticity rather than 
unassimilable wildness, just as her asylum was modelled on 'home'; Laura's 
powerlessness was compounded therefore by moving 'inwards' into an 
exclusion that was an extrem e version of that from which it was excluded, a 
contrast reinforced by M arian, whose strength resided in her marginality. In 
No Nam e both sisters are cast out of the middle class family into a 
competitive and indifferent w orld, but their struggle for survival both brings 
them back into it and in different ways reveals its concealed underside. A t 
first there seems to be a clear contrast between the passive Nor ah, who takes 
on the protective colouring of a governess, and Magdalen, who is described as 
'resolute and impetuous, clever and domineering ... not one of those model 
women who want a man to  look up to, and to protect them'.*0 But this is 
broken down in an ambivalent way that on the one hand reinforces the 'moral 
fable' aspect of the story, emphasising Norah's patient moral force, but on
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the other explicitly displaying the very propriety fro m  which the sisters are 
exiled to be a masquerade.
For in moving 'out' the heroine is again, in e ffe c t, moving 'inwards', and
this is manifested in the way that the theatre rather than the asylum
becomes the crucible for the construction, as much as the transformation, of
the seif. Magdalen transgresses not because the roles she plays are in
themselves unseemly, but because they are obviously a series of seemings
shamelessly pursued to advance her own ends and her own autonomy,
behaviour explained by Norah as her being 'not sufficiently mistress of herself
to exert her natural judgment'.1* H e r aim in escaping from her sister and
governess initially is to become an actress, but her first public performance
is a dramatic presentation of 'A  Young Lady at Hom e', an entertainment
based on the public display of domestic femininity. But Magdalen developed
her dramatic skills in the prelapsarian days of th e  family by her 'cool
appropriation of Norah's identity to  theatrical purposes', in an amateur
performance of The Rivals.12 She disguises herself as Miss Garth, her
governess, to gain entrance to Noel Vanstone's household, but her most daring
imposture, in collaboration with Wragge, is to assume the ready-made
identity of one of his many *Skins to  Jump Into', to  lure Noel Vanstone into
marriage by acting the role of innocent middle-class g i r l .1^ 'You may depend
on my never making the general Sense of Propriety m y enemy again: I am
getting knowledge enough of the w orld, to make it m y accomplice this time
... My life as a public performer is at an end. It was innocent enough God
knows ...', Magdalen writes to her governess.14 L a te r, she asks herself,
'thousands of women marry for money, why shouldn't I? '15 And again, having
married Noel Vanstone, she writes to the governess:
I don't wish to tell you I was the reformed and 
repenting creature whom you might have approved ...
I am no longer the poor outcast girl, the vagabond 
public performer ... I have made the general sense of
propriety my accomplice .. .  Do you know who I am? I 
am a respectable married woman, accountable for m y 
actions to nobody under heaven but my husband. I 
have got a place in the world, and a name in the world 
at last .. .  You forget what wonders my wickedness has 
done for me. It has made Nobody's Child , Somebody's 
W ife.!*
Thus Magdalen's transgression is transformed into adaptation. And though 
this might involve moral regression the 'skin' into which she 'jumps' has been 
formed by 'the general sense of propriety', and has already been shaped by 
social use.
Thus, in amplifying earlier concerns and conventions, No Nam e merges 
its own ambiguous rhetoric of moral management with an equally 
contradictory discourse of organic development and evolution. As Collins 
pointed out in the Preface ('here is one more book ...') the novel sets up its 
characters as types to personify moral struggles, but the 'least artificial' 
means that he attempts to employ -  'a resolute adherence, throughout, to the 
truth as it is in Nature' -  demonstrates that there is no single tru th  of Nature 
or of the self to be revealed. 'What is this mask of yours hiding?', Francis 
C lare , the cynical philosopher, asks Magdalen, and the novel, in playing with 
the notion of identity as masquerade, also frustrates the physiognomic 
expectation that the mask re veals^ a tru th .^  No Name also typifies a well 
worn narrative contradiction that is highlighted by the sensation novel: that 
excitement, and therefore the survival of the story itself, is generated by 
m ultiplicity and perversity, but that this needs to be continually realigned 
with a linear narrative of moral growth and improvement. Norah is 
continually referred to as the touchstone of worthiness by the narrator, but 
her struggles and dilemmas are never made interesting. She hovers, boringly, 
on the periphery of the story, to be wheeled on at the conclusion, along with 
the more improbable deus ex machina figure, the masculine paragon of
colonial fitness, Robert Kirke upon whom Magdalen finally depends. But the
160
narrative rhetoric which poses these contradictions and which shapes the 
terms that shape the figures in the story does so by juxtaposing contrasting 
notions of what survival and what fitness means, and through the dissonance 
of these notions, questions the 'natural' of natural selection by employing an 
ambiguous language of nature itself. The dominant narrative voice enacts a 
concept of development that corresponds to Lamarck's model of willed 
transformation, setting itself against the perverse resolution of the heroine. 
But this is qualified by other figures in the novel who focus these identities in 
other contexts, and also by elements within the narrative voice itself, which 
needs to resort to exploring hidden associations and to chance, in order to 
reach its premonitored c o nc lu sio n .^
Magdalen is the central figure of No Name, the problematic heroine on 
whose quest and metamorphosis the story depends; but she also makes sense 
through her anomalous position in the family, and the novel, in exposing the 
illusionary social coherence of the family, also investigates its organic 
identity. There is a shift in the significance of inheritance, from Basil and 
Th e  Woman in White; genealogy here is no longer completely transmuted into 
social and psychic transmission -  the withdrawal of the fam ily as a social 
mould is both the withdrawal of 'environment' itself, leaving the sisters in a 
liminal state, and a disruption of the 'natural order' as they are catapulted 
into a hostile social environment. Vestiges of fam ily roles are perpetuated in 
N o Name, however, in the shape of various honorary elder relatives who have 
particular ideological as well as narrative functions: Miss Garth the 
governess; Francis C lare  senior, Magdalen's unworthy lover's father; Wragge 
who claims the role of honorary uncle; Mme Lecount, Noel's housekeeper and 
manipulative substitute mother.
Miss Garth, the governess, with her 'air of habitual authority*, is not 
simply a substitute for the absent parents but takes their place as the focus
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of 'friendly authority' even before their death. 'She treats Mr Vanstone as if 
he was a kind of younger brother of hers', she remarks of Magdalen's 
19relationship with her father. The psychological questions that are
explicitly set up as the sisters respond to their calam ity are focussed through
the indirectly reported thoughts of the governess who has 'studied the natures
of her tw o pupils in the daily intimacy of twelve years', thoughts which have
a correspondingly copy-book quality about them , and could be taken as
extracts from a popular treatise on the incubation of inherited latent traits,
revealing at the same time their allegorical moral quality.2®
Does there exist in every human being, beneath that 
outward and visible character which is shaped into 
form by the social influences surrounding us, an 
inward, invisible disposition, which is part of 
ourselves; which education may d irectly modify, but 
can never hope to change? Is the philosophy which 
denies this, and asserts that we are born with 
dispositions like blank sheets of paper, a philosophy 
which has failed to remark that we are not born with 
blank faces -  a philosophy which has never compared 
together two infants of a few days old and has never 
observed that those infants are not born with blank 
tempers for mothers and nurses to fill up at will? Are 
there, infinitely varying with each individual, inbred 
forces of Good and Evil in all of us, deep down beneath 
the reach of mortal encouragement and moral 
repression -  hidden Good and hidden E v il, both alike at 
the mercy of the liberating opportunity and the 
sufficient temptation? Within these earthly limits is 
earthly circumstance ever the key; and can no human 
vigilance warn us before hand of those forces 
imprisoned in ourselves which that key may unlock?21
The governess, like Norah, operates as the ta cit and marginal voice of 
common sense in the novel, but her perspective -  moral management 
modified by predetermined inheritance -  is qualified in the first place by 
Francis C la re , honorary absent father and alternative voice from the 
prelapsarian world. The member of the 'younger branch of a family of great 
antiquity' whose 'views of human nature were the views of Diogenes, 
tempered by Rochefoucault', and who is set up as a personification of 
'eighteenth-century' scepticism Ohis favourite poets were Horace and Pope;
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his chosen philosophers Hobbes and V o lta ire ').^  Clare's analysis of the likely
future of his vapid son is also set up as an explicit hypothesis. His voice
becomes an alternative peripheral form of 'traditional good sense', a modified
Hobbes as Miss Garth's is a modified Locke, and in his view established
privilege favours the incompetent, as against 'native' witi
I have always maintained that the one important 
phenomenon presented by modern society is -  the 
enormous prosperity of Fools. Show me an individual 
fool, and I w ill show you an aggregate society which 
gives that highly favoured personage nine chances out 
of ten -  and grudges the tenth to the wisest man in 
existence. Look where you w ill, in every high place 
there sits an Ass, settled beyond the reach of all the 
greatest intellects in this world to pull him down.
Over our whole social system, complacent Imbecility 
rules supreme, snuffs out the searching light of 
Intelligence, with total impunity -  and hoots, owl-like, 
in answer to every form of protest, See how well we 
all do in the dark! One of these days that audacious 
assertion will be practically contradicted; and the 
whole rotten system of modern society w ill come down 
with a crash.23
These contrasted established positions, typified by archetypal figures as 
representing alternative discourses of development, each pessimistic, each 
emphasising a 'truth of nature' to be modified by circumstance either as 
unlocking hidden dispositions or as selecting them, are set up as ideologically 
dissonant hypotheses that foreshadow the unfolding of the central drive of 
the narrative. But another process is also taking place here in which the 
narrative itself questions its own teleological implications, elaborating 
Spencer's use of von Baer's principle that development takes the form of 'the 
continuous adjustment of internal relations to  external relations' suggesting 
different hypotheses of development as the story shifts its conceptual 
emphasis and mores beyond its early presuppositions.^4 The narrative 
progress of No Name goes through three stages. The first sets up the socially 
constructed natural order, the domestic catastrophe and the hypothetical 
speculations on possible outcomes. The second is the 'Wragge' dominated part
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of the story which hinges on trickery, manipulation and disguise, and is the 
stage in which identities become provisional and attentuated. The third stage 
follows Magdalen's decline, breakdown and final penitential reassimilation; 
here the third person narrative  literally comes to occupy her consciousness. 
Each stage both develops out of the previous one and overturns its 
presuppositions. Within this overall process, each expresses different degrees 
of cognitive ambivalence about how to interpret the significance of physical 
signs of identity -  linking them to a conception of male and female 'proper 
natures' manifested as adjustment or otherwise to roles that are, as I have 
already argued, in the process of being revealed as masquerades. Thus 'the 
continuous adjustment o f internal relations to external relations' is itself an 
ambiguous process -  it ca n  take the form either of conformity or perversity.
In the first stage Magdalen is set in the context not only of established
'development hypotheses', but in a network of family characteristics that
suggest that continuous lines of transmission lead to morbidness, weakness,
degeneration in a way that suggests that the meaning of physiological
features can only m ake sense in the light of the established cultural
references of masculinity and femininity. This method of perception qualfies
the dichotomy that was central to Hartright's method of perception and
interpretation in The W oman in White, and is built up in the contrasted
figures of Norah, Frank C la re  and Noel Vanstone; figures in which d irectly
contrasted physical signifiers carry different social and moral referents.
Norah and Frank each apparently manifest the same process of wearing out
through genealogical transmission. Norah:
Inheriting the dark majestic quality of her mother's 
beauty, she had yet hardly inherited all of its charms.
Though the shape of her face was the same the 
features were scarcely so delicate, their proportion 
was scarcely so true. She was not so tall. She had the 
dark-brown eyes of her mother ... and yet there was 
less interest, less refinement and depth of feeling in 
her expression: it was gentle and feminine, but
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clouded by a certain quiet reserve, from which her 
mother's face was free. If we look closely enough, 
may we not observe, that the moral fo rce  of character 
and the higher intellectual capacities in parents seem 
often to wear out mysteriously in  the course of 
transmission to children? In these days of insidious 
nervous exhaustion and subtly-spreading nervous 
malady, isHhot possible that the same rule may apply, 
less rarely than we are willing to a d m it, to the bodily 
gifts as well?25
This passage moves rapidly through a range o f  speculations about Norah's 
incipient 'nervous exhaustion' and possible m oral weakness and sets up an 
image of vulnerability that is to be explicitly refuted by the very unsettled 
status of the narrative gaze itself. A t  first she seems to be a cruder version 
of her mother; transmission here breeds 'less refinement and depth of 
feeling', but not less femininity. But the location of this bluntness or 
vagueness suddenly shifts from the structure of the features to their 
expression, signalled by its blankness, its quiet reserve. The narrator then 
stands back, making the general speculative statement that Norah's actual 
development is to overturn, as adverse circumstances become the key that 
unlock the forces of hidden strength; but this m eans that her extreme reserve 
and self control -  the symptom here of her degeneration -  have to become the 
primary sources of her resolution. This inverts th e  pattern of references that 
made sense of Laura's passivity and Marian's resolution in The Woman in 
White, for here resolution can only be expressed as patience, a passivity that 
is also in itself morbid.
Frank Clare's organisational weakness on the  other hand is expressed in 
a way that develops Frederick Fairlie's disturbing androgyny in The Woman in 
White into femininity:
The small regular features, which he was supposed to 
have inherited from his mother, w e re  rounded and 
filled out, without having lost th e ir remarkable 
delicacy of form .. .  His gentle wandering brown eyes 
would have looked to better advantage in a woman's 
face -  they wanted spirit and firmness to  fit them for
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the face of a man ... He was undeniably handsome, 
graceful, well bred -  but no close observer could look 
at him  without suspecting that the stout old family 
stock had begun to wear out in the later generations, 
and that M r Francis Clare had more in him of the 
shadow of his ancesters than of the substance. ^
This is pushed even further in the figure of Noel Vans tone: 'His complexion
was as delicate as a young girl's, his eyes were of the lightest blue, his upper
lip was adorned by a weak little white moustache, waxed and twisted at
either end into a thin spiral curl. When any object specially attracted his
attention, he half closed his eye-lids to look at it. When he smiled, the skin
at the temples curled up into a nest of wicked little  wrinkles.'27 H ere
decadent sensibility withers into atrophy -  'feminine' is the initial association,
replaced by 'wizen', finally compounding his 'reptile temperament'.2**
These figures a ll depend on a set of references which link organic and 
moral decline by compounding a connection between femininity and 'subtly 
spreading nervous malady'. But the figure of Noel also realigns this network 
of associations, since his nervous debility and intellectual decline stems fro m  
an atrophied circulation that is presented by conflating organic and d irec tly  
economic processes: 'He had inherited his father's love of money, w ithout 
inheriting his father's capacity for seeing the uses to which money can be put. 
His one idea in connection with his wealth, was the idea of keeping it.'29 And 
Noel himself is first introduced in his father's house in Lambeth, at the 
centre of what is presented by a suddenly detached and polemical narrator, to 
be the inevitable concomitant of modern progress -  urban degeneration; the 
'street-labyrinth o f a remote London', of which the inhabitants are both 
products and victim s:
In this district, as in other districts remote from the 
wealthy quarters of the metropolis, the hideous 
London vagabond lounges, lowering and brutal .. . the 
public disgrace of his country, the unheeded warning 
of social troubles that are yet to come. Here, the loud 
self-assertion of Modern Progress -  which has 
reformed so much in manners, and altered so little in
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men -  meets the flat contradiction that scatters its 
pretensions to the winds. Here, while the national 
prosperity feasts, like another Belshazzar, on the 
spectacle of its own magnificence, as the Writing on 
the Wall which warns the monarch, Money, that his 
glory is weighed in the balance, and his power found 
wanting.30
Thus the nervous weakness of the hypochondriacal bachelor and the late- 
nineteenth century threat of a degenerate casual poor meet in the figure of 
Noel, and become the double product of his father's commercial enterprise, 
and his waning patriarchal line.
Magdalen is set within this matrix of fam ily  resemblances as a 'wild
type', the healthy strain in the family, who can only be defined by difference,
the absence of any fixed characteristics, transparency. The first
presentation of her implies what turns out to  be true, though in an
unexpected way -  that she is a bastard. But it  is done by emphasising her
flexibility and strength, so that initially anomalousness implies healthiness.
So while Magdalen is introduced as a 'caprice of Nature' that seems to be
scientifically inexplicable, she draws on a set of references that correspond
most closely of all to the Darwinian model o f natural selection that makes
anomalousness itself the central element of development:
By one of those caprices of Nature, which science still 
leaves unexplained, the youngest of Mr Vanstone's 
children presented no recognisable resemblance to 
either of her parents. How had she come by her hair?
How had she come by her eyes? . . .  It  was here exactly 
that the promise of her face failed of performance in 
the most startling manner. The eyes, which should 
have been dark, were incomprehensibly and 
discordantly light: they were of that nearly colourless 
grey which, though little attractive in itself, possesses 
the rare compensating merit of interpreting the finest 
gradations of thought, the gentlest changes of feeling, 
the deepest trouble of passion, with a subtle 
transparency of expression which no darker eyes can 
rival. Thus quaintly self-contradictory in the upper 
part of her face, she was hardly less at variance with 
established ideas of harmony in the lower ... The whole 
countenance -  so remarkable in its  strongly-opposed 
characteristics -  was rendered additionally striking by
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its extraordinary mobility ... She bloomed in the full 
physical maturity of twenty years or more -  bloomed 
naturally and irresistibly, in right of her matchless 
health and strength. Here, in truth, lay the mainspring 
of this strangely-constituted organisation. 31
Magdalen's 'fitness' therefore is manifested as a refusal to fit into any 
perceptual category, while her *unexplainable' identity disrupts the cognitive 
perspective that makes sense of Norah. But it also suggests that there are no 
stable signs or clues that can manifest feminine strength and this is 
reinforced by the fact that the roles she plays are exaggerated versions of 
established feminine ones. This paradox takes on a new set of connotations in 
the second stage of the story where Magdalen, in collaboration with Wragge, 
adapts herself to an assumed role in plotting to marry Noel -  an act of 
individual survival that threatens to compound the family's degeneration.
Wragge's anomalous and perverse attraction lies more openly in the way 
that he manipulates and exposes dominant social, psychological and narrative 
codes. He reproduces Collins's recurrent technique of subverting the 
dominant discourse of the narrative by replicating it in an unexpectedly 
fam iliar form rather than in a directly grotesque or uncanny way -  but in 
another key. Like Fosco, his pleasurableness lies in his total shamelessness, 
but here it is as a 'rogue' or trickster, a figure that has different kinds of 
class connotations from 'villain', and which replicates and overturns a moral 
management now pressed into the service of self-made competitive 
individualism rather than the 'fortified Success' of the Count's counter­
republicanism. While it is structurally necessary that Frank Clare should fail 
to fu lfil his father's expectations by not surviving -  Tie drifted away into the 
misty commercial future -  as aimless, as helpless, as gentlemanlike as ever' -  
so Wragge's pastiche of free enterprise as imposture masquerading as 
respectability depends on his particular status as a bastardised form , a 
trickster who is composed from a montage of overlapping rhetorics, pushing
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their terminology to a ridiculous conclusion while also managing finally to 
flourish in defiance of the conditions he exploits.32 He appears for the 
second time as victim  of a more widespread economic catastrophe, the 
overreaching of the commercial speculation of 18<»6 described as collective 
insanity: 'The railway mania of that famous year had attacked even the wary 
Wragge; had withdrawn him from his customary pursuits; and had left him 
prostrate at the end, like many a better man', the same catastrophe from 
which Michael Vanstone profited. But this reinforces the sense of his 
capacity for survival while turning respectable poverty into a caricature of 
respectability: 'From  top to toe every square inch of the captain's clothing 
was altered for the worse; but the man himself remained unchanged -superior 
to all forms of moral mildew, impervious to the action of social rust.'33
Wragge's own rhetoric deflates horticultural metaphors of individual 
self-culture by inflating them to their absurd conclusion, so that he becomes 
a pastiche of a moral management that bolsters competitive individualism. 
He describes himself as 'a moral agriculturalist; a man who cultivates the 
field of human sympathy .. .  Consult my brother agriculturalists in the 
horticultural line -  do they get their crops for the asking? No! they must 
circumvent arid Nature, exactly as I circumvent sordid man. They must 
plough, and sow, and top dress, and bottom dress, and deep drain, and surface 
drain and ail the rest of it. Why am I to be checked in the vast operation of 
deep draining mankind?'3** His w ife  is a parodied patient of a non-restraint 
asylum, a grotesque image of w ifely propriety, whose 'personal appearance' 
he fails to 'mould* into 'harmony w ith the eternal laws of symmetry and order' 
although she desperately attempts to  enact a domestic tableau.35 Wragge's 
speculation eventually leads to com m ercial success, based on his widespread 
use of advertising and his shift 'from  moral agriculture to medical 
agriculture. Form erly I preyed on the public sympathy, now I prey on the
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public stomach ... Don't think me mercenary -  I merely understand the age I 
36live in.' And it is balanced by the intrigues oi his antagonist and 
counterpart, Mrs Lecount. Like Count Fosco, Mrs Lecount wields a magnetic 
power through her simultaneous foreignness and familiarity. This too 
combines ability to turn moral management into medical control, but it is a 
power that is now brought about more decisively by her feminine 
manipulation of her own appearance, which was 'little less than a triumph of 
physical resistance to  the deteriorating influence of time', and an artificial 
counteraction to degeneration.^ Mrs Lecount's favourite pet, moreover, is 
no white mouse, an echo of Laura, but a more atavistic equivalent of Noel -  a 
toad.
The central section of No Name, the battle of plot and counterplot 
between Magdalen assisted by Wragge and Lecount as they 'vie  with each 
other in politeness and propriety', is the main focus of tension in the novel -  
the Saturday Review went so far as to claim that 'the whole point of the 
story, the one source of interest it possesses, is the contest between these 
two wicked, deceitful, obstinate women'. It works as this focus of tension 
precisely because it enacts a view of the world in which 'seeming' is multiple 
and flexible and seemliness is masquerade. But the novel also has to 
negotiate the consequences of Magdalen's power and resolution. The means 
by which she is brought to book in the final stage of the story both enacts the 
already established premonition of her fall and reverses the implications of 
the codes by which her early healthy self was built up by transmuting them 
into the symptoms of hysteria, corresponding to a medical perception that 
defines female resolution and 'nerve' itself as morbid, and turning resolution
39itself into the 'hysterical passion swelling at her heart'. This connection 
between resolution and hysteria, however, means that she can remain 
pathetic as well as perverse by linking moral decline and monomania rather
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than moral insanity as the quest becomes obsessive: 'Tim e .. .  had made her 
purpose part of herself: once she governed it , now it governed her'.^0 And 
this in turn makes nervous collapse both the product of her fall and the 
precondition of her reconstitution by being the source and cause of 
intellectual disintegration: H e r  whole nervous system has given way: all the 
ordinary functions of her brain are in a state of collapse', the doctor notes of 
41her breakdown.
The narrative voice, moreover, also negotiates its own ambivalence 
towards Magdalen, shifting between identification and distance by shifting 
between different registers itself. It d irectly decodes manifest physical 
signs. It presents indirectly reported internal monologue. It reports 
Magdalen's own voice, in the form of letters or directly reported speech, then 
slides into explicit interjection: the narrator stresses, 'let this be said of her; 
let the truth which has been told of the fault be told of the expiation as well. 
Let it be recorded of her that she enjoyed no secret triumph on the day of her 
42success', on the eve of her marriage to Noel Vanstone. Her decline, too, is 
marked in the third stage of the story by an increasingly split narrative voice 
as she becomes increasingly socially isolated on the one hand, the narrator 
•homes in' on her consciousness, becoming an 'inner voice' on the other: 
'Faintly and more faintly the inner voices now pleaded with her to pause on 
the downward way .. .  But one refuge now. She turned to the relentless 
Purpose which was now hurrying her on to her ruin and cried to it with the 
daring of despair -  Drive me on!'**3 And as she 'declines' her image becomes 
less plastic and translucent; her features freeze or settle into one meaning as 
her plots become more monomaniacal: 'There was a settled composure on her 
face which ... made it look still and cold as marble ...'.**
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Or just before her marriage: 'In one mysterious instant, all her beauty left 
her; her face stiffened awfully, like the face of a corpse.'**^
In T h e  Woman in White Collins developed a narrative structure that 
enabled h im  to draw on a set of psychological methods, references and 
allusions, use them as sources of tension and then to turn them round into the 
method of fictional and ideological resolution. No Name does not have this 
kind of structural complexity, yet in spite of the obtrusiveness of the 
narrative voice, it, too^continually qualifies the sources of its own apparent 
coherence. One way this tacitly works is in the ambiguous relationship 
between degeneration and gender that I have traced -  the means whereby the 
same codes that signify survival and decline work in different ways for men 
and women. The novel displays this double movement as the masquerading of 
social identity  by relying on a 'truth to nature' that resists the idea of an 
essential se lf. This equivocation also operates on a more structural level. 
Unlike Basil, N o Name is not a novel that explores the subjective experience 
of 'associations and sympathies'; even Magdalen's breakdown occurs off-stage, 
and the tensions that lead to it take the form of the voice of conscience 
ignored by a pathological resolution. No Name is the most apparently 
purposeful of Collins's 1860s novels; it is concerned with creating detached 
curiosity as much as suspense; it does not exploit cognitive ambiguity or 
anxiety to the extent that the earlier novels that I have examined do, and its 
'underside' is comic rather than uncanny. Unconscious, secret processes are 
described as manifesting themselves automatically, through the workings of 
an 'inevitable law of revelation', a return of the repressed that is one of the 
laws of nature.
But w hile  this explicitly reinforces the dominant preformative structure 
of the sto ry, the narrative itself both demonstrates that the laws and 
languages o f nature can operate in contradictory ways and draws on a more
ambiguous process of 'revelation' in order to focus its sources of tension and 
keep the story moving forward, while postponing its end. The third person 
narrative is broken up by letters -  the 'Progress of the Story through the Post' 
and by Wragge's chronicle that works on a different time-scale from the 
dominant narrative as well as disrupting its omniscience and qualifying its 
authority over Magdalen. The sto ry continually resorts to chance and 
coincidence to reach its predestined end, it is only when that end has been 
revealed that this is reinterpreted as providential intervention. Magdalen, on 
the brink of despair, counts the ships passing her window to decide whether 
she should commit suicide; she is discovered in the last stages of nervous 
exhaustion accidentally by the paragon of colonial fitness Kirke, as her quest 
takes an increasingly obsessive form a fte r the death of Noel. Increasingly, 
preternatural and 'uncanny* devices are used when, disguised as a servant 
rather than a wife, she penetrates the house of the new heir and attempts to 
find the 'Secret Trust' outlining the future  of the inheritance. Hidden links of 
association, lost keys, dark and winding passages abound in this section, and 
Magdalen is 'unconsciously' put on the trail of the document by the 
somnambulent heir, so that the means by which she pursues her social self 
become more weird as her own subjective coherence disintegrates. 
Mesmerism, too, makes an appearance, but fleetingly and in a deflated way 
through the indirectly reported speech of Noel, as Magdalen has a momentary 
collapse under the strain of dissembling in the 'Bygrave' plot, explained as a 
'neuralgic attack*: 'Mesmerism was frequently useful in these cases. Mr Noel 
Vanstone's father had been the most powerful mesmerist in Europe; and Mr 
Noel Vanstone was his father's son. M ight he mesmerise?^6 It becomes the 
sign here of Noel's gullibility and lack of power.
There is, however, one moment where Collins does directly exploit 
internalised psychological processes, drawing on specific developments in
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associationist psychology to make it possible to make the  necessary
conceptual leap in order to be able to recognise masquerade. Th is  is where
Mrs Lecount first meets Magdalen disguised as Miss Bygraves a fte r meeting
her masquerading as Miss Garth. Before falling asleep, Lecount's m ind drifts
along its own, uncontrolled chain of associations:
She had got no further with this during the day; she 
could get no further now: the chain of thought broke.
Her mind took up the fragments and formed another 
chain which attached itself to the lady who was kept 
in seclusion -  to the aunt who looked well and yet was 
nervous; who was nervous, and yet able to ply her 
needle and thread ... Were the members of this small 
family of three, what they seemed on the surface of 
them?
With that question in mind, she went to bed.
As soon as the candle was out, the darkness seemed to 
communicate some inexplicable perversity to her 
thoughts. They wandered back from present things to  
past, in spite of her. They brought her old master 
back to life again; they revived forgotten sayings and 
doings in the English circles at Zurich; they veered 
away to the old man's death-bed at Brighton; they 
moved from Brighton to London; they entered the bare 
comfortless room at Vauxhall Walk . . .  A t  this point her 
thoughts broke off once more, and there was a 
momentary blank. The next instant she started up in 
bed; her heart beating violently, her head whirling as 
if she had lost her senses. With electric suddenness, 
her mind pieced together its scattered multitude of 
thoughts, and put them before her plainly under one 
intelligible form. In the all-mastering agitation of the 
moment, she clapped her hands together and cried out 
suddenly in the darkness: 'Miss Vanstone again!'^
'She was quite incapable of tracing the mental processes which had led her to 
discovery', notes the narrator, ¿witching from tracing these processes to 
analysing them. 'She could not get sufficiently far from herself to  see that 
her half-formed conclusions on the subject of the Bygraves, had ended in 
making that family objects of suspicion to her; that the association of ideas 
had thereupon carried her mind back to that other object of suspicion which 
was represented by the conspiracy against her master; and that the tw o ideas 
of those two subjects of mistrust, coming suddenly into contact, had struck
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the light.'**8 This self-consciously echoes a process that Abercrombie 
discusses in the analysis of memory in Intellectual Powers and the 
Investigation of Tru th , a borderland state of reverie that is neither dreaming, 
nor trance, nor logical association, but a state in which connected ideas 
directly recall each other:
Besides this tendency, by which thoughts formerly 
associated are brought into the mind in a particular 
order, there is another species of association, into 
which the mind passes spontaneously, by a suggestion 
from any subject which happens to be present to it.
The thought or fact, which is thus present, suggests 
another which has some kind of affinity to it; this 
suggested a third, and so on, to the formation of a 
train of series which m ay be continued at great length.
A  remarkable circumstance likewise is, that such a 
train may go on w ith very little consciousness of, or 
attention to it.^°
Here too, as elsewhere in the novel, a process of 'inexplicable perversity' 
simultaneously disrupts and reaffirm s the central 'train of circumstances'. 
No Name is an extraordinary exploration of a process that A  Rogue's Life  
satirically suggested -  a study o f 'the workings of the social system .. .  on 
individual nature'. But in his next novel, Armadale, Collins takes the figure 
of the transgressive heroine one step further, this time in the context of an 
inquiry into the interaction of subjective identity, social power and 'psychic' 
forces, and hereda set of narrative conventions that does more than 
demonstrate the provisional nature of the natural -  it completely takes it to 
pieces.
173
C H A P T E R  FIV E
A R M A D A L E : T H E  SENSITIVE S U B JE C T  AS PA LIM P S ES T
The Mind is not a passive recipient of external 
impulses but an active co-operant ... it is a variable 
mechanism which has a history. What the senses 
inscribe on it are not merely changes in the external 
world, but these characters are co-mingled with 
characters of preceding inscriptions. The sensitive 
subject is no tabula rasa, not a blank sheet of paper, 
but a palimpsest.
G .H . Lewes, Foundations of a C re e d 1
In the Prologue in Armadale, Allan Armadale II (Senior) father of Allan
Armadale II (Junior), alias Ozias Midwinter, warns his son in his deathbed
confession of his name-sake's murder:
Guiltless minds may see nothing thus far but the result 
of a series of events which could lead no other way. I 
.. . with m y crime unpunished and unatoned, see what 
no guiltless minds can discern. I see danger in the 
future, begotten of the danger in the past ... I look 
into the Book which all Christendom venerates; and 
the Book tells me that the sins of the father shall be 
visited on the child. I look out into the world; and I 
see the living witnesses round me to that terrible 
truth. I see the vices that have contaminated the 
father, descending and contaminating the child; I see 
the shame which has disgraced the father's name 
descending and disgracing the child. I look in on 
myself -  and I see My C rim e, ripening again for the 
future in the self-same circumstance which first 
sowed the seeds of it in the past; and descending in 
inherited contamination of Evil, from me to my son .. .
My son! Th e  only hope I have left for you, hangs on a 
Great Doubt -  the doubt whether we are, or are not, 
the masters of our own destinies .. .2
Armadale opens with a confession, a complicated narrative of a guilty past 
involving doubling, pursuit and retribution. But the confession does not form 
a reconstruction and reassessment of that past that will lead to atonement 
and reassimilation. It  turns it into a force that will determine the future
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progress of the story, but not in a straightforward way. It becomes the 
novel's opening assertion, setting up a framework of expectation wherein the 
language of scriptural judgment merges with m oral transmission. Armadale's 
son, the receiver of the confession, is placed in a similar position to Robert 
Mannion in Basil as the three-fold 'look' of the father -  into the 'Book', into 
the w orld, into himself -  becomes his own social and psychic inheritance. 
Th a t destiny is thus simultaneously resisted and fulfilled by the progress of 
the narrative. It is internalised by the hypochondriacal obsessions of the son 
who becomes the sensitive subject who indirectly transmits the tensions and 
mysteries of the story, who is the subject of a psychological investigation of 
the way that a monomania can work its own fulfilm ent. He is the victim , 
too, of a plot to steal the name and identity that is the subject of so much 
complication and confusion; a plot that depends for its sensation on fulfilling 
the very expectations that have been rendered problematic.
Armadale is a fascinating and elusive novel which combines, in a 
bizarrely kaleidoscopic way, many of the narrative elements and 
psychological methods that have so far emerged in Collins's fiction. The 
narratives of The Woman In White and No Nam e hinged on one of the basic 
conventions of sensation fiction: gaining a name and an identity by assuming 
another false one. In Armadale there are plots, and plots within plots, which 
in turn become the breeding ground for further plots, all proliferating around 
the name 'Allan Armadale' -  a name without an identity, not, as in No Name, 
an identity that has been rendered problematic by the loss of name. It is a 
blank space standing for a property that has no real owner, a stage on which 
various psychological propensities and dispositions are acted out, though the 
replications and inversions take on different meanings in different contexts. 
The confessional narrative of the Prologue -  the letter addressed to the son -  
sets up the basic conflict around the inheritance of name, property and
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morbid traits that works in tw o directions, between self and other, and father 
and son, and it shapes the presuppositions that both determine and undermine 
the story. The fathers, the tw o  Allan Armadales of the Prologue, are set in 
opposition by directly replicating the other's transgression in a way that 
presents the excess of power itself as morbid, as a form of moral insanity. 
The conflict is given the exotic setting of Barbados, but the colony primarily 
gains its 'wild' connotations from  its position as the site of unlicensed feudal 
power, a reversion to an earlier historical epoch and outside the historical 
process itself. The confessing Armadale, rm i Wrentmore, inherited the 
Armadale name and estates in both England and Barbados in the place of the 
Armadale who had 'disgraced himself beyond redemption', though 
Wrentmore's own youth had echoed this absence of restraint: 'M y mother was 
blindly fond of me ... she let me live as I pleased. My boyhood and youth 
were passed in idleness and self-indulgence, among people -  slaves and half 
castes mostly -to  whom m y w ill was law ... I doubt if there was ever a young 
man in this world whose passions were left so entirely without control of any 
kind.'3 Both echo Pritchard's case of 'an only son of a weak and indulgent 
mother [w ho] gave himself up habitually to the gratification of every caprice 
and passion of which an untamed and violent temper was susceptible ... The 
money with which he was lavishly supplied removed every obstacle to the 
indulgence of his wild desires.'** But he is then displaced himself by the 
original Armadale, who takes on another assumed name to steal back his 
inheritance and to marry an English heiress and gain an English estate; in 
revenge he drowns him by locking him in a sinking ship, and dying himself of a 
degenerative disease, confesses this to his son.
There are no stable oppositions between self and other, reality and 
imposture here, and this process of displacement of significance is taken 
further in that there is nothing but displacement, even the desire to (re cla im
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a name becomes another form of imposture. The story itself re-enacts the 
'gaining a name and identity through dissemblance' plot through two 
countervailing registers, which follow the way in which the projected 
narrative that is the father's legacy is resisted and fulfilled. The first 
revolves round the relationship between the two Armadales, focussing on the 
morbid self-consciousness of W rent more's son, discovered as an outcast under 
the bizarre name of 'Ozias Midwinter’ -assuming a name now to avoid 
inheriting the property and the prophesy. The junior Armadales deconstruct 
the discourses through which their fathers are set up while at the same time 
upsetting the very expectations generated by their own opposition. They are 
respectively dark and fair, burdened with anxiety and harmlessly 
irresponsible, and this involves a complex notion of the splitting, shadowing 
or doubling of the self, which emerges most clearly in the premonitory Dream 
that foreshadows the future and which 'belongs' to both of them. The second 
focusses on the one surviving figure from the Prologue, the extraordinary 
villainess, the red-haired Lydia G w ilt, who conspires to acquire the English 
inheritance by assuming the Armadale name through marriage, not to 
Armadale, but to his replica Midwinter, under his 'real' name. The 'fatal' 
force of the father's prophesy and projected threat now turns out to be the 
power of manipulative female sexuality.
So Armadale juggles with the concept of transmission, scrutinising the 
way in which a legacy of the past is reproduced by the next generation, 
becomes internalised within the consciousness and then again transmitted 
through various 'psychic' phenomena -  most notably the dream in which one 
morbid state is transposed into the subjectivity of another. It uses the 
devices of doubling and substitution of names and identity and exploits the 
links between names and inherited property to question the stable boundaries 
of the self, as well as explore its social construction. It draws on
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contradictory psychological conventions and assumptions in building up and 
breaking down outcast and deviant figures, figures who are either shown to be 
threatening and anomalous because of others' fears and preconceptions, or 
make use of those projections and fears to build up Collins's most ambitious 
villainess in a way that can never be assimilated, as it is in The Woman in 
W hite, within the overall framework of moral management. The Woman in 
W hite explored how identity could be built up and broken down by 
manipulating a consistent rhetoric that simultaneously covered and disclosed 
its interests, using the asylum as the pivot of this. A secluded asylum for 
nervous patients also makes an appearance in Armadale, but as an 'over­
wrought' melodramatic device at the climax of the story.
This replicates the contrast in the way the novels operate, for 
A rm adale draws on a set of psychological processes that suggest 
contradictory interpretations. By continually replaying a plot with 
modifications the novel elicits distinct interpretations which succeed and 
overlap with one another, and which form a set of interlocking but dissonant 
frameworks. In this respect, Armadale generates a sense of mystery by 
continually undermining the terms on which its own cognitive assumptions are 
founded while allowing them, on another register, to remain intact. Towards 
the beginning of the novel the naive and boorish Allan Armadale I (J r ) tells 
his surrogate father, Decimus Brock, a joke about 'three Bedouin brothers at 
a show': 'A ll will take a lighted torch, and jump down the throat of his 
brother Muli -  Muli w ill take a lighted torch, and jump down the throat of his 
brother Hassan -  and Hassan, taking a third lighted torch, w ill jump down his 
own throat, and leaving the spectators in total darkness.'5 Armadale is a 
story which 'jumps down its own throat', and unlike The Moonstone, and The  
Woman in White, there are no sympathetic detectives, only victims and 
conspirators. There is no reconstruction which proceeds through distinct
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narrative frameworks as part of a process of detection, yet neither is there 
an overall omniscient narrative authority as there is in No Name.
Armadale works as a sensation novel by pushing the conventions of the 
mode to their limits, and Collins took as many explicit aesthetic and moral 
risks with the novel as he had done with Basil. But he wrote the novel when 
his economic security and position as a popular w riter seemed most assured. 
Smith, Elder had lured him from A ll the Year Round, following the 
serialisation of No Nam e as the result of the phenomenal success of The  
Woman in White, serialising Armadale in the well-established middle-class, 
middle-brow Com hill Magazine, paying Collins no less than £3,000 for the 
publishing rights.6 Again the Preface offers defence and justification: 
'Readers in particular w ill, I have some reason to suppose, be here and there 
disturbed -  perhaps even offended -  by finding that Armadale oversteps, in 
more than one direction, the narrow limits within which they are disposed to 
lim it the development of modern fiction -  if they can.'7 Armadale certainly 
was condemned by critics  as an exaggerated sensation novel; Miss G w ilt -  'a 
portrait drawn with m asterly art, but one from which every rightly 
constituted mind turns with loathing' -  being singled out for their special 
detestation.8 But although the novel was attacked for both aesthetic and 
moral distortion, on the one hand winding up the narrative to such a pitch as 
to render the characters 'puppets', on the other producing dangerously 
attractive and realistic crim inals, it was also accorded a grudging admiration. 
'Those who make plot their first consideration and humanity the second -  
those, again, who represent the decencies of life as so often too many 
hypocrisies -  have placed themselves in a groove which goes, and must go, in 
a downward direction, whether as regards fiction or morals. We are in a 
period of diseased invention, and the coming phase of it may be palsy', The
9
Athenaeum complained. But Th e  Saturday Review was more ambivalent,
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acknowledging Collins's 'strange capacity fo r weaving extraordinary plots; 
Armadale, from first to last, is a lurid labyrinth of improbabilities. It 
produces upon the reader the effect of a lite ra ry  nightmare ... If it were the 
object of art to make one's audience feel uncomfortable without letting them 
know why, Mr Wilkie Collins would be beyond doubt a consummate artist ... 
As a whole the effect is clever, powerful, and striking, though grotesque, 
monotonous, and to use a French word, bizarre.' 11*
Though the review is finally dismissive i t  points to the real complexities 
of the way the novel works -  that it produces the same effect that Marian 
had on Hartright, 'a sensation oddly akin to the helpless discomfort familiar 
to us all in sleep, when we recognise yet cannot recognise the anomalies and 
contradictions of a dream'.11 And here the D ream  itself and the way that it 
is offered up to distinct kinds of interpretation is both the fulcrum of the plot 
and a direct analogue of a more generalised process whereby meaning is 
rendered problematic in the novel. CoUins w ro te  an Appendix to Armadale 
where he made it clear that he left the meaning of the Dream deliberately 
opaque: 'My readers w ill perceive that I have purposely left them, with 
reference to the Dream in this story, in the position that they would occupy 
in the case of a dream in real life -  they are  free to interpret it by the 
natural or the supernatural theory as the bent o f their own minds may incline 
them.'1^  This means that overlapping forms o f 'double consciousness' are at 
work in the novel: firstly the 'double consciousness' of contemporary dream 
theory that is put to work in the text; secondly the ambiguous possible 
interpretations of the dream focussed through the consciousness of 
individuals; and thirdly the way in which the te xt works as a dream through 
mingling its own past and present. Armadale works in a way that is analogous 
to Elliotson's analysis of dreams in Human Physiology where he reiterates 
that dreams are marked by loss of control over the thoughts, but goes on to
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argue that the mind cannot, in fact, 'perceive the grossest incongruities and 
impossibilities ... thoughts riot on in confusion ... more like the cross reading 
of a newspaper ... A  dream sometimes continues rational or consistent till 
near the end, when suddenly it becomes absurd.'1^ The novel 'jumps down its 
own throat' through its juxtaposition of these different modes, without 
signalling that anything peculiar is happening, and the effect is to collapse 
the natural into the supernatural, but in ways which never move beyond the 
devices of the manipulation of sensation and perception. It thus extends the 
dream theory of physiological psychology, even as it points to its lim itation 
of explaining psychical reality as morbid phenomena by investigating the 
social construction o f a morbid consciousness in the figure of the 'sensitive 
subject' of Ozias M idw inter. To  analyse how this works it is necessary to  look 
at the Dream, its own immediate relationship to contemporary dream theory, 
and the way both are manipulated by the workings of the narrative and the 
shaping of identities that this involves.
Armadale's Dream , which takes the form of a series of static tableaux 
which then 'work their own fulfilment' In the later narrative through 
strategies that are open to contrasting interpretation, is itself subjected to 
tw o contrasting analyses immediately the dreamer wakes, which straightaway 
puts it on a different footing to the dreams that have emerged so far in 
14Collins's novels. In Basil and The Woman in White (with the exception of 
Marian's trance) unexplainable forebodings were discussed by the partial view 
of sceptical but naive narrators who were sensitive to the 'influences' around 
them, but unable to perceive the hidden connections that the dream or 'other' 
state represented. Th e y  therefore interpreted monition as a monomania but 
in a way that could then be reworked (by Basil in delirium, by H artright by 
gaining self and narrative control) as part of a process of transformation or 
reassimilation. In Arm adale there is also a split between superstition and
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rationality, but it is given a different emphasis and serves a different 
narrative function. Th e  Dream is given a superstitious 'supernatural' reading 
by Midwinter, reworked in the framework of expectation that he is set within 
as 'sensitive subject', and a materialist one by the local doctor, Hawbury, who 
serves no other function than as the voice of medical authority. This sets up 
a direct correlation between the Dream's narrative function, enabling the 
bizarre juxtapositioning of anomalous elements and the use of dream theory 
to explain it, which means that Hawbury's theory should be credible in 
external terms in order for it to be effectively qualified and developed in the 
narrative itself.
Hawbury's explanation of Armadale's dream corresponds closely to the 
dream analysis of MacNish, Abercrombie, Symonds and other contemporaries, 
but it does so selectively. Like his non-fictional counterparts, Hawbury is 
more concerned to offer a causal explanation of the Dream's different 
elements than a reading of its meaning, and like them, too, he offers a purely 
physiological explanation with an account of how the dream selects and 
combines past traces, working 'as the shuffling of a deranged kaleidoscope'.1* 
'We don't believe that a reasonable man is justified in attaching a 
supernatural explanation to any phenomenon which comes within the range of 
his senses, until he has certainly ascertained that there is no such thing as a 
natural explanation of it to be found in the first instance', opines Hawbury.16 
'There is nothing at all extraordinary in my theory of dreams: it is the theory 
accepted by the great mass of my profession. A  Dream is the reproduction, 
in the sleeping state of the brain, of images and impressions produced on it in 
the waking state; and this reproduction is more or less involved, imperfect or 
contradictory, as the action of certain faculties of the dreamer is controlled 
more or less completely, by the influence of sleep.'17 The three then attempt 
to 'trace [their] way back to these impressions', speculating on how they will
18*»
be transformed in the dream, which is 'like guessing a riddle'.18 This process 
directly corresponds with Abercrombie's outline o f the different processes at 
work in dreaming, where he notes that 'one of the most curious objects of 
investigation is to trace the manner, in which the particular visions or series 
19of images arise'. The process of tracing back in the dream analysis of 
Armadale correlates with Abercrombie's identification of 'Recent events and 
recent mental emotions, mingled up into one continuous series’;20 Allan 
combines the image of the landscape of a recent trip  with a scene he has 
been reading about, and condenses this with other memories and suggestions -  
'And behold the dream, Mr Midwinter, mixing up separate waking impressions 
just as usual!'21
But Hawbury's analysis only gives a partial account of the theory 
outlined by Abercrombie. It focusses on the recent past, while Abercrombie 
stressed 'Recent events ... mingled up ... w ith old events', and 'Dreams 
consisting in the revival of past associations, respecting things which had 
entirely passed out of mind, and which seem to have been forgotten', as well 
as those in which 'a strong mental emotion is embodied in a dream and is 
fulfilled'.22 The text suggests a more complex understanding of the dreaming 
process, corresponding to the concept of 'double consciousness' current In 
contemporary theory which was developed by associationist analysis and 
mesmerism, and was a starting-point for Dallas's The Gay Science. In  
dreams each man's character is disintegrated, so that he may see the 
elements of which it is composed.'2^ Frank Seafield's summary of methods of 
dream interpretation is taken literally in Armadale. On hearing that a bad 
dream has been had, the doctor immediately assumes that Midwinter has had 
it -  'with your constitution, you ought to be w ell used to dreaming by this 
« I n * » .  And by giving Allan the dream which reproduces Midwinter's 
anxieties, the novel directly makes use of one the tenets of mesmerism -  that
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impressions can be directly transmitted -  as well as the claim that 
clairvoyance offers a method of prediction which is not 'contrary to nature': 
'Say, now, what can be concealed from us, present and future?* Elliotson asks, 
'the soul of magnetiser and the magnetised can be mingled, and afterwards 
separated again.'25 This further blurs the boundary between natural and 
supernatural explanation as well as Midwinter's and Armadale's identities. 
But the novel mixes this with less obviously transcendental processes in both 
the text of the dream itself and its narrative setting.
Allan's Dream is presented as an embedded narrative carefully itemised 
and noted by Midwinter:
"1. The first event of which I was conscious, was the 
appearance of my father. He took me silently by the 
hand, and we found ourselves in the cabin of a ship.
"2. Water slowly rose over us in the cabin; and I and 
my father sank through the water together.
"3. An interval of oblivion followed; and then the 
sense came to me of being left alone in the darkness.
I waited.
"3. The darkness opened and showed me the vision -  as 
in a picture -  of a broad, lonely pool, surrounded by 
open ground ...
"6. On the near margin of the pool, there stood the 
Shadow of a Woman ..."26
Like Basil's early dream it takes the form of a set of static tableaux, which 
have an allegorical, already interpreted quality about them, but which are 
themselves embedded in the narrative as the dreamer sinks into the other 
world of double consciousness in the dream and he and the father sink 
beneath the water in a state which is neither past nor future. This use of the 
language of sinking and drowning is closer to Basil's delirium and Hartright's 
fear: 'my mind sinks in darkness and confusion when I think of it', making 
literal use of the metaphors of unconscious activity to describe the process
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within the dream itself.27 The use of metaphors or currents or tides to 
conceptualise unconscious processes within the self, either as a force linking 
the individual to the surrounding world or as a set of currents forming 
channels within the mind that could be developed, blocked or controlled, was 
developed in different contexts within physiological psychology.2* But Dallas 
in particular conceptualised the unconscious as a sea or expanse of water 
containing a range of different currents or tides that both frame the 
perimeters of the self and exist within, or beneath it. 'When one is most 
struck with the grandeur of the tides and currents of thought that belong to 
each of us, and yet all beyond our consciousness, one is apt to conceive of it 
as a vast outer sea or space that belts our conscious existence.'29 'In the 
dark recesses of memory, in unbidden suggestions, in trains of thought 
unwittingly pursued, in multiplied waves and currents all at once flashing and 
rushing, in dreams that cannot be laid ...', he writes, ' we have glimpses of a 
great tide of life ebbing and flowing, rippling and rolling and beating about 
where we cannot see it ... Our conscious existence is a little spot of light, 
rounded or begirt with a haze of slumber.'30 Thus the device of sinking 
beneath the waters with the father to produce the 'visions' of the 
preternatural state of consciousness simultaneously moderates and disrupts 
the distinction between alternative states of consciousness within the dream. 
And this corresponds with Dallas's sense that 'this unconscious part of the 
mind is so dark and yet so full of activity ; so like the conscious intelligence 
and yet so divided from it by a veil of mystery, that it is not much of a 
hyperbole to speak of the human soul as double, or at least leading a double 
life', but a double life in which there is a secret 'constant traffic ' between 
conscious and unconscious existence, and each is necessary to the other.31
It also directly echoes the patterns at work in creating the immediate 
conditions of dreaming and disrupts the linear sequence of time. Th e  'sinking
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beneath the waters with the father' sequence mixes Allan's 'unconscious past'
(the drowning of the father in the ship) with the immediate one (the two
Armadales finding themselves stranded on the wreck of the same ship) where
coincidence perversely reproduces the patterns of the intractable past. But
it also seeps into the language describing the waking present, and suffuses the
terms of reference of the novel as a whole. Allan Armadale's lack of
discipline in early life evaporates harmlessly but it  means that he becomes a
principle of free association in the novel, flitting from one idea to the other,
but never being anchored to any meaning. His passion for sailing and the sea
both underpins this and is made explicit when the narrator comments on his
confusion about the dreams: In  both senses of the word his mind was at sea
already'; a disruption of the distinction between the metaphorical and the
literal reinforced by the way that Midwinter, the more obvious outcast, is
continually described as being 'cast adrift'.32 And this comes to permeate
the language of the narrative itself. As the story moves into the sequence of
the fulfilment of the dream with the trip to the Norfolk Broads and the first
encounter w ith  the fa tal L y d ia  th e  landscape becom es increasingly d ream lik e
-  not, as in Basil through the dramatic Fusell-like imagery of cliffs and
chasms, but in the way that the flat monotony of the Norfolk Broads are built
up by the juxtapositioning of unexpected elements, presented by a dissociated
narrative consciousness that does not know how to  make sense of it.
A ll the strange and startling anomalies presented by 
an inland agricultural district, isolated from other 
districts by its intricate surrounding network of pools 
and streams -  holding its communication and carrying 
its produce by water instead of land -  began to present 
themselves In closer and closer succession. Nets 
appeared on cottage palings; little flat-bottomed boats 
lay strangely at rest among the flowers in cottage 
gardens; farmer's men passed to and fro clad in the 
composite costume of the coast and the field, in 
sailor's hats and fisherman's boots and ploughman's 
smocks, -  and even yet the low -lying labyrinth of 
waters, embosomed in its mystery and its solitude, was 
a hidden labyrinth still.**
188
Armadale also turns into a bizarre or dreamlike text as processes of 
psychical transmission are explored through a narrative which continually 
displaces any stable authority. Ye t this displacement is still aligned in a 
social framework where the meaning of identity is overdetermined by the 
expectations and perceptions of others, which can compound or undermine 
the legacy of the past. There is neither a clear shift between narrators nor 
an identifiable moralised narrative rhetoric in Armadale. It modulates 
between different kinds of narrative modes which can correspond to different 
modes of remembering the past. For example the most clearly identifiable 
benign authority is Armadale's substitute father, the rector Decimus Brock. 
The Epilogue of the novel closes with the posthumous re-reading of his letter, 
which states his belief in rational religion, autonomy and moral management, 
and which finally cancels out the opening of the scriptural denunciation of 
the absent father in the Prologue. The opening of the Story is focussed 
through Brock's m emory and presents his immediate response to Midwinter. 
It takes place after the two Armadales have met and after some of 
Midwinter's past is known, but before Brock has read the confessional letter 
of the Prologue.
The reader thus has a latent knowledge of the past which qualifies the 
way that the opening events of the story are transmitted through the 
retrospective analysis of the rector. Brock recalls Armadale's early life, his 
mother's self-imposed exile and the mysterious appearance of Midwinter as a 
vagabond through a process of 'natural or philosophical association', which, 
following Abercrom bie, takes place 'when a fact or statement, on which the
attention is fixed, is, by a mental process, associated with some subject 
3a
which it is calculated to illustrate'. 'One by one the events of those years -  
all connected w ith  the same little group of characters, and all more or less 
answerable for the anxiety which was now intruding itself between the
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clergyman and his night's rest rose, in progressive series, on Mr Brock's 
memory.'35 So narrative mood and the modes o f focus and recall are bound 
up with the control of narrative time, which is itself built up as a palimpsest 
of distinct kinds of memory. As the novel progresses suspense is heightened 
as knowledge of the past turns into anticipation of the future via the Dream, 
and this involves a shift from 'natural' to 'fictional' forms of association in 
Abercrombie's terms. This process coincides w ith  a shift in the use of 
narrative voice as well as focus. The main body o f the story takes the form 
of continuous narration into which other texts -  the Dream, letters -  are 
embedded. But as the plot thickens the significance of the embedding shifts; 
as Lydia Gw ilt gains power over Midwinter her diary substitutes itself for 
continuous narration. She becomes in both senses the author of the plot, 
while remaining a shadow within it -  in both capacities the fatal force of the 
past.
The Dream disrupts the coherent order o f the narrative and is the 
means by which the past, in another register, exerts a pressure on the future, 
and is also the means by which the 'double consciousness' of Armadale and 
Midwinter becomes a means of resisting and replaying the drama of the past. 
The junior Armadales, I have suggested, overturn the expectations by their 
father's and their own opposition, and they add a tw ist to Collins's methods of 
doubling and replicating identity and exploring patterns of exclusion through 
the means by which the unitary self is disintegrated in the Dream. Midwinter 
at first seems to represent Allan's 'unconscious', as repository of the guilty 
knowledge of the past, describing himself as 'an ill-conditioned brat, with my 
mother's negro blood in my face and my m urdering father's passions in my 
heart, inheritor of their secret, in spite of them ', and is the source of the 
36Dream. But it is as Allan's cdhscience as much as his submerged 
consciousness that Midwinter compounds as w ell as resists his 'destiny' -
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turning an over-anxious gaze back on himself. The figure of Midwinter is 
Collins's most sophisticated treatment of the ways in which 'sensitive' 
subjectivity is perceived as pathological and becomes morbid without being 
constructed by the narrative as pathological itself. He represents a complex 
overlapping of psychological codes, not only in the mingling of contrasting 
sets of expectations through which he makes sense, but in the way that these 
implied term s themselves are rendered problematic and provisional, and 
resist any coherent set of correspondences between identity and physical 
sign.
M idwinter is burdened by a social and a psychic inheritance, but he is 
developed in a way that goes against the grain of Spencer's development of 
the organic paradigm to discuss psychical inheritance: 'Hereditary
transmission ... applies not only to physical but psychical peculiarities ... 
modified nervous tendencies ... are also bequeathed.'37 He is built up as a 
palimpsest in a way that corresponds more closely with the way Lewes 
developed the metaphor to emphasise the 'double root, the double history' of 
development, which 'passes quite out of the range of animal life, and no 
explanation of mental phenomena can be valid which does not allow for this 
extension o f range', an extension which here includes the traces of others' 
projections and the force of memory.38 The narrative voice shifts between 
indirect narration focussed through others' views of Midwinter, his own 
consciousness, and his own embedded confessional accounts of his past. In 
the first place this takes the form of an interrogation of even the more 
liberal assumptions of moral management. Midwinter is introduced through 
Brock's perspective as an outcast and half-caste and the precise method of 
narrative focus used emphasises Brock's pathologising response as much as its 
object: **
Ozias Midwinter, on recovering from brain-fever, was
a startling object to contemplate on first view of him.
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His shaven head, tied up in an old yellow silk 
handkerchief; his tawny, haggard cheeks; his bright 
brown eyes, preternaturally large and wild; his rough 
black beard, his long supple, sinewy fingers, wasted by 
suffering till they looked lik e  claws -  all tended to 
discompose the rector at the  outset of the interview. 
When the first feeling of surprise had worn off, the 
impression that followed it was not an agreeable one. 
Mr Brock could not conceal from himself that the 
stranger's manner was against him. The general 
opinion has settled that if a man is honest, he is bound 
to assert it by looking straight at his fellow-creatures 
when he speaks to them. If  this man was honest, his 
eyes showed a singular perversity in looking away and 
denying it . Possibly they were affected in some 
degree by a nervous restlessness in his organisation 
which appeared to pervade every fibre of his lean, 
lithe body. The rector's healthy Anglo-Saxon skin 
crept responsively at every casual movement of the 
usher's supple brown fingers, and every passing 
distortion of the usher's haggard yellow face. 'God 
forgive me!' thought Mr B ro ck, with his mind musing 
on Allan and Allan's mother, 1 wish I could see my way 
to turning Ozias Midwinter adrift in the world 
again.'39
This manifestation of the figure through the shifting response to it 
moves through a succession of interpretative modes and calls each of them 
into question. The first two sentences, concentrating on him as 'startling 
object' surprising the rector's habitual perception, presents him simply as a 
collection of disembodied objects. Here there are no clear boundaries of the 
body -  head, handkerchief, cheeks, eyes, beard, claw-like fingers, both 
discompose the rector and are presented as the product of a process of 
suffering which itself only makes sense within a particular analytical 
fram ework. This is taken further in th e  rector's response to Midwinter's 
'shiftiness', which in turn distances Brock's unquestioning appropriation of 'the 
general opinion's' use of a set of vaguely defined physiognomic codes. 
Midwinter's shiftiness and twitchiness is both cultural -  the particular 
interpretation of a set of physical responses -  and physiological, but it is a 
physiology that has no meaning beyond* its cultural reception. Thus the initial 
impression is gradually qualified as his history of social isolation and
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rejection is revealed, by Brock's perception being replaced by a distanced and 
anonymous stranger: 'The fatal reserve which he had been in a fa ir  way of 
conquering some minutes since possessed itself of him once more. Again his 
eyes wandered, again his voice sunk in tone. A  stranger who had heard his 
story, and who saw him now, would have said: "his look is lurking, his manner 
is bad, he is, every inch of h im , his father's so n ".'^
'Nerves' are a key term  in defining Midwinter. But the particular class 
and gender connotations that the rhetoric of 'nervous sensibility' had absorbed 
through Basil's hypochondriacal fancies or Laura's vulnerability, are here 
transformed by being applied to a physically resilient, racially ambiguous, 
male vagabond even as the rhetoric itself is developed to suggest M idwinter's 
sensitive subjectivity. It is a sensitivity however that is put fo rw ard in 
gender terms rather than class ones: his 'sensitive feminine organisation' co­
exists with resilience while remaining the sign of vulnerability; anxiety 
continually hovers on the brink of hysteria as he struggles for control over his 
own nervous fancies and associative processes -  not hypochondria. Th is  not 
only gives his sensations feminine connotations, but also shifts the emphasis 
from the delusion itself to the subject's immediate response to it  in  a way 
that exposes the limitations of a moral management that simply takes the 
form of an exhortation to pull oneself together. For Midwinter's hysteria 
arises from his struggles to suppress his nervous fancies, not from giving  in to 
them; from his attempts to  enact an exaggerated cheerful sociability, not 
from his customary melancholy. Thus 'the hysterical passion rose, and 
conquered him' as he describes his history to Brock, but the passion is the 
strength of his gratitude to Armadale.*** The chapter in which he attem pts 
to build an acceptable persona is headed 'Midwinter in Disguise' and here he 
presents a face which takes the form of throwing off reserve, which was 'no 
new side of Midwinter's character ... It was only a new aspect of the  e ve r-
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recurring struggle of Midwinter's life'. This leads to his most morbid and
bizarre behaviour, loss of control and hysterical breakdown.
His artificial spirits, lasted continuously into higher 
and higher effervescence since the morning, were now 
mounting hysterically beyond his own control. He 
looked and spoke with that terrible freedom of licence 
which is the necessary consequence, when a diffident 
man has thrown off his reserve, of the very effort by 
which he has broken loose from his own restraints ...
He looked backwards and forwards from Miss Milroy to 
Allan and declared jocosely that he understood now 
why his friend's morning walks were always taken in 
the same direction. He asked her questions about her 
mother, and cut short the answers she gave by remarks 
on the weather ...
There are limits even to the licence of laughter; and 
these limits were ere long so outrageously overstepped 
by one of the party as to have the effect of almost 
instantly silencing the other two. Th e  fever of 
Midwinter's false spirits flamed out into sheer delirium 
as the performance of puppets came to an end. His 
paroxysms of laughter followed one another with such 
convulsive violence, that Miss Milroy started back in
ala rm .^2
The Dream is the most explicit example of how the narrative both 
analyses the basis of Midwinter's morbid delusions and makes his superstitious 
reading of it work while scrutinising the effects of his ability to resist its 
implications. Hawbury's explanation of the Dream , and his subsequent 
interpretation of its elements as having a limited significance provides a 
framework to read Midwinter's 'prophetic' response to i t .  This interpretation 
continues to operate even as Midwinter's interpretation itself qualifies it, 
which in turn reinforces the sense of fatality in the text itself, as he is 
caught in the spell of the Dream. And in sinking under it ,  he hastens the very 
end that he is seeking to evade while struggling to control the delusion and 
reassert the claims of moral management. In attempting to control his 
associations Midwinter enacts the prescriptions set up by Abercrombie and 
Conolly in outlining 'the qualities and acquirements which constitute a well- 
regulated mind', by reworking the associations and impressions of the Dream
minto different contexts, and this becomes a process of self-analysis.**^ For
example, he is able to dispel the superstitious connotations of Armadale's
mother's old room, not by shutting it away and turning it into a site of
repressed associations but by opening it up and transforming those past
accretions: 'Here, more strangely still, he looked on a change in the
household arrangements, due in the first instance entirely to himself. His
own lips had revealed the discovery that he had made on the first morning in
the new home; his own voluntary act had induced the son to establish himself
in his mother's room.' This turns into a more sustained analysis:
It was only after he had unreservedly acknowledged 
the impulse under which he had left Allan at the Mere, 
that he had taken credit to himself for the new point 
of view from which he would now look at the Dream.
Then, and not till then, he had spoken of the fulfilment 
of the first Vision, as the doctor on the Isle of Man 
might have spoken of it -  he had asked, as the doctor 
might have asked, Where was the wonder of their 
seeing a pool at sunset, when thev had a whole 
network of pools within a few hours' drive of them?
And what was there extraordinary in discovering of 
woman at the Mere, when there were roads that led to 
It, and villages in its neighbourhood, and boats 
employed on it, and pleasure parties visiting it? So 
again, he had waited to vindicate the firmer resolution 
with which he looked to the future, until he had first 
revealed all that he now saw himself of the errors of 
the past .. .  The glaring self-contradictions betrayed in 
accepting the Dream as the revelation of a fatality, 
and in attempting to escape that fatality by an 
exertion of free will -  in toiling to store up knowledge 
of the Steward's duties for the future, and in shirking 
from letting the future find him in Allan's home -  were 
in their turn, unsparingly exposed ..S*1*
Yet here, too, the very effort that Midwinter makes to shake off the past 
reinforces the sense of the strength of its hold; the weighty, convoluted 
sentences themselves, all build up the sense of its intractability while 
working through the processes by which it has gained its power.
But the legacy of the past is most decisively enacted in the future by 
the plots of the femme fatale Lydia G w ilt. She is the figure of all­
embracing, disarming and suffocating female power -  in whom fear of the 
father and his legacy of male violence becomes transformed into the threat 
of the castrating woman. She is everything that men desire in the feminine 
and everything they fear, a villainess who comes to control the narrative and 
who is never overpowered by succesfu! detection, though her past is revealed 
by it; she only finally overpowers herself through the retribution of suicide. 
As most critics realised, Miss Gwilt's villainy made her the most forceful 
character in Armadale, and one aspect of her dangerous attraction is the 
initial absence of shame with which, like Fosco, she perpetuates her 
conspiracies. But this takes on a completely different set of meanings: 
firstly, her villainy is mediated through her femininity and secondly, her diary 
plays an important role in compounding and undermining this villainy as she 
experiences contrition and attempts to reform herself.
'G w ilt' is emblematically set up as a study of 'guilt' in the dual sense of 
both wickedness and conscience; but she also operates as a study of the 
limitations of conventions of feminine transgression and remorse -  the 
repentant fallen woman -  and she enacts the narrator's remark that 'a man 
entering on a course of reformation ought, if virtue is its own reward, to be a 
man engaged in an essentially inspiring pursuit. But virtue is not always its 
own reward, and the way to reformation is remarkably ill-lighted for so 
respectable a thoroughfare.'**5 She is first seen as the embodiment of the 
shadow in the dream, as a shadow, and is built up through the juxtapositioning 
of her appearance manifested as shadow, w ith the self that manipulates that 
appearance as a means of gaining power. But while w ith Midwinter the 
delusions are dispelled through gaining self-control, Lydia's lack of shame and 
ability to control her appearance can only be interpreted as moral insanity. 
Pedgift, the lawyer, compares her to other female criminals: 'A ll had a 
secret self-possession which nothing could shake.'4*6
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This means that Lydia gains power when she is not what she appears to 
be, loses it when she becomes subjected to her own desire for Midwinter, 
when she wants to fill the role that she had been able to manipulate as a 
masquerade. She first puts herself in the position of being able to seduce 
both Armadale and Midwinter by becoming the neighbour's governess and acts 
the role of governess the more successfully by seeming to be too attractive 
and too self-possessed to be one: 'The sudden revelation of her beauty, as she 
smiled and looked at him inquiringly, suspended the movements of his limbs 
and the words on his lips. A  vague doubt beset him whether it was the 
governess after a l l . '^  She seduces through simulating the apparent passivity 
of the femme fatale, while in reality actively conspiring: 'Perfectly modest 
in her manner, possessed to perfection of the graceful refinements of a lady, 
she had all the allurements that feast the eye, all the Siren-invitations that 
seduce the sense -  a subtle suggestiveness in her silence and a sexual sorcery
(ig
in her smile.' She plays the role of repentant fallen woman as a means of
concealing her real history (w hich remains concealed from the reader for
most of the story) and uses the conventions of melodrama to persuade
Midwinter of the 'truth' of her past: 'There was nothing new in what I told
him : it was the commonplace rubbish of the circulating libraries. A  dead
father, a lost fortune, vagabond brothers whom I dread ever seeing again.'**9
And the 'repentant fallen woman' story is further dismantled when Armadale
thinks he has discovered Lydia's past. Here an intrusive narrator switches
from sensation novel conventions to a pastiche of melodrama:
One conclusion, and one only ... forced itself into his 
mind. A  miserable, fallen woman, who had abandoned 
herself in her extrem ity to the help of wretches skilled 
in criminal concealment -  who had stolen her way back 
into decent society and a reputable employment, by 
means of a false charactec -and whose position now 
imposed on her the dreadful necessity of perpetual 
secrecy and perpetual deceit in relation to her past 
life -  such was the aspect in which the beautiful 
governess at Thorpe-Ambrose now stood revealed to 
Allan's eyes!
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Falsely revealed or truly revealed? Had she stolen her 
way back into decent society and a reputable 
employment by means of a false character? She had. 
Did her position impose upon her the dreadful 
necessity of perpetual deceit in relation to her past 
life? It did. Was she some such pitiable victim to the 
treachery of a man unknown as Allan had supposed? 
She was no such pitiable victim ...Th e  true story of the 
house in Pimlico -  a house rightly described as filled 
with wicked secrets, and people rightly represented as 
perpetually in danger of feeling the grasp of the law -  
was a story which coming events were yet to disclose: 
a story infinitely less revolting, yet infinitely more 
terrible, than Allan or Allan's companion had either of
them  supposed.
Lydia Cwilt's attempted reform, as she falls for Midwinter and 
attempts to subjectively fill the role that was previously an imposture, is 
negotiated and shown to be impossible in the terms of her own self-defining 
identity, in the shifting confessional function of her diary. The diary is the 
means by which Miss Gwilt both mediates the tensions of the plot; where she 
meditates on the significance of coincidence and is 'haunted' by the 
resemblance of names and by herself: 'My nerves must be a little  shaken, I 
think. I was startled just now by a shadow on the wall. It was only after a 
moment or two that I mustered sense enough to notice where the candle was, 
and to see that the shadow was my own .. .  Here is my own handwriting 
startling me now! ... The sim ilarity of names never struck me in this light 
before.'^* It is also the place where her 'wicked' self speaks and where she 
incubates the plot against the Armadale property, and a means of self- 
control, as it was for Marian. 'Would it help me to shake off these 
impressions, I wonder, if I made the effort of writing them down? There 
would be no danger, in that case, of my forgetting anything important, and 
perhaps, after all, it may be the fear of something I ought to remember, this 
story of Midwinter weighing as it  does on my mind.'*2 But while with Marian 
the gradual loss of this self-control is the sign of defeat by forces beyond it, 
with Lydia a split gradually arises in the function of the diary between the
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conspiring and controlling self, and the 'guilty' self as she becomes 'reformed'. 
Thus the movement of penitence is marked by the merging of narrative time 
and story time as Lydia renounces her diary and herself, and loses self- 
possession: 'Six o'clock ... How is it that he alters me so that I hardly know 
myself again? ... I felt a dreadful hysterical choking in the throat when he 
entreated me not to reveal my troubles ...'55 'Sunday August 10th The eve of 
my wedding-day! I close and lock this book, never to w rite  in it , never to 
open it again. I have won the great victory} I have trampled my own 
54
wickedness underfoot. I am innocent.' But as she finds the sheer boredom 
of domesticity and wifely dependence to be the falsest role of all, she comes 
to depend on her diary as much as her 'Drops' of laudanum: 'My misery is a 
woman's misery and it  will speak here rather than nowhere; to my second 
self, in this book, if I have no-one else to hear me.'55 Th e  diary is the only 
place where she achieves a sympathetic subjectivity, but self-imposed moral 
management and reform involves that loss of self-possession, a contradiction 
which in the end can only be expressed by suicide.
The climax of Armadale and of the Gw llt conspiracy is when Lydia, 
with the accomplice Dr Downward, now transformed into the sinister Dr le 
Doux, lures Armadale and Midwinter into le Doux's newly built model 
'Sanatorium' for nervous patients, and where Gw ilt uses one of the asylum's 
boasted non-restraint methods as a means to attempt to poison Armadale by 
'drowning' or suffocating him in poisoned air -  a method she finally applies to 
herself. While the non-restraint asylum was the means of Laura's 
transformation in its very acceptability in The Woman in  White, here the 
image of the Sanatorium winds up the elements that are disturbing for their 
realism in the earlier novel, and draws on the 'older' image of the asylum as a 
melodramatic force of evil, a means-of sensational conspiracy and horror. 
But it does this, as Reade does In Hard C a4i, by blowing up moral
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management itself as a sinister force and transforming seclusion and repose 
into litera l sources of suffocation -  firstly of the hero, finally of the 
repentant villainess -  and thus creates a sensational framework to achieve 
the 'fatal' end that is a pastiche of the very means by which it is resisted.
Th e  Sanatorium is an explicit parody of a private asylum for nervous 
patients directly based on those aspects of Conolly's The Treatment of the 
Insane Without Mechanical Restraints that stress suppression and seclusion 
rather than self-control, and it turns the image of the theatre round to 
parody those presuppositions. It is a theatre of its own techniques, open to 
public inspection and offering a welcome relief to the visitors from the 
propriety of their private lives while replicating its essential forms: 'In the 
miserable monotony of the lives led by a large section of the middle classes 
of England, anything is welcome to the women which offers them any sort of 
harmless refuge from the established tyranny of the principle that all human 
happiness begins and ends at home.'56 Doctor le Doux has graduated to the 
proprietorship of the Sanatorium from an earlier position as 'ladies' medical 
man': 'One of those carefully constructed physicians ... he had the necessary 
bald head, the necessary double eyeglass, the necessary black clothes and the 
necessary blandness of manner, ail complete.'57 His description of the 
asylum is a direct echo of Conolly's argument. Conoliy wrote in The 
Treatm ent of the Insane:
Many English superintendents speak of seclusion as 
something worse than mechanical restraint; seeming 
to forget that it is as much adapted to secure an 
irritable brain from causes of increased irritability as 
a quiet chamber and the exclusion of glare ... is 
adapted to the same state of brain in a fever. The 
patient needs repose, and every object, or every 
person seen, irritates him ... It is often seen that the 
mere moving of the cover of the inspection-plate in 
the door of a patient's room if not cautiously done, 
rouses the patient from traoquillity and causes him to 
start up and rush violently to the door ... Seclusion 
gives him the benefit of continued tranquillity, by 
removing at once every cause of excitement.'“8
200
Le Doux extends this to cover all forms of nervous disorders of modern life:
Literally a word, on nervous derangement first .. . I 
throw up impregnable moral entrenchments between 
Worry and You ... I assert the medical treatment of 
nervous suffering to be entirely subsidiary to the 
moral treatment of it .  That moral treatment of it, 
you find here ... [Th e  patient's mind] is one mass of 
nervous fancies and caprices, which his friends (with 
the best possible intentions) have been ignorantly 
irritating at home ... I pull a handle when he is snug in 
his bed, and the window noiselessly closes in a 
moment. Nothing to  irritate him, ladies and 
gentlemen, nothing to irrita te  him!**
The two doctors, Hawbury and le Doux, thus form two poles in the use of 
psychological discourse -  dream theory and moral management -  around 
which the plot revolves; but they do so by having contradictory fictional 
functions; the function of le Doux (to transform perception through 
transforming moral management into a bizarre and uncanny device) 
undermines Hawbury's role as realigning the trains of association.
Armadale has two endings as well as two beginnings: the end of the 
Story with Lydia's suicide and the Conclusion -  'Midwinter' -  where Midwinter 
himself finally reaches a satisfactory interpretation of the Dream, and a 
means of explaining coincidence, and reversing the terms of his father's 
letter: 1 have learnt to view the purpose of the Dream with a new mind ... In 
that faith I can look back without murmuring at the years that are past, and 
can look on without doubting to the years that are to c o m e .'^  Brock's 
rational Christianity is the final means of closing the novel. But it is in 
seeking out the resolution and generating the mystery that creates the 
cognitive complexity of Armadale, which is never finally able to emerge from 
its involuted heuristic structure and either reach a final interpretation of the 
dream, or offer a stable interpretation of itself to the reader. Armadale 
seems to be set up as a struggle between fate and chance, destiny and 
autonomy, but it quickly turns into a novel about the different ways the
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present and present identity are over-determined by the forces of the past, 
emerging in coincidence as much as conspiracy. Finally the G re a t Doubt -  
•the doubt whether we are, or are not, masters of our own destiny' -  of the 
father remains unresolved, but in the process the meaning of destiny has 
splintered through the process of working out what that working out might 
mean. And as a palimpsest of traces of the past, Armadale -  both the name 
and the title -  anticipates Collins's most ambitious attempt to investigate 
that process of investigation, set within a psychological context that 
incorporates an analysis of the unconscious -  The Moonstone.
V
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C H A P TE R  SIX
T R U T H  W E A R IN G  T H E  MASK O F  D ELU SIO N :
D E T E C T IN G  T H E  U N CO N S C IO U S  IN  T H E  M O O N STO NE
Is there a form of hysterics that bursts into words 
instead of tears?
The Moonstone1
What have I lost? Nothing but Nervous Force -  which 
the law doesn't recognise as property.
The Moonstone2
'Here was our quiet English house suddenly invaded by a devilish Indian 
Diamond -  bringing after it a conspiracy of living rogues, set loose on us by 
the vengeance of a dead man .. .  Who ever heard the like of it -  in the 
nineteenth century, mind; in an age of progress, and in a country which 
rejoices in the blessings of the British constitution?13 Thus Gabriel 
Betteredge, who has the edge on all the narrators in The Moonstone, 
describes his reaction to the news of the advent of the oriental jewel, seized 
by imperialist plunder, into the apparently calm , stable world of the English 
upper-middle-class country house. The Moonstone has become dangerous 
because it has been stolen, displaced; it is stolen and misplaced again, causing 
widespread anxiety and a disruption of social and sexual relationships within 
the family, manifested finally in the apparently hysterical behaviour of the 
heroine: 'the cursed Moonstone had turned us a ll upside down'.^ The drive of 
the narrative, then, is to track down the lost object not simply for itself, but 
to restore what its lack signifies, socially and sexually, within the family. 
Suspicion falls predictably on the alien, marginal figures: on the Indians, 
hovering about the grounds, relying on clairvoyance to ascertain the
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diamond's whereabouts; on the deformed penitent thief turned housemaid, 
Rosanna Spearman; even on Rachel. But it is the hero, Franklin Blake, 
possessed of what Ezra  Jennings describes as 'youth, health, riches, a place in 
the world, a prospect before you', who is revealed, three-quarters of the way 
through the story, to have stolen the diamond, unconsciously, himself.5 The 
quest now becomes to find the lost object through the reinterpretation of the 
meaning of the past. And this means not only learning to see differently, but 
to define knowledge and what constitutes experience in a way that leads to a 
historical and psychological reconstruction. But the traces of the past are 
ambiguous and shifting and there is no focal point from which they can be 
surveyed, and the physiological experiment that is interpreted as proof is 
essentially a piece of theatre projected out of a fictional hypothesis which 
claims the authority of science -  an opium-induced re-enactment of an 
opium-induced action, set up by an opium-addicted doctor.6 They never get 
the diamond back either. It is stolen from Blake by the hypocritical 
philanthropist and rival suitor Godfrey Ablewhite, taken from him by the 
Indians and finally restored to its proper place in the Hindu temple.
The Moonstone is Collins's most compulsively readable and pleasurable 
novel. It is also in many ways his most conceptually complex; the one in 
which he most clearly appropriates theories through telling stories in a way 
that suggests that theories are interpretative narratives themselves. It is a 
novel that repays psychoanalytic interpretation, and offers means of 
exploring those forms of symbolic transformation that Freud identified as 
being central to the process of repression; and as such it is impossible not to 
read the text as a palimpsest of overt and covert meanings/ The Moonstone, 
however, has had much of its cognitive complexity defused by its 
retrospective placing in the 'Whodunnit' school of detective fiction. This
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suggests that the novel should be read in the light of the interpretative 
framework shaped by the later development of the genre, as a cosy 'three 
pipe problem' which deals with the disruption of order in an isolated 
community, but from the safe standpoint of retrospection, and a belief in 
scientific investigation as narrowing down, fixing, proving meaning through 
uncontrovertible evidence, revealing a static tru th .8
Like The Woman in White, The Moonstone was written within specific 
constraints, partly shaped by the explicit risks that Collins had taken with his 
previous novel; again it was phenomenally popular, doing more to boost the 
circulation of A ll the Year Round than Great Expectations.9 The novel also 
seems to defuse the intensity of Armadale; there is none of the explicit 
struggle for female autonomy of No Name, or the overt manipulation of 
appearance as a form of power of that novel and Th e  Woman in White. T t  is a 
v e ry  curious story, wild yet domestic ... nothing belonging to disguised women 
o r the like', Dickens wrote to Wilis.10 The concerns and questions of the 
earlier novels are pushed beyond their own lim its here, but, paradoxically, In 
the  process, reassimilated. They are taken up both in a more *homely' and on 
a more abstract, conceptual register, and it is this that simultaneously gives 
a  cosy reassuring feel to The Moonstone, and overturns the discursive 
boundaries and the cognitive assumptions on which that security rests.
As in The Woman in White, The Moonstone uses a dominant 
psychological model ambivalently, as a means of both creating m ystery and 
resolving it. In The Woman in White the benign asylum was the crucible for
•m.
both destruction and reconstruction of Laura's Identity, displaying the 
contradictions even as it reasserted the overall framework of moral 
management. The Moonstone uses the physiological experiment and 
contemporary theories of the unconscious as a means of disclosing the past
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and controlling the present. But closer investigation reveals that that 
conception of the unconscious combines distinct yet overlapping hypotheses, 
reinforcing and undercutting a moral management that itself has no coherent 
focus. And this ambiguity determines both 'the discovery of truth' and the 
'loss of the diamond', which is in turn generated by a narrative structure that 
continually resists any stable authority.
This means, too, that metaphors of levels, of depth and surface, are 
inadequate to discuss w hat happens in the novel -  and here it takes the 
implied scrutiny of interpretative assumptions that I discussed in Armadale a 
stage further. The Moonstone is not an innocent text that can be interpreted 
as if it was a dream, where manifest meanings conceal and reveal latent 
ones, or a 'serious' intention can be detected beneath a superficial 'popular' 
one. The novel is ambiguous b£ being about ambiguity and thus in a range of 
ways is the analogue of its o w n  meanings. The complexity of the story lies in 
the way that ambivalence works as a continuous, contradictory process; in 
the way that the narrative affirm s, while relativising, cognitive assumptions; 
and in the way that interpretative frameworks become part of the mystery. 
The Moonstone can be discovered -  but only as an absence.
I have suggested that a ll the novels of the 1860s unpick their own 
discursive assumptions as they go along. The Moonstone culminates this 
process -  and not only in the sense that the pleasure of the search is a direct 
analogue of the mental processes that are investigated as part of it. As a 
'wild yet domestic' story, i t  takes the overturning of the boundaries between 
the homely and the uncanny, inside and outside, deviant and normal, occult 
and rational, which I have argued operates in different ways in all the novels 
further than any of them. Franklin Blake tells Rachel, after he has pressed 
her into confessing to her knowledge of his apparent crim e; 'You are the
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victim , and I am the victim, of some monstrous delusion which has worn the 
mask of truth. If we look at what happened on the night of your birthday 
together, we may end in understanding each other yet.'** It is obvious that 
The Moonstone explores the ways things are not w hat they seem -  like The  
Woman in White, it suggests how easy it is, in the rig h t context, to conjure 
with appearance, to become the victim  of delusions that wear the mask of 
truth, when, as Fosco put iti 'A ll the world is in a conspiracy to accept the 
mask for the true face.'12 But it also explores the converse of this, that 
some methods of detection might first appear to be conjuring tricks. The 
narrative bifurcates into two forms of search which a re  continually merging 
into and clashing with each other: the police search -w hich tears off the 
mask to reveal the truth and the true villain G o dfrey Ablewhite, whose 
imposture is his philanthropic persona, concealing the conventional secret life 
of the English middle class male -  and the psychological search, which leads 
to the experimental investigation into Franklin Blake's unconscious in a way 
that suggests that truth itself can be known only as the manipulation of a 
delusion.
And this in turn discloses and conceals a further unresolved question -  
what is the 'self of Blake's unconscious? A glimpse back to an earlier, 
amoral state, the truth of an underlying transgressive tra it, or an over- 
zealous desire to protect the property of his future w ife  intensified by the 
influence of opium? How does Blake's 'innocent* theft prefigure and contrast 
with Ablewhite's guilty one? The interwoven relationship between social and 
self control that is traced through the earlier novels surfaces again here, with 
the exploration of the ground on which the distinction between the healthy 
and the pathological is founded. But here it is fram ed within the specific 
context of competing hypotheses, which draw on and transform  contemporary
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theories about what constitutes the unconscious, the extent to which it 
controls or is controlled by the sensitive subject, and the conditions under 
which it m ight be reclaimed. The fact that Blake was under the influence 
when he took the diamond obviously enables him to become temporarily 
deranged while remaining both healthy and innocent, just as he is seen as 
guiltless of Rosanna Spearman's death. But the process of the search itself 
disturbs this security by the very means that it uses to establish it, for the 
narrative relationships and processes through which the past is reclaimed are 
more convoluted here than in The Woman in White.
The Moonstone is a novel about remembering, about how, and under 
what conditions, the unconscious past can be reclaimed, about how its traces 
might be interpreted and understood, about how this might be transmitted to 
posterity. It shows the inadequacy of Bruff's common-sense suggestion: 1 
tell you, we shall be wasting our time ... if we attempt to try  back, and 
unravel this frightful complication from the beginning. Let us close our mind 
resolutely to a ll that happened last year at Lady Verrinder's country house; 
and let us look to what we can discover in the future, instead of what we can 
not discover in the past' in the light of Blake's stricture: 'Surely you forget ... 
that the whole thing is essentially a matter of the past.'13 But in order to do 
this, it needs to be equally a novel about forgetting, about what is 
intractable, about silence, suppression and concealment. On a 
straightforward level, of course, this is a basic precondition of the narrative; 
there would be no mystery and therefore no story if Rachel had not 
suppressed her knowledge of the theft -  this also makes it impossible for her 
to be a narrator -  or if Rosanna's confession had not been sunk in the 
quicksand, to be dragged back, much later, on a chain. The pleasure of the 
'discovery of the truth' depends on the conscious and unconscious forms of
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resistance involved in the 'loss of the diamond' in the first place; an equivocal 
pleasure, enhanced by disclosing marginal and half-hidden texts that exist on 
the perimeters of the central narrative, written by those who labour under 
the yoke of a psychic and social inheritance, and who finally sink without 
trace. The narrative thus needs to overturn its own apparent order in order 
for meaning to emerge, but that order itself never takes the form of a fixed 
set of relations. It works as a set of interlocking frameworks: the overall 
structure of the story and the perspectives of special narrators within it on 
the one hand, and the ordering of narrative tim e through which the past is 
repossessed within the overall construction on the other. But these exist in 
no stable relation to each other, just as testimonies written within clearly 
identified cognitive frameworks undermine the authority of a stable, 
objective truth.
A t  first, structurally, The Moonstone seems to develop and combine 
many of the narrative features of The Woman in White and Armadale: it is 
narrated by different characters, through different interpretative and 
psychological perspectives; it is divided into Prologue, Story and Epilogue. 
The Prologue is 'extracted from a family paper' of 1799 and supplies both the 
long-term history of the Moonstone as religious object and source of passion 
and violence, and the more recent story of the Verrinder family's guilty past 
of colonial expropriation -  a past shared by Rachel, Blake and Able white in 
that they are all cousins, but not directly known by them. As in Armadale, 
the Prologue thus sets the scene for the legacy of the Verrinder family while 
remaining outside its perimeters by describing English unrestrained passion 
and violence in an 'exotic' colonial setting. But it is more thoroughly 
separated from the Story here: the autonomous family document makes no 
direct appearance in the Story; the history of the diamond, as against the
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diamond itself, remains 'unconscious', so that it takes on the more occult 
connotations of a curse or an invasion, and this means that the Prologue and 
the Story hold a different relation to each other here than their equivalents 
in Armadale.
The Story is subdivided into the 'Loss of the Diamond' and the 
'Discovery of the Truth ', the first, narrated by the Steward, Gabriel 
Betteredge, deals with the appearance of the diamond, the budding courtship 
between Rachel and Franklin Blake, its loss on the night of the birthday, the 
inadequacy of the police search and the suicide of Rosanna Spearman. The 
second is related by several narrators: Miss Clack the evangelical fanatic, 
Bruff the Solicitor, Franklin Blake, Ezra Jennings the doctor's assistant, Cuff 
the police detective, Dr Candy and Betteredge. It covers Rachel's relations 
with Godfrey Ablewhite, Blake's action, the discovery of Rosanna's confession 
and Blake's stained nightshirt, the experimental reconstruction of the theft 
and the reconciliation of Rachel and Blake, the re-emergence of the police 
search and the tracking down of Ablewhite. The Epilogue, narrated 
principally by Murthwaite, the anthropologist, describes the 'Finding of the 
Diamond' in the Hindu temple. The resolution of the double m ystery is thus 
separated from the restoration of the original crime of colonial expropriation 
which takes place outside the perimeters of the Story itself.
So The Moonstone seems to take the form of an 'English' chain 
embedded within an Indian' frame. But just as the frame is marginal in both 
senses of the word, since it both defines and places the story and remains at 
its edges, so other kinds of marginal texts -  the Indians' clairvoyant visions, 
Rosanna's letter, Jennings's unfinished book on the brain and the nervous 
system -  can only become central, paradoxically, by remaining peripheral. 
The more embedded and qualified a narrative the stronger its significance,
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and this explicitly overturns the pattern of a narrative authority which was 
more im plicitly subverted in The Woman in White. The obviously subjective 
perceptions of the different narrators work primarily as devices to frustrate 
the reader's knowledge of the truth; to offer evidence unconsciously through 
lapses of symptomatic mannerisms, rather than to operate as a chain of 
linked associations. Moreover, there is no Walter Hartright figure who 
doubles as general editor and specific narrator in The Moonstone. 
Structurally, Franklin Blake fulfils this role; Betteredge reveals at the 
beginning that he is w riting at the behest of Blake, who is himself following 
B ruff, the lawyer's, suggestion: 'M r Bruff thinks, as I think, that the whole 
story ought, in the interests of truth, to be placed on the record in writing 
and the sooner the better', and it then emerges that it was Blake who had 
extracted the 'family paper' of the Prologue. But whereas in The Woman in 
White the *breakdown* of Laura is narrated through a multiple viewpoint and 
the reconstruction through Hartright's individual reappropriation of the past, 
in The Moonstone this is reversed. Here it is the loss that is described by one 
narrator while the restoration, or discovery of the truth is told through 
interlocking narrative voices, and although the discovery depends on 
appropriating and realigning information hidden in the 'loss' section of the 
narrative, this process is more unstable and equivocal than it is in The Woman 
in  White. Blake is collecting evidence after the resolution of the mystery 
(which implies a different conception of evidence and a different use of it 
from  the processes of rediscovery), whereas in The Woman in White the two 
processes are merged. Although he makes editorial interventions in the form 
of notes, or (in the case of Miss Clack) disputes with the participating 
narrator, the narrative as a whole is constructed retrospectively. Indeed it is 
the voice of Betteredge which closes the story: 1 am the person (as you 
remember, no doubt), who led the way in these pages and opened the story. I 
am also the person who is left
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behind, as it were, to close the story up', and thus frames the frame that he is 
set within.*'5
Blake's character is given no illusionary unity, and although Collins 
claimed in the Preface that his aim was to 'trace the influence of character 
on circumstanced, the discovery of the truth invokes the disintegration of 
Blake as a single, let alone a resolute, self in control of his associations and 
his memory.*6 Moreover, while Hartright's vacillations and anxieties, his lost 
recollections, had to be passed over in order to achieve final narrative 
coherence, Blake's must be investigated. This again puts the text itself in a 
different kind of relation to its own past and its own hidden traces, which, 
like the Moonstone, remain continually absent and present. The Moonstone is 
not only a reconstruction: it is the reconstruction of a reconstruction of a 
reconstruction, which means that suspense and indeterminacy need to arise 
from within the processes of memory itself and the way that it in turn is 
remembered. Thus although story time and narrative time remain 
structurally separate in the novel -  with the important exception of 
Jennings's journal -  both enact the circuitous process of detection by drawing 
on, while covering over^ their own marginal traces.
There is thus a tacit correspondence between the way the detective 
process draws on marginal forms of knowledge, seen through the 
interpretative framework of the various narrators in the later reconstruction; 
the process through which the text explores the way that states of 'otherness' 
or transgression are created, and the implicit concepts of how the past 
determines the present as well as the processes by which it might be 
reclaimed. It is necessary to draw out the implications of the explicit use of 
contemporary theories of the unconscious which are transformed and 
manipulated in the text to investigate how this works. Ezra Jennings
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repeatedly claims the authority of scientific credibility in explaining the
physiological experiment with the opium to Blake:
I think myself bound to prove, in justice to both of us, 
that I am not asking you to try  this experiment in 
deference to any theory of my own devising.
Admitted principles, and recognised authorities, 
justify me in the view that I take ... Science sanctions 
my proposal, fanciful as it may seem. Here, in the 
first place, is the physiological principle on which I am 
acting, stated by no less a person than Dr Carpenter ...
Observe, Mr Blake, that I am now referring to  one of 
the greatest of British physiologists. The book in your 
hand is Doctor Elliotson's Human Physiology; and the 
case which the doctor cites rests on the well-known 
authority of Mr Combe ... Are you satisfied that I have 
not spoken without good authority to support m e?17
Jennings thus repeatedly claims the credibility of externally verifiable 
scientific texts in the novel, and Collins, too, emphasises the external 
validity of the physiological experiment in the Preface: 'Having first 
ascertained, not only from books, but from living authorities as well, what 
the result of that experiment would really have been, I have declined to avail 
myself of the novelist's privilege of supposing something which might have 
happened, and have so shaped the story as to make it  grow out of what 
actually would have happened -  which, I beg to inform m y readers, is also 
what actually does happen, in these pages.'18 But the credibility here 
depends on hypothetical speculation as much as on empirical evidence and it 
is this that gives scientific credibility its particular ro le  of producing a 
fictional frisson in the novel; the reader, like the initially sceptical observers, 
Bruff and Betteredge, is drawn in, as voyeurs and involved spectator into the 
'secret theatre' of the action -  the pleasure increased by the belief that this 
is a re-enactment of both 'what happened1 and 'what would have happened'. 
The experiment and what it reveals is thus the pivot of the story and it is set 
up within its own framework of internal coherence by the citing of the
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Carpenter and Elliotson texts. But Collins uses Carpenter and Elliotson in 
this particular context in a very precise way as a means of highlighting the 
dramatic elements of the story and of combining the homely and exotic, the 
scientific and the occult; both the specific use of opium and the particular 
conception o f the unconscious that is evacuated are crucial here. When 
placed in the  interlocking context of the broader narrative relations at work 
in the novel, the experiment, and the conception of the unconscious that it 
reveals, takes on connotations which are a further elaboration of their 
immediate psychological context.
In what ways does Jennings's experiment draw on and transform specific 
aspects of contem porary theories of the unconscious? His hypothesis, it has 
been seen, rests on combining authoritative statements from Carpenter and 
Elliotson, th e  latter resting his claims on the phrenological authority of 
Combe (who in turn cites Abel) though what this also means is that the 
authority also takes the form of a trip ly  embedded anecdote. In running 
Elliotson and Carpenter together in this way, Collins is condensing two 
figures whose names would have had very different connotations by the late 
1860s: Carpenter, the respected voice of mainstream physiological
psychology; Elliotson, the marginalised advocate of mesmerism. But although 
these names suggest different conceptions of the way that the unconscious 
can be discovered, directed and controlled, the way that they are run 
together e xp licitly  here focusses on those notions of the unconscious that 
they share.
This is, o f course, the basic assertion that there is an unconscious -  and 
that nothing that has been assimilated by the mind is ever entirely lost. The 
passage from Carpenter's Principles of Human Physiology that Jennings cites: 
'There seems much ground for the belief, that every sensory impression which
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has once been recognised by the perceptive consciousness, is registered (so to 
speak) in the brain, and may be reproduced at some subsequent time, although 
there may be no consciousness of its existence in the mind during that
period', evokes an image of the unconscious as the mind's 'lumber room' filled 
19with misplaced articles. It is an image which is reinforced by the use of 
£11101300*3 anecdote of the Irish porter, 'w ho forgot, when sober, what he had 
done when drunk; but being drunk, again recollected the transactions of his 
former state of intoxication'.20 This anecdote, moreover, is the same 
example that Dallas focussed on to criticise  the most simplistic aspects of 
physiological theories of the unconscious: 'We laugh to hear of the drunken 
Irish porter who forgot when sober what he'd done when drunk .. .  so that 
having once in a state of intoxication lost a  valuable parcel, he could give no 
account for it, but readily found it again in his next drinking bout .. .  The 
physiologists attempt to account for this b y  regarding the brain as a double 
organ',21 and to argue that 'these physical explanations are not satisfactory 
... If memory has its hiding place in the m ind, and if there too is to be found a 
hidden reason; so also, nearly all that w e  understand by passion, feeling 
sympathy ... is an energy of the hidden soul' -  an energy derived from the 
secret interaction of the two aspects of the m ind.22
Here however Collins's selective and specific conflation of Carpenter 
and Elliotson provides a means of re-enacting the night of the theft 'as it 
happened', in a way that enables Blake's identity  to remain both innocent of 
conscious complicity, and as obscure as the content of the lost parcel itself. 
But a more complex correspondence between the novel and Carpenter and 
Elliotson's ideas is also at work. As I outlined in the first chapter Carpenter 
recognised that memory operated selectively, but that 'consciouness of 
agreement' or recognition of the traces of the past 'constitutes the basis of
our feeling of personal identity', in a way that stressed the importance of 
continuous lines of transmission between past and present.2^ He argued that 
'the unconscious prejudices that we thus form are often stronger than the 
conscious, and they are more dangerous because we cannot thoroughly guard 
against them ... the conceptions of childhood will appear latent in the mind, 
to reappear in every hour of the weakness ... when the tension of the reason 
is relaxed, and the power of old associations is supreme.' But his precise 
interpretation of the implications of this underwent important modifications 
during the late 1840s which resulted in a renewed assertion of the claim s of 
moral management, by realigning the significance of the distinction between 
reflex and volitional action.
Carpenter had claimed, following Pritchard and anticipating Maudsley, 
that individuals could not be held directly responsible for actions they had 
performed reflexively, or automatically: 'nor can he say a human action is 
m orally wrong ... when it directly results from a powerful impulse w hich he 
has no power to restrain ... According to this view, what is termed conscience 
is nothing less than the idea of right or wrong character which becomes 
attached to an action, when we place in comparison the motives that 
prompted it.'25 The implications of this argument, however, underwent 
important modifications during the 1840s, and moved towards arguing fo r the 
possibility of a greater degree of self-control. An important element o f his 
analysis here was his study of the workings of the mind in various states of 
induced derangement in which volitional activity was suspended, but not 
entirely abolished. His study of Jacques Moreau's Psychological Studies on 
Hachisch and on Mental Derangement of 1847 argued that even under the 
influence of cannabis the mind was partially capable of self-direction:
One of the first appreciable effects of the hachisch ...
is the gradual weakening of that power of voluntarily
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controlling and directing the thoughts, which is so 
characteristic of the vigorous mind. The individual 
feels himself incapable of fixing his attention on any 
subject; his thoughts being continually drawn off by a 
succession of the ideas that force themselves, (as it 
were), into his mind without his being able in the least 
to trace their origin ... By a strong effort of will, 
however, the original thread of the ideas may still be 
recovered, and the interlopers may be driven away, 
their remembrance, however, being preserved, like 
that of a dream recalling events long since past.26
This analysis moreover gradually led him to modify the idea that reflex
actions were completely beyond volitional direction. With the right training,
he came to argue, the mind would not simply suppress desires which the
unconscious might express, but would participate in their formation and
direction. It is 'not only concerned with carrying into effect the suggestions
of the desires. In the well-regulated mind it ought to have a controlling
influence over the desires themselves, so as to present them from exercising
themselves with undue force.'22
Collins puts Carpenter's theories to a specific use in The Moonstone and 
allows Blake to have it both ways, even as they are framed in a context that 
transforms their implications. Collins's own account of his having written 
sections of the novel under the influence of opium are probably exaggerated; 
as both medicine and hallucinatory drug, opium provides the explicit means of 
inducing a trance-like state where 'volitional activity is suspended' in Blake, 
but this is implicitly qualified, not simply through Jennings's reference to 
Carpenter, but to his other source of authority -  De Quincey's Confessions of 
an English Opium Enter28. T h .  use of De Quincey simultaneously gives 
•opium' exotic and romantic connotations and defuses them along Carpenter­
like lines. Jennings cites De Quincey as a self-conscious analyser of the 
effects of opium to suggest that one can still function relatively normally 
under the influence of opium, and the section on T h e  Pleasures of Opium' in
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the Confessions themselves, following the incidents that Jennings cites, 
reinforces this: 'Whereas wine disorders the mental faculties, opium on the 
contrary (if taken in a proper manner), introduces amongst them the most 
exquisite order, legislation and harmony.'29
Here, therefore, it is used to produce a kind of unconscious that tacitly 
is still regulated, a state of passive derangement in Blake that does not 
explicitly imply or involve the disintegration of his social identity; which 
offers him a past to be visited not a history to be narrated. Blake's 
physiological morbid condition, induced by giving up smoking, is ostensibly 
produced by a banal transgression; similarly the hallucinatory aspects of the 
opium are here played down, and the anxieties that ostensibly rise to his 
consciousness in his deranged state in both its original and replayed versions, 
are the immediate ones about the safety of the diamond that suggests that he 
both desires and wishes to protect it. He is thus acting in accordance with a 
set of indirectly willed reflexive gestures which are beyond his immediate 
volitional control, and for which he is not, as it  were, responsible, but which 
take the form of a relatively conscientious impulse in response to immediate 
impressions. Thus Jennings describes Blake's behaviour as both automatic and 
unconsciously controlled:
Under the stimulating influence, the latest and most 
vivid impressions left on your mind -  namely, the 
impressions relating to the Diamond -  would be likely, 
in your morbidly sensitive nervous condition, to 
become intensified in your brain, and would 
subordinate to themselves your judgment and your will 
-  exactly as an ordinary dream subordinates to itself 
your judgment and your w ill. L ittle  by little , under 
this action, any apprehensions about the safety of the 
Diamond which you might have felt during the day 
would be liable to develop themselves from the state 
of doubt to the state of certainty -  would impel you 
into practical action to preserve the jewel -  would 
direct your steps, with that motive in view, into the 
room which you entered -  and would guide your hand 
to the drawers of the cabinet until you had found the
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drawer which held the stone. In the spiritualised 
intoxication of opium, you would do all that.^O
Thus the opium discloses an already moralised unconscious.
So Collins combines aspects of Carpenter with the less contentious side 
of Elliotson and this is reinforced by the management of the experiment 
itself. Jennings's aim is to reproduce the conditions of the night of the 
crime, in the belief that Blake will automatically replay his earlier actions: 
'We shall have to put you back again into something assimilating to your 
nervous condition on the birthday night. If we can next revive, or nearly 
revive, the domestic circumstances which surrounded you; and if we can 
occupy your mind again with the various questions concerning the Diamond 
which formerly agitated it, we shall have replaced you, as nearly as possible, 
in the same position physically and m orally, in which the opium found you last 
year.'31 However the device through which this is enacted and achieved, 
Blake's trance watched by hidden observers, actually corresponds to the 
'Magnetic Evenings at Home' -  the controlled experiment of the mesmeric 
exhibition. Blake's re-enactment of the night is ambiguous. It can be seen 
either as a reflex response or as a somnambulist's trance -  artificially induced 
-  and it is this voyeuristic process of observation of the disclosure of the past 
that is turned into the source of fascination as much as what is actually 
revealed.
And this means that the 'Elliotson' of the fifth edition of Human 
Physiology, the outcast of the scientific establishment as the advocate of 
mesmerism as means of healing and of self-direction, who writes, citing Gall: 
'How often in intoxication ... under violent emotions ... through the effect of 
such poisons as opium ... are we not in some measure transformed into totally 
different beings', becomes the more ambiguous subtext of the 'official'
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physiological experiment.32 Druff's initial distrust of the scheme: 'It was
quite unintelligible to his mind, except that it looked like a piece of trickery,
akin to the trickery of mesmerism, clairvoyance and the like', is overruled as
he is drawn into the excitement of the dram a.33 Yet mesmerism, as an
implied mode of influence and power that has both occult and scientific
connotations, is continually invoked to produce a contradictory source of
tension in the novel. The explicit discussion of mesmerism is linked to the
more exotic process of clairvoyance and the tactics of the Indians are
accounted for by Murthwaite in a way that replicates the contemporary
rational explanation of the phenomenon:
The clairvoyance in this case is simply a development 
of the romantic side of the Indian character. It would 
have been a refreshment and encouragement to these 
men -  quite inconceivable, I grant you, to the English 
mind -  to surround their wearisome and perilous 
journey in this country with a certain halo of the 
marvellous and the supernatural. Their boy is 
unquestionably a sensitive subject to the mesmeric 
influence -  and under that influence, he has no doubt 
reflected what was in the mind of the person 
mesmerising him. I have tested the theory of
clairvoyance -  and I have never found that the 
manifestations get beyond that point ... We have 
nothing whatever to do with clairvoyance; or with 
mesmerism, or with anything that is hard of belief to a 
practical man, in the inquiry that we are now pursuing.
My object of following the Indian plot, step by step, is 
to trace results back, by rational means, to natural 
causes.^**
But although Murthwaite emerges as one of the authoritative voices in the 
novel, mesmerism actually merges w ith materialist physiology while 
suggesting a countervailing notion of the unconscious. It thus forms a key 
piece in the pattern of competing and interwoven hypotheses in the text as a 
whole, by remaining within, and subverting, Murthwaite's explanatory 
framework.
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The lynchpin of this process is Jennings himself, who is a figure of
ambiguity, uses psychological discourse ambiguously, and plays a dual role as
agent and subject, doctor and patient in the progress of the story itself. As
narrator, Jennings obviously provides the fulcrum of the story; his journal
recounting the course of the experiment is one of the most exciting points of
the detective process by being the one point where narrative time and story
tim e merge and retrospective testimony turns into current journal. It is also
the most reliable account as the place where 'objective' and 'subjective'
impressions merge. Jennings thus collapses different kinds of knowledge and
authority into each other. He is Collins's most explicit cross category figure,
composed out of a bizarre  juxtaposition of opposites in a way which extends
the patterns of projection, expectation and perception involved in the first
impressions of Marian Halcombe and Ozias Midwinter. These oppositions
become a force of unconscious attraction for Blake, who is in turn responding
to Betteredge's use of popular physiognomy:
It was impossible to dispute Betteredge's assertion 
that the appearance of Ezra Jennings, speaking from a 
popular point of view, was against him. His gypsy- 
complexion, his fleshless cheeks, his gaunt facial 
bones, his dreamy eyes, his extraordinary parti­
coloured hair, the puzzling contradiction between his 
face and his figure which made him look both old and 
young together -  were all more or less calculated to 
produce an unfavourable impression of him on a 
stranger's mind. And yet, feeling this as I certainly 
did -  it is not to be denied that Ezra Jennings made 
some inscrutable appeal to my sympathies, which I 
found it impossible to resist.^*
Jennings, too, asks himself, of Blake, 'What is the secret of the attraction 
that there is for me in this man? ... Is there something in him that answers 
the yearning I have for a little  human sympathy?'*6 As in the 
Armadale/Midwinter opposition, Jennings operates as Blake's 'unconscious', 
the site of the painful memories of which Blake is blissfully unaware, as well
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as the container of the knowledge of how the unconscious works, and this is 
expressed in terms which hover on the edge of the language of mesmerism. 
The reconstruction of the night not only looks like a display of artificial 
somnambulism, even as it is explained according to Carpenter's model of the 
unconscious; Jennings notes immediately before it  takes place: 'Without 
professing to believe in omens, it was at least encouraging to find no direct 
nervous influence -  no stormy or electric perturbations -  in the 
atmosphere.'^7 And the use of the diary to record immediate impressions 
means that there is a continual correspondence between Blake's artificially 
induced nervous irritation and his own.
A ll of Jennings's methods involve the experimental testing of 
speculative hypotheses and this means that he operates as extension and 
inversion of the conceptual authority that he draws on in explaining the 
experiment to Blake, while remaining the unwritten object of psychological 
enquiry himself. It also means that he functions as the inversion of the 
flamboyant manipulation of 'medical and magnetic science' as manifested by 
Fosco, and uses pharmacological transformation in the opposite way. The 
techniques that Jennings uses as a doctor are all designed to stimulate rather 
than soothe, suppress or sedate. He rallies the strength of the fever-struck 
Candy with the use of 'champagne, or brandy, ammonia and quinine', rather 
than following received wisdom and administering 'gruel, lemonade, barley 
water and so f o r t h ' . H e  uses opium to stir up Blake's past, in contrast with 
Candy, who originally used it as a sedative. But this is based on the testing 
of an even more speculative hypothesis that he is elaborating in the 
unfinished book on 'the intricate and delicate subject of the brain and nervous 
system', a hypothesis that develops the assumptions of associationist 
psychology that corresponds with those elements of both Carpenter and
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Elliotson that come closest to Dallas. Carpenter, like Abercrombie discussed 
how chains of association at work in memory include suppressed links 'which 
might be reproduced, as by the touching of a spring, through a nexus of 
suggestions'; Hennings concentrates more closely on the logic underlying the 
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associative process at work on delirium.
. He doubts 'whether we can justifiably infer -  in cases of delirium -  that 
the loss of the faculty of speaking connectedly, implies of necessity the loss 
of the facility of thinking connectedly as well', a theory that he tests by
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rewording Candy's delirious rumblings by filling in the gaps between them. 
And although this process of 'thinking connectedly' means ironing out the 
inconsistencies in Candy's speech, creating 'a smooth and finished texture out 
of the ravelled skein', it still works through a symptomatic decoding of 
fragmented testimony that is in one sense an analogue of the pleasure of 
reading the novel itself.**1 But this can only happen on the condition that 
Jennings's text be allowed to remain disconnected, and his own past to take 
the form of an unconfessed and unvindicated taint of guilt. His own 
medicinal use of opium as a sedative and pain-killer has none of the assuring 
reflexes of Blake's trance -  the past here becomes a Tiideous phantasmagoria' 
rising up, like an exhalation and a curse which recalls Basil's delirium, and De 
Quincey's account of opium's pains: 'June 16th.- Rose late, after a dreadful 
night, the vengeance of yesterday's opium pursuing me through a series of 
frightful dreams. A t one time I was whirling through empty space with the 
phantoms of the dead, friends and enemies together. A t  another, the one
beloved face which I shall never see again, rose at my bedside, hideously
42
phosphorescent in the black darkness, and grinned at me.' For Jennings, 
too, as for Mannion and Midwinter, memory takes the form of the continual 
pursuit of unsolicited testimonials from the past that turn him Into an outcast
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in the eyes of others and whose psychic burdens seem unable to remain 
concealed; but while for Mannion and Midwinter the confessional disclosing of 
the past is either used to reinforce pathological identity or to realign the 
perception through which this is made aberrant, with Jennings it finally 
remains unconfessed, concealed as the undisclosed secret in the text itself. 
For Jennings 'obscurity is the only hope'; the one trace that remains is the 
diary extract selected by himself: 'He opened the volume for this year, and 
tore out, one by one, the pages relating to the time when you and he were 
together', before consigning them, his book on the brain and himself, to a 
nameless grave. 'His story is a blank.'**3
So the figure of Jennings embodies the process by which contemporary 
theories of the unconscious both reinforce and disturb the process of 
detection that is also both reassuring and disturbing. He acknowledges the 
importance of searching 'the dark recesses of memory, unbidden suggestions, 
trains of thought unwittingly pursued', yet creates a smooth texture of the 
tangled skein through total recall or obliteration. This method of deciphering 
finally merges into the process of Cuff's detection and the disclosure of 
Ablewhite, while remaining a more complex process of which the police 
search only echoes one aspect. Jennings operates as the point at which the 
different kinds of oppositions that are at work in the novel break down, as 
signalled by his cross-grained identity: dark/light, young/old,
attractive/repellant, masculine/feminine. 'Physiology says, and says truly, 
that some men are born with female constitutions -  and I am one of them!'**** 
He provides the means of disclosing the secret while remaining secret 
himself; he decodes delirium and has his own hallucinations. But this still 
does not represent a reconciliation of opposites. His own secret past does not 
signify as far as the central drive of the narrative is concerned. But the very
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dissonant status of Jennings's evidence implies that there is another concept 
of the unconscious that remains tacit in the text, one that emerges through a 
process of displacement and transference, yet which still draws on the 
imagery and language of mesmerism, thus turning it into a referent which 
takes on different connotations in combination or contention with distinct 
perceptual codes. Thus Collins, in one respect, is using mesmerism as a 
means of invoking the mysterious, the occult, the hidden sources of energy 
and power. But the narrative relations of the novel also involve a more 
convoluted pattern of the social and psychic mechanisms by which that power 
is produced.
The most obvious way that 'occult' processes are invoked in the novel as 
the strange and indecipherable product of dominant fears and anxieties, is in 
the figures of the three Brahmins, upon whom the most extreme form of 
mesmerism -  clairvoyance -  is projected as a form of romantic fascination, 
which is then explained by Murthwaite as the product of their romantic 
fascination. The Indians, like the Moonstone itself, link the framing Prologue 
with the Story as well as moving across the margins of the narrative itself 
through a set of shifting perspectives which imperceptibly shift the centre of 
gravity so that they finally become seen as the rightful owners of the 
diamond. Clairvoyance works as a kind of familiar exoticism for English 
readers here, compounding the occult implications of orientalism, but 
deflecting its violent connotations from the oriental other to the English 
excesses of which it is the transformed expression. This is a precise 
elaboration of the ways in which Collins uses 'colonies' as fantastic other 
places in his work, as places of magical transformation or sources of violence 
or sexual excess whose position is structured by their simultaneous 
marglnality and annexation to England, inheritors of a morbid inheritance
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that remains an English malady. In Th e  Woman in White, for example, South 
America is essentially a magical device, a place to which Hartright can 
disappear out of the story and where he can learn some of the skills and 
resolution that he w ill need in the London jungle. In No Name, by contrast, 
Canada is the site of Andrew Vanstone's youthful excesses, and Frank Clare's 
constitutional weakness fails the test of colonial survival, a survival which 
enhances Robert Kirke's masculinity. In Armadale, the West Indies reinforce 
the absence of parental control on the Armadale fathers -  facilitating their 
implied moral insanity but in a way that emphasises that this is a result of 
their own unlicensed power.
In developing this particularly double-edged colonial exoticism in The 
Moonstone, Collins is of course still reinforcing a perception of an inscrutable 
oriental other, and seeing the colonies as incubators of violence, though it 
might be 'English' violence.^* But as John Reed has suggested, in The 
Moonstone he does so in a way that goes decisively against the grain of 
dominant representations of India as the extreme signifier of unlicensed 
passion and violence, that had been fuelled by the reaction to the Indian 
mutiny of 1S57.**6 Collins reinforces the image of the oriental despotism of 
the Muslims in the history of the diamond in the Prologue, and India again is a 
place where violent passions are let loose by an act of invasion, but the Siege 
of Seringapatam explicitly overturns the patterns of invasion and violence 
generated by accounts of the contemporary event. Again it is Hemcastle, 
the transgressive cousin, who is 'exasperated to a kind of frenzy by the 
slaughter through which we had passed'.^7 It is he who transforms the 
diamond into a dangerous and morbid inheritance by compounding its secrecy, 
and who returns to England to dwell in a social and psychic underworld of 
moral insanity that nonetheless anticipates the fascination with experimental
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chemistry and artifically induced mental states that is to be unfolded later: 
’Sometimes they said he was given up to opium smoking and collecting old 
books; sometimes he was reported to be trying strange things in chemistry; 
sometimes he was seen carousing and amusing himself among the lowest 
slums of London.'***
The Indians' clairvoyance gains romantic and transcendent connotations 
in opposition to this, just as there is a close correspondence between decoding 
the significance of the Indians' structure of knowledge and attitudes towards 
the physiological experiment, first seen as a kind of mesmerism, and towards 
the figure of Jennings. Both Jennings and Indians are seen by Bruff and 
Betteredge as disturbingly alien and indecipherable and as conjuring 
tricksters; both Indians and mesmerism are decoded by Murthwaite, of whom 
Bruff notes 'Lawyer as I was, I began to trust M r Murthwaite to lead me
blindfold through the last windings of the labyrinth, along which he had 
i*9guided me thus far.' Like Jennings, too, Murthwaite is a figure who 
continually crosses the boundary between fam iliarity and difference, though 
not so bizarrely as Jennings, and who is the witness, in the Epilogue, of the 
Hindu ceremony in which the diamond is finally restored to its right place, 
marking its final passage from devilish occultism to  spirituality, and at the 
same time cancelling out Herncastle's earlier English transgression.
Mesmerism, therefore, does not provide a coherent alternative model of 
the unconscious so much as a set of implied psychological references that 
enables different processes of transference to take place, and forms of sexual 
and psychic power to be connoted, which can be 'traced back by rational 
means, to natural causes', but which also undercut any consistent cognitive 
framework. The Moonstone itself, of course, is the apotheosis of this process 
by which meaning and value are created out of projection, displacement and
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transference. It represents a 'wild1, nervous energy that works through both 
metaphoric and metonymic kinds of comparison. It signifies desire and also is 
an object of desire; it disrupts, too, any stable distinction between literal and 
figural, depth and surface, latent and manifest content. 'What have I lost? 
Nothing but Nervous Force -which the law doesn't recognise as property', 
jokes Ablewhite after being attacked by the Indians, but steals the Diamond 
50as a piece of property. The Moonstone absorbs the language of magnetism 
to convey its influence and attraction, to turn it into a conductor of the 
disruptive forces of the past, and to suggest sexual energy and psychic power. 
Its meaning is continually merging with objects and people around it, yet it 
also emanates from its own self-reflected light. 'When you looked down into 
the stone you looked into a yellow deep that drew your eyes into it so that 
they saw nothing else', Betteredge notes. 'No wonder Miss Rachel was 
fascinated; no wonder her cousins succeeded. The Diamond laid such a hold 
on one that I burst out with as large an ’O ' as the Bouncers themselves.' Like 
the mesmeric fluid, or ether, it is simultaneously transcendental and 
material. Betteredge goes on, I t  seemed unfathomable ... we set it in the 
sun, then shut the light out of the room, and it shone awfully out of the 
depths of its own brightness.'5* This reinforces L.W . King's point in The  
Natural History of Precious Stones and Gems, one of Collins's sources, that 
'the diamond is highly electric, attracting light objects when heated by 
friction, and alone among many gems has the peculiarity of becoming 
phosphorescent in the dark, after prolonged exposure to the sun's rays.'52
As signifier of nervous force the Moonstone is set against the other 
image of 'magnetic' yellow deeps -  the Shivering Sands. It becomes linked to 
Rachel as she is drawn to it , just as the Sands magnetise her obscure 
counterpart -  reformed thief, deformed housemaid and subject of illicit
228
desire, Rosanna Spearman. The Moonstone is a source of unconscious energy 
which when lost produces hysteria. It  is inherited by Rachel, yet seems to 
arrive without a history, or at least, its history is mysterious, outside the 
perimeters of the Story. The Shivering Sands, too, are an apparently 
meaningless natural phenomenon with no social and human use -  its force 
itself is hidden, its unseen currents and tides suggesting the Horrid, as the 
diamond does the Sublime. Betteredge notes: 'A t the turn of the tide, 
something goes on in the unknown deeps below, which sets the whole face of 
the quicksand shivering and trembling in a manner most remarkable to see ... 
Winter and summer, when the tide flows over the quicksand, the sea seems to 
leave the waves behind it on the bank, and rolls its waters in smoothly with a 
heave, and covers the sand in silence. A  lonesome and horrid retreat, I can 
tell y o u !'^  Th is  implies that the Sand both has a magnetic force and 
signifies the 'magnetised' patient as it contains Rosanna's confession of an 
unspoken sexual desire. Unlike the sand in No Name which 'turns traitor and 
betrays the footsteps which have passed over it', the Sands conceal their 
secrets, their own past and the pasts of others which have to be dragged, 
painfully, back on a chain of submerged associations. Neither liquid or solid, 
it represents a double consciousness that exerts continual pressure on the 
waking subject, literally sucking it down. Rosanna foresees her own fate in 
the Sands, telling Betteredge, 'Something draws me to i t ... I try to keep away 
from it, but I can't. Sometimes ... I think m y grave is waiting for me h e re .'^  
But she does this by reading the place as the expression of the intractability 
of the past, linking social and sexual repression: 'Do you know what it looks 
like to me? ... It  looks as if it had hundreds of suffocating people under it -all 
struggling to get to the surface, and a ll sinking lower and lower in the 
dreadful deeps!'5^
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It is as nervous force and sexual energy, emerging through Moonstone 
and Sands, Rachel and Rosanna that mesmerism provides a language of 
secrecy, mystery and power, and suggests a process of unconscious repression 
that clashes with the 'Carpenter' dominated unconscious of moral 
management. There is an obvious attack on evangelical piety and 
hypocritical philanthropy in the figure of Godfrey Ablewhite, which is then 
transmuted into a grotesque parody of the evangelical end of the spectrum of 
self-control and moral management in the narrative of Miss C lack . Miss 
C la ck , the fanatical spinster whose sexual obsession for Ablewhite is overtly 
presented as being displaced into religion, presents herself as an example of 
early moral training and of the virtues o f 'energetically exercising the w ill', 
in a way that parodies the advocates of early self-culture: 1 am indebted to 
m y parents (both now in heaven) for having had habits of order and regularity 
instilled into me at a very early age.'56 But the figure is so grotesque, the 
satire against Clack as a spinster as well as a religious fanatic is laid on with 
so heavy a hand, that it defuses its effectiveness, and simply turns it against 
a familiar stereotype. With Rachel and Rosanna a more subtle process is at 
w ork. They are linked and set in opposition to each other by their magnetic 
attraction to Franklin Blake, for whom they both suppress knowledge and 
remain silent in order to protect, becoming secret bearers of his unconscious 
knowledge and of their own desire. As a linked opposition, moreover, they 
also qualify the double model of the simultaneous shaping of a feminine and a 
class identity through moral management posed by Laura Fairlie and Anne 
Catherick.
The figure of Rachel Verrinder sidesteps the problems posed by the 
overtly transgressive identities of Magdalen Vanstone or Lydia G w ilt -  she 
remains an heiress though she loses the diamond, and she does not step
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beyond the limits of propriety to regain a name or to gain a property. But 
the codes and the methods by which she keeps to her place suggest both the 
stress of the imposition of a self-imposed silence and the impossibility of 
breaking through the restraint other than as a form of hysteria. She becomes 
transformed, as Blake notes in his 'Objective-Subjective explanation', into 
'Somebody Else' by suppressing his secret.5^ Rachel thus ta citly  upsets the 
conventions of femininity as Magdalen or Lydia do explicitly -  while both 
inverting and breaking down the Laura/Marian contrast; she is dark, positive, 
purposeful, independent -  yet silent. Like Magdalen, she displays the 
characteristics that F .C . Skey identified as incipient hysteria in young middle 
class women: 'She judged for herself, as few women twice her age judge in 
general', Betteredge notes, ambivalently, in presenting Rachel; 'never asked 
your advice; never told you beforehand what she was going to  do; never came 
with secrets and confidences to anybody, from her mother downward.'5* 
Rachel's silence is structurally essential; there would be no story if the 
heroine had loquaciously blurted out what happened on the night of the theft. 
But increasingly this silence turns the conventions of moral management into 
hysterical repression on the one hand and suggests that the ascription of 
hysteria is the uncomprehending response to self-willed and indecipherable 
behaviour in a young woman on the other. 1 have never seen her so strange 
and reserved as she is now. The loss of her jewel seems almost to have 
turned her brain', remarks Lady Verrinder -  while Rachel demands, on 
discovering Ablewhite's meretricious motivations for marriage, Is  there a 
form of hysterics that bursts into words instead of tears?' -  a form of 
hysterics that ultimately bursts out in words with her confession of her 
knowledge of Blake's apparent guilt -  and which leaves her powerless.59 She 
can only be a spectator of the replay of the drama.
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'Suppose you put Miss Rachel in a servant's dress and took her 
ornaments off? ... it does stir one up to hear Miss Rachel called pretty, when 
you know all the time that it's her dress that does it and her confidence in 
herself.'60 Rosanna Spearman, the underside of Rachel, as Jennings is of 
Blake, is never compared to Rachel as Anne is to Laura; the elimination of 
the difference between them is eroded by the elimination of Rosanna, not of 
the difference. And like Jennings, Rosanna finally sinks without trace in 
order that the official story m ight be told, though her testimony is the 
precondition for its resolution. But Rosanna also cow a« c -f j  an implied 
critique of the belief in self-determination in the face of a psychic 
inheritance that refuses to be laid to rest, with the negotiation of illicit 
desire itself. For what is prim arily transgressive about Rosanna is not only a 
guilty past but also that she has a subjectivity and a sexuality that she dares 
to acknowledge: 'It's quite monstrous that she should forget herself and her 
station in that way. But she seems to have lost pride, and proper feeling, and 
everything', notes the good servant, Penelope, who keeps to her place.61 It is 
a desire that it is impossible either to confess or to suppress, and which 
reveals both the shaky foundations on which her reformed subjectivity -  her 
'proper feeling' -  is built, and the self-restraint and submission which is its 
precondition. She points out the banality of Betteredge's paternalistically 
benevolent comment that 'your past life is all sponged out. Why can't you 
forget it?' by developing the metaphor in a way that exposes its copy-book 
complacency: T h e  stain is taken off .. .  but the place shows, Mr Betteredge -  
the place shows!'62 Her confessional letter is buried with the nightshirt that 
bears Blake's stain; like Rachel she is the bearer of Blake's unconscious guilt. 
Her confession, however, reveals her own hopeless desire and class and sexual 
powerlessness, and makes it clear that moral management has compounded a
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self-consciousness that breeds self-hatred rather than esteem b y  building up 
the hope that she can possess a subjectivity that is denied by her structural 
position:
My life was not a very hard life to bear when I was a 
thief. It  was only when they taught me at the 
reformatory to feel my own degradation and try  for 
better things, that the days grew long and weary . . .  I 
don't regret, far from it, having been roused to m ake 
the effort to be a reformed woman -  but indeed, it was 
a weary life . You had come across it like a beam of 
sunshine at first -  and then you too had failed m e. I 
was mad enough to love you -  but I could not even 
attract your notice. 6^
So, in The Moonstone occult, deviant and marginal traces become 
significant in the process of becoming obliterated and I have argued that this 
implicitly overturns the patterns of narrative authority that are set up by the 
overall narrative structure of the novel. But the implications o f this in turn 
depend on where one is starting; and in concluding I want to suggest that the 
novel in a curious way becomes the victim of its own relativism. A t  an early 
stage, Betteredge and Blake speculate on how to interpret the significance of 
the Colonel's legacy: 'O h , that's your interpretation of his m o tive , is it? The 
Subjective interpretation again!' remarks Blake. There is a to ta lly  different 
explanation from yours, Betteredge, taking its use in a Subjective-Objective 
point of view. From  all I can see, one interpretation is just as likely to be 
right as the other.' O f  which Betteredge remarks: Having brought matters 
to this pleasant and com forting issue, Mr Franklin appeared to  think that he 
had completed all that was required of him .. .  He lay down flat on his back in 
the sand.'6<* The novel suggests and undermines competing psychological and 
interpretative hypotheses, which are framed by different narrative  voices, 
and placed in a narrative hierarchy the order of which is never made clear.
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But they all revolve around Franklin Blake -  the slippery implied general 
editor and specific narrator.
There are at least six different kinds of cognitive frameworks operating 
in the novel, although they are not on a par with each other, either in terms 
of credibility or in terms of space. There is Betteredge, voice of English 
common sense, who tells Blake 'you'll get over the weakness of believing in 
facts'; and Bruff 'immersed in Law, impenetrable to  Medicine', who gives a 
more official and authoritative version of the same; C u ff, working by logical 
inference, based on the speculative interpretation of empirical evidence; 
Blake, a palimpsest of clashing methodologies; Murthwaite, Jennings and 
finally the Indians.65 These overlap with the more specific function of the 
actual narrators in the novel, wh$ like the narrators of Th e  Woman in White, 
are told to keep within the perimeters of their own experience but who 
highlight the shifting and provisional nature of evidence, becoming more self- 
conscious as they take up each other's narratives, dispute with others' views, 
and so on. These in turn overlap with the method of structuring time, which 
to some extent seems to echo the implied inversion of narrative authority in 
that, inevitably, the narratives which have the greatest immediate impact on 
the story, and which are in some sense the closest to it , can only do so by 
disrupting the pattern of progressive retrospection -  the linked testimonies. 
Jennings's journal is one example of this, the others are also submerged, 
partial texts -  Candy's lost recollections and Rosanna's letter, are both on a 
tim e-fuse, since their function in creating suspense depends on their action 
being delayed. Thus the very means that Collins uses to produce 
indeterminacy in a retrospective narrative reinforces the sense of the 
relative inaccessibility of the past.
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But these countervailing tendencies, crucial to the generation of 
tension and the involvement of the reader in the narrative itself, can also be 
read another way, as mutually collusive. In collapsing wildness and 
domesticity into each other, the disruption itself finally becomes 
domesticated. Betteredge is a crucial figure here. Old retainer and bearer 
of the family's unofficial memory, he is the safely cross-category figure who 
moves between the upper and nether worlds of the family, and who achieves a 
reconciliation between the contradictions of his role as unreliable witness. 
Betteredge stands as the model introducing the reader to the provisional way 
that proof w ill operate in the novel, providing the necessary digressions and 
delays that impede the sense of the continuous line of the story, yet also is 
the story, suggesting that all m em ory and all associations are significant. 
Betteredge engages in continual discussions of how to get started, how to tell 
the story, what constitutes relevance, what constitutes progress: 'Still, this 
doesn't look much like starting the story of the Diamond -  does it? I seem to 
be wandering off in search of the Lord knows what, the Lord knows where.' 1 
am asked to tell the story of the Diamond, and instead of that, I have been 
telling the story of my own self.'66 He continually reveals his own prejudices 
and assumptions, and uses that parable of self-help and colonial survival, 
Robinson Crusoe, as a Bible on which he imposes his own exegesis, and which 
at one point becomes a text that explains the uncanny itself in Betteredge's 
interpretation: 'Fear of Danger is ten thousand times more terrifying than 
Danger itself when apparent to the Eyes.'67 Betteredge thus works as a kind 
of friendly unconscious in The Moonstone, an unconscious constructed after 
the event, which takes the form of a ravelled skein of homely associations 
and sympathies, and which simultaneously conveys and defuses the anxiety 
surrounding the Moonstone.
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Betteredge is turned inside out by the story, but Franklin Blake's role in
the narrative as the unconscious bearer of the mystery also means that he
becomes the absentee landlord of a property and an identity, and the central
yet absent figure around whom the narrative inversions of the novel turn. His
apparently effortless power and magnetic attraction is reasserted, and his
marriage to Rachel finally assured, as he moves along 'the slow and toilsome
journey from the darkness to the light' by searching the recesses of others'
memories which replace his own.6* He even has to ask Betteredge about his
own possible childhood somnambulism: 1 knew I could trust his memory, in a
matter of this kind.'69 But this blankness also suggests that Blake can remain
healthy and the centre of privilege because he is dissociated from any past,
or fixed identity. He is caught up in the family's morbid legacy, but he is no
•hypochondriacal bachelor', subjectively embroiled in the mesh of a family
history. He appropriates others' memory, but this does not invoke any
fundamental social and psychological transformation -  the most intense
moment of 'superstitious terror' that he mediates directly as a narrator is
when he feels Rosanna's submerged chain beneath the Shivering Sands. Yet
while this blankness means that it is the marginal Jennings who mediates the
psychological contradictions of the novel, Blake nonetheless becomes
Jennings's healthy counterpart through being the point where the cognitive
boundaries of the novel break down, as he evades any fixed national identity
or discursive framework. He is, really, as Betteredge humourously describes,
a palimpsest -  but a palimpsest built up not of layers of past memories and
impressions, but of national identities, all,and none of whict^stick:
A t  the age when we are a ll of us most apt to take our 
colouring, in the form of a reflection from the 
colouring of other people, he had been sent abroad, 
and had been passed on from one nation to another, 
before there was time for any one colouring more than 
another to settle on him firm ly. As a consequence of
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this he had come back with so many different sides to 
his character, all more or less jarring with each other, 
that he seemed to pass his life in a state of continual 
contradiction with himself ... He had his French side, 
and his German side, and his Italian side -  the original 
English foundation showing through, every now and 
then, as much to say, Tiere I am, sorely transmogrified 
as you can see, but there's something of me at the 
bottom of him still.'^O
He thus becomes the analogue of The Moonstone as well as the Moonstone. 
He is the figure whose juxtaposed, fragmented elements become entangled 
methodologies, and who, in becoming embroiled in tracking the clues of the 
story becomes satirically enmeshed in a labyrinth of speculation rather than a 
maze of disturbing hallucinations, a labyrinth that still leads back to his 
absent seifs
To  speak seriously, it is perhaps possible that my 
German training was in some degree responsible for 
the labyrinth of useless speculations in which I now 
involved myself. For the greater part of the night, I 
sat smoking, and building up theories, one more 
profoundly improbable than the other. When I did get 
to sleep, my waking fancies pursued me in dreams. I 
rose the next morning, with Objective-Subjective and 
Subjective-Objective inextricably entangled together 
in my mind; and I began the day which was to witness 
my real effort at practical action of some kind, by 
doubting whether I had any sort of right (on purely 
philosophical grounds) to consider any sort of thing 
(the Diamond included) as existing at a l l / 1
The Moonstone is a novel which simultaneously conceals and reveals its 
own traces. Like Rosanna Spearman, it leaves half obliterated footprints, 
exposed by its own attempts at self-erasure, and like all playful, self- 
referential narratives, its significance can be bent to the preferences of its 
readers. But this ambiguity is not free floating, and here I have traced the 
way it is created by juxtapositioning contemporary theories of the 
unconscious in ways that suggest contrasting models of memory, identity and 
self-control and where the wild and the domestic finally turn out to be 
mutually collusive. The novel thus cannot be completely assimilated to any
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one theory of the unconscious, and can simultaneously suggest both Carpenter 
and Elliotson's models. But if  there is one conception of 'unconscious 
cerebration' that corresponds most closely to the workings of the text itself, 
it is E.S. Dallas's notion of 'the play of thought' that he puts forward in The 
Gay Science.
I have suggested that Dallas argued that the workings of the liidden 
soul' in unconscious, 'automatic' thought was inherently paradoxical; that the 
power of the unconscious lay in the very secrecy which characterised its 
operations rather than in the content of the 'lost parcels' that it might 
contain. He argued, too, that this process of transformation, generated by 
'trains of thought' that are 'continually passing to and fro, from the light into 
the dark, and back from the dark into the light', is most evident to the 
conscious mind 'when memory halts a little . Then we are aware that we are 
seeking for something which we know not, and there arises a strange 
contradiction of a faculty knowing what it searches for, and yet making the 
search because it does not know'.72 The elusiveness of the Moonstone works 
as a direct analogue to the workings of the bidden soul' in this respect. Its 
power, which can be mystical or 'devilish', is derived from absorbing the 
meanings of those who are seeking it -  meanings which are reflected back, 
changed and grown, as if it were a new thought, and we know not whence it 
comes'.73 And the narrative structure of Th e  Moonstone itself also draws on 
the kinds of pleasure involved in the 'play of thought' that Dallas argued 
linked unconscious thought and the 'secrecy' of art. It is a pleasure derived 
from tracing clues and deciphering meanings, yet it is finally ambivalent as 
well as elusive; and it corresponds to the workings of the unconscious by 
seeming not cosy and reassuring, since, 'these art-effects which we feel to be
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C H A P T E R  SEVEN 
RESISTLESS IN F L U E N C E S :
D E G E N E R A T IO N  A N D  ITS  N E G A T IO N  IN  TH E  L A T E R  F IC TIO N
The resistless influences w hich are one day to reign 
supreme over our hearts and to shape the sad short 
course of our lives, are sometimes of mysteriously 
remote origin, and find their devious ways to us 
through the hearts and lives o f strangers.
The Fallen Leaves1
So do we shape our own destinies, blindfold. So do we 
hold our poor little tenure of happiness at the 
capricious mercy of Chance. It is surely a blessed 
delusion which persuades us that we are the highest 
products of the great scheme of creation, and sets us 
doubting whether other planets are inhabited, because 
other planets are not surrounded by an atmosphere 
which we can breathe!
Man and Wife2
A  central figure in Jezebel's Daughter is a lunatic, Jack Straw. Like the 
'meagre man' in Th e  Lazy Tour of Tw o  Idle  Apprentices he is undersized, and 
at once childlike and prematurely aged. L ike  the 'meagre man' he is obsessed 
by matting and plaiting, and spends a large proportion of his time weaving 
straw hats and baskets. But the emphasis has shifted, and with it the 
fictional and discursive role of madness. Jezebel's Daughter, a 
reconstruction of events in 1828 narrated in 1878, is Collins's most explicit 
discussion of m oral management: the widow of a lunacy reformer discovers a 
copy of Tuke's A  Description of the R etreat amongst her husband's books, 
rescues Jack Straw from an old-fashioned 'whips and chains' asylum, and 
reforms him in complete accordance w ith  non-restraint ideals. Yet while this 
directly echoes Dickens's earlier philanthropic humanitarianism, the more 
radical connotations of the 'meagre man' passage have drained away. The 
plaited straw no longer offers a conceptual metaphor that merges with the
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interwoven clues of the narrative of how he came to be there, or of how we 
might interpret it} it has become externalised into a handicraft, a suitably 
feminine piece of occupational therapy.
'Once', Jack Straw remarks, 'there was a tim e when my hands were the 
maddest things about me. They used to turn against me and tear my hair and 
flesh. An angel in a dream told me how to keep them quiet. An angel said, 
"Let them work at your straw." A ll day long I plaited m y straw. I would have 
gone on all night, too, if they would only have given me a light ...'^ Even 
Jack's dreams provide their own paternalistic keeper; but the image has 
already become a historical curiosity. The non-restraint system is explicitly 
and favourably contrasted with the 'old' corrupt asylum in Jezebel's Daughter, 
but the function of Jack Straw himself is to be a kind of domesticated co urt 
jester, to provide the light relief that offsets the horror of the central 
villainy of the story -  the plots of Madame Fountaine, the 'Jezebel' of the 
title , who is a case of qualified moral insanity. In using the contrasting 
images of madness so explicitly in this way, Collins seems to be resorting to 
desperate, worn out, remedies. Yet they are images which, In harking back 
to earlier models, both depend on and resist the shift in discourses on insanity 
itself in 1880. The suspense of Jezebel's Daughter hinges on the uncertainty 
over how Jack's well-intentioned actions will turn out -  whether he will cure 
the heroine of an earlier attempt to poison her, or inadvertently administer 
the fatal dose himself.
Collins's later fiction poses its own particular interpretative problems. 
To  treat a selection of his novels written during the 1870s and 1880s in  a 
single chapter and inevitably schematically, tracing developments between 
novels rather than exploring the complexity of individual narratives, seems to 
make assumptions about the second half of his career that concurs with the 
overwhelming consensus on his later work -  that it represents a process of
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steady and irreversible decline. Many discussions of Collins's work present 
this in an extremely simplistic and often a somewhat prurient way, collapsing 
biographical circumstances, literary influences, explicit ideological shifts, 
cultural context and the use of particular fictional conventions into one 
another. Both author and works tend to be discussed in a degenerative 
framework themselves: Collins's poor health, his accelerating gout and 
increasing dependence on laudanum, the withdrawal of the benign influence 
of Dickens w ith his death in 1870, and the ascendancy of the supposed 
detrimental effects of his growing friendship with Reade, can be pressed into 
service to make Collins seem like a figure in one of his own narratives, 
gradually growing weaker, his w riting becoming more and more 'feeble, faint 
and defaced by blots'.^ Collins fiction does decline -  the late work does not 
have either the narrative complexity or the cognitive sophistication of the 
1860s. But the process is much less relentless than is often assumed, and 
many of the novels deserve a fuller investigation than I have space to develop 
here. Moreover the factors that contribute to the shifts in the later writing 
need to be disentangled themselves.
To  analyse Collins's 'decline' it is necessary to ask a slightly different 
question -  why was he able to sustain his writing for so long? Th e  novels of 
the 1860s were written when a particularly productive range of constraints 
and possibilities converged. They included the beginning of the enormous 
expansion of middle-range publishing that was signalled by the sensation 
novel, a factor which combined with the limitations and opportunities offered 
by the Dickens-dominated Household Words and A ll the Year Round. This, 
together with the competing claims of Collins's publishers, George Bentley, 
and George Sm ith, who offered him £5,000 for Armadale, meant that by the 
late 1860s Collins was in a strong position to set his terms as an independent 
writer wishing to expand his audience, while avoiding the more extreme
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pressures of serial production. In 1875 he signed a contract with Andrew 
Chatto transferring the copyright of a ll his published and future works to 
Chatto and Windus, to be published originally in three-volume form , but to be 
made quickly available in two shilling and ultimately sixpenny editions. This 
was an experiment in cheap popular publishing that Richard Bentley had 
attempted unsuccessfully to initiate with Basil in 1852, but which
was only now economically and culturally feasible.9 By the mid-1870s, 
therefore, Collins was in a relatively secure position, though he still needed 
to maintain a steady output of fiction: potentially he was able to reach a 
more broadly based lower-middle-class mass audience than ever before, yet 
remained structurally constrained by the three-volume form, which dragged 
out its weary life until the early 1890s.
Thus while Collins, like Hardy, Moore and Gissing, was affected by the 
economic and ideological crisis of novel production at the end of the 
nineteenth century, he was also in a position to take advantage of the 
revolution in middle range publishing that was one off-shoot of it: the 
bringing out of cheap editions which undermined, while remaining under the 
shadow of, the three-decker .form.* However this also m eant that his 
conception of both his actual and potential audience became oddly skewed. 
Collins always felt constricted by a narrowly moralistic element in the 
critical establishment and by Mudie's evangelicalism: T h is  ignorant fanatic 
holds m y circulation in his pious hands. What remedy have we? What remedy 
have his subscribers?' he stressed angrily to Bentley in 1873 when Mudie 
refused to accept The New Magdalen unless the title were modified.7 Yet his 
continuing popularity, as witnessed by the Chatto sales, gave him  the sense of 
a radical, popular public just beyond his grasp, that was, in a real sense, not 
simply an unknown, but a mythical one.
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Late nineteenth-century literary culture was marked not so much by 
the disintegration of a previously coherent readership (the fears of that sort 
of disintegration had surrounded the rise of the sensation novel itself as a 
mass middle-class form in the 1860s and before that the Minerva press had 
appealed to a predominantly female audience in the late eighteenth century) 
as by the development of specific forms of publishing aimed at increasingly 
specific readerships.® While the sensation novel had emphasised that culture 
was a commodity, it helped to create the conditions that enabled publishing 
to expand as a commodity and in a way that further consolidated the already 
established split between 'serious' and 'popular' literature. Collins became 
more explicitly radical, more openly socially committed in the second half of 
his career, and also, like E.S. Dallas, came increasingly to pin his cultural 
hopes on a mass popular audience rather than a bohemian avant-garde or
liberal coterie, as his critique of social institutions became more open and 
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outspoken. But it was a public that remained elusive. For example, he had 
originally intended that his most explicitly political novel, The Fallen Leaves, 
should be in two series, the second series following the hero and heroine's 
adventures in Am erica. The second series was indefinitely postponed, 
ostensibly because of the negative critical reaction to the first, and Collins 
justified this in the Letter of Dedication to the following novel, Jezebel's 
Daughter: T h e  first part of that story has, through circumstances connected 
with the various forms of publication adopted thus far, addressed itself to a 
comparatively lim ited class of readers in England. When the book is finally 
reprinted in its cheapest form -  then, and then only, it will appeal to the 
great audience of the English people. I am waiting for that time, to complete 
my design by w riting the second part of The Fallen Leaves.'10 But the time 
never arrived.
So there are connections between the permutations of Collins's cultural 
and economic circumstances, his political position, his discursive context and 
his adaptation of particular fictional conventions, but they are indirect and 
entangled ones. The later work, for example, continually shifts between 
genres though on the whole the novels are clearly recognisable within definite 
categories, as purpose novels, high melodrama, domestic realism. They adapt 
a shared stock of conventions from the earlier sensation fiction, yet it is 
impossible to draw precise generic boundaries around them. In much of the 
later work too Collins clearly encounters a problem that had not emerged as 
a problem before -  of how to revitalise the pleasurable potential of 'sensation' 
conventions by making them 'work harder' and at the same tim e to intensify 
the fictional and psychological codes they draw on, by giving them a more 
clearly tendentious purpose. Collins's late novels have a strangely disturbing, 
dissonant, bizarre quality. Yet though they often employ similar devices of 
the earlier stories, the effect, on the whole (The  Law and the Lady is an 
important exception here), is not so much to  blur cognitive boundaries as to 
return to them in an unexpected way, developing an alternative method of 
producing a critical distance by turning particular assumptions against 
themselves. Many of the later novels seem to  be concerned not with creating 
a range of possible meanings, but with narrowing meanings down, although 
this still often involves parody and play. In the 1870s and 1880s Collins 
develops particular conventions to overturn the assumptions of what had 
become a dominant discursive model -  the narrative of degeneration. In the 
1860s he could draw on a range of psychological and experimental scientific 
methods, speculatively and hypothetically. Now science itself comes 
increasingly to be used as a monolithic form of power and manipulation -  an 
externalised source of melodrama and horror.
Here Collins's dissension from dominant contemporary psychological, 
biological and social theory becomes in a curious way an appropriation of, and 
adaptation to, it. In the first chapter I argued that conceptions of 
degeneration were not a new feature of social and psychological theory of the 
1870s. The general notion of the inheritance and transmission of morbid 
symptoms and propensities within families was a well-established one 
throughout nineteenth-century psychological theory, and the more concrete 
notion of madness accumulating within families through the inexorable stages 
of eccentricity, insanity, idiocy and extinction, which was to be developed in 
the late 1870s and 1880s by Maudsley, was a direct appropriation of Morel's 
writings from the 1850s. But by the mid-1870s, the emphasis had changed: 
'degeneration' was no longer one explanatory model interwoven with others, it 
became the dominant paradigm, in a way that also involved a shift in the 
cognitive status of the paradigm itself, and in the nature of the relationship 
between biological, psychological and social theory that it  posed. Thus 
degenerative explanations of insanity and pathology directly contributed to 
post-Darwinian biological theory, and were themselves reinforced by it. This 
took place in an ideological context that increasingly drew on biological and 
organicist ideas less as conceptual metaphor or analogue, more as a direct 
model wherein the social became collapsed into the biological. The 'tyranny 
of organisation' implied not only that the physiological explained and defined 
individual psychology, but also that this could only make sense in a 
framework which placed the individual, on the one hand, in a long-term 
history of degenerative genealogy, on the other, in a context of a theory that 
conceptualised all social, racial and sexual division as manifestations of the 
biological determinism that it relied on to legitimise them.
The concept of degeneration as an implied concomitant of the process 
of inheritance and transmission is a strand that runs throughout Collins's
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fictio n, and is set against moral management in a variety of ways, which take 
on different connotations as their narrative context and their social focus 
shift. The novels of the 1850s and 1860s that I have analysed all depended for 
their sensations on tensions generated within the family -  echoed or 
articulated by the excluded or marginal figures outside it . The upper middle 
class fam ily, le ft to itself, needed to be roused from atrophy in order to 
renew itself, but moral management was also a source of manipulation, its 
presuppositions overturned by the tenacity of a psychic legacy. Collins uses 
sim ilar narrative motifs in the 1870s and 1880s but the elements within the 
stories as well as their context has changed. The later novels often attempt 
to locate the tensions in a wider structural network than the immediate one 
of the  fam ily, to  trace the determinants, the 'resistless influences', that 
shape identity. They seek remote origins in a social fabric constructed by 
economic divisions as well as a meretricious m orality. The meliorist beliefs 
of m oral management are set within this wider implied analytical framework, 
and emerge most explicitly in Th e  New Magdalen and The Fallen Leaves 
through the rhetoric of Christian Socialism. It is a rhetoric that clashes and 
combines with organic metaphors in exploring structural processes, expressed 
through physiological signs, and stresses that destinies are shaped, 'blindfold' 
by chance as much as a predetermined origin. But now, the devices through 
which the novels explore the position of powerless groups within this 
structure transform the way that physiological and psychological codes can 
be transformed themselves by being put to work as fictional conventions. It 
also transforms the meanings of the sensation conventions themselves.
Man and Wife and Th e  New Magdalen
Man and W ife  (1870) and The New Magdalen (1873), for example, take 
up certa in  of the central concerns and conventions of Th e  Woman in White 
and N o  Name to focus on the way that feminine identity is constituted
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through marriage as a property relationship, and Collins pushes the 
conventions of No Name further to explore the structural position of more 
obvious outcasts: the fallen woman, the servant and the penitent prostitute -  
the latter the subject of such ambivalent fascination. But because Collins 
deals with these questions of class and sexuality so openly here, he is forced 
into covering his tracks as he goes along. He implies that the anomalousness 
of the powerless is completely the  product of the codes of a dominant social 
structure whose morbidity lies in its very power, but he ends up by 
reinforcing the split between p urity  and danger that earlier is made so 
ambiguous. Man and V ile  in particular is an extraordinary exploration of 
male violence and the position of women in marriage. It uses the familiar 
ingredients of forced marriage, masculine villainy and feminine vulnerability, 
but, in contrast with The Woman in White, turns the resource of these 
conventions to focus not on the vulnerability of the heiress, but the plight of 
the propertyless middle-class woman, the self-reliant and productive 
working-class woman able to earn her own property. In a modified return to 
the older melodramatic conventions of the seduction of the working-class girl 
by upper-class villain, the victim s are vulnerable either because of their lack 
of property or their ability to e arn  money, not because of their inheritance -  
though that vulnerability is itself passed on from mother to daughter. The 
narrative revolves around three problematic, interrelated marriages, and it 
draws explicit connections, at the beginning, between the two Anne Silvesters
-  middle-class, propertyless m other and daughter, both seduced and betrayed
-  and towards the end, between the positions of Anne Silvester the younger 
and of the mysteriously dumb cook Hester Dethridge. The latter's written 
confession, describing her oppression by, and final murder of, her drunken and 
brutal husband, is revealed as p art of the process by which Anne's wicked 
husband Geoffrey Delamayne attem pts literally to smother Anne herself.11
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Hester Dethridge's ambiguously pathological id e n tity  absorbs and 
expresses the unspoken connotations of the middle-class m arriage; but it is 
the figure of Geoffrey Delamayne who both echoes and is contrasted with her 
feckless, drunken and dead working class husband, in a way that suggests that 
it is the latter's gender which is morbid rather than his class, and this turns 
M an and Wife into a polemical attack on the 'inbred1 violence that lies at the 
heart of the dominant culture. Published in 1870, tw o  years after the 
appearance of Arnold's Culture and A n a rc h y , it takes up the increasing 
middle-class fear of the violence of a degraded urban w orking class and turns 
this round into a* a  on. the 'savagery* of English upper-middle-class
customs and ideals of masculinity in a way that extends Arnold's discussion of 
'Barbarians' while pushing it to a pathological conclusion. In doing this 
Collins detaches the physiognomic sign from its superficial m oral referent in 
a way that makes 'fitness' itself the corollary of cultural atrophy and decay; 
yet this also finally leads to a transformed but reasserted realignm ent of the 
moral and the physiological. The Preface claims m edical authority in 
exposing the rigours of the 'national eccentricity*, the 'm ania  for muscular 
cultivation', and goes on:
As to the moral results, I may be right or I m a y  be 
wrong in seeing as I do a connection between the 
recent unbridled development of physical cu ltivatio n  
in England, and the recent spread of grossness and 
brutality among certain classes of the English 
population. But, is it to be denied that the grossness 
and brutality exist? and, more, that they have assumed 
formidable proportions among us of late years? We 
have become so shamelessly familiar with violence and 
outrage that we recognise them as a necessary 
ingredient in our social system, and class our savages 
as a representative part of our population, under the 
name of 'Roughs'. Public attention has been d irected  
by hundreds of other writers to the dirty R ough in 
fustian. If the present writer had confined him self 
within these limits, he would have carried a ll his 
readers w ith him. But he is bold enough to d ire c t 
attention to  the washed Rough in broadcloth -  and  he
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must stand on his defence with readers who have not 
noticed this variety, or who, having noticed it, prefer 
to ignore it. *2
Thus the very terms that he uses to question the framework through which 
'Roughs' are seen as expressions of working class degeneration can only do so 
by reinforcing the assumptions that contribute to its  formation.
Geoffrey Delamayne is the figure who marks and reinforces the point of 
shift in the interpretations and modifications of the  notion of 'fitness' itself -  
the point where evolution slides into degeneration. His excessive physical 
strength is both cause and symptom of moral atrophy which in turn is finally 
explained physiologically. It is stressed that he is representative of 
modernity, but as a result of upper-class 'barbarism' rather than over­
refinement. And in modifying the degenerative model that produced the 
attenuated 'inbre<f nervous disorder of Noel Vanstone and Frederick Fairlie, 
Delamayne can only be presented as a 'savage' throwback to a primitive state 
that is fostered and required by modern social conditions rather than a 
product of a worn out but tenacious heritage: 'The  savage element in 
humanity ... began to show itself furtively in his eyes, to utter itself furtively 
in his voice. Was he to blame for the manner in w hich he spoke to her? Not 
he! What had there been in the training of his life  (at school or at college) to 
soften and subdue the savage element in him? About as much as there had 
been in the training of his ancestors (without the school or the college) five 
hundred years since.'*3 Moral insanity is now incubated at the heart of 
English progress, but Geoffrey nonetheless needs to be presented as a 
prim itive throwback for this to stick.
In Man and Wife, moreover, power and strength become degenerate 
through turning out not really to be power and strength after all -  Vanbrough, 
Anne Silvester Senior's husband, turns to suicide when his own relentless 
ambition and success turn to dust in his hands; Delamayne's muscularity is
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finally revealed to be a deceptive mask concealing a vital weakness. But the
manipulation of these conventions themselves is made dependent here on a
narrative rhetoric that actively projects interpretations into physiological
signs, and this paradoxically reinforces the patterns of control that fix
Delamayne as pathological, and, by contrast, Anne as unconsciously
attractive through physiognomic irregularity. Here nervous symptoms, as
with Laura Fairlie, become the sign of desirability itself; but this now
extends to actual physical defect -  in Maudsley's terms 'a want of regularity
and harmony in the features ... there are tics, grimaces, other spasmodic
movements ... of eyelids, or lips . . .V *
Worse even than this, there were positive defects in 
her face, which it  was impossible to deny. A  nervous 
contraction at one corner of her mouth, drew up the 
lips out of the symmetrically right line, when they 
moved. A  nervous uncertainty in the eye on the same 
side narrowly escaped presenting the deform ity of a 
'casf. And yet, with these indisputable drawbacks, 
here was one of those women -  the formidable few -  
who have the hearts of men and the peace of families 
at their m ercy.* "
Anne's innocent vulnerability is the outcome of her attractivenss being at 
once perverse and beyond her control. And her counterpart, Hester 
Oethridge becomes an uncanny figure by both functioning as the extended 
analogue of Anne's position, and as the literal manifestation of a psychic 
response to violence and repression.
Hester, like Anne Catherick, is a spectral manifestation of a psychic 
response who is herself 'psychic'; she sees visions but refuses to speak. While 
her written confession disrupts both narrative voice and narrative time in the 
story -  it emerges from underneath the dominant narrative as a trace of the 
past -  it also enacts a parodied return to the model of moral management 
now transformed into opposing but related forms of spectral delusion. For 
the confession is not only addressed to a vengeful God, replaying the history
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behind her murder of her husband, but also recounts the punishment itself: 'I 
was commanded in a vision to open the Bible, and vow on it to set my guilty 
self apart from my innocent fellow-creatures from  that day forward: to live 
among them a separate and silent life so that her hysterical dumbness 
turns out to be restraint imposed by the controlling gaze of a punitive 
D e ity .16 And this vision of a controlling God turns into another kind of 
revelation; this time a vision of her guilty self, unambiguously presented as 
her pathological other:
The Thing stole out, dark and shadowy in the pleasant 
sunlight. A t first I saw only the dim figure of a 
woman. A fter a little, it began to get plainer, 
brightening from within outwards -  brightening, 
brightening, brightening, till it set before me the 
vision of M Y OW N SELF -  repeated as if I was 
standing before a glass: the double of myself looking 
at me with my own eyes ... It  pointed to the boy, with 
my own hand. And it said to me, in m y own voice: kill 
h im .17
Thus Hester Dethridge functions as an uncanny, ghostly figure within the 
overall naturalistic narrative by remaining embedded within its implied terms 
of reference as pathological -  though it is a pathology that has become more 
self-conscious. And while Anne Catherick and Laura directly echoed each 
other through their shared ghostly whiteness, Hester's absence, her silence 
and 'deathliness', finally breaks out into mania as she attacks Delamayne -but 
it is a violence that has to take the form of doubling within the self, if Anne 
Silvester is to remain sympathetically vulnerable.
In The New Magdalen these patterns of guilty and innocent identities 
are more complex, but they still finally reinforce the fixed purity of the 
victim. While Man and Wife took up the unspoken questions of The Woman in 
White in the interrelated figures of propertyless women, The New Magdalen 
reruns its familiar sensation conventions -  the substitution of identity to gain 
a new one -  to elaborate what by the 1870s was also a familiar convention -
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the figure  of the chaste 'Magdalen'. This explicitness imposes another layer 
of necessity for subterfuge, which is enacted as much by the novel's narrator 
as its heroine. The New Magdalen is about the need to evade the stigma of 
an intractable past and an intolerant m orality, but the deception and disguise 
that this involves both produces the remorse that can only be experienced by 
the penitent and reveals the true self that is expressed by the role. The novel 
contrasts respectable pathology and penitent transgression. Tw o  women 
meet b y chance in the neutral ground of a war zone. The orphaned middle 
class G ra c e  Roseberry is returning from Canada to a well-established position 
as paid companion to an aristocratic dowager; the Red Cross nurse, Mercy 
M errick, reveals herself both as an angel of mercy, and as at the mercy of 
her past. Her account of her past and present position is not so much a 
reform ed confession as a philanthropist's case history. It is a study of 
ostracism told by an assimilated voice that conjures up a familiar image of 
the penitent fallen woman: 'I am accustomed to stand in the pillory of my 
past life . I sometimes ask myself if it was all my fault. I sometimes wonder 
if society had no duties towards me when I was a child selling matches in the 
street -w h en  I was a hard working girl fainting at my needle for want of food 
... What I am can never alter what I was ... Everybody is sorry for me ... 
Everybody is kind to me. The lost place is not to be regained.'18 A  literal 
bolt fro m  the blue -  a bomb -  leaves Grace for dead; Mercy takes her place as 
the companion -  but is then persecuted by her own remorse and by Grace 
herself, who returns to claim her place and name -claims initially dismissed 
as insane delusion.
A  process of double displacement is thus developed throughout the 
novel. It  is only through imposture that Mercy can find her right place, while 
the respectability that has been stolen from Grace turns out to be an empty 
shell; it  is only through another emigration with the radical preacher Julian
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Gray that the heroine can fin a lly  be assimilated. Echoing Th e  Woman in 
White and No Name, the social self is seen to be the product of others' 
interpretations and projections -  the disintegration of this becomes madness. 
A t first Grace's response to the  stealing of her identity seems to enact 
Laura's plight -  she is shown M ercy's  clothes to prove that that is who she is; 
she is stripped of all the reference-points that link her to the past. With 
M ercy, as with Magdalen Vanstone, the greatest form of imposture is duping 
respectability, and both heroines break down under the strain of dissembling, 
even as Mercy comments, 'Rem orse is the luxury of an honest woman'.19 But 
it is a remorse that has been internalised, nonetheless. Collins often 
protested in his Prefaces that he drew  a distinction between 'true' and 'false* 
m orality, and exposed the latter as a way of reassessing the former, but this 
was qualified by narrative com plexity in the 1860s. In The New Magdalen it 
is more clearly affirmed, but this in turn depends on images of unequivocal 
guilt and innocence as well as rem orse and reform that are reinforced by the 
contrasting psychological reference points that make sense of Mercy and 
Grace.
I have suggested that Collins needed to resort to an unambiguous notion 
of purity in order to represent an actual prostitute -  here a rhetoric of 
radical philanthropy is pushed through moral management into a state of 
'grace' -  as Mercy finally acknowledges she is not really Grace. The moral 
centre of the story is the Christian Socialist priest, Julian G ray, a figure who 
clearly states his own position as he is introduced: 'Pitiless Political 
Economy shall spend a few extra shillings on the poor as certainly as I am 
that Radical, Communist and Incendiary -  Julian G ray.'20 He reinforces 
Mercy's self-analysis by presenting the plight of the ex-prostitute to the 
middle class household: 'She may lo ng to make atonement, and may not know 
how to begin. A ll her energies m ay be crushed under the despair and horror
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of herself, out of which the truest repentance grows. Is such a woman as this 
all wicked, all vile? I deny it! She may have a noble nature , she may show it 
nobly ye t.'21 And he later refers to this symbolic figure as Mercy struggles 
under the strain of dissembling: 'Be the woman whom I once spoke of -  the 
woman I still have in m y mind -  who can nobly reveal the noble nature that is 
in he r.'22 Thus he transforms Mercy into absolute v irtu e  by holding up an 
idealised image of herself for her to emulate. The disguise literally is a mask 
rather than a metaphor for identity shaped by perception; her final confession 
reveals that even her apparent former life as a prostitute  was forcibly 
imposed.
While Mercy Merrick represents a modification of the self-regulating 
perspective of moral management projected onto an idealised image that 
functions almost as an allegorical figure, her counterpart, Grace Roseberry, 
depends on the expectations generated by the conventions o f moral insanity -  
wherein self-possession becomes the sign of perversion, which is in turn 
manifested through the unambiguous display of physiognomic signs: 'The 
forehead was unusually low and broad; the eyes unusually far apart; the 
mouth and chin remarkably small.'2^ Just as Mercy's p urity  defies as it 
manifests 'Society's' exclusion of its outcasts, so Grace's 'perversion' is the 
extension of the very propriety that consolidated that exclusion. Collins 
often suggested that the very attempt to enact the social codes that are the 
sign of self-possession through propriety can easily slip o v e r the edge into 
weird behaviour -  Midwinter's collapse into hysteria in  Armadale as he 
attempts to enact a parody of good-humoured politeness is one clear 
example. But this depends on a pattern of self-sustaining contradictions 
within the self that are reversed in the figure of Grace Roseberry in The New 
Magdalen. Again her moral insanity resides in the strength of her self- 
control, though not in the skill with which she can sexually manipulate others,
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but this must again depend on the simple realignment of the physiological and 
the moral: the connotations o f Grace's low forehead and receding chin -  her 
arrested moral development -  are borne out by her subsequent behaviour.
But although the transformation and disguise of identity in The New 
Magdalen paradoxically ends up by reinforcing the very physiological 
assumptions that the earlier novels questioned, Mercy and Grace are 
nonetheless placed in the context of a set of marginal or contingent figures 
who represent different graduations of the interpretative realignment as they 
shift down the social scale. Horace Holmcroft, the false hero from an 
ancient upper-middle-class fam ily, combines the decadence of Fairlie with 
the degeneration of Delamayne, but again it is healthy conformity that 
breeds a morally deficient type signalled by the stock conventions of 
physiognomy: 'Men -  especially men skilled in observing physiognomy -  might 
have noticed in the shape of his forehead and in the line of his upper lip the 
signs indicative of a moral nature deficient in largeness and breadth -  of a 
mind easily accessible to strong prejudices, and obstinate in maintaining 
those prejudices in the face o f conviction itself.'2^ The plain-clothes 
policeman -  a hybrid voyeur who crosses the boundaries between classes, 
between public and private zones, between crime and respectability -  is 
presented more comically, as a sinister creature whose degradation is the 
product of adaptation: *He had odiously watchful eyes -  eyes that looked 
skilled at peeping through keyholes. His large ears, set forward like the ears 
of a monkey, pleaded guilty to  meanly listening behind other people's 
doors ,. . '2^ But the East End pauper child, whom Mercy wants to save herself 
by saving, has become a polluted and polluting victim , adapted to the 
conditions which have formed her in a way that suggests that Mercy's own 
story is formed by the very 'halo o f romance' that her 'sister' negates:
There was no beauty in this child; no halo of romance
brightened the commonplace horror of her story. She
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came cringing into the room, staring stupidly at the 
magnificence all around her -  the daughter of the 
London streets! the pet creation of the laws of 
political economy! the scourge and terrible product of 
a worn out system of government and of a civilizatio n  
rotten to its core! Cleaned for the first tim e in her 
life , dressed in clothes instead of rags for the first 
tim e in her life, Mercy's sister in adversity crept 
fearfully over the beautiful carpet and stopped 
wonder-struck before the marble of an inlaid table -  a 
blot of mud on the splendour of the room.
Mercy turned from Julian to meet the child. The 
woman's heart, longing in its horrible isolation for 
something it might harmlessly love, welcomed the 
rescued waif as a consolation sent from G od. She 
caught the stupefied little  creature up in her arms. 
'Kiss me', she whispered in the reckless agony of the 
moment. 'Call me sister!' The child stared vacantly. 
Sister meant nothing to her mind but an older g irl who 
was strong enough to beat her. 26
The narrative rhetoric here is forced to overturn the very structure of liberal 
philanthropic sympathy that is activated by and manifested in the figure of 
Mercy in order to emphasise the social and political laws that form the 
pauper child. And it can only do this, setting her as a figure in a political 
rhetoric, by reinforcing her alien identity through the physiological signs of 
urban degeneration.
The Law and the Lady, Jezebel's Daughter, Heart and Science 
Man and W ife and The New Magdalen each take the questions that sensation 
conventions raise about the perception of social identity beyond their earlier, 
limits, yet need to strip away much of their psychological and cognitive 
equivocation in order to elicit their readers' sympathy, but in The Law and 
the Lady (1875) Collins approaches the cognitive com plexity of The  
Moonstone, and develops his most bizarre and contradictory image of insanity 
in the figure of Misserimus Dexter. Here, and in Jezebel's Daughter (1880), 
and Heart and Science (1883), there is a return to distinct methods of 
psychological investigation, which are self-consciously used as sources of
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narrative tension in ways that turn the stories themselves into more detailed 
inquiries into the methods that are exploited. Collins's brief note to the 
reader in The Law and the Lady* 'Be pleased then to remember (f irs t) that the 
actions of human beings are not invariably governed by the laws of pure 
reason', is enacted by the narrative itself, in which the process of disclosing 
the past involves the exploration of psychic mechanisms which have to be 
hidden again if the social and sexual balance that their disclosure achieved is 
to be maintained.27
The Law and the Lady is neither as structurally or conceptually 
complex as The Moonstone, nor does it  draw explicitly on contemporary 
theories of the unconscious, but this means that it merges legal and 
psychological definitions and psychic and social identities the more 
effectively, and gives Dexter as madman a range of competing roles to play 
as agent in the narrative. The heroine, Valeria Macallen's story opens with 
her marriage, but then goes on to reveal her husband's hidden secret as she 
discovers that he had been tried for the murder of his former wife, the 
verdict pronounced 'Not Proven'. Her own resolution to re-open the case and 
vindicate her husband's innocence in order to gain full possession of him and 
consolidate her own subjective identity as his wife, makes her in some 
respects a female equivalent of Walter H artright. But the truth that is 
disclosed, the ghostly trace of the first m arriage, and the final discovery of 
the first wife's confession, embedded in Valeria's narrative, and in fragments, 
in a dust-heap, leaves the husband's guilt ambiguous: the wife's confession 
describes how she was gradually driven to suicide, not by her husband's 
violence, but by his contemptuous indifference and sexual aversion -  evidence 
that Valeria suppresses herself.
Thus 'the discovery of the truth' confirms the husband's legal innocence 
though in a manner that allows it to remain morally opaque. And although
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the reconstruction of the dead wife's diary is finally confirmed to be the real 
evacuation of the past's traces, uncovered through archaeological and 
forensic science, and photography, the disclosure of the existence of the trial 
and the courtroom drama itself, merges cognitive opacity w ith the 
unreliability of legal perceptions. Valeria first discovers that all is not well 
with her husband when she accidentally meets his mother (whom she 
recognises from a photograph) who in turn fails to show any sign of 
recognition when she tells her her name, and who then fails to acknowledge 
her son. Her husband's friend, an ageing roue, refuses to reveal his secret, 
but leaves her in a room which contains the clue to it; this means that every 
object becomes overburdened with significance, as she notes and analyses in 
detail her own sensations and associations: 'the longer I searched the farther 
I seemed to remove myself from the one object I had it in my heart to 
attain'.2*
The secret, when she does discover it, is presented as a piece of 
sensation drama in a volume of 'Celebrated Trials', which is then replayed at 
length as an embedded narrative in the story itself. And the transcript of the 
trial reinforces the device that produces the unresolved tension in the story; 
the verdict does seem 'not proven' as the evidence itself is open to 
contradictory interpretations. The post mortem proves 'beyond the 
possibility of doubt' that the wife died poisoned. But it is more d ifficult to 
interpret the significance of the husband's diary in which he acknowledges his 
dist^te for his wife; Dexter denies that it should be read as a 'true confession' 
despite the way it is paraded as such: 'A  Diary (when it extends beyond a 
true record of facts and dates) is, in general, nothing but an expression of the 
weakest side in the character of the person who keeps it . It is, in nine cases 
out of ten, the more or less contemptible outpouring of vanity and conceit 
which the writer dares not exhibit to any mortal but himself.'29 And
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equivocation in turn hinges firstly, on the controversial identity of the wife -  
presented alternatively as ugly, aggressive, pathologically jealous and 
demanding -  and as intelligent, charming, compassionate and w itty; and 
secondly, on the status of the evidence of Dexter himself.
Dexter has a range of contrasting functions in the narrative. He plays a 
crucial role In achieving its final resolution by possessing a knowledge of the 
truth that he refuses to reveal, so that it has to emerge through the 
disintegration of his consciousness, and the piecing together of the fragments 
of his memory (as Jennings does with Candy). Here the business of 
disentangling and realigning the elements of his unconscious associations 
directly prefigures the means by which the wife's confessional letter is 
recovered from the forgotten detritus of the household's past. And his 
'craziness' is a crucial means for compounding the mystification of the trial 
itself. But the excesses of Dexter go far beyond this. They take the form of 
a fantastic magnification of competing psychological codes; above all, of 
competing definitions of the perception and significance of the borderlands of 
insanity.
In the first place Dexter is presented not simply as a fantastic image, 
but as a figure who works, on different registers, in a way that is directly 
analogous to the drea ' :ess himself. He is initially introduced in the
transcript of the tria l. on the courtroom stage as exhibit as well as
witness. He literally appears as the unexpected juxtapositioning of fragments 
that can be recognised but not reconciled: 'a strange and startling creature -  
literally the half of a man' but 'to make the deform ity all the more terrible, 
the victim of it was -  as to his face and his body -  an unusually handsome and 
well-made man'. And further, although 'Never had Nature committed a more 
careless or a more cruel mistake than in the making of this man' he is 
presented as both natural and mechanical -  half man, half chair -  'My Chair is
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Me’. 30 As in a dream, Dexter's physical manifestations are metaphoric 
expressions of mental processes which are in turn dream-like. Mrs Macallen 
describes how he 'mixed up sense and nonsense in the strangest confusion' 
after a lucid opening in the trial. 'In short, he was just like himself -  a 
m ixture of the strangest and opposite qualities; at one time perfectly clear 
and reasonable, as you said just now; at another breaking out into rhapsodies 
of the most outrageous kind, like a man in a state of delirium.'3* This openly 
acknowledges that physical identity has become a deconstructed analogue of 
a mental process.
Moreover just as Dexter is presented in the language of dreams, and 
inhabits the uncanny borderlands at the edge of logical associations, so the 
overlapping narrative views of him progressively both deconstruct and 
reinforce competing perceptions and definitions of insanity. 'Miserrimus 
D e xte r -  First View' presents him in a state of high mania, complete with the 
classic symptoms of delusions of grandeur, in his sombre house in the 
indeterminate suburbs, found by driving 'through a dingy brick labyrinth' of 
streets. Here the frisson of what he signifies depends on magnifying his 
grotesqueness:
A high chair on wheels moved by, through the field of 
red light, carrying a shadowy figure with floating hair 
and arms furiously raised and lowered, working the 
machinery that raised the chair at its utmost rate of 
speed. 'I am Napoleon, at the sunrise of Austerlitz!' 
shouted the man in the chair as he swept past me, on 
his rumbling and whistling wheels, in the red glow of 
the firelight. 'I give the word; and thrones rock, and 
kings fall, and nations tremble, and men by tens of 
thousands fight and bleed and die!' The chair rushed 
out of sight and the man in it became another hero -  'I 
am Nelson!' the ringing voice cried now. '1 am leading 
the fleet at Trafalgar ...' The frightful and fantastic 
apparition, man and machinery blended in one -  the 
new Centaur, half man, half chair -  flew at me again 
by the dying light. 'I am Shakespeare!' cried the 
frantic creature now. 'I am writing "Lear”, the 
tragedy of tragedies. Ancient and modern, I am the 
poet who towers over them all.'*2
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This passage, however, qualifies, as it sets up, the terms of its own 
interpretation. Dexter is seen fleetingly, in a lurid half-light in a way that 
'works the machinery' of his dramatic performance as he works the machinery 
of his chair. He is thus giving a performance of a performance, a display of 
contrasting personas, presented as a 'fantastic and frightful apparition' and 
concluding with the perform ance of a playwright.
This 'apparition' is extended and modified in the 'Second View' where 
again 'the whole man appeared to have undergone a complete transformation', 
but this time a transformation across an earlier boundary between madness 
and eccentricity: 'I saw plainly now the bright intelligent face, and the large 
clear blue eyes .. .  the deform ity which degraded and destroyed the manly 
beauty of his head and breast was hidden by an Oriental robe of many colours 
.. .  He wore lace ruffles at the ends of his sleeves, in the fashion of the last 
century.'3* Here he analyses his own behaviour, in a way that turns it into 
the excess of hypochondriacal nervous sensibility: 'I have an immense 
imagination; it runs rio t at times. It makes an actor of me. I play the parts
of all the heroes that ever lived .. .  I merge myself in their individualities 
34
...' Thus romanticism is pushed beyond its own limits -  beyond any 
conception either of originality of self or truth to nature. 'Persons who look 
for mere Nature in works of A rt are persons to whom Mr Dexter does not 
address himself with the brush', he writes of his grotesque paintings; 'Nature 
puts him out.'35 And while Dexter is unmistakably morbid, Valeria's response 
to him is inconclusive. She acknowledges in the 'Second View' 'It may well 
have been due to want of perception on my part -  but I could see nothing mad 
in him, nothing in any w ay repelling, as he now looked at h im .'36 And this 
leads into a more detailed analysis of the way he expresses latent or 
suppressed impulses. She tells Mrs Macallen:
I never felt more surprised, more confounded in my
life. But now that I have recovered from my
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amazement, and can think it over quietly, I must 
continue to doubt whether this strange man is really 
mad, in the true meaning of the word. It seems to me 
that he openly expresses -  I admit in  a very reckless 
and boisterous way -  thoughts and feelings which most 
of us are ashamed of as weaknesses, and keep to 
ourselves accordingly. I confess I have often fancied 
myself transformed into another person, and have felt' 
a certain pleasure in seeing m yself in my new 
character. One of our first achievements as children 
... is to get out of our own characters, and to try  the 
characters of other personages for a  change -  to be 
fairies, to be queens, to be anything, in  short, but what 
we really are. Mr Dexter lets out th e  secret, just as 
the children do -  and if that is madness he really is 
mad ... I am not learned enough to tra ce  the influence 
of that life in making him what he is. But I think I can 
see the result in an over-excited im agination.37
As with the figure of Hester Dethridge, Collins here self-consciously includes 
the psychological explanation of uncanny figures as part of the process of 
representing them.
Miserrimus Dexter's ability to play with identity and undermine the 
concept of stable character thus mirrors and extends the ambiguous nature of 
reality, the danger in trusting the evidence of th e  senses, and the instability 
of self explored in the first part of the novel. Valeria herself needs to be 
disguised as a 'pretty girl' in order to be able to search for the clue leading to 
the disclosure of her husband's past: 'From the moment when I had resigned 
myself to the hands of the chambermaid, I seemed in some strange way to 
have lost my ordinary identity -  to have stepped out of my own character'.^® 
But the resolution of the mystery depends not only on evacuating Dexter's 
unconscious but reducing him to one meaning as a specimen framed within 
contemporary medical discourse; here the language of moral management 
merges into that of degeneration, in a way that involves the interpretation of 
the borderlands of eccentricity, insanity and idio cy. Valeria's modified view 
of Dexter claims a kind of kinship and common sympathy with him which, in 
stressing his childlikeness, is compatible with the perspective of moral
263
management, even as i t  goes beyond it. This is realigned by the initial report 
by the doctor on his m ental condition, which presents his very self-control as 
another mode of perform ance. 'He may say and do all sorts of odd things; but 
he has his mind under the control of his w ill, and you can trust his self­
esteem to exhibit him  in  the character of a substantially intelligent witness', 
an analysis which is im m ediately modified in a way that links the breakdown 
of the conditions of self-control with disintegration into total insanity:
That he w ill end in madness (if he lives), I entertain 
little or no doubt. The question of when the madness 
will show itself, depends entirely on the state of his 
health. H is  nervous system is highly sensitive; and 
there are signs that his way of life has already 
damaged it . If he conquers the bad habits to which I 
have alluded in an earlier part of my report, and if he 
passes m any hours of every day quietly and in the open 
air, he m ay last as a sane man for years to come. If 
he persists in his present way of life -  or, in other 
words, if  further mischief occurs to that sensitive 
nervous system -  his lapse into insanity must 
inevitably take place when the mischief has reached 
its culm inating point. Without warning to himself or 
to others, the whole mental structure will give way; 
and at a moment's notice, while he is acting as quietly, 
or speaking intelligently as at his best time, the man 
may drop ( if  I may use the expression) into madness of 
idiocy .. .  T h e  balance once lost, will be lost for life .39
The doctor's re po rt hovers, as the figure of Dexter does, on the 
boundary between self-control and degeneration, finally collapsing into the 
latter, which is seen as a latent feature of the former, intertwining physical 
organisation and m ental reponsibility. As with both Henry Maudsley and 
Andrew Wynter's analyses of mental degeneration, Dexter's latent insanity is 
an inevitable destiny, a Nemesis which he might struggle against by virtuous 
living, but not one th a t he can evade. Moreoever, Dexter simultaneously 
corresponds with and parodies Maudsley's description of eccentric individuals 
who 'exhibit peculiarities of thought, feeling and character which render 
them unlike ordinary beings', and in whom 'a vein of madness in the
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constitution sometimes displays itself .. . in a morbid vein of poetical delusion 
...'.**° His lifestyle takes Wynter's argum ent that 'it  is the sustained 
departure from the normal condition of life  which should suggest a grave 
suspicion of impending insanity*, to an absurd extreme.**1 But this becomes 
another view, another assumed persona, for D exter's disintegration telescopes 
the degenerative process that both Maudsley and Wynter, for example, 
considered to stretch over generations. His figure, moreover, collapses the 
shift from late eighteenth-century nervous sensibility into late nineteenth- 
century degenerate eccentricity, but in an overtly improbable way. He 
finally comes to resemble his idiot cousin A r ie l, who is presented as an 
evolutionary freak, a throwback -  1 could now  see the girl's round, fleshy, 
inexpressive face, her rayless and colourless eyes, her coarse nose and heavy 
chin. A  creature half alive; an imperfectly-developed animal in shapeless 
form', Valeria notes.**2 {D e x te r] showed an anim al interest in his meals, and a 
greedy animal enjoyment in eating and drinking as much as he could get -  and 
that was all.'**3 So in resolving the narrative and ideological contradictions 
that Dexter poses in this way, the figure can be read as playing with and 
qualifying degenerative discourse as much as fin a lly  laying stress on it.
Collins's use of specific notions of degeneration in these novels 
highlights some of the interpretative problems posed by analysing how 
psychological codes take on different meanings in shifting contexts. The 
different combinations of emphasis in the interrelated social, physiological 
and psychological influences suggested in the figures of Delamayne in Man 
and Wife, the East End child in The New Magdalen and in Dexter himself, for 
example, suggests that 'degeneration' itse lf can take on different 
connotations; it can be used to satirise the conception of 'fitness' to qualify 
the complacencies of philanthropy -  no m atter how radical, and to parody its 
own presuppositions. It is twisted further w ith  Jack Straw in Jezebel's
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Daughter, a figure who seems to be compounded out of the opposite elements 
from those that made up Miserrimus Dexter, and who serves a com pletely 
different narrative function in a novel that represents a m odified 
reconsideration of the moral polarities of high melodrama, rather than the 
interpretative subtleties of the detective story. 'You will .. . find tw o 
interesting studies of humanity in these pages', Collins claimed in the L e tte r  
of Dedication.
In the character called 'Jack Straw' you have the 
exhibition of an enfeebled intellect, tenderly shown 
under its lightest and happiest aspects, and used as a 
means of relief in some of the darkest scenes of terror 
and suspense in the story. Again, in 'Madame 
Fountaine', I have endeavoured to work out the 
interesting moral problem, which takes for its ground 
work the strongest of all instincts in a woman, the 
instinct of maternal love, and traces to its  solution the 
restraining and purifying influence of this one virtue 
over an otherwise cruel, false, and degraded n a tu re .^
In hingeing the 'terror and suspense' around an act of conscious v illa iny , 
Collins again consolidates the split between moral insanity and responsibility, 
medical and moral definitions while pressing them into service in a narrative 
process that draws on and reinterprets early nineteenth-century perceptions.
Jezebel's Daughter is a reconstruction, by a detached narrator, of 
events in 1828 written in 1878; it is further distanced by being set in 
Germany, although the madhouse, Bethlehem, has very specifically 'English' 
connotations. The story contrasts the effects of the intellectual legacies of 
two men on their widows. Wagner was a successful merchant involved as a 
philanthropist in the lunacy reform movement -  his widow carries on his w o rk  
by rescuing Jack Straw from the madhouse. Fountaine was an experimental 
chemist who had been working on an antidote to poisons -  his work is tw isted 
by the villainess, who uses all the machinery of experimental medicine as a 
means of consolidating her power. Jack is a crucial figure in the narrative 
because he turns out to have been an earlier accidental victim of Fountaine's
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experiments, and this gives him the knowledge necessary to reverse the 
effects of Madame Fountaine's attempts to poison Mrs Wagner. He is thus 
primarily an agent of narrative resolution, although the crucial focus of 
suspense hinges on whether he has correctly understood the medical 
instructions.
It also means that he has to be absolutely and unequivocally innocent 
(just as Mercy Merrick has to be), and this partially explains why he is, like 
Anne Catherick, so firm ly and explicitly set within the discursive framework 
of moral management. It is, moreover, the moral management of Tuke, 
rather than Conolly; moral treatment here again involves removal to a home, 
a curative asylum where Jack takes up permanent residence as a cross 
between a household pet and an adoring servant. But the novel sidesteps the 
interacting resonances of 'home' and 'asylum' that provide so much of the 
tension of The W om an in  White, by splitting the home into two polarised 
places of safety and danger -  the site of moral treatment on the one hand, of 
medical manipulation on the other. The thrill of horror conveyed by the 
image of the 'old* corrupt asylum is created from the same standpoint of half 
prurient self-congratulation that produced the early descriptions of moral 
treatment and the articles in Household W ords: T h e  man put his hand into 
the big pocket of his coat, and produced a horrible whip, of many lashes. He 
exhibited this instrument of torture with every appearance of pride and 
pleasure. ''This is what keeps him in order, m y lady", said the brute 
cheerfully. "Just take it in your hand."
Jack Straw, himself, moreover, is w ritten out of A  Description of the 
Retreat but never in a way that confirms the reciprocity of its moral 
treatment. He is first presented as being prone to fits of mania, but already 
has his own internal keeper -  the 'angel' of his dreams who instructs him in 
basket-work. Just as the maniac in Tuke's account 'promised to restrain
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himself' so Jack struggles with his 'morbid propensities'.**6 Like Tuke's 
patients, he is exaggeratedly grateful for his kind treatment: *On the one 
occasion when he did lose self-control, you saw how he recovered himself 
when he was calmly and kindly reasoned with', Mrs Wagner argues.**7 Jack is 
caught in a perpetual childhood and thus becomes a magical agent; a figure 
who can be assimilated into the Wagner family as quasi-servant and child, but 
who has no family, no history, of his own: 'the memoirs of Jack remain 
unw ritten'^®  The focus on inbred or inherited traits is all on the 'moral 
insanity' side of the narrative, and the figure of Madame Fountaine. Like 
Lydia  G w ilt in Armadale, Collins attempts to set up a self-divided character
here, but is unable to do so by exposing the limitations of the resources of
To uu fw v«-
moral management as Gw ilt does. As a result ;  ^ becomes completely the 
product of a 'perverted' nature: even her 'better nature', her desire to 
protect her daughter, becomes the expression of an amoral instinctive 
expression of biological destiny. The cynical Frau Meyer's comment: 'It's as 
much part of a woman's nature to take to her child when she has got one, as
it is to take to her dinner when she is hungry. A  fond mother? What stuff! A
u 9
cat is a fond mother', is never completely overturned.
Jack Straw and Madame Fountaine become self-sustaining oppositions, 
and this is bound up with the equally decisive polarisation of medical and 
moral means of transformation. In Armadale the parodied curative asylum 
merged into medical control and became the means for melodramatic 
manipulation; in Jezebel's Daughter, the terror of the well-established 
convention of malignancy manifested through poisoning becomes more potent 
as a fantastic form of alchemy through being a perversion of 'legitimate' 
science. In the 'Story of the Present Tim e', Heart and Science, the split 
between morality and medicine is amplified and finally modified as 
physiological investigation into the brain and nervous system becomes a
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source both of horror and of reconciliation. Again, as in The Moonstone, 
Collins invokes the authority of physiological psychology, but this time it is 
the externalised phrenological authority of David Ferrier. 'A  supposed 
discovery in connection with brain disease, which occupies a place of 
importance, is not (as you may suspect) the fantastic product of the author's 
imagination', he stresses in the Preface. 'Finding his materials everywhere he 
has even continued to make use of Professor Ferrier -  writing on "The 
Localisation of Brain Disease".'50 Indeed Ferrier's The Localisation of Brain 
Disease (1878) was one of the most important developments of experimental 
physiology that was based on the earlier tenets of phrenology in the late 
nineteenth century. His findings established that the brain's different 
hemispheres produced distinct sensory-motor functions. A  report to the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science stated of Ferrier's 
observations: 'A  new, but this time a true, system of phrenology will 
probably be founded upon them: by this, however, I do not mean that it will 
be possible to tell a man's faculties from the configuration of his skull; but 
m erely this, that the various mental faculties w ill be assigned to definite 
territories of the brain.'51 But although Collins concludes 'plenty of elbow- 
room here for the spirit of discover)*', it is not the curiosity that motivates 
the narrative and cognitive complexity of Th e  Moonstone and the shift in 
emphasis is important.
The critical reception of Jezebel's Daughter had highlighted how much 
Collins's well-established reputation as 'master of plots' had undermined his 
claim to seriousness. 'Is Mr Collins in fact, as he declares himself to be in 
purpose, a moral reformer, or is he merely an ingenious story-teller?' 
reiterated The Spectator. 'Are his ends greater than his means, or are his 
means so cunningly devised as to make his ends comparatively insignificant or 
invisible? Do his puppets exist purely for the sake of the dance, or is the
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dance contrived to elucidate the mechanism of the puppets? Is a noble 
warmth at the heart, or a creepy sensation down the spine, the commoner 
consequence of reading one of Mr Collins's novels?*52 In the Preface to 
Heart and Science Collins takes up a position where he simultaneously claims 
that he is 'still refusing to get up in a pulpit and preach, or to invade the 
platform and lecture' to his 'Readers in General', yet makes his didactic 
intention clear to  his 'Readers in Particular'. Here, too, in contrast with his 
earlier balancing of plot and character in the Preface to Th e  Woman in 
White, he concedes that he has 'never succeeded in keeping an equal balance' 
between the two elements: 'In the present story you w ill find the scales 
inclining, on the whole in favour of character and humour . . .  It  has been my 
chief effort to draw the characters w ith a vigour and breadth of treatment 
derived from the nearest and truest view that I could get of one model, 
Nature.'55 This claim to naturalism takes on a new meaning here, for in a 
curious way the fictional techniques of the novel are caught up in the 
contradictions of the very belief in naturalistic empirical observation that it 
simultaneously exploits and criticises. Conversely, Collins concedes an 
incompatibility between emotional and sensational response by stressing that 
he deliberately plays down the macabre potential of the vivisection 
laboratory, as this would outrage the very sympathies to which he was 
appealing. 'From first to last you are purposely left in ignorance of the 
hideous secrets of vivisection. The outside of the laboratory is a necessary 
object in my landscape -  but I never once open the door and invite you to look 
In.-5*
Heart and Science depends on the dichotomy implied by its title even as 
it attempts to redraw its boundaries within science by invoking a moralised 
physiology. Again the plot hinges on a vulnerable heroine who breaks down 
under the strain of malicious family intrigue, but now it is experimental
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physiology rather than moral management that becomes the crucible of 
breakdown and restoration. Moreover, this is a science which is wheeled on 
as a magical solution rather than producing a sense of cognitive opacity, for 
the story also revolves around the opposition between the good and bad 
physiologist. The hero discovers the significance of Ferrier's theory of brain 
disease in order to rescue the heroine from  a vaguely-defined nervous 
prostration, while the villain resorts to the necessarily obscure horrors of 
vivisection to advance his researches on the nervous system. Thus there are 
two kinds of experimental subjects, and while vivisection itself is polemicised 
against by stressing the 'common sympathies' between humans and animals 
(the most sympathetic figure is 'Zo', a wayward child), this serves to 
reinforce a paternalism based on experimental observation that finally 
becomes its humane equivalent. There are, moreover, distinct modes of 
naturalistic scrutiny in the narrative method itself. The novel set the hero up 
as sympathetic agent by tracing his associative processes as he wanders round 
London; the villain is 'vivisected' by a narrative gaze that also penetrates his 
mental processes.
Conclusion: The Fallen Leaves and The Legacy of Cain
Collins aimed to transform the well-w orn conventions of mistaken or 
substituted identity in Man and Wife and Th e  New Magdalen, and self­
consciously turned the manipulation of the physiological experiment back into 
a qualified critique of science itself in Heart and Science. The Fallen Leaves 
(1879) and The Legacy of Cain (1889) are sharply contrasting adaptations of 
the conventions of mysterious coincidences, misplaced children, the discovery 
of origins and contrasting projections of inheritance and destiny, which now 
link the connections within the family into wider social and organic networks 
whose strands and origins are shaped by a structure in which chance is a 
crucial determining element. The Fallen Leaves is Collins's most politically
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explicit novel. Commercial capitalism, social contradictions, and the 
ideology that both exploits and attempts to explain them are critically 
scrutinised through the framework of Christian Socialism, and this in turn is 
qualified and shown to be inadequate by being placed in different contexts by 
a narrative rh e to ric  which alternatively identifies with and distances itself 
from it. The novel attempts to resist the influence of two organic models of 
social structure -  Spencer's notion of competitive individualism, with its 
naturalisation and validation of 'fitness', and clearly degenerative 
explanations o f growing class divisions produced by adaptation to the 
environment. Y e t  this resistance also modifies radical liberalism itself and 
focusses on th e  determining influence of social structure as well as the 
effects of economic contradictions. The outcasts and cast-offs, the 'fallen 
leaves' of the t it le  -'the people who have drawn blanks in the lottery of life ' 
are the victim s of an arbitrary process and the product of specific 
circum stances.^ So the novel grapples with the problem of how to develop a 
narrative perspective which resists the naturalising connotations of the 
metaphor, that the 'fallen leaves' are the necessary detritus of an organic 
process of change, while constantly attempting to relate this to the 
establishment and analysis of dominant forms of power.
Collins often  attempted to develop a method that allowed various 
means of tension, contradiction and coincidence to work quasi-legitimately in 
the story, while scrutinising the various causes that lay behind and affected 
their outcome, but they are linked most clearly to the rhetorical purpose of 
the novel in T h e  Fallen Leaves. Moreover the novel does more than question 
a new kind of natural order by incorporating the Ijcocaj^  improbability of 
sensational conventions. It attempts to combine this with more openly 
allegorical, utopian and social investigative methods and the development of 
a narrative voice  that oscillates between exploratory, explanatory and
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distancing modes. Th e  central narrative and ideological focus is the figure of 
Amelius Goldenheart -  like Hartright, obviously the perspective of 'good 
feeling'. He is an innocent who arrives fro m  the 'other world' of an American 
utopian Christian Socialist community, and is a figure whose optimism is 
modified but whose identity is never fundamentally contaminated by his 
encounter with the divided London of the drawing room and the East End. 
His focussing perception is set within the narrative of the social evolution of 
the Farnaby family. Th e  Prologue, set fifteen  years before the beginning of 
the story, describes how Farnaby, epitom e of self-made, competitive 
individualism, builds his own success on jettisoning his future wife's 
illegitimate child to a shady fate in an unknown London; fifteen years later 
the wife is still obsessed by the loss. Here the fairy tale device of the 'stolen 
child' is used to mock its own complacent expectations even as it fulfils 
them. Similarly, Mrs Farnaby both depends on the sustaining illusions of her 
dreams of reunion even as she derides them  as delusions: 'O , you needn't 
remind me that there is a rational explanation to my dream. I have read it 
all up, in the Encyclopaedia in the Library. One of the ideas of wise men is 
that we think of something, consciously or unconsciously, in the daytime, and 
then reproduce it in a dream.'^* Amelius is both the innocent agent who is 
able to  discover the child -  now a prostitute -  by traversing the zones of 
London, and the means of her reformation, but never becomes the eye 
through which contradictions can be resolved, or a figure that can be 
assimilated -  he remains almost a dream figure himself.
This means that the dominant narrative voice is distanced from the 
hero even as it identifies with him, and this in turn shapes the way that his 
Christian Socialism (outlined early on through the familiar device of 
'explanation to a stranger') functions as the qualified ideological centre of the 
book. This is a curious blend of earlier nineteenth-century co-operative
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socialism, and contemporary models. Collins himself clearly knew  something 
about American Utopian socialist communities, but in The F a lle n  Leaves the 
Tadm or community is always presented as a memory or a future possibility.5^ 
It becomes a pastoral myth that combines co-operation and the  abolition of 
private property with an idealised belief in education and self-management 
that echoes Owenism. But the political ideas that the hero puts forward in 
London -  most obviously in the 'Fatal Lecture' -  correspond w ith  many of the 
tensions that marked late nineteenth-century English Christian Socialism.
Christian Socialism was always fundamentally a middle-class attempt 
to defuse the threat of violent social revolution, rather than aiming to 
radically transform the social structure, but there was an im portant shift in 
emphasis between its founding movement in the 18<»0s and its revival 
initiated by Stuart Headlam in the late 1870s. Maurice had made it clear 
that the movement was a response to the tw in  threats of C hartism  and the 
revolutionary upheavals in France, w riting to Ludlow, in 1848: T h e  
sovereignty of the people, in any sense or form , I not only repudiate as one of 
the silliest and most blasphemous of all contradictions, but I look on it as the 
same contradiction, in its fullest expansion, of which kings have been 
guilty.'58 Headlam, in reviving the movement, redirected its concerns away 
from the fears of class conflict and focused instead more on the  structural 
divisions that might bring the threat of social disintegration. T h e  'Socialism' 
of the equation here was clearly of the Fabian kind; Headlam considered the 
Guild of St George to be the religious wing of the Fabian Society, and 
published a pamphlet with them on Christian Socialism. T h e  fear of 
organised revolution was now replaced by equally profound anxieties about 
the demoralisation leading to contagion and degeneration o f the casual
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The figure of Amelius Goldenheart enables these contrasting political
resonances -  the utopian ideals of the willed transformation of self and
society through education and progressive social reorganisation, as against
the need for planned intervention to defuse the disintegrating forces of a
degeneration escalating under capitalism -  to be telescoped together. In the
'fatal lecture' he uses the Bible as a moral reference point and as a means of
distancing his audience from their habitual assumptions, revealing the 'bare
bones' under the 'plump pasteboard* of international capitalism:
Look at our commerce. What is its social aspect, 
judged by the morality which is in this book in my 
hand? Let those organised systems of imposture 
masquerading under the disguise of banks and 
companies, answer the question ... You know how our 
poor Indian customer finds his cotton-print dress a 
sham that falls to pieces .. .  how the half-starved 
needlewoman who buys her reel of thread finds printed 
on the label a false statement of the numbers of yards 
she buys ... Do you believe in the honourable 
accumulation of wealth by men who hold such opinions 
and perpetuate such impostures as these?60
The rhetoric of contagion and corruption -  'demoralisation and disgrace' is 
deflected here from its morbid symptoms and linked to its structural causes. 
But in the next stage of the analysis, Amelius claims Scriptural authority as a 
means of resolving the conflict as well as providing the perspective from 
which to view it:
Do I unjustly ignore the capacity for peaceable 
reformation which has preserved modern England from 
revolutions, thus far? .. .  And I do personally fear (and 
older and wiser men than I agree with me), that the 
corruptions at which I have only been able to hint are 
fast extending themselves -  in England as well as in 
Europe generally -  beyond the reach of that lawful and 
bloodless reform which has served us so well in past 
years .. .  The one sure foundation on which a 
permanent, complete and worthy reformation can be 
built -  whether it prevents a convulsion or whether it 
follows a convulsion -  is only to be found within the 
covers of this book.6 *
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Amelius's speech is embedded in the narrative as his solution is 
embedded in the 'book', while always remaining alien and distanced. But the 
lecture also serves a more immediate narrative purpose. It loosens the fixed 
separateness of the different classes of London, leading to the recognition of 
Farnaby from the nether world to which he had jettisoned his daughter, Sally, 
and it projects Amelius into his random wanderings round London, and to his 
chance encounter with the 'lost child'. But it is also an extreme expression of 
the problem of social perception that is played out tacitly in the text as a 
whole; the problem of how to transform dominant perceptions rather than 
simply inverting them. Th e  Fallen Leaves in this respect takes the specific 
ideological tensions of Man and Wife and The New Magdalen into another 
dimension, and grapples with the problem of how to resist the 'resistless 
influences' of the degenerative connotations of evolutionary language, but in 
a framework which depends on interlocking social, psychological and organic, 
as well as more narrowly physiological, metaphors. In The New Magdalen 
Collins encountered the problem of how to elicit sympathy for the 
'contagious' figure of the prostitute in a way that presented her as shaped by 
social influences while remaining morally uncontaminated. Here this process 
has become more complex; the prostitutes are the ultimate 'fallen leaves' of 
society, and this both changes the meaning of the metaphor itself and the 
transgressive connotations of 'fallen'. But again this also implies that the 
contrasted 'pet creations of the laws of political economy' are also the 
creations of organic laws.
The boundaries between the different zones of London are both 
reinforced and blurred by describing the city itself as an ubiquitous virus: 
'with its monstrous extremes of wealth and poverty, and its all-permeating 
malady of life at a fever h e a t '.^  This means that the corruption of 
commercial capitalism exposed in the lecture is reproduced in and
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contaminates the nether world; the costermongers have become a parody of 
the 'organised system of imposture' of legitimate commerce, but poverty 
itself is alternately a state of grace and contamination. Amelius's response 
to 'the sight of utter misery around him, and the sense of his utter inability to 
remedy it', makes him doubt whether tiis happy brethren of the community 
and these miserable people [were] creatures of the same all-m erciful Cod 
But the prostitutes themselves are again idealised as asexual 
madonnas: 'A ll that is most unselfish, all that is most divinely compassionate 
and self-sacrificing in a woman's nature, was as beautiful and undefiled as 
ever in these women -  the outcasts of the hard highway!'6^ And this 
contradiction is even more exaggerated in the childish figure of Sally: 'She 
was little and thin; her worn and scanty clothing showed her frail youthful 
figure was still waiting for its full perfection and growth ... But for the 
words in which she had accosted him, it would have been impossible to 
associate her with the lamentable life that she led. The appearance of the 
girl was artlessly virginal and innocent; she looked as though she had passed 
through the contamination of the streets without being touched by it, without 
fearing it or feeling it or understanding it .'6^ Her apparent 'simple 
mindedness' is both sign of her innocence and proof against environmental 
contamination; her rescue involves re-education but not a fundamental 
transformation.
The hereditary link between mother and daughter, which becomes the 
clue that Amelius attempts to trace as he threads his way through the streets 
of London, is their webbed toes -  an unmistakable stigma in degenerative 
terms.66 Here the ideological connotations of those terms are overturned 
but not the language of degeneration itself; it becomes a sign of those 
'mysteriously remote origins' whose negative significance is displaced as Sally 
is able to adapt into a middle-class girl, by being presented, like Amelius, as 
a 'child of Nature'. But when the poor actually adapt to their surroundings
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they absorb all the degenerate connotations that the figure of Sally resists. 
Sally's step-father extends the fears of the demoralised vagabond that 
hovered on the periphery of No Name: 'a half-drunken ruffian; one of the 
swarming beasts of low London, dirtied from  head to foot the colour of street 
mud -  the living danger and disgrace of English civilization'.67 The Fallen 
Leaves slides between different rhetorics and employs different models of 
social and individual identities and forms of change, but it clearly works 
within and against a culture steeped in degenerative assumptions. There can 
be no final assimilation within the terms of the known world here; the 
vigorous colonial can no longer vitalise the culture, but must return to 
colonial exile in order to survive.
These degenerative assumptions have become paramount in The Legacy 
of Cain , a story of inheritance and psychic transmission which overturns the 
methods of Armadale and No Name even as it seems to be developing them. 
The Legacy of Cain is set up as a parable that both debates and extrapolates 
from contemporary theories of inheritance; exploring hypotheses tested 
through the parallel development of questionable identities, but the 
framework of the story now determines both the progress of the narrative 
and the terms within which it is read. This framework is set up in the 
Prologue, set in a prison, where three representative types -  the Doctor, the 
Minister and the Prison Governor -  debate criminal responsibility, moral 
insanity and the inheritance of morbid propensities, focussing their remarks 
on the case of a condemned murderess. The Doctor's position clearly 
corresponds to contemporary degenerative theory concerning the 
accumulation of morbid traits through transmission; he echoes Maudsley in 
stressing 'I have found vices and diseases descending more frequently to 
children than virtue and health'.6® His fatalism is countered by the moral 
management of the Minister, who agrees to adopt the murderess's child and
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to bring her up with his own daughter, keeping her identity concealed. The 
Story traces the girls' parallel development, adding the complication that the 
Minister's own daughter, too, might have inherited morbid propensities from 
her dead mother.
So the terms of the narrative are set up speculatively, yet they 
constitute a framework of which the terms can never be fundamentally 
reformulated by the Story. The narrative as a whole is a reconstruction by 
the Prison Governor, who mediates the opposing positions and who tells the 
Story from a position of knowledge which is its outcome. Thus the Story 
itself teases the reader's expectations by keeping him or her in ignorance of 
the girl's true identity, but the reader still knows more than the girls do about 
themselves. Their development is charted by the parallel presentation of 
their diaries, and their propensities emerge through these narratives, which 
gradually disclose that the Minister's daughter, Helena, has incubated and 
compounded the latent pathological propensities of her mother. The 
murderess's daughter, Eunice, on the other hand, has a fundamentally good 
nature, but contains the trace of her mother's 'evil genius', which is excited 
by extreme provocation, yet which she is finally able to control. Thus the 
Prison Governor's conclusion takes the form of an equivocal reconciliation of 
the claims of determinism and self-control. He doubts, in relation to Eunice, 
'the conclusion which sees, in the inheritance of moral qualities, a positive 
influence over moral destiny', but follows this by asserting that 'there are 
inherent emotional forces in humanity to which the inherited influences must
69submit; they are inherently influences under control'. But this once more 
means that the contrasting figure, Helena, must embody a melodramatic 
wickedness and become absolutel) guilty: I t  was weak, indeed, to compare 
the mean vices of Mrs Grace Dieu with the fundamental depravity of the
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daughter ... There are virtues which exalt us and vices which degrade us 
w h ic h  are not in our parents but in ourselves.'7®
The story thus closes with a moral management that now leaves no 
space for ambiguity of identity, and in this respect the novel is, as J .A . Noble 
pointed out, a 'protest against the fatalism that is more or less bound up with 
a ny  fu ll acceptance of the modern doctrine of heredity'. But Noble is also 
r ig h t to point out that 'our interpretation may be mistaken, and ... the 
d o ctrin e  in question is not really discredited by the story*.71 The doctrine of 
inheritance needs to be set up as a foil for the Story, providing a set of terms 
th a t produce the necessary tension over whether they will be resisted or 
fu lfille d  in order for it to work as a story at all. It  also forms a new kind of 
unconscious in the text that invokes a completely different kind of tension 
betw een determinism and indeterminacy from that which generates the 
n arrative  of Armadale.
For in The Legacy of Cain psychic legacies have narrowed down to a 
single strand of biological inheritance rather than operating as a metaphor 
w hich  gains its meanings from breaking down the boundaries between social 
and psychological transmission. So while the Prison Governor asserts that we 
are 'masters of our own destinies' the actual interest of the narrative 
focusses on unconscious influences, conveyed through the device of the girls' 
contrasting diaries, which present their impressions and secret thoughts, but 
w hich  reveal propensities of which they are unconscious. Thus Eunice, in an 
a rtific ia lly  induced state of somnambulism brought about by a 'composing 
draught', hears the 'voice' of her mother urging her to violence, and asks 
'w here  does this horrid transformation of me out of myself come from?'72. 
But th e  reader knows where It comes from, and the unconscious force of the 
tra ce  does not permeate the narrative itself, as it does in Armadale. The 
dream  does not work its own fulfilment through the sensitive subject's self-
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conscious morbid fancies; Eunice is no palimpsest but a moralised self whose 
morbid unconscious must be suppressed even as it forms a central source of 
interest for the story. Here hereditary theory becomes a doctoral narrative, 
exerting a fatal pressure that the story now affirms by resisting, and it 
provides the basis for fictio nal conventions that once again resort to the 
revelation of a true self in order to work against the grain of dominant 
assumptions.
This study has explored the different kinds of correspondence between 
Collins's stories and contemporary psychological theories. I have argued that 
his narratives often work at the limits of a range of these discourses, 
paradoxically overturning, w hile  remaining within, their boundaries; it is thus 
that they offer intricate explorations both of the self and of the social and 
psychic reality within which th a t self is formed. There are a repeated and 
developing set of motifs and concerns in Collins's fiction, but there is no 
fixed connection between fictional and psychological narratives -  together 
they make up a kaleidoscopic set of elements that shape the frameworks of 
the stories and the threads o f the narratives, replaying plots in different 
keys. Collins's novels work as naturalised fantastic texts which, with their 
stress on play and ambiguity, on unstable and double identities and on the 
provisional nature of truth, are  recognisably 'modern' ones too. But they 
work in this way through their active correspondence with their 
contemporary intellectual cu lture , which they both appropriate and comment 
on, and their psychological context provides a set of presuppositions which 
the narratives themselves can both subvert and reaffirm. They form part of 
that culture as popular narratives, and it is as pleasurable stories that they 
extrapolate from psychological theories in most interesting ways, ways that 
emphasise those theories' contradictions, that juggle with dominant and
281
marginal forms of knowledge, that explore the social shaping of subjective 
perception as well as the subjective construction of re a lity . And in working 
at the limits of their psychological context, they w o rk at the limits of that 
liberal ideology that is encapsulated most forcefully in  the concept of moral 
management itself.
In Basil the central consciousness disintegrates under the strain of being 
unable to recognise the clues of modern life, and being unable to reconcile his 
development with his family history; here moral management compounds the 
self-doubt that precipitates collapse, while Mannion's aspirations of self-help 
are dashed by the tenacity of the past. In the novels of the 1860s moral 
management becomes both a means of villainous p lo tting and the model for 
the emergence of a new heroic identity that can resolve its own incoherence 
and gain control of narrative and passive heroine. For Collins's active 
heroines though, moral management creates a different kind of contradiction 
exerting a pressure to be patient, so that in being resolute they become 
anomalous. They thus take on an identity that is both healthy and morbid in 
gaining their goals, and in achieving them, lose self-possession, break down. 
In the novels of the 1860s the legacies of the past and the traces of the 
unconscious mind continually emerge and exert a pressure on the present, 
pressures which are, in The Moonstone, appropriated and concealed through 
the interplay of different implied notions of Hjnconscious cerebration'. The 
novels of the 1870s and 1880s require a full-length study of their own; here I 
have briefly traced the way that shifts in psychological theory take on new 
meanings and exert a new kind of pressure on Collins's fictio n, a pressure that 
can lead to the affirmation of a fixed identity, but also gives rise to 
distinctive and bizarre productions. Collins's novels have their starting point 
in physiological sensation; but that sensation is developed and maintained by 
the methods through which he makes the familiar w o rld  strange, by taking
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the psychological codes and the cultural categories through which that world 
makes sense to pieces. His novels 'appal the imagination yet satisfy the 
intellect'; but it is the source of the sensation -  the mystery, the trace and 
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Introduction
Collins as a Sensation Novelist
1. ’Miss Braddon', The Nation, 9 November 1863, p.594.
2. 'Recent Novels', Th e  Spectator, 26 January 1889, p.120.
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Chapter One 1 
In the Complicated Labyrinths o f our Frame: 1 
Psychology as Social Perception in the Nineteenth C e n tu ry
Quoted in V. Skultans, Madness and Morals: Ideas on Insanity in the I 
Nineteenth Century (1975), p.172. I
2. Th e  Lazy Tour of Tw o  Idle Apprentices, Household Words, 29 October 1 
1857, p.385. Compare this with 'A Walk in a Workhouse': 'Groves of 
babies in arms; groves of mothers and other sick women in bed; groves 
of lunatics; jungles of men in stone-paved down-stairs dayrooms ... In 
all these Long Walks of aged and infirm , some old people were bed­
ridden and had been for some time ...', Household Words, 25 May 1850, 1
p.206.
3. The Lazy Tour of Tw o  Idle Apprentices, p.386. For a brief summary of 1 
Collins's and Dickens's collaborations, see Introduction, note 17. 1
9. 'A  Walk in a Workhouse', p.205.
3. The main articles on insanity in Household Words (H .W .) are: T h e  1 
Treatm ent of the Insane', 6 September 1851, pp.572-576 (p ro b. Richard 1 
O liver); 'A  Curious Dance Round a Curious Tree', 17 January 1852, 1 
pp.385-389 (Charles Dickens); Idiots Again ', 15 April 1859, pp. 197-200 1 
(Harriet Martineau); 'Grand Jury Powers', 16 May 1857, p.957-963 1 
(Henry Morley); 'The Star of Bethlehem', 15 August 1857, pp.199-150 1 
(Henry Morley); Th ings Within Dr Conolly's Remembrance', 28 1 
November 1857, pp.518-523 (Henry M orley); 'The Cure of S ick Minds', 2 1 
A pril 1859, pp.915-919 (H enry Morley).
6. T h e  Cure of Sick Minds', H .W ., 2 April 1859, p.915. The a rtic le  goes on
to paraphrase pieces from Th e  Journal o f Mental Science. 1
7. For example, The Journal of Psychological Medicine and  Mental 1 
Pathology, The Asylum Journal, The Journal o f Mental Science, were all 1 
established during the 1890s. For an analysis of the rise  of the 1 
psychiatric profession in the mid nineteenth century, see Andrew  T .  1 
Scull, Museums of Madness: The Social Organisation o f Insanity in 1 
Nineteenth-Century England, second edition (Harmondsworth, 1982), 1 
pp. 169-186 and Michael Donnelly, Managing the Mind: A  Study of 1 
Medical Psychology in Ea rly  Nineteenth-Century Britain (1983). 1
8. On Collins's use of Mejan's Recueil de Causes Celebres, see Clyde K . 1 
Hyder, 'Wilkie Collins and Th e  Woman in White', P .M .L .A ., 59 (1939), 1 
297-303. Collins described how he received a letter in the late 1850s 1 
'asking him to take up some case of real or wrongful confinement in a 1 
lunatic asylum', in The W orld, 26 December 1877, reprinted as 'Wilkie 1
Collins in Gloucester Place', in Edmund Yates, Celebrities a t  Home, 1 
third series (1879), pp. 195-56, and Hall Caine, My Story (1908), p.336. 1 
The relationship of Th e  Woman in White to the lunacy reform 1 
movement is also discussed by Barbara Fass Leavy in 'W ilkie  Collins's 1 
Cinderella: The History of Psychology and The Woman in  White', 1 
Dickens Studies Annual, 10 (1982), 91-191. Our historical perspective 1 
overlaps at times, but Leavy concentrates on the character of Anne 1 
Catherick as case study in the novel. 1
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M orality and Medicine: A  Study of the York Retreat, 1786-1982 (1986).
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11. W .A.F. Browne, What Asylums Were, A re , and Ought to  Be (Edinburgh, 
1837), p.139.
12. 'A  Curious Dance Round a Curious Tree', H .W ., 17 January 1832, p.385.
13. T h e  Star of Bethlehem', H .W ., 13 August 1837, p.196. The case of 
Norris, who was kept for years chained to his bed in a steel harness and 
became the emblem of the cruelty of the private madhouse treatment, 
is vividly described in John Conolly's Th e  Treatm ent of the Insane 
Without Mechanical Restraint (1856), and is directly quoted in this 
article. For a discussion on the significance of this case, and 
Bethlehem Hospital, see Patricia Allderidge, 'Bedlam: fact or 
fantasy?', in The Anatomy of Madness: Essays in the History of 
Psychiatry, edited by W .F. Bynum, Roy Porter and Michael Shepherd, 
volume II, 'Institutions and Society' (1985), pp. 17-39.
19. Things Within Dr Conolly's Remembrance', H .W ., 28 November 1837, 
pp.318-523.
15. 'Lunatic Asylums', Quarterly Review, 101 (A p ril 1857), 353-393 (p.353).
16. See Roy Porter, T h e  Rage of Party: A  Glorious Revolution in English 
Psychiatry?', Medical History, 73 (1983), 33-50. Porter's work is 
concerned with exploring the complexities of eighteenth-century 
treatment and perception of madness, which have tended to be obscured 
by the rather monolithic histories of insanity that have been directly or 
indirectly inspired by Foucault's Madness and C ivilization . See 
Introduction, note 93. For a critique of Foucault's method, as 
manifesting many of the problems of 1960s anti-psychiatry, see Peter 
Sedgwick, Psycho-Politics (1982).
17. George Cheyne, The English Malady (1733), p.99. Cited in Porter, p.93, 
who points out that similar characterisations of English madness 
continue throughout the eighteenth century. See also Vieda Skultans, 
English Madness: Ideas on Insanity, 1580-1890 (1973), and Michael V. 
De Porte, Nightmares and Hobbyhorses, Sw ift, Sterne and Augustan 
Ideas of Madness (California, 1979).
18. See Anne Digby, 'Moral Treatment at the Retreat, 1796-1896', in 
Anatomy o f Madness, II, pp.52-73.
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shift between early moral treatment and the mid-nineteenth-century 
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mentions that Carpenter was a friend and neighbour of Wills, the co­
editor of Household Words (p.63).
125. G .H . Lewes, Problems of L ife  and Mind, 5 volumes (1876-9). First 
Series, The Foundations of a Creed, 2 volumes, I, p.162.
126. William D. Carpenter, Principles of Mental Physiology, with their 
Application to  the Training and Discipline of the Mind, and the Study of 




130. E.S. Dallas, Th e  Gay Science, 2 volumes (1866). 'A  science of criticism  
is possible and it must of necessity be the science of the laws of 




136. II, p.136. Dallas criticises both Spencer and Carpenter for their 
reductive conception of the 'play of thought'. Although he agrees with 
Carpenter that there is no clear boundary between reason and 
imagination, he argues that they cannot be differentiated by relating 
one to 'fact' and one to 'fiction'. (I, pp. 187-8.) See also James Sully, 
Sensation and Intuition, Essays in Psychology and Aesthetics (1876).
135. Pritchard, A  Treatise on Insanity, pp.156-170.
136. George Man Burrows, Commentaries on Insanity (1829) p.61. He 
comments, 'Habitual luxury, and the vices of refinement, are peculiar 
to the rich, and consequently a greater degree of susceptibility and 
irritability is super-induced. The lower orders, who ought more 
generally to be exempt from the concomitant of wealth and indolence, 
that is, disease, unhappily provoke it by their excesses; and thus 
voluntarily gra ft onto themselves the evils which, from their condition, 
they might otherwise escape.' (p.19).
137. 'Idiots Again', H W , 15 April 1856, p.197.
138. Charles D arw in, On the O rigin  of the Species by Means of Natural 
Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for 
Life  (1859). On the development of Darwin's theories and mid­
nineteenth century organicism, see Gillian Beer, Darwin's Plots, Sally 
Shuttleworth, George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Science: The  
Make-Believe of a Beginning (Cambridge, 1986) and Ludm illa 
Jordanova, Lam arck (Oxford, 1986). See also Stephen Jay Gould, Ever 
Since Darwin (1981) and Gertrude Himellfarb, Rooms in the Darw in  
Hotel (1959).
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139. In the Preface to First Principles (1862), Spencer emphasised that his 
concept of the 'Development Hypothesis' had preceded Darwin's and was 
independent of it . For further analysis o f Spencer's evolutionary ideas, 
their relation to associationism, see Young, Mind, Brain and Adaptation, 
pp.150-190, and to Darwin, D. Freeman, 'The  Evolutionary Theories of 
Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer', C urren t Anthropology, 15 (1979), 
211-237.
190. Herbert Spencer, 'Progress, its Law and Cause', Westminster Review, 67 
(A pril 1859), 995-985; reprinted Essays: Scientific, Political n d  
Speculative (1858), p.3. Spencer discovered Von Baer's formula that 
'the development of every organism is a change from homogeneity to 
heterogeneity*, from reviewing Carpenter's Principles o f Human 
Physiology in 1851« Young, Mind, Brain and Adaptation, p.168.
191. 'Progress, its Law and Cause', p.3.
192. Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Psychology (1855), p.526.
193. This, for example, is the position put forward in Charles Bucknill and 
Daniel Hack Tuke's A  Manual of Psychological Medicine in 1858.
199. Andrew Wynter, 'Lunatic Asylums', p.392.
195. Henry Maudsley, Responsibility to M ental Disease (1879), p.23. 
Maudsley was one of the most prolific and influential developers of 
psychiatric theory of the late nineteenth century. He was Fellow of the 
Royal College of Physicians and Professor of Medical Jurisprudence at 
University College, London.
196. For a detailed analysis of the development and meaning of the term 
( degeneration-) in social and biological theory, and its im pact on late
nineteenth century novelists, see William Greenslade: T h e  Concept of 
Degeneration 1880-1910, with Particular Reference to the Work of 
Hardy, Wells and Gissing', (unpublished P hD  dissertation, University of 
Warwick, 1982).
197. E . Ray Lancaster, Degeneration (1880), p .3 3, cited in Greenslade, p.19.
198. The concept of the residuum, or the 'submerged tenth' of a criminalised 
class of ca sua l poor, and the particular fears that they gave rise to, is 
analysed most thoroughly in Gareth Sted man-Jones, Outcast London 
(Oxford, 1971).
199. Cited in A . Ackerknect, A  Short H istory of Psychiatry (New York, 
1959), p.99. See also Ian Dowbiggin 'Degeneration and Hereditarianism 
in French Mental Medicine i 890-90: Psychiatric theory as ideological 
adaptation', in The Anatomy of Madness, I , pp. 188-232.
150. Henry Maudsley, Body and Mind (1873), pp.99-95.
151. Morel, On the Physical, Intellectual and Moral Degeneracy of the 
Human Race, cited in Dowbiggin, p.192.
152. Responsibility to Mental Disease, p.3.
153. Responsibility to Mental Disease, p.29.
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130. Body and Mind, p.63.
133. Elaine Showalter's The Female Malady includes a discussion of the role  
of degenerative theory in opposing the demands of feminism. Both 
socialist and feminist debates themselves were permeated w ith  
evolutionary assumptions, as witnessed particularly by, for example, 
Olive Schreiner's Woman and Labour (1911) and Havelock Ellis's theory 
of homosexuality. See Ruth Frist and Anna Scott, O live Schreinet; and 
Jeffrey Weeks, Sex, Politics and Society (19S0).
156. Hysteria had been established as predominantly, but not exclusively 
female disorder by classical medicine; it became seen specifically as a 
nervous disorder in the context of Whytt's general theory of the 
sympathetic structures of the nervous system in Observations on the  
Nature and Causes of Those Disorders which have Commonly Been 
Called Nervous, Hypochondriac and Hysteric in 1764. By 1840 Thomas 
Laycock argued that while the nervous system was 'the seat of hysteric 
disease', there was a reciprocal action between the nerves, the 
sympathetic system and the uterus, which has 'rather a directing than 
an exciting influence on nervous affectations'. A  Treatise on the  
Nervous Disorders of Women (1840), p.144. See Veith, Hysteria, 
especially pp. 153-193.
157. 'It is reasonable to expect that any emotion that is strongly felt by 
great numbers of people, but whose natural manifestations are 
completely repressed in compliance with the usages of society, w ill be 
the ones whose morbid effects are most frequently noted.' Robert 
C arter, O n  the Pathology and Treatment of Hysteria (1853), p.21; cited 
in Veith, p.201. For an important reassessment of the simplistic 
'repressive' conception of Victorian attitudes to sexuality see Michel 
Foucault, Th e  History of Sexuality, volume one, A n Introduction 
translated by Robert Hurley (1979); Peter Gay, The Bourgeois 
Experience, Victorian to Freud, volume one, The Education of the  
Senses (O xford, 1984), and M. Jeanne Peterson, 'Dr Acton's Enem y: 
Medicine, Sex and Society in Victorian England', Victorian Studies, 29 
(Summer, 1986), 369-591.
158. F .C . Skey, Hysteria (1867), p.55.
159. Henry Maudsley, The Pathology of Mind (1879), p.466.
160. 'Sex in Mind and Education', The Fortnightly Review, 21 (A pril 1874), 
466-483. c f also Herbert Spencer: 'More or less of this constitutional 
disturbance w ill inevitably follow an exertion of the brain beyond the 
normal amount; and when not so excessive as to produce absolute 
illness, is sure to entail a slowly accumulating degeneracy of physique'. 
Education, Intellectual, Moral and Physical (1861), p.184.
161. Andrew W ynter, The Borderlands of Insanity (1875), p 1.
162. Maudsley, Responsibility in Mental Disease, p.63.
163. p.40.
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C hapter Tw o
Nervous Fancies of Hypochondriacal Bachelors: 
Basil, and the Problems of Modem Life
1. Boswell's Colum n, edited by M . Bailey (1951), pp.42-3. Cited in Roy 
Porter, 'The Hunger of Imagination: Approaching Samuel Johnson's 
Melancholy', in Th e  Anatomy o f  Madness, edited by W .F. Bynum, Roy 
Porter, and Michael Shepherd (1985), volume one, 'People and Ideas', 63- 
89 (p.66).
2. Wilkie Collins, Basil, A  Story o f Modem Life, 3 volumes (1852), 2, 
pp.265-6.
2. I, p. 30.
3. T h e  Progress of Fiction as an A r f ,  The Westminster Review, 60 
(October 1853), 343-37* (p.358).
*. p.372.
5. 'Esmond and Basil', Bentley's Miscellany, 32 (November 1852), 576-586 
(p.577 and p.586).
6. Dickens reiterated that it was his admiration for Basil that first made 
him take Collins seriously as a promising author, in a letter to Collins 
when he was w riting No Nam e: 1 cannot tell you with what a dash of 
pride as well as pleasure I read the great results of your hard work. 
Because, as you know, I was certain  from the Basil days that you were 
the Writer who would come ahead of all the Field -  being the only one 
who combined invention and power, but humourous and pathetic, with 
that invincible determination to  work, and that profound conviction 
that nothing is to be done w ithout work, of which triflers and feigners 
have no conception.' (Letter to  Collins, 20 September 1862, in The  
Letters of Charles Dickens to  Wilkie Collins, selected by Georgina 
Hogarth, edited by Lawrence H utton  (1894), p.124.)
7. Basil, Preface, I, pp.xi-xiv.
8. p.xi.
9. Review of Antonina or The F a ll of Rome, Gentleman's Magazine, 30
(A p ril 1850), 408-409 (p.408). T h e  novel, in the tradition of Scott and 
Bulw er-Lytton, was well received, not least for its historical detail. 
'But the work is not more remarkable for the characters it brings out 
than for the learning and perfect acquaintance with the times it alludes 
to; everything is truthful in it ; it  represents Rome as it was, and the 
Romans as they were, with a ll their insolence and recklessness, their 
idleness and improvidence.' (R eview  of Antonina, or Th e  Fall of Rome, 
Bentley's Miscellany, 27 (A pril 1850), 375-378 (p.378).) Collins referred 
to the historical research that he had put into Antonina in The Preface 
to Basil: 'As the reading of past realities in books gave me the 
materials for making Antonina, so the reading of present realities in 
man, must give me the m aterials for making Basil. Industry in 
collecting useful information; discretion in selecting it; and care and 
diligence in using it, were just as important in the one case, as in the 
other.' (p.ix).
306
10. The 'hypochondria' was the region of the stomach im m ediately under 
r the ribs,.thought to be the seat of melancholy; Whytt uses the term
hypochomriac’ prim arily in this sense of melancholy in analysing it as a 
specifically nervous disorder in Observations on the N a tu re , Causes and 
Cure of those Disorders which have been commonly ca lled  Nervous, 
Hypochondriac, o r Hysteric (1767), and this overlaps w ith the sense that 
the word later acquires as its primary meaning, that the nervous 
disorder itself takes the form that the patient suffers from an 
imaginary disease. See W .F. Bynum, T h e  Nervous P atient in Late 
Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth-Century Britain: T h e  Psychiatric 
Origins of British Neurology*, in The Anatom y of Madness, I, pp.89-103.
11. Basil, I, pp.25-7. The 'morbid anatomy* metaphor is erased from the 
1862 edition.
12. Compare the opening of Basil with the confessional openings of Caleb 
Williams and The Confessions of a Justified Sinner:
'My life has for some tim e been a theatre of ca lam ity. I have 
been a mark for the vigifctjpce of tyranny, and I could not escape. I 
My enemy has shown himself inaccessible to entreaties and 
untried In persecution. My fame, as well as my happiness, has 
become his v ic tim . Everyone, as far as my story has been 
known, has refused to assist me In m y distress and has execrated 
my name. I have not deserved this treatment. M y own 
conscience witnesses in behalf of that innocence, my pretentions 
to which are regarded in the world as incredible .. .  I am  incited 
to a penning of these memoirs only by a desire to d ivert m y mind 
from the deplorableness of my situation, and by a faint idea that 
posterity may by their means be induced to render me a justice 
which my contemporaries refuse. M y story will, at least, appear 
to have that consistency which is seldom attendant but upon 
truth.' (William Godwin, Caleb Williams (179«), edited b y David 
Macracken (Oxford, 1977), p.3.)
'M y life has been a life  of trouble and turmoil; of change and 
vicissitude; of anger and exultation; of sorrow and of vengeance.
My sorrows have all been for a slighted gospel, and my 
vengeance has been wreaked on its adversaries. Therefore , in 
the might of heaven w ill I sit down and write: I w ill  let the 
wicked of this world know what I have done in the fa ith  of the 
promises, and justification by grace, that they may read and 
tremble, and bless their gods of silver and gold, that the minister 
of heaven was removed from their sphere before their blood was 
mingled with their sacrifices.' (James Hogg, Th e  Private  
Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (182«), edited by 
John Carey (Oxford, 1970), p.97.)









21 . I, p.96.
22. I, pp.120-121.
23. II, p.9.
2%. I, pp. 179-80 
23. I, pp. 199-200.
26. II, pp.29-27.







39. I, p. 159.
35. I, pp. 158-59.
36. I, p. 199.
37. I, pp. 151-59.
38. John Abercrombie, Intellectual Powers and the Investigation of T ru th
(1830), p.267.
39. Basil, I, p. 160.
90. Thomas De Quincey, The Confessions of an English Opium -Eater (1821), 
1856 edition (1960), pp.89-5 (note).
91. J .A . Symonds, Sleep and Dreams (1851), p.78.
92. Basil, I, pp. 160-1.
93. Symonds, Sleep and Dreams, p.29.
99. Audrey Peterson, in a discussion of the medical and fictional 
development of the concept of brain fever during the nineteenth 
century, argues that the simultaneous vagueness and medical
308
authenticity of the term  made it an attractive device for many 
nineteenth-century novelists. The term was a colloquial development 
of the classical 'phrensy* and defined, at the end of the eighteenth 
century, as inflammation of the brain. In 1857, James Copland 
described brain fever as being characterised by: 'Acute pain In the 
head, with intolerance of light and sound; watchfulness, delirium; 
flushed countenance and redness of the conjunctiva, or a heavy diffused 
state of the eyes; quick pulse, heavy spasmodic twitchings or 
convulsions, passing into somnolency, coma, and a complete relaxation 
of the limbs.' (James Copland, A  Dictionary of Practical Medicine 
(1857), p.228; cited in Peterson, p.997.) In general an attack of brain 
fever was described as developing abruptly and as a potentially 
contagious disease, though precipated by moral causes. Audrey 
Peterson, 'Brain Fever In Nineteenth-Century Literature: Fact and 
Fiction', Victorian Studies, 19 (June 1976), 938-960.
95. Basil, II, pp. 159-62.
96. II, p. 175.
97. II, pp. 168-70.
98. II, p.175.
99. De Quincey, Confessions, pp.233-35.
50. Basil, II, pp. 176-80. De Quincey describes his architectural visions -  the 
result of looking at Piranesi's pictures: 'With the same power of endless 
growth and self-reproduction did my architecture proceed in dreams. In 
the early stages of the malady, the splendours of my dreams were 
indeeed chiefly architectural; and I beheld such pomp of cities and 
palaces as never yet was beheld by the waking eye, unless in the clouds' 
'... Now it was that upon the rocking waters of the ocean the human 
face began to reveal itself; the sea appeared paved with innumerable 
faces, upturned to the heavens .. .  '  (Confessions, p.239 and p.299).






57. Kenneth Robinson, W ilkie Collins, A  Biography (1951), p.73; K irk H. 
Beetz, Wilkie Collins: A n  Annotated Bibliography 1889-1976 (1978), 
p.2. Dickens rejected the story on the grounds that its treatment of 
hereditary insanity might cause distress 'among those numerous families 
in which there is such a taint' in 1852. T h e  Monktons of Wincot Abbey' 
eventually appeared in Fraser's Magazine during November and 
December 1855 and was reprinted in The Queen of Hearts collection as 
'Brother Griffith's Story of Mad Monkton', The Queen of Hearts, 3 
volumes (1859).
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58. Edgar Allan Poe, T h e  Fall of the House of Usher', Graham's Magazine 
(1839), in Tales of Mystery and Imagination (1845), 1971 edition, p.130.
59. p.I33.
60. p.131.
61. Wilkie Collins, 'Brother Griffith's Story of Mad Monkton', The Queen of 
Hearts, II, p.2.
62. II, pp.85-86.
63. Wilkie Collins, A  Rogue's Life, Written by Himself, Household Words, 13




Th e  Woman in White:
Resemblance and Difference -  Patience and Resolution
1. Wilkie Collins, The Woman in White, 3 volumes (1S60), edited by H.P. 
Sucksmith (Oxford, 1973), p.22.
2. p.22.
3. p.400.
4. See Introduction, and John Sutherland, Victorian Novelists and 
Publishers (1976), p p .l7 1 -S l.
5. 'Sensation Novels', Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine, 91 (May 1862), 564- 
584, p.565 and p.566. For a discussion o f Collins's development of 
fictional conventions in Th e  Woman in W hite, Walter Kendrick, T h e  
"Sensationalism" of The Woman in White', Nineteenth-Century Fiction, 
32 (June 1977), 18-35 and Mark Hennelly, 'Reading Detection in The  
Woman in White', Texas Studies In Literature and Language, 22 (Winter 
1980), 449-467.
6. The Woman in White, p.75.
7. John Conolly, An Inquiry Concerning the Indications of Insanity (1830), 
p.17.
8. 'M .D . and M A D ', A ll the Y e a r Round, 22 February 1862, pp.511 and 513. 
This article also picks up on the debate about the definition of 'moral 
insanity' and what constitutes criminal responsibility. See Chapter One.
9. In the course of his evidence to the Parliamentary Select Committee, 
Perceval argued that no one should be com m itted as insane on the 
evidence of doctors alone, but on medical opinion in combination with 
that of magistrates or clergy. Patients should have the right to appeal 
against their confinement, and should freely be able to correspond with 
friends or relatives. They should also be allowed to wear their own 
clothes, and not have their hair or beards fo rcib ly cut. Report of the 
Parliamentary Com mittee into the Care and Treatm ent of Lunatics and 
their Property (April 1859), p.17-19. See also Barbara Fass Leavy, 
'Wilkie Collins's Cinderella: The History of Psychology and The Woman 
in W hite', Dickens Studies Annual, 10 (1982), 91-141, for a discussion of 
the reference of the Select Com mittee Enquiry to the novel in relation 
to the figure of Anne Catherick.
10. John Perceval, 'Letters to the Right Honourable Sir James Graham, 
Bart., and to other Noblemen and Gentlemen, Upon the Reform of the 
Law Affecting the Treatm ent of Persons Alleged to be of Unsound 
Mind* (1846), p.35.
11. The Woman in White, p.380.
12. ' "No pauper Asylum" ', Mrs Catherick insists: ' "I won't have her put in 
a pauper Asylum. A Private Establishment, if  you please. I have my 
feelings as a mother, and m y character to preserve in the, town; and I
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w ill submit to nothing but a Private Establishment, of the sort which 
my genteel neighbours would choose for afflicted relatives of their 
own." Those were my words. It is gratifying for me to  reflect that I 
did my duty. Though never over-fond of my late daughter, I had a 
proper pride about her. No pauper stain -  thanks to m y firmness and 
resolution -  ever rested on m y child.' (p.498) This of course only 
emphasises her cynical obsession with propriety. Th e  fact that the 
asylum is in a London suburb might have given it 'madhouse' 
connotations, since Hoxton was one of the main areas specialising in 
private madhouses in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
But the asylum itself does not bear this out. See W. Parry-Jones, The  
Trade in Lunacy' (1972), p.36 and, for description of Fox's enlightened 
establishments, pp. 112-127.
13. The Woman in  White, p.386.
14. Alexander Morison, Outlines o f Lectures on Mental Diseases (1826), 
p.125. The ability of madness itself to shape the habitual expression 
and thus the meaning of the face was a basic assumption of the 
physiognomy of madness. Morison, whose Physiognomy of Mental 
Diseases (1847) was one of the most influential mid-nineteenth century 
analyses, emphasised the importance of expression over structure. See 
Sander Gilman, Seeing the Insane, pp.92-100.
13. T h e  Cure of Sick Minds', H W , 2 April 1839, pp.416-17.
16. The Woman in  White, p.15. Com pare this also with Prichard's analysis 
of female insanity: 'A female modest and circumspect becomes violent 
and abrupt in her manners, loquacious, impetuous, talks loudly and 
abusively against her relatives and friends, before perfect strangers.' A  
Treatise on Insanity (1833), p.19.
17. John Conolly, The Construction and Government of Lunatic Asylums 
and Hospitals for the Insane (1847), pp.39-60. See above, Chapter One.
18. The Woman in White, p.49. Conolly, like his contemporaries, stresses 
the importance of early education in establishing the correct 
associations, in Indications o f Insanity, pp. 190-196. Th e  article on 
idiots in Household Words also stresses that early education can modify 
inherited characteristics of the 'weak minded'. 'Idiots Again', HW , 15 
April 1854, pp. 197-200.
19. The Woman in White, p.85.
20. p.90.
21. She is, however, described as briefly flashing the signs of mania when 
Percival Clyde's name is mentioned: 'A  most extraordinary and 
startling change passed over her. Her face, at all ordinary times so 
touching to look at, in its nervous sensitiveness, weakness and 
uncertainty, became suddenly darkened by an expression of maniacally- 
intense hatred and fear, which communicated a wild, unnatural force to 
every feature. Her eyes dilated in the dim evening light like the eyes 





24. p.514. The Biblical reference is to Exodus, 34:7. Philip Fairlie is 
described as 'the spoilt darling of society, especially of the woman -  an 
easy, light-hearted, impulsive, affectionate man; generous to a fault, 
constitutionally lax in his principles, and notoriously thoughtless of his 





29. p.445. The concept of 'nervous' as meaning resolute, or 'of well strung 
nerves' refers back to the earlier eighteenth century usage of the term. 
See W.B. Bynum, T h e  Nervous Patient in Eighteenth and Nineteenth- 
C entury Britain: the psychiatric origins of British neurology1, in 
Anatom y of Madness, I, p.90.
30. T h e  Woman in White, p.l and p.178.
31. p . l .
32. p.67.
33. p.18.
34. p.24. Conolly and Abercrombie both identify the loss of a coherent 
sense of time as one of the signs of derangement. Conolly, Indications 
o f Insanity, p.177, Abercrombie, Intellectual Powers, pp.99-101.
35. T h e  Woman in White, p.53.
36. John Barlow, On Man's Power O ver Himself to Prevent and Control 
Insanity (1843), p.27.
37. T h e  Woman in White, pp.65-66.
38. p.66. cf J .C . Pritchard: 'Mental defection, or melancholy, which 
extinguishes life and gives the mind up to fear and anticipation of evils, 
lays the foundation for many kinds of varieties of monomania. The 
most numerous and the worst instances are those in which the thoughts 
are directed towards the evils of a future life.' A  Treatise  on Insanity, 
p . 30.



















57. p.222. 'He laid his plump, yellow-white fingers ... upon the formidable 
brute's head and looked him  straight in the eyes.' (p.199).
58. p.147.
59. pp. 194-95.
60. p.195. Eleanor Fairlie never does break into mania though.
61. Pritchard, A  Treatise on Insanity, p.19. See also Conolly's treatment of 
the Nottridge case in C hapter One.
62 . The Woman in White, p .1 9 5 .
63. The World, 26 December 1877, p.5. Reprinted as 'Mr Wilkie Collins in 
Gloucester Place' in Edmund Yates, Celebrities at Home, third series, 
1877, pp. 145-56.




68. cf U .C . Knoepflmacher's point that Fosco, like Frank Softly in A  
Rogue's L ife  and Captain Wragge in No Name represents an anarchic 
and rebellious counterworld to the dominant order of 'respectability' 
represented by Hartright, in 'Th e  Counterworld of Victorian Fiction and
3 1 0
The Woman in White', The Worlds of Victorian F ic tio n , edited by 
Jerome K . Buckley (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1975), pp.351-371.
69. The Woman in White, p.211.
70. p.162. I owe this point about Marian's breakdown through loss of 
control of time, to Mavis D aly, 'Genette's N arrative  Theory and 
Chinese Box Stories', unpublished BA dissertation, University of 
Bradford, 1980, p.30.















Skins to  Jum p Into:
Fem ininity as Masquerade in N o Name
1. Charles Dickens, Dombey and Son, 3 volumes (1848), edited by Peter 
Fairdough (Harmondsworth, 1970), p.737.
2. Wilkie Collins, No Name, 3 volumes (1862), 1890 edition, p.21.
3. p.7.
4. Preface, p.i.
3. No Name is generally considered the novel in which Collins was most 
influenced by Dickens's editorial interventions. Dickens suggested 
various names for the novel, none of which Collins chose, but which 
clearly suggest unconscious processes and pressures: Below the 
Surface; Undercurrents; Behind the Veil; Secret Springs; La ten t Forces; 
Changed, or Developed?; Nature's Own Daughter. Letter to  Collins, 24 
January 1862. Th e  Letters of Charles Dickens to W ilkie Collins, 
selected by Georgina Hogarth, edited by Laurence Hutton (1892), p.120. 
He also stressed in the same letter: I t  seems to be that great care is 
needed not to tell the story too severely. In exact proportion as you 
play around it here and there, and m itigate the severity of your own 
sticking to it, you will enhance and intensify the power w ith  which 
Magdalen holds on to her purpose.' (p.121).







13. Wragge's name for a series of roles based on characters whose history 





18. This, as Gillian B e y  points out, is one of the most important 
differences between Lamarck and Darwin. She argues that Lamarck's 
work 'follows the pattern of a ll stories of how things came to  be the
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way they are: need brings about change or -  in more admonitory 
versions -  bad behaviour results in loss and degradation.' Darwin's 
Plots: Evolutionary' Narrative, in Darwin, George Eliot and Nineteenth- 
Century' F iction (1983), p.24.





24. H erbert Spencer, 'Progress, Its Law and Cause', Essays: Scientific, 











35. p .226 .
36. p.525.
37. p.200.
38. Unsigned review, Saturday Review, 17 January 1863, p.84.










« 7 . pp.275-76.
48. pp.277-78.
49. John Abercrombie, Intellectual Powers and the Investigation of T ru th
(1840), p.102.
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Chapter Five
Armadale: The Sensitive Subject as Palimpsest
1. G .H . Lewes, The Foundations of a Creed, 2 volumes (1874), I, p. 162.
2. Wilkie Collins, Armadale, 2 volumes (1866), 1908 edition, pp.39-40.
3. pp. 20-21.
4. James Cowles Pritchard, A  Treatise on Insanity (1833), p.14.
3. Armadale, p.34.
6. J .A . Sutherland, Victorian Novelists and Publishers, p.103. As 
Sutherland points out, George Smith was an aggressive publisher who 
actively solicited his authors. He had made Collins the offer in 1861, 
but the w riting of Armadale was delayed both by an attack of gout and 
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Chapter Six
Truth  W earing the Mask of Delusion: 
Detecting the Unconscious in The Moonstone





6. Alethea Hay ter notes this 'Chinese box' intricacy in Opium and the 
Romantic Imagination (B erkeley, 1970), p.239.
7. See Albert D. H utter, 'Dreams, Transformation and Literature; the 
Implications of Detective Fiction', Victorian Studies, 19 (December 
1975) 181-209, for the fullest example of this kind of interpretation, see 
also Sue Lonoffs chapter on 'Collins at Play' in Wilkie Collins and His  
Victorian Readers, where she analyses the ways in which Collins invokes 
and plays with the expectations of his audience.
8. Moreover The Moonstone cannot, pace T .S . Eliot, be described as the 
first English detective novel. An earlier novel, The Notting H ill  
M ystery, serialised in O n ce  A  Week, 1862 and 1863, and published in 
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title . Bloody Murder: F ro m  the Detective Story to  the Crim e N ovel: 
A  History (Harmondsworth, 1976), p.53-6. See also D .A . Miller, 'From  
roman-policier to rom an-police: Wilkie Collins's The Moonstone', 
Novel, 13 (Winter 1980), 153-170, for an analysis of the way the novel 
overturns 'classic' detective story conventions.
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and read the new numbers in sly corners, with packs on their backs.' 
Random Recollections o f an Old  Publisher. Cited in Kenneth Robinson, 
Wilkie Collins -  A  Biography (1851), p.216. Sue Lonoff's Wilkie Collins  
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10. Letter W .H. Wills, 30 June 1867; Norman Page, WUkie Collins, the  
C ritica l Heritage (1976), p.169.
11. The Moonstone, p.386.
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17. pp.432-3. The passage from Elliotson is an exact quotation, Human 
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18. Preface to Th e  Moonstone, p.xxxi.
19. p.432-33.
20. p.433.
21. E.S. Dallas, Th e  G a y Science, I, p.231 and p.235.
22. I, pp.236-37
23. William B. Carpenter, Principles of Mental Physiology (1874), pp.454-
55.
24. pp. 542-43.
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Introductory Memoir in Nature and Man: Essays Scientific and 
Philosophical (1888), pp.57-8.
26. C ited  in Introductory Memoir, Nature and Man, p.56.
27. p.58.
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that he dictated sections of the novel crippled w ith  the pain of gout and 
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Wilkie Collins and His Victorian Readers, p.186. As Hay ter notes in 
Opium in the Romantic Imagination Collins was not unduly 
incapacitated by the use of opium in the 1860s. F o r an account of the 
widespread medical use of opium in the mid nineteenth century, see 
Te rry  M. Parssinen, Secret Passions, Secret Remedies: N arcotic Drugs 
in British Society 1820-1930 (Manchester, 1983), pp.22-61; he argues 
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judgment, and gives a preternatural brightness and a v iv id  exaltation to 
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30. Th e  Moonstone, p.435.
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38. p.412. As Anthea Todd points out in the notes to the Oxford edition 
used here, Dr John Brown, a late eighteenth century Edinburgh doctor, 
the 'Scottish Paracelsus', gained an international reputation for 
advocating the stimulant method (p.334).
39. Principles of Mental Physiology, pp.429-30.





43. The fullest analysis of the process of the psychic construction of the 
'oriental other' in the Western imagination is Edward W. Said's 
Orientalism (1978).
46. John Reed, 'English Imperialism and the Unacknowledged Crim e of Th e  
Moonstone', C lio , 2 (June 1973), 281-290. Between December 1857 and 
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'A  Sermon for Sepo& H .W ., 27 February 1858, pp.244-247, has been 
ascribed to Collins -  an article that both reinforces and qualifies the 
dominant racism of the journal by pointing to the 'excellent moral 
lesson [the Indians] may learn from their own O riental literature' 
(p.244). See also William Oddie, 'Dickens and the Indian Mutiny1, The  
Dickensian, 68 (January 1972), 3-15.





52. Collins's notes from C .W . King, The Natural History', Ancient and 
Modern, of Precious Stones and of the Precious Metals (1865), p.37.
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edition of Th e  Moonstone, the Orloff diamond, pillaged from India and 
adorning the Russian Imperial Diamond, and the Koh-i-noor, also of 
Indian extraction, are also taken from King, who also mentions the 
diamond stolen from India by Governor Pitt (Lonoff, p.176).
53. Th e  Moonstone, p.24-5. Th e  sexual connotations of the Shivering Sands 
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54. Th e  Moonstone, p.27.
55. p.28.
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58. p.58.
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Degeneration and its  Negation in the Later Fiction
1. Wilkie Collins, The Fallen Leaves, F irst Series, 3 volumes (1879), I, p.3.
2. Wilkie Collins, Man and W ife, 3 volumes (1870); 1893 edition, p.174.
3. Wilkie Collins, Jezebel's Daughter, 3 volumes (1880), I, pp.37-8.
k. The mould for this interpretation was set by Swinburne's couplet:
What brought good Wilkie's genius nigh perdition?
Some demon whispered -  'W ilkie! have a mission!'
which is repeatedly cited in subsequent critica l discussions of Collins's 
later work. Swinburne goes on to argue that 'in some, but by no means 
all, of his later novels there is much of the peculiar and studious ability 
which distinguishes his best: but his original remarkable faculty for 
writing short stories had undergone a total and unaccountable decay.' 
Swinburne, 'Wilkie Collins', Studies in Prose and Poetry (1894), p . l l l .  
Robinson's biography suggests that Collins's later work is virtually 
marked by premature senility; Robert Ashley's Wilkie Collins (1952) 
presents a modified version of the same theme, arguing that poor health 
rather than turning to thesis novels, contributed to Collins's decline. 
William Marshall's Wilkie Collins (New Yo rk, 1970), gives a more 
positive account of his later fiction, as does Sue Lonoff in Wilkie 
Collins and His Victorian Readers, though she too lays stress on the 
'detrimental' effect of Reade.
5. Bentley had published most of Collins's w riting up until 1860; Basil was 
one of the novels chosen by him in an attempt to cut the price of first 
editions from 21s to 10s 6d. Collins wrote to Bentley that he was 
'delighted to hear that your house is about to lead the way in lowering 
the present extravagantly absurd prices charged for works of fiction'. 
Berg Collection, cited in G uinivere Guest, Mudie*s Circulating Library' 
and the Victorian Novel (1911), p.68. See also Royal A . Gettman, A  
Victorian Publisher, A  Study’ o f the Bentley Papers (Cambridge, 1960). 
On the Chatto deal, see Robinson, pp.275-6; also the Chatto 
correspondence in the University of Reading library.
6. Chatto was also responding to developments in 'mass' publishing that 
had been established earlier, particularly to the railway bookstall 
publishing phenomenon as w ell as the sensation novel itself. See 
Richard A ltick , The English Com mon Reader: A  Social History’ of the 
Mass Reading Public IS00-1900 (Chicago, 1957), for an analysis of the 
complicated relationships between class patterns, literary and reading 
habits. Also 3.M.S. Tom kins, The Popular Novel In England (1932), 
Margaret Dalziel, Popular F iction  A  Hundred Years Ago (1957), Louis 
James, Fiction for the W orking Man 1830-1850 (Oxford, 1963), and, 
more recently, R .C . Terry, Victorian Popular F iction  1860-1880 (1983).
7. Letter to Bentley, 18 March 1873, cited in N .P . Davis, The Life  of 
Wilkie Collins (1956), p.274. Collins hopes for the cultural elevation of 
a mass lower middle and working class readership of 'penny novel
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journals', 'a public of three millions -  a public unknown to  the literary 
world ... which lies right out of the pale of literary civilization', are 
expressed in The Unknown Public, which first appeared in Household 
Words, 21 August 1858, pp.217-222, reprinted in M y Miscellanies, 
second edition (1875), pp.249-264 (p.261). He pins his hopes for the 
development of the novel on this public, but stresses that the stories of 
the penny journals are marked by 'a combination of fierce  melodrama 
and weak domestic sentiment .. .  incidents and characters taken from 
the old exhausted mines of the circulating libraries .. .  There  seems to 
be an intense in-dwelling respectability in their dullness' (pp.260-1).
8. See Tomkins, The Popular Novel In England for a discussion of the 
'Minerva Press'.
9. This sense of the need to appeal to a mass popular audience is one of 
the central arguments of The G ay Science, 'Now in art, the two seldom 
go together; the fit are not few and the few are not f it . The 
judges of art are the despised many -  the crowd -  and no c ritic  is worth 
his salt who does not feel with the many.' The Gay Science, I, p.127.
10. Letter of Dedication, Jezebel's Daughter, I, p.v.
11. One of the explicitly tendentious purposes of the novel is the attack on 
the anomalous marriage laws of Scotland and Ireland; Geoffrey avoids 
marrying Anne by attempting to use the Scottish ruling that public 
recognition of marriage is equivalent to marriage itself, to  palm her off 
on his friend, compounding her 'illegitimate' position. However the 
solution, Geoffrey's actual marriage to Anne, turns out to be a far 
greater source of danger, and this is reinforced by Hester's predicament 
of having her own property continually taken from her by her husband.
12. Man and Wife, preface, p .vi, cf Matthew Arnold: T h e  Barbarians, 
again, had the passion for field-sports; and they have handed it down to 
our aristocratic class .. .  The case of the Barbarians for the body, and 
for all manly exercises; the vigour, good looks and fine complexion 
which they acquired and perpetuated in their families by these means, -  
all this may still be observed in our aristocratic class.' Culture and 
Anarchy (1868), edited by J . Dover Wilson (Cambridge, 1969), pp.102-3. 
Arnold goes on to argue that the chief defect of the Barbarian class is 
'insufficiency of light'.
13. Man and Wife, p.46.
1 *. Henry Maudsley, Bod)' and Mind (1873), p.63.
15. Man and Wife, p.32.
16. p.435.
17. p.437. An extremely interesting analysis of the contradictory 
representation of the pure fallen woman in women's reading of the mid­
nineteenth century is Sally Mitchell's The Fallen Angel: Chastity, Class 
and Woman's Reading 1833-1880 (Bowling Green, Ohio, 1981).











27. Wilkie Collins, T h e  Lew and the Lady, 3 volumes (1875), 1898 edition, 













90. Henry Maudsley, Responsibility in Mental Disease (1879), p.90.
91. Andrew Wynter, T h e  Borderlands of Insanity (1875), p.17.
92. p.219. cf Maudsley: 'When the insane temperament has been developed 
in its most marked form, we must acknowledge that the hereditary 
predisposition has assumed the character of degeneration of race, and 
that the individual represents the beginning of a degeneracy which, if 
not checked by favourable circumstances, w ill go on increasing from 
generation to generation and end finally in the extreme degeneration of 
idiocy.' (Responsibility in Mental Disease, p.96).
93. p.363.
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44. Jezebel's Daughter, I, Letter of Dedication, p .v iL
*5. I, p.49.
46. 'He was calm [after his shackles were rem oved]; his attention appeared 
to be arrested by his new situation. H e  was invited to join in the 
repast, during which he behaved w ith to tal propriety. A fter it was 
concluded, the superintendent conducted him  to  his apartment and told 
him the circumstances on which his treatm ent would depend .. .  The 
maniac was sensible to the kindness of his treatm ent. He promised to 
restrain himself, and he so completely succeeded, that during his stay 
no coercive means were ever employed towards him.' Samuel Tuke, A  
Description of the Retreat (1813), 1964 edition, pp. 146-7.
47. Jezebel's Daughter, I, p.47.
48. Ill, p.299.
49. I, p.255.
50. Wilkie Collins, Heart and Science: A  S to ry  of the Present Tim e , 3 
volumes (1883), I, Preface, p.xiv.
51. William Rutherford, Report of the Forty' T h ird  Meeting of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science (1874), p.122. Cited in 
Robert M. Young, Mind, Brain and Adaptation: Cerebral Localisation 
from G all to  Ferrier (Oxford, 1970), p.239. Young gives a full account 
of Ferrier's work.
52. Unsigned review, The Spectator, 15 May 1880, p.627.
53. Preface to Heart and Science, I, p.ix and p .x iii. cf the Preface to the 
1861 edition of The Woman in White: I t  may indeed be possible in 
novel-writing to present characters successfully without telling a story; 
but it is not possible to tell a story successfully without presenting 
characters.' p.xxxiii.
54. Preface to Heart and Science, I, p.xi.
55. The Fallen Leaves, 3 volumes (1879), I, p.87.
56. I, p.212.
57. Collins had visited the Brotherhood of the New Life  during his 
American lecture tour in 1873, and had read Charles Nordoff's The  
Communistic Societies of the United States (1875). Robinson, p.292.
58. Frederick Denison Maurice, Letter to Ludlow , 4 December 1848; The  
Life of Frederick Denison Maurice, C h ie fly  To ld  in His Own Letters,
edited by Frederick Maurice, 2 volumes, I, p.484. F .D . Maurice and 
Charles Kingsley were founders of the English Christian Socialist 
movement in the late 1840s.
59. See Henry Pelling, The Origins of the Labour Party' 1880-1900 (1954), 
p.126, Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London; A  Study' of the 
Relationship Between Classes in V ictorian  England, and Roydon 
Harrison, Before the Socialists.
329
60. The Fallen Leaves, II, pp.95-96.
61. II, pp. 103-9.
62. m , pp. 180-1.
63. n, p.159.
64. II, p.167.
63. II, pp. 164-63.
66. This is most clearly stated by Max Nordau, who cites M orel and 
Maudsley in Degeneration (1893): 'irregularities in the form  and 
position of the teeth; pointed flat paletes, webbed or supernumerary 
fingers, e tc .' (p.17).
67. n, p.169.
68. Wilkie C ollins, The Legacy of C ain, 3 volumes (1889), I, p.30.
69. II, p.221-22.
70. Ill, p.280.
71. 'Recent Novels', The Spectator, 26 January 1889, p.120.
72. The Legacy o f  C ain, II, p.21S.
73. Review of A fte r  Dark, 'Arts and Belles Lettres', Westminster R evie w , 9 
(april 1836), 629-630 (p.640).
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